Abeliefis a subjectiveattitudethat apropositionistrueor astate of affairsis the case. A subjective attitude is a mental state of having some stance, take, or opinion about something.[1]Inepistemology,philosophers use the term "belief" to refer to attitudes about the world which can be eithertrue or false.[2]To believe something is to take it to be true; for instance, to believe that snow is white is comparable to accepting the truth of theproposition"snow is white". However, holding a belief does not require activeintrospection.For example, few individuals carefully consider whether or not the sun will rise tomorrow, simply assuming that it will. Moreover, beliefs need not beoccurrent(e.g. a person actively thinking "snow is white" ), but can instead bedispositional(e.g. a person who if asked about the color of snow would assert "snow is white" ).[2]
There are various ways that contemporaryphilosophershave tried to describe beliefs, including as representations of ways that the world could be (Jerry Fodor), as dispositions to act as if certain things are true (Roderick Chisholm), as interpretive schemes for making sense of someone's actions (Daniel DennettandDonald Davidson), or as mental states that fill a particular function (Hilary Putnam).[2]Some have also attempted to offer significant revisions to our notion of belief, includingeliminativistsabout belief who argue that there is no phenomenon in the natural world which corresponds to ourfolk psychologicalconcept of belief (Paul Churchland) andformal epistemologistswho aim to replace our bivalent notion of belief ( "either we have a belief or we don't have a belief" ) with the more permissive, probabilistic notion of credence ( "there is an entire spectrum of degrees of belief, not a simple dichotomy between belief and non-belief" ).[2][3]
Beliefs are the subject of various important philosophical debates. Notable examples include: "What is the rational way to revise one's beliefs when presented with various sorts of evidence?", "Is the content of our beliefs entirely determined by our mental states, or do the relevantfactshave any bearing on our beliefs (e.g. if I believe that I'm holding a glass of water, is the non-mental fact that water is H2O part of the content of that belief)? "," How fine-grained or coarse-grained are our beliefs? ", and" Must it be possible for a belief to be expressible in language, or are there non-linguistic beliefs? "[2]
Conceptions
editVarious conceptions of the essential features of beliefs have been proposed, but there is no consensus as to which is the right one.Representationalismis the traditionally dominant position. Its most popular version maintains that attitudes toward representations, which are typically associated with propositions, are mental attitudes that constitute beliefs. These attitudes are part of the internal constitution of the mind holding the attitude. This view contrasts withfunctionalism,which defines beliefs not in terms of the internal constitution of the mind but in terms of the function or the causal role played by beliefs. According todispositionalism,beliefs are identified with dispositions to behave in certain ways. This view can be seen as a form of functionalism, defining beliefs in terms of the behavior they tend to cause.Interpretationismconstitutes another conception, which has gained popularity in contemporary philosophy. It holds that the beliefs of an entity are in some sense dependent on or relative to someone's interpretation of this entity.Representationalismtends to be associated with mind-body-dualism.Naturalistconsiderations against this dualism are among the motivations for choosing one of the alternative conceptions.[4]
Representationalism
editRepresentationalism characterizes beliefs in terms ofmental representations.Representations are usually defined as objects withsemantic properties—like having content, referring to something, or being true or false.[4][5]Beliefs form a special class of mental representations since they do not involve sensory qualities in order to represent something, unlike perceptions or episodic memories.[6]Because of this, it seems natural to construe beliefs as attitudes towards propositions, which also constitute non-sensory representations, i.e. aspropositional attitudes.Asmental attitudes,beliefs are characterized by both their content and their mode.[6]The content of an attitude is what this attitude is directed at: its object. Propositional attitudes are directed at propositions.[7][8][5]Beliefs are usually distinguished from other propositional attitudes, like desires, by their mode or the way in which they are directed at propositions. The mode of beliefs has a mind-to-worlddirection of fit:beliefs try to represent the world as it is; they do not, unlike desires, involve an intention to change it.[4][6]For example, if Rahul believes that it will be sunny today, then he has a mental attitude towards the proposition "It will be sunny today" which affirms that this proposition is true. This is different from Sofía's desire that it will be sunny today, despite the fact that both Rahul and Sofía have attitudes toward the same proposition. The mind-to-world direction of fit of beliefs is sometimes expressed by saying that beliefs aim at truth.[9]This aim is also reflected in the tendency torevise one's beliefupon receiving new evidence that an existing belief is false.[4]Upon hearing a forecast of bad weather, Rahul is likely to change his mental attitude but Sofía is not.
There are different ways of conceiving how mental representations are realized in the mind. One form of this is thelanguage of thought hypothesis,which claims that mental representations have a language-like structure, sometimes referred to as "mentalese".[10][11]Just like regular language, this involves simple elements that are combined in various ways according to syntactic rules to form more complex elements that act as bearers of meaning.[4][11]On this conception, holding a belief would involve storing such a complex element in one's mind. Different beliefs are separated from each other in that they correspond to different elements stored in the mind. A more holistic alternative to the "language of thought hypothesis" is themap-conception,which uses an analogy of maps to elucidate the nature of beliefs.[4][11]According to this view, the belief system of a mind should be conceived of not as a set of many individual sentences but as a map encoding the information contained in these sentences.[4][11]For example, the fact that Brussels is halfway between Paris and Amsterdam can be expressed both linguistically as a sentence and in a map through its internal geometrical relations.
Functionalism
editFunctionalismcontrasts with representationalism in that it defines beliefs not in terms of the internal constitution of the mind but in terms of the function or the causal role played by them.[12][13]This view is often combined with the idea that the same belief can be realized in various ways and that it does not matter how it is realized as long as it plays the causal role characteristic to it.[4][14]As an analogy, ahard driveis defined in a functionalist manner: it performs the function of storing and retrieving digital data. This function can be realized in many different ways: being made of plastic or steel, or using magnetism or laser.[4]Functionalists hold that something similar is true for beliefs (or mental states in general).[12][13]Among the roles relevant to beliefs is their relation to perceptions and to actions: perceptions usually cause beliefs and beliefs cause actions.[4]For example, seeing that a traffic light has switched to red is usually associated with a belief that the light is red, which in turn causes the driver to bring the car to a halt. Functionalists use such characteristics to define beliefs: whatever is caused by perceptions in a certain way and also causes behavior in a certain way is called a belief. This is not just true for humans but may include animals, hypothetical aliens or even computers.[4][12]From this perspective, it would make sense to ascribe the belief that a traffic light is red to aself-driving carbehaving just like a human driver.
Dispositionalism is sometimes seen as a specific form of functionalism.[4]It defines beliefs only concerning their role as causes of behavior or asdispositionsto behave in a certain way.[15][16]For example, a belief that there is a pie in the pantry is associated with the disposition to affirm this when asked and to go to the pantry when hungry.[6]While it is uncontroversial that beliefs shape our behavior, the thesis that beliefs can be defined exclusively through their role in producing behavior has been contested.[4][15]The problem arises because the mechanisms shaping our behavior seem to be too complex to single out the general contribution of one particular belief for any possible situation.[6]For example, one may decide not to affirm that there is a pie in the pantry when asked because one wants to keep it secret. Or one might not eat the pie despite being hungry, because one also believes that it is poisoned.[6]Due to this complexity, we are unable to define even a belief as simple as this one in terms of the behavioral dispositions for which it could be responsible.[4]
Interpretationism
editAccording to interpretationism, the beliefs of an entity are in some sense dependent on, or relative to, someone's interpretation of this entity.[4][17]Daniel Dennettis an important defender of such a position. He holds that we ascribe beliefs to entities in order to predict how they will behave. Entities with simple behavioral patterns can be described using physical laws or in terms of their function. Dennett refers to these forms of explanation as the "physical stance" and the "design stance". These stances are contrasted with theintentional stance,which is applied to entities with a more complex behavior by ascribing beliefs and desires to these entities.[18][19]For example, we can predict that a chess player will move her queen to f7 if we ascribe to her the desire to win the game and the belief that this move will achieve that. The same procedure can also be applied to predicting how a chess computer will behave. The entity has the belief in question if this belief can be used to predict its behavior.[4]Having a belief is relative to an interpretation since there may be different equally good ways of ascribing beliefs to predict behavior.[4]So there may be another interpretation that predicts the move of the queen to f7 that does not involve the belief that this move will win the game. Another version of interpretationism is due toDonald Davidson,[17]who uses the thought experiment ofradical interpretation,in which the goal is to make sense of the behavior and language of another person from scratch without any knowledge of this person's language.[4]This process involves ascribing beliefs and desires to the speaker. The speaker really has these beliefs if this project can be successful in principle.[4]
Interpretationism can be combined with eliminativism and instrumentalism about beliefs. Eliminativists hold that, strictly speaking, there are no beliefs. Instrumentalists agree with eliminativists but add that belief-ascriptions are useful nonetheless.[4]This usefulness can be explained in terms of interpretationism: belief-ascriptions help us in predicting how entities will behave. It has been argued that interpretationism can also be understood in a more realistic sense: that entities really have the beliefs ascribed to them and that these beliefs participate in the causal network.[20]But, for this to be possible, it may be necessary to define interpretationism as a methodology and not as anontologicaloutlook on beliefs.[17]
Origins
editBiologistLewis Wolpertdiscusses the importance ofcausalbeliefs and associates the making and use oftoolswith the origin of human beliefs.[21]
Historical
editIn the context ofAncient Greek thought,three related concepts were identified regarding the concept of belief:pistis,doxa,anddogma.Simplified,pistisrefers to "trust"and" confidence, "doxarefers to "opinion"and" acceptance, "anddogmarefers to thepositionsof a philosopher or of aphilosophical schoolsuch asStoicism.
Types
editBeliefs can be categorized into various types depending on their ontological status, their degree, their object or their semantic properties.
Occurrent and dispositional
editHaving an occurrent belief that theGrand Canyonis in Arizona involves entertaining the representation associated with this belief—for example, by actively thinking about it. But the great majority of our beliefs are not active most of the time: they are merely dispositional.[4]They usually become activated or occurrent when needed or relevant in some way and then fall back into their dispositional state afterward.[4]For example, the belief that 57 is greater than 14 was probably dispositional to the reader before reading this sentence, has become occurrent while reading it and may soon become dispositional again as the mind focuses elsewhere. The distinction between occurrent and dispositional beliefs is sometimes identified with the distinction between conscious and unconscious beliefs.[22][23]But it has been argued that, despite overlapping, the two distinctions do not match. The reason for this is that beliefs can shape one's behavior and be involved in one's reasoning even if the subject is not conscious of them. Such beliefs are cases of unconscious occurrent mental states.[22]On this view, being occurrent corresponds to being active, either consciously or unconsciously.[23]
A dispositional belief is not the same as a disposition to believe.[16]We have various dispositions to believe given the right perceptions; for example, to believe that it is raining given a perception of rain. Without this perception, there is still a disposition to believe but no actual dispositional belief.[16]On a dispositionalist conception of belief, there are no occurrent beliefs, since all beliefs are defined in terms of dispositions.[4]
Full and partial
editAn important dispute in formal epistemology concerns the question of whether beliefs should be conceptualized asfullbeliefs or aspartialbeliefs.[24]Full beliefs are all-or-nothing attitudes: either one has a belief in a proposition or one does not. This conception is sufficient to understand many belief ascriptions found in everyday language: for example, Pedro's belief that the Earth is bigger than the Moon. But some cases involving comparisons between beliefs are not easily captured through full beliefs alone: for example, that Pedro's belief that the Earth is bigger than the Moon is more certain than his belief that the Earth is bigger than Venus. Such cases are most naturally analyzed in terms of partial beliefs involving degrees of belief, so-calledcredences.[24][25]The higher the degree of a belief, the more certain the believer is that the believed proposition is true.[26]This is usually formalized by numbers between 0 and 1: a degree of 1 represents an absolutely certain belief, a belief of 0 corresponds to an absolutely certain disbelief and all the numbers in between correspond to intermediate degrees of certainty. In theBayesian approach,these degrees are interpreted assubjective probabilities:[27][28]e.g. a belief of degree 0.9 that it will rain tomorrow means that the agent thinks that the probability of rain tomorrow is 90%. Bayesianism uses this relation between beliefs and probability to define the norms of rationality in terms of the laws of probability.[26]This includes both synchronic laws about what one should believe at any moment and diachronic laws about how one should revise one's beliefs upon receiving new evidence.[25][26]
The central question in the dispute between full and partial beliefs is whether these two types are really distinct types or whether one type can be explained in terms of the other.[24]One answer to this question is called theLockean thesis.It states that partial beliefs are basic and that full beliefs are to be conceived as partial beliefs above a certain threshold: for example, that every belief above 0.9 is a full belief.[24][29][30]Defenders of a primitive notion of full belief, on the other hand, have tried to explain partial beliefs as full beliefs about probabilities.[24]On this view, having a partial belief of degree 0.9 that it will rain tomorrow is the same as having a full belief that the probability of rain tomorrow is 90%. Another approach circumvents the notion of probability altogether and replaces degrees of belief with degrees of disposition to revise one's full belief.[24]From this perspective, both a belief of degree 0.6 and a belief of degree 0.9 may be seen as full beliefs. The difference between them is that the former belief can readily be changed upon receiving new evidence while the latter is more stable.[24]
Belief-in and belief-that
editTraditionally, philosophers have mainly focused in their inquiries concerning belief on the notion ofbelief-that.[31]Belief-that can be characterized as apropositional attitudeto a claim which is either true or false.Belief-in,on the other hand, is more closely related to notions like trust or faith in that it refers usually to an attitude to persons.[31]Belief-inplays a central role in manyreligious traditionsin whichbelief in Godis one of the central virtues of their followers.[32]The difference between belief-in and belief-that is sometimes blurry since various expressions using the term "belief in" seem to be translatable into corresponding expressions using the term "belief that" instead.[33]For example, abelief infairies may be said to be abelief thatfairies exist.[32]In this sense, belief-in is often used when the entity is not real, or its existence is in doubt. Typical examples would include: "he believes in witches and ghosts" or "many children believe inSanta Claus"or" I believe in a deity ".[34]Not all usages of belief-in concern the existence of something: some arecommendatoryin that they express a positive attitude towards their object.[34][31]It has been suggested that these cases can also be accounted for in terms of belief-that. For example, abelief inmarriage could be translated as abelief thatmarriage is good.[32]Belief-in is used in a similar sense when expressingself-confidenceor faith in one's self or one's abilities.
Defenders of a reductive account of belief-in have used this line of thought to argue thatbelief in Godcan be analyzed in a similar way: e.g. that it amounts to a belief that God exists with his characteristic attributes, likeomniscienceandomnipotence.[32]Opponents of this account often concede that belief-in may entail various forms of belief-that, but that there are additional aspects to belief-in that are not reducible to belief-that.[33]For example, abelief inan ideal may involve thebelief thatthis ideal is something good, but it additionally involves a positive evaluative attitude toward this ideal that goes beyond a mere propositional attitude.[32]Applied to thebelief inGod, opponents of the reductive approach may hold that abelief thatGod exists may be a necessary pre-condition forbelief inGod, but that it is not sufficient.[32][33]
De dictoandde re
editThe difference betweende dictoandde rebeliefs or the corresponding ascriptions concerns the contributions singular terms like names and other referential devices make to the semantic properties of the belief or its ascription.[4][35]In regular contexts, thetruth-valueof a sentence does not change upon substitution of co-referring terms.[36]For example, since the names "Superman" and "Clark Kent" refer to the same person, we can replace one with the other in the sentence "Superman is strong" without changing its truth-value; this issue is more complicated in case of belief ascriptions.[36]For example, Lois believes that Superman is strong but she does not believe that Clark Kent is strong.[4]This difficulty arises due to the fact that she does not know that the two names refer to the same entity. Beliefs or belief ascriptions for which this substitution does not generally work arede dicto,otherwise, they arede re.[4][36][35]In ade resense, Lois does believe that Clark Kent is strong, while in ade dictosense she does not. The contexts corresponding tode dictoascriptions are known asreferentially opaque contextswhilede reascriptions are referentially transparent.[4][36]
Collective belief
editA collective belief is referred to when people speak of what "we" believe when this is not simply elliptical for what "we all" believe.[37] SociologistÉmile Durkheimwrote of collective beliefs and proposed that they, like all "social facts","inhered in "socialgroupsas opposed to individual persons.Jonathan Dancystates that "Durkheim's discussion of collective belief, though suggestive, is relatively obscure".[38] Margaret Gilberthas offered a related account in terms of the joint commitment of a number of persons as a body to accept a certain belief. According to this account, individuals who together collectively believe something need not personally believe it individually. Gilbert's work on the topic has stimulated a developing literature among philosophers.[39]One question that has arisen is whether and how philosophical accounts of belief in general need to be sensitive to the possibility of collective belief.
Collective belief can play a role insocial control[40] and serve as a touchstone for identifying and purgingheresies,[41] deviancy[42] or politicaldeviationism.
Contents
editAsmental representations,beliefs have contents, which is what the belief is about or what it represents. Within philosophy, there are various disputes about how the contents of beliefs are to be understood. Holists and molecularists hold that the content of one particular belief depends on or is determined by other beliefs belonging to the same subject, which is denied by atomists. The question of dependence or determination also plays a central role in the internalism-externalism- debate. Internalism states that the contents of someone's beliefs depend only on what is internal to that person and are determined entirely by things going on inside this person's head. Externalism, on the other hand, holds that the relations to one's environment also have a role to play in this.
Atomism, molecularism and holism
editThe disagreement betweenatomism, molecularism and holismconcerns the question of how the content of one belief depends on the contents of other beliefs held by the same subject.[43]Atomists deny such dependence relations, molecularists restrict them to only a few closely related beliefs while holists hold that they may obtain between any two beliefs, however unrelated they seem.[4][5][43]For example, assume that Mei and Benjamin both affirm thatJupiteris a planet. The most straightforward explanation, given by the atomists, would be that they have the same belief, i.e. that they hold the same content to be true. But now assume that Mei also believes thatPlutois a planet, which is denied by Benjamin. This indicates that they have different concepts ofplanet,which would mean that they were affirming different contents when they both agreed that Jupiter is a planet. This reasoning leads to molecularism or holism because the content of the Jupiter-belief depends on the Pluto-belief in this example.[4][43]
An important motivation for this position comes fromW. V. Quine'sconfirmational holism,which holds that, because of this interconnectedness, we cannot confirm or disconfirm individual hypotheses, that confirmation happens on the level of the theory as a whole.[43][44]Another motivation is due to considerations of the nature of learning: it is often not possible to understand one concept, likeforceinNewtonian physics,without understanding other concepts, likemassorkinetic energy.[43]One problem for holism is that genuine disagreements seem to be impossible or very rare: disputants would usually talk past each other since they never share exactly the same web of beliefs needed to determine the content of the source of the disagreement.[4][43]
Internalism and externalism
editInternalism and externalismdisagree about whether the contents of our beliefs are determined only by what's happening in our head or also by other factors.[4][5][45][46]Internalists deny such a dependence on external factors. They hold that a person and a molecule-by-molecule copy would have exactly the same beliefs.Hilary Putnamobjects to this position by way of histwin Earth thought experiment.He imagines a twin Earth in another part of the universe that is exactly like ours, except that their water has a different chemical composition despite behaving just like ours.[4][45][46]According to Putnam, the reader's thought that water is wet is aboutour waterwhile the reader's twin's thought on twin Earth that water is wet is abouttheir water.This is the case despite the fact that the two readers have the same molecular composition. So it seems necessary to include external factors in order to explain the difference. One problem with this position is that this difference in content does not bring any causal difference with it: the two readers act in exactly the same way. This casts doubt on the thesis that there is any genuine difference in need of explanation between the contents of the two beliefs.[4][45][46]
Epistemology
editEpistemology is concerned with delineating the boundary between justified belief andopinion,[47]and involved generally with a theoreticalphilosophicalstudy ofknowledge.The primary problem in epistemology is to understand what is needed to have knowledge. In a notion derived fromPlato's dialogueTheaetetus,where the epistemology ofSocratesmost clearly departs from that of thesophists,who appear to have defined knowledge as "justified true belief".The tendency to base knowledge (episteme) on common opinion (doxa) Socrates dismisses, results from failing to distinguish adispositivebelief (doxa) from knowledge (episteme) when the opinion is regarded correct (n.b.,orthénotalethia), in terms of right, and juristically so (according to the premises of the dialogue), which was the task of therhetorsto prove. Plato dismisses this possibility of an affirmative relation between opinion and knowledge even when the one who opines grounds his belief on the rule, and is able to add justification (logos:reasonable and necessarily plausible assertions/evidence/guidance) to it.[citation needed]A belief can be based fully or partially onintuition.[48]
Plato has been credited for thejustified true belieftheory of knowledge, even though Plato in theTheaetetuselegantly dismisses it, and even posits this argument of Socrates as a cause for his death penalty. The epistemologists,Gettier[49]andGoldman,[50]have questioned the "justified true belief" definition.
Justified true belief
editJustified true beliefis a definition ofknowledgethat gained approval during theEnlightenment,"justified" standing in contrast to "revealed". There have been attempts to trace it back toPlatoand his dialogues, more specifically in theTheaetetus,[51]and theMeno.The concept of justified true belief states that in order to know that a given proposition is true, one must not only believe the relevant true proposition, but also have justification for doing so. In more formal terms, an agentknows that a propositionis trueif and only if:
- is true
- believes thatis true, and
- is justified in believing thatis true
That theory of knowledge suffered a significant setback with the discovery ofGettier problems,situations in which the above conditions were seemingly met but where many philosophers deny that anything is known.[52]Robert Nozicksuggested aclarificationof "justification" which he believed eliminates the problem: the justification has to be such that were the justification false, the knowledge would be false.[53]Bernecker and Dretske (2000) argue that "no epistemologist since Gettier has seriously and successfully defended the traditional view."[54]: 3 On the other hand,Paul Boghossianargues that the justified true belief account is the "standard, widely accepted" definition of knowledge.[55]
Belief systems
editAbelief systemcomprises a set of mutually supportive beliefs. The beliefs of any such system can bereligious,philosophical,political,ideological,or a combination of these.[56]
Glover's view
editThe British philosopherJonathan Glover,following Meadows (2008), says that beliefs are always part of a belief system, and that tenanted belief systems are difficult for the tenants to completely revise or reject.[57][58]He suggests that beliefs have to be consideredholistically,and that no belief exists in isolation in the mind of the believer. Each belief always implicates and relates to other beliefs.[57]Glover provides the example of a patient with an illness who returns to a doctor, but the doctor says that the prescribed medicine is not working. At that point, the patient has a great deal of flexibility in choosing what beliefs to keep or reject: the patient could believe that the doctor is incompetent, that the doctor's assistants made a mistake, that the patient's own body is unique in some unexpected way, that Western medicine is ineffective, or even that Western science is entirely unable to discover truths about ailments.[57]
This insight has relevance forinquisitors,missionaries,agitpropgroups andthought-police.The British philosopherStephen Lawhas described some belief systems (including belief inhomeopathy,psychic powers,andalien abduction) as"claptrap"and says that such belief-systems can "draw people in and hold them captive so they become willing slaves of claptrap... if you get sucked in, it can be extremely difficult to think your way clear again".[59]
Religion
editThis sectionusestexts from within a religion or faith systemwithout referring tosecondary sourcesthat critically analyze them.(August 2020) |
This sectionneeds additional citations forverification.(May 2021) |
Religion is a personal set or institutionalized system of religious attitudes, beliefs, and practices; the service or worship of God or the supernatural.[60]Religious belief is distinct fromreligious practiceand fromreligious behaviours—with some believers not practicingreligionand some practitioners not believing religion.Beliefis no less of a theoretical term than isreligion.[61]Religious beliefs often relate to the existence, characteristics and worship of adeityor deities, to the idea ofdivine interventionin theuniverseand inhuman life,or to thedeontologicalexplanations for the values and practices centered on the teachings of aspiritual leaderorcommunity.[62]In contrast to otherbelief systems,religious beliefs are usuallycodified.[63]
Forms
editA popular view holds that different religions each have identifiable and exclusive sets of beliefs orcreeds,but surveys of religious belief have often found that the official doctrine and descriptions of the beliefs offered by religious authorities do not always agree with the privately held beliefs of those who identify as members of a particular religion.[64]For a broad classification of the kinds of religious belief, see below.
Fundamentalism
editFirst self-applied as a term to the conservative doctrine outlined by anti-modernistProtestantsin the United States,[65]"fundamentalism" in religious terms denotes strict adherence to an interpretation of scriptures that are generally associated with theologically conservative positions or traditional understandings of the text and are distrustful of innovative readings, new revelation, or alternative interpretations.[66]Religious fundamentalism has been identified[by whom?]in the media as being associated withfanaticalorzealouspolitical movements around the world that have used a strict adherence to a particular religious doctrine as a means to establish political identity and to enforce societal norms.[67]
Orthodoxy
editFirst used in the context ofEarly Christianity,the term "orthodoxy" relates to religious belief that closely follows the edicts,apologies,andhermeneuticsof a prevailing religious authority. In the case of Early Christianity, this authority was the communion of bishops, and is often referred to by the term "Magisterium".The termorthodoxwas applied[when?]almost as an epithet to a group of Jewish believers who held to pre-Enlightenment understanding of Judaism—now known asOrthodox Judaism.TheEastern Orthodox Churchof Christianity and theCatholic Churcheach consider themselves to be the true heir to Early Christian belief and practice. The antonym of "orthodox" is "heterodox",and those adhering to orthodoxy often accuse the heterodox ofapostasy,schism,orheresy.
Modernism/reform
editTheRenaissanceand later theEnlightenmentin Europe exhibited varying degrees ofreligious toleranceand intolerance towards new and old religious ideas. Thephilosophestook particular exception to many of the more fantastical claims of religions and directly challenged religious authority and the prevailing beliefs associated with the established churches. In response to the liberalizing political and social movements, some religious groups attempted to integrate Enlightenment ideals of rationality, equality, and individual liberty into their belief systems, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.Reform Judaism[68][69]andLiberal Christianityoffer two examples of such religious associations.
Attitudes to other religions
editAdherents of particular religions deal with the differing doctrines and practices espoused by other religions or by otherreligious denominationsin a variety of ways.
Exclusivism
editPeople with exclusivist beliefs typically explain other beliefs either as in error, or as corruptions or counterfeits of thetrue faith.This approach is a fairly consistent feature among smallernew religious movementsthat often rely on doctrine that claims a uniquerevelationby thefoundersorleaders,and considers it a matter of faith that the "correct" religion has a monopoly on truth. All three majorAbrahamic monotheistic religionshave passages in their holy scriptures that attest to the primacy of the scriptural testimony, and indeedmonotheismitself is often[quantify]vouched[by whom?]as an innovation characterized specifically by its explicit rejection of earlier polytheistic faiths.
Some exclusivist faiths incorporate a specific element ofproselytization.This is a strongly-held belief in the Christian tradition which follows the doctrine of theGreat Commission,and is less emphasized by the Islamic faith where theQuranicedict "There shall be no compulsion in religion" (2:256) is often quoted as a justification for toleration of alternative beliefs. TheJewish traditiondoes not actively seek out converts.
Exclusivism correlates with conservative, fundamentalist, and orthodox approaches of many religions, while pluralistic and syncretist approaches either explicitly downplay or reject the exclusivist tendencies within a religion.[citation needed][70]
Inclusivism
editPeople withinclusivistbeliefs recognize some truth in all faithsystems,highlighting agreements and minimizing differences. This attitude is sometimes associated[by whom?]withInterfaith dialogueor with the ChristianEcumenicalmovement, though in principle such attempts at pluralism are not necessarily inclusivist and many actors in such interactions (for example, theRoman Catholic Church) still hold to exclusivist dogma while participating in inter-religious organizations. Explicitly inclusivist religions include many that are associated with theNew Agemovement, as well as modern reinterpretations ofHinduismandBuddhism.TheBaháʼí Faithconsiders it doctrine that there is truth in all faith-systems.
Pluralismandsyncretismare two closely related concepts. People with pluralist beliefs make no distinction between faith systems, viewing each one as valid within a particular culture. People with syncretic views blend the views of a variety of different religions or traditional beliefs into a unique fusion which suits their particularexperiencesand contexts (eclecticism).Unitarian Universalismexemplifies a syncretic faith.
Adherence
editTypical reasons for adherence to religion include the following:
- Some see belief in a deity as necessary formoral behavior.[71]
- Some regard religious practices as serene, beautiful, and conducive to religious experiences, which in turn support religious beliefs.[72]
- Organized religions promote asense of communityamong their followers, and the moral and cultural common ground of these communities makes them attractive to people with similarvalues.[73]Indeed, while religious beliefs and practices are usually connected, some individuals with substantially secular beliefs still participate in religious practices for cultural reasons.[74]
- Each religion asserts that it is a means by which its adherents may come into closer contact with the Divine, with Truth, and withspiritual power.They all promise to free adherents from spiritual bondage, and to bring them into spiritual freedom. It naturally follows that a religion which can free its adherents from deception, sin, and spiritual death will have significant mental-health benefits.Abraham Maslow's research afterWorld War IIshowed thatHolocaustsurvivors tended to be those who held strong religious beliefs (not necessarily temple attendance, etc.), suggesting that belief helped people cope in extreme circumstances.Humanistic psychologywent on to investigate how religious or spiritual identity may have correlations with longer lifespan and better health. The study found that humans may particularly need religious ideas to serve various emotional needs such as the need to feel loved, the need to belong to homogeneous groups, the need for understandable explanations and the need for a guarantee of ultimate justice. Other factors may involve sense ofpurpose,sense ofidentity,or a sense of contact with the divine. See alsoMan's Search for Meaning,byViktor Frankl,detailing his experience with the importance of religion in surviving the Holocaust. Critics assert that the very fact that religion was the primary selector for research subjects may have introduced a bias, and that the fact that all subjects were Holocaust survivors may also have had an effect. According to Larson et al. (2000), "[m]ore longitudinal research with better multidimensional measures will help further clarify the roles of these [religious] factors and whether they are beneficial or harmful."[75]
PsychologistJames Alcockalso summarizes a number of apparent benefits which reinforce religious belief. These include prayer appearing to account for successful resolution of problems, "a bulwark against existential anxiety and fear of annihilation," an increased sense of control, companionship with one's deity, a source of self-significance, and group identity.[76]
Apostasy
editTypical reasons for rejection of religion include:
- Some people regard certain fundamental doctrines of some religions as illogical, contrary to experience, or unsupported by sufficientevidence;such people may reject one or more religions for those reasons.[77]Even some believers may have difficulty accepting particular religious assertions or doctrines. Some people believe the body of evidence available to humans to be insufficient to justify certain religious beliefs. They may thus disagree with religious interpretations of ethics and human purpose, or with variouscreation myths.This reason has perhaps[original research?]been aggravated by the protestations and emphases of somefundamentalist Christians.
- Some religions include beliefs that certain groups of people are inferior or sinful and deserve contempt, persecution, or even death, and that non-believers will be punished for their unbelief in anafter-life.[78]Adherents to a religion may feel antipathy to unbelievers. Numerous examples exist of people of one religion or sect using religion as an excuse to murder people with different religious beliefs. To mention just a few examples:
- the slaughter of theHuguenotsby FrenchCatholicsin the sixteenth century
- HindusandMuslimskilling each other whenPakistanseparated from India in 1947
- the persecution and killing ofShiiteMuslims bySunniMuslims in Iraq
- the murder ofProtestantsbyCatholicsand vice versa inIreland(both of these examples in the late twentieth century)
- theIsraeli–Palestinian conflictthat continues as of 2018[update]– According to some critics of religion, such beliefs can encourage completely unnecessary conflicts and in some cases even wars. Manyatheistsbelieve that, because of this, religion is incompatible with world peace, freedom, civil rights, equality, and good government. On the other hand, most religions perceive atheism as a threat and will vigorously and even violently[79]defend themselves against religious sterilization, making the attempt to remove public religious practices a source of strife.[79]
- Some people may be unable to accept the values that a specific religion promotes and will therefore not join that religion. They may also be unable to accept the proposition that those who do not believe will go to hell or be damned, especially if said nonbelievers are close to the person.
Psychology
editThis sectionneeds additional citations forverification.(May 2021) |
Mainstream psychology and related disciplines have traditionally treated belief as if it were the simplest form of mental representation and therefore one of the building blocks of conscious thought.[80]Philosophers have tended to be more abstract in their analysis, and much of the work examining the viability of the belief concept stems from philosophical analysis.[81]
The concept of belief presumes a subject (the believer) and an object of belief (the proposition). Like otherpropositional attitudes,belief implies the existence ofmental statesandintentionality,both of which are hotly debated topics in thephilosophy of mind,whose foundations and relation to brain states are still controversial.
Beliefs are sometimes divided intocore beliefs(that are actively thought about) anddispositional beliefs(that may be ascribed to someone who has not thought about the issue). For example, if asked "do you believe tigers wear pink pajamas?" a person might answer that they do not, despite the fact they may never have thought about this situation before.[82]
PhilosopherLynne Rudder Bakerhas outlined four main contemporary approaches to belief in her bookSaving Belief:[83]
- Our common-sense understanding of belief is correct – Sometimes called the "mental sentence theory," in this conception, beliefs exist as coherent entities, and the way we talk about them in everyday life is a valid basis for scientific endeavor.Jerry Fodorwas one of the principal defenders of this point of view.
- Our common-sense understanding of belief may not be entirely correct, but it is close enough to make some useful predictions – This view argues that we will eventually reject the idea of belief as we know it now, but that there may be a correlation between what we take to be a belief when someone says "I believe that snow is white" and how a future theory of psychology will explain this behavior. PhilosopherStephen Stichhas argued for this particular understanding of belief.
- Our common-sense understanding of belief is entirely wrong and will be completely superseded by a radically different theory that will have no use for the concept of belief as we know it – Known aseliminativism,this view (most notably proposed byPaulandPatricia Churchland) argues that the concept of belief is like obsolete theories of times past such asthe four humourstheory of medicine, or thephlogiston theoryof combustion. In these cases science has not provided us with a more detailed account of these theories, but completely rejected them as valid scientific concepts to be replaced by entirely different accounts. The Churchland argue that our common-sense concept of belief is similar in that as we discover more about neuroscience and the brain, the inevitable conclusion will be to reject the belief hypothesis in its entirety.
- Our common-sense understanding of belief is entirely wrong; however, treating people, animals, and even computers as if they had beliefs is often a successful strategy – The major proponents of this view,Daniel DennettandLynne Rudder Baker,are both eliminativists in that they hold that beliefs are not a scientifically valid concept, but they do not go as far as rejecting the concept of belief as a predictive device. Dennett gives the example of playing a computer at chess. While few people would agree that the computer held beliefs, treating the computer as if it did (e.g. that the computer believes that taking the opposition's queen will give it a considerable advantage) is likely to be a successful and predictive strategy. In this understanding of belief, named by Dennetttheintentional stance,belief-based explanations of mind and behaviour are at a different level of explanation and are not reducible to those based on fundamental neuroscience, although both may be explanatory at their own level.
Strategic approaches make a distinction between rules, norms and beliefs as follows:
- Rules. Explicit regulative processes such as policies, laws, inspection routines, or incentives. Rules function as a coercive regulator of behavior and are dependent upon the imposing entity's ability to enforce them.
- Norms. Regulative mechanisms accepted by the social collective. Norms are enforced by normative mechanisms within the organization and are not strictly dependent upon law or regulation.
- Beliefs. The collective perception of fundamental truths governing behavior. The adherence to accepted and shared beliefs by members of a social system will likely persist and be difficult to change over time. Strong beliefs about determinant factors (i.e., security, survival, or honor) are likely to cause a social entity or group to accept rules and norms.[84]
Belief formation and revision
editBelief revision is a term commonly used to refer to the modification of beliefs. An extensive amount of scientific research and philosophical discussion exists around belief revision. Generally speaking, the process of belief revision entails the believer weighing the set of truths and/or evidence, and the dominance of a set of truths or evidence on an alternative to a held belief can lead to revision. One process of belief revision isBayesian updating(orBayesian inference) and is often referenced for its mathematical basis and conceptual simplicity.[85]However, such a process may not be representative for individuals whose beliefs are not easily characterized as probabilistic.
There are several techniques for individuals or groups to change the beliefs of others; these methods generally fall under the umbrella ofpersuasion.Persuasion can take on more specific forms such asconsciousness raisingwhen considered in an activist or political context. Belief modification may also occur as a result of the experience of outcomes. Becausegoalsare based, in part on beliefs, the success or failure at a particular goal may contribute to modification of beliefs that supported the original goal.
Whether or not belief modification actually occurs is dependent not only on the extent of truths or evidence for the alternative belief, but also characteristics outside the specific truths or evidence. This includes, but is not limited to: the source characteristics of the message, such ascredibility;social pressures;the anticipated consequences of a modification; or the ability of the individual or group to act on the modification. Therefore, individuals seeking to achieve belief modification in themselves or others need to consider all possible forms of resistance to belief revision.
Glover maintains that any person can continue to hold any belief if they would really like to[57](for example, with help fromad hochypotheses). One belief can be held fixed, and other beliefs will be altered around it. Glover warns that some beliefs may not be entirelyexplicitlybelieved (for example, some people may not realize they have racist belief-systems adopted from their environment as a child). Glover believes that people tend to first realize that beliefs can change, and may be contingent on their upbringing, around age 12 or 15.[57]
Glover emphasizes that beliefs are difficult to change. He says that one may try to rebuild one's beliefs on more secure foundations (axioms), like building a new house, but warns that this may not be possible. Glover offers the example ofRené Descartes,saying: "[Descartes] starts off with the characteristic beliefs of a 17th-century Frenchman; he then junks the lot, he rebuilds the system, and somehow it looks a lot like the beliefs of a 17th-century Frenchman." To Glover, belief systems are not like houses but are instead like boats. As Glover puts it: "Maybe the whole thing needs rebuilding, but inevitably at any point you have to keep enough of it intact to keep floating."[57]
Models of belief formation
editPsychologists study belief formation and the relationship between beliefs and actions. Three types ofmodels of belief formationand change have been proposed: conditional inference process models, linear models and information processing models.
Conditional inference process modelsemphasize the role of inference for belief formation. When asked to estimate the likelihood that a statement is true, people allegedly search their memory for information that has implications for the validity of this statement. Once this information has been identified, they estimate the likelihood that the statement would be true if the information were true, and the likelihood that the statement would be true if the information were false. If their estimates for these twoprobabilitiesdiffer, people average them, weighting each by the likelihood that the information is true and false. Thus, information bears directly on beliefs of another, related statement.[86]
Unlike the previous model,linear modelstake into consideration the possibility of multiple factors influencing belief formation. Using regression procedures, these models predict belief formation on the basis of several different pieces of information, with weights assigned to each piece on the basis of their relative importance.[86]
Information processing modelsaddress the fact that the responses people have to belief-relevant information is unlikely to be predicted from the objective basis of the information that they can recall at the time their beliefs are reported. Instead, these responses reflect the number and meaning of the thoughts that people have about the message at the time that they encounter it.[86]
Some influences on people's belief formation include:
- Internalization of beliefs during childhood, which can form and shape humans' beliefs in different domains.Albert Einsteinis often quoted as having said that "Common sense is the collection of prejudices acquired by age eighteen." Political beliefs depend most strongly on the political beliefs most common in the community where one lives.[87]Most individuals believe thereligionthey were taught in childhood.[88]
- Charismatic leaderscan form or modify beliefs (even if those beliefs fly in the face of all previous beliefs).[89]Rational individuals need to reconcile their direct reality with any said belief; therefore, if belief is not present or possible, it reflects the fact that contradictions were necessarily overcome usingcognitive dissonance.
- Advertisingcan form or change beliefs through repetition, shock, or association with images of sex, love, beauty, and other strong positive emotions.[90]Contrary tointuition,a delay, known as thesleeper effect,instead of immediate succession may increase an advertisement's ability to persuade viewer's beliefs if a discounting cue is present.[91]
- Physical trauma, especially to the head, can radically alter a person's beliefs.[92]
However, even educated people, well aware of the process by which beliefs form, still strongly cling to their beliefs, and act on those beliefs even against their own self-interest. In her bookLeadership Therapy,Anna Rowley states: "You want your beliefs to change. It's proof that you are keeping your eyes open, living fully, and welcoming everything that the world and people around you can teach you." This view implies that peoples' beliefs may evolve as they gain new experiences.[93]
Prediction
editDifferent psychological models have tried to predict people's beliefs and some of them try to estimate the exact probabilities of beliefs. For example,Robert Wyerdeveloped a model of subjective probabilities.[94][95]When people rate the likelihood of a certain statement (e.g., "It will rain tomorrow" ), this rating can be seen as a subjective probability value. The subjective probability model posits that these subjective probabilities follow the same rules as objective probabilities. For example, thelaw of total probabilitymight be applied to predict a subjective probability value. Wyer found that this model produces relatively accurate predictions for probabilities of single events and for changes in these probabilities, but that the probabilities of several beliefs linked by "and" or "or" do not follow the model as well.[94][95]
Delusion
editIn theDSM-5,delusions are defined as fixed false beliefs that are not changed even when confronted with conflicting evidence.
Belief studies
editThere is research investigating specific beliefs, types of beliefs and patterns of beliefs. For example, a study estimated contemporary prevalence and associations with belief inwitchcraftaround the world, which (in its data) varied between 9% and 90% betweennationsand is still a widespread element inworldviewsglobally. It also shows associations such as with lower "innovative activity", higher levels of anxiety, lowerlife expectancy,and higherreligiosity.[97][96]Other research is investigating beliefs in misinformation and their resistance to correction, including with respect tomisinformation countermeasures.It describes cognitive, social and affective processes that leave people vulnerable to the formation of false beliefs.[98]A study introduced the concept offalse social realitywhich refers to widespread perceptions of public opinion that are shown to be false, such asunderestimatedgeneralpublic supportin the U.S. forclimate change mitigationpolicies.[99][100]Studies also suggested some uses ofpsychedelicscan shift beliefs in some humans in certain ways, such as increasing attribution of consciousness to various entities (including plants and inanimate objects) and towardspanpsychismandfatalism.[101][102]
Emotion and beliefs
editThis sectionneeds expansion.You can help byadding to it.(January 2020) |
Research has indicated thatemotionand cognition act in conjunction to produce beliefs, and more specifically emotion plays a vital role in the formation and maintenance of beliefs.[103][104][105]
See also
edit- Alief
- Bayesian epistemology
- Culture-specific syndrome
- Doxastic attitudes
- Doxastic logic
- Doxastic voluntarism
- Expectation (epistemic)
- Idea
- Magical thinking
- Moore's paradox
- Observer-expectancy effect
- Opinion
- Propositional knowledge
- Self-deception
- Subject-expectancy effect
- Subjective validation
- Suggestibility
- Suggestion
- Theory of justification
- Thomas theorem
- Tinkerbell effect
- Trust
- Unintended consequence
- Validity
- Value (personal and cultural)
- World view
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- ^Compare:"Roy Moore: 'We Have No Morality Without an Acknowledgment of God'".Christianity Today.7 March 2005.Archivedfrom the original on 8 January 2009.Retrieved19 May2006.
- ^Miller, David Ian (15 February 2005)."Finding My Religion: Steve Georgiou on his faith and mentor, minimalist poet Robert Lax".SFGate.Archivedfrom the original on 16 May 2012.Retrieved19 May2006.
- ^Repa, J. Theodore (18 October 1998)."Building Community: The Marriage of Religion and Education".Archived fromthe originalon 7 September 2006.Retrieved19 May2006.
- ^Note for example the concept of acultural Christian.
- ^Larson, David B.; Susan S. Larson; Harold G. Koenig (October 2000)."Research Findings on Religious Commitment and Mental Health".Psychiatric Times.17(10).Archivedfrom the original on 8 January 2009.Retrieved19 May2006.
- ^Alcock, James(2018). "The God Engine".Skeptical Inquirer.42(5): 32–38.
- ^For example:Russell, Bertrand(1927)."Why I am Not a Christian".Archived fromthe originalon 19 November 2006.Retrieved19 May2006.
- ^For example, someMuslimsbelieve that women are inferior to men. SomeChristiansshare this belief. At the time of theAmerican Civil Warof 1861–1865, many Southerners used passages from theBibleto justify race-basedslavery.Certain campaigners have used the Christian religion as a reason to persecute and to deny the rights of homosexuals, on the basis that the Christian biblical God disapproves of homosexuality, and by implication of homosexuals. Comparehttp://www.godhatesfags.comArchived7 March 2021 at theWayback Machine
- ^abBeauchamp, Philip (pseudonym of Jeremy Bentham)Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion on the Temporal Happiness of MankindArchived4 February 2020 at theWayback Machine,1822, R. Carlile, London, at page 76: "Of all human antipathies, that which the believer in a God bears to the unbeliever is the fullest, the most unqualified, and the most universal"
- ^Bering, Jesse (2006)."The Cognitive Psychology of Belief in the Supernatural".American Scientist.94(2): 142.doi:10.1511/2006.58.142.ISSN0003-0996.
- ^Barnett, Zach (1 January 2019)."Philosophy Without Belief".Mind.128(509): 109–138.doi:10.1093/mind/fzw076.ISSN0026-4423.
- ^Bell, V.; Halligan, P.W.; Ellis, H.D. (2006). "A Cognitive Neuroscience of Belief". In Halligan, Peter W.; Aylward, Mansel (eds.).The Power of Belief: Psychological Influence on Illness, Disability, and Medicine.Oxford: Oxford University Press.ISBN978-0198530107.
- ^Baker, Lynne Rudder (1989).Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism.Princeton University Press.ISBN978-0691073200.
- ^Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Army (2012). Information Operations. Joint Publication 3–13. Joint Doctrine Support Division, Suffolk, VA. p. 22.
- ^Parr, Thomas; Rees, Geraint; Friston, Karl J. (2018)."Computational Neuropsychology and Bayesian Inference".Frontiers in Human Neuroscience.12:61.doi:10.3389/fnhum.2018.00061.ISSN1662-5161.PMC5829460.PMID29527157.
- ^abcWyer, R.S., & Albarracin, D. (2005). "Belief formation, organization, and change: Cognitive and motivational influences". In D. Albarracin, B.T. Johnson, & M.P. Zanna,The Handbook of Attitudes(273–322). New York: Psychology Press.
- ^Gelman, Andrew;Park, David; Shor, Boris; Bafumi, Joseph; Cortina, Jeronimo (2008).Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why Americans Vote the Way They Do.Princeton University Press.ISBN978-0691139272.
- ^Argyle, Michael (1997).The Psychology of Religious Behaviour, Belief and Experience.London: Routledge. p. 25.ISBN978-0415123303.
Religion, in most cultures, is ascribed, not chosen.
- ^Hoffer, Eric (2002).The True Believer.New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics.ISBN978-0060505912.
- ^Kilbourne, Jane; Pipher, Mary (2000).Can't Buy My Love: How Advertising Changes the Way We Think and Feel.Free Press.ISBN978-0684866000.
- ^See Kumkale & Albarracin, 2004.
- ^Rothschild, Babette (2000).The Body Remembers: The Psychophysiology of Trauma and Trauma Treatment.New York: W.W. Norton & Company.ISBN978-0393703276.
- ^Rowley, Anna (2007).Leadership Therapy: Inside the Mind of Microsoft.Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. p.69.ISBN978-1403984036.
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- ^Clifford, Catherine."Americans don't think other Americans care about climate change as much as they do".CNBC.Retrieved15 September2022.
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- ^Nayak, Sandeep M.; Griffiths, Roland R. (28 March 2022)."A Single Belief-Changing Psychedelic Experience Is Associated With Increased Attribution of Consciousness to Living and Non-living Entities".Frontiers in Psychology.13:852248.doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2022.852248.ISSN1664-1078.PMC8995647.PMID35418909.
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- ^Frijda, Nico H (2010).Emotions and Beliefs.Cambridge University Press.ISBN978-0511659904.
- ^Mercer, Jonathan (January 2010). "Emotional Beliefs".International Organization.65:1–31.doi:10.1017/S0020818309990221.S2CID232251086.
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Further reading
edit- Robert Audi(Dec. 1994)."Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to Believe",Noûs,Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 419–434.OCLC481484099.
- Coleman, T. III, Jong, J., & van Mulukom, V. (2018).Introduction to the Special Issue: What are Religious Beliefs?.Contemporary Pragmatism, 15(3), 279–283.doi:10.1163/18758185-01503001
- Järnefelt, Elisa,Created by Some Being: Theoretical and Empirical Exploration of Adults' Automatic and Reflective Beliefs about the Origin of Natural Phenomena.Diss. University of Helsinki, 2013.ISBN978-9521094163.
- Leicester, J. "What beliefs are made from". Sharjah, UAE: Bentham Science Publishers, 2016.
External links
edit- Schwitzgebel, Eric."Belief".InZalta, Edward N.(ed.).Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- "The Aim of Belief".Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- John Russell(1877),An analysis of religious belief.