Wikipedia

Operation Hurricane

For the Allied air forces' show of force over Germany during World War II, seeOperation Hurricane (1944).For the Canadian Forces maintenance mission in the Arctic, seeOperation Hurricane (Canada).

Operation Hurricanewas the first test of aBritish atomic device.Aplutoniumimplosion devicewas detonated on 3 October 1952 in Main Bay, Trimouille Island, in theMontebello IslandsinWestern Australia.With the success of Operation Hurricane, the United Kingdom became the thirdnuclear power,after the United States and theSoviet Union.

Operation Hurricane
The mud-laden cauliflower explosion
Information
CountryUnited Kingdom
Test siteTrimouille Island,Montebello Islands,Western Australia
20°24′19″S115°33′59″E/ 20.40528°S 115.56639°E/-20.40528; 115.56639
Date23:59:24UTC,2 October 1952
Number of tests1
Test typeShip
Max. yield25kilotons of TNT(100 TJ)
Test series chronology

During theSecond World War,Britain commenced a nuclear weapons project, code-namedTube Alloys,but the 1943Quebec Agreementmerged it with the AmericanManhattan Project.Several keyBritish scientists worked on the Manhattan Project,but after the war the American government ended cooperation on nuclear weapons. In January 1947, acabinet sub-committeedecided to resume British efforts to build nuclear weapons, in response to an apprehension of American isolationism and fears of Britain losing itsgreat powerstatus. The project was calledHigh Explosive Research,and was directed byLord Portal,withWilliam Penneyin charge of bomb design.

Implicit in the decision to developatomic bombswas the need to test them. The preferred site was thePacific Proving Groundsin the US-controlledMarshall Islands.As a fallback, sites in Canada and Australia were considered. TheAdmiraltysuggested that the Montebello Islands might be suitable, so thePrime Minister of the United Kingdom,Clement Attlee,sent a request to thePrime Minister of Australia,Robert Menzies.The Australian government formally agreed to the islands being used as a nuclear test site in May 1951. In February 1952, Attlee's successor,Winston Churchill,announced in theHouse of Commonsthat the first British atomic bomb test would occur in Australia before the end of the year.

A small fleet was assembled for Operation Hurricane under the command ofRear AdmiralA. D. Torlesse;it included theescort carrierHMSCampania,which served as the flagship, and theLSTsNarvik,ZeebruggeandTracker.Leonard Tyte from theAtomic Weapons Research EstablishmentatAldermastonwas appointed the technical director. The bomb for Operation Hurricane was assembled (without its radioactive components) atFoulnessand taken to thefrigateHMSPlymfor transport to Australia. On reaching the Montebello Islands, the fiveRoyal Navyships were joined by elevenRoyal Australian Navyships, including theaircraft carrierHMASSydney.To test the effects of a ship-smuggled atomic bomb on a port (a threat of great concern to the British at the time), the bomb was exploded inside the hull ofPlym,anchored 350 metres (1,150 ft) offTrimouille Island.The explosion occurred 2.7 metres (8 ft 10 in) below the water line and left a saucer-shaped crater on the seabed 6 metres (20 ft) deep and 300 metres (980 ft) across.

Background

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Montebello Islands
class=notpageimage|
Location of the Montebello Islands

The December 1938 discovery ofnuclear fissionbyOtto HahnandFritz Strassmann—and its explanation and naming byLise MeitnerandOtto Frisch—raised the possibility that an extremely powerful "atomic bomb"could be created.[1]During theSecond World War,Frisch andRudolf Peierlsat theUniversity of Birminghamcalculated thecritical massof a metallic sphere of pureuranium-235,and found that instead of tonnes, as everyone had assumed, as little as 1 to 10 kilograms (2 to 22 lb) would suffice, which would explode with the power of thousands of tonnes of dynamite.[2]In response, Britain initiated an atomic bomb project, codenamedTube Alloys.[3]

At theQuebec Conferencein August 1943, thePrime Minister of the United Kingdom,Winston Churchill,and thePresident of the United States,Franklin Roosevelt,signed theQuebec Agreement,which merged Tube Alloys with the AmericanManhattan Projectto create a combined British, American and Canadian project.[4]TheBritish contribution to the Manhattan Projectincluded assistance in the development ofgaseous diffusiontechnology at theSAM Laboratoriesin New York,[5]and theelectromagnetic separationprocess at theBerkeley Radiation Laboratory.[6]John Cockcroftbecame the director of the joint British-CanadianMontreal Laboratory.[7]A British mission to theLos Alamos Laboratoryled byJames Chadwick,and later Peierls, included scientists such asGeoffrey Taylor,James Tuck,Niels Bohr,William Penney,Frisch,Ernest Titterton,andKlaus Fuchs,who was later revealed to be a spy for theSoviet Union.[8][9]As overall head of the British Mission, Chadwick forged a close and successful partnership withBrigadier GeneralLeslie R. Groves,the director of the Manhattan Project,[10]and ensured that British participation was complete and wholehearted.[11]

Clement Attlee (left) with the Leader of the Australian Federal Opposition, DrH. V. Evattin 1954

With the end of the war theSpecial Relationshipbetween Britain and the United States "became very much less special".[12]The British government had trusted that America would share nuclear technology, which the British saw as a joint discovery,[13]but the terms of the Quebec Agreement remained secret. Senior members of theUnited States Congresswere horrified when they discovered that it gave the British a veto over the use of nuclear weapons.[14]On 9 November 1945, the new prime minister of the United Kingdom,Clement Attlee,and thePrime Minister of Canada,William Lyon Mackenzie King,went to Washington, D.C., to confer with Truman about future cooperation in nuclear weapons and nuclear power.[15][16]They signed a Memorandum of Intention that replaced the Quebec Agreement. It made Canada a full partner, and reduced the obligation to obtain consent for the use of nuclear weapons to merely requiring consultation.[17]The three leaders agreed that there would be full and effective cooperation on civil and military applications of atomic energy, but the British were soon disappointed;[18]the Americans made it clear that cooperation was restricted tobasic scientific research.[19]TheAtomic Energy Act of 1946(McMahonAct) ended technical cooperation. Its control of "restricted data" prevented the United States' allies from receiving any information.[20]

Attlee set up acabinet sub-committee,theGen 75 Committee(known informally as the "Atomic Bomb Committee" ),[21]on 10 August 1945 to examine the feasibility of a nuclear weapons program.[22]In October 1945, it accepted a recommendation that responsibility be placed within theMinistry of Supply.[23]The Tube Alloys Directorate was transferred from theDepartment of Scientific and Industrial Researchto the Ministry of Supply on 1 November 1945.[24]To coordinate the effort,Lord Portal,the wartimeChief of the Air Staff,was appointed Controller of Production, Atomic Energy (CPAE), with direct access to the Prime Minister. AnAtomic Energy Research Establishment(AERE) was established atRAF Harwell,south ofOxford,under the directorship of Cockcroft.[25]AERE moved toAldermastonin 1952.[26][27]Christopher Hintonagreed to oversee the design, construction and operation of the new atomic weapons facilities.[28]These included a new uranium plant atSpringfieldsinLancashire,[29]andnuclear reactorsandplutoniumprocessing facilities atWindscaleinCumbria.[30]Hinton established his headquarters in a formerRoyal Ordnance FactoryatRisleyin Lancashire on 4 February 1946.[28]

In July 1946, theChiefs of Staff Committeerecommended that Britain acquire nuclear weapons.[31]They estimated that 200 bombs would be required by 1957.[32]Despite this, and the research and construction of production facilities that had already been approved, there was still no official decision to proceed with making atomic bombs.[33]Portal submitted a proposal to do so at the 8 January 1947 meeting of the Gen 163 Committee, a subcommittee of the Gen 75 Committee, which agreed to proceed with the development of atomic bombs. It also endorsed his proposal to place Penney, now the Chief Superintendent Armament Research (CSAR) atFort Halsteadin Kent, in charge of the bomb development effort,[34]which was codenamedHigh Explosive Research.[35]Penney contended that "the discriminative test for a first-class power is whether it has made an atomic bomb and we have either got to pass the test or suffer a serious loss of prestige both inside this country and internationally."[36]

Although the British government had committed to the development of anindependent nuclear deterrent,it still hoped for a restoration of the nuclear Special Relationship with the Americans. It was therefore important that nothing be done that would jeopardise this.[37]

Site selection

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Captioned satellite image of the Montebello Islands

Implicit in the decision to develop atomic bombs was the need to test them.[38]Lacking open, thinly-populated areas, British officials considered locations overseas.[39]The preferred site was the AmericanPacific Proving Grounds.A request to use it was sent to the AmericanJoint Chiefs of Staffin 1949. In October 1950 the Americans turned down the request.[40]As a fallback, sites in Canada and Australia were considered. Penney spoke toOmond Solandt,the chairman of the CanadianDefence Research Board,and they arranged for a joint feasibility study.[38]

The study noted several requirements for a test area:

  • an isolated area with no human habitation 160 kilometres (100 mi) downwind;
  • large enough to accommodate a dozen detonations over a period of several years;
  • with prevailing winds that would blowfalloutout to sea but away from shipping lanes;
  • a temporary camp site at least 16 kilometres (10 mi) upwind of the detonation area;
  • a base camp site at least 40 kilometres (25 mi) upwind of the detonation area, with room for laboratories, workshops and signals equipment;
  • ready for use by mid-1952.[41]

The first test would probably be a ground burst, but consideration was also given to an explosion in a ship to measure the effect of a ship-borne atomic bomb on a major port. Such data would complement that obtained about an underwater explosion by the AmericanOperation Crossroadsnuclear test in 1946, and would therefore be of value to the Americans. Seven Canadian sites were assessed, the most promising beingChurchill, Manitoba,but the waters were too shallow to allow ships to approach close to shore.[41][42]

In September 1950, theAdmiraltysuggested that the uninhabitedMontebello Islandsin Australia might be suitable, so Attlee obtained permission from thePrime Minister of Australia,Robert Menzies, to send a survey party to look at the islands,[43]which are about 80 kilometres (50 mi) and 130 kilometres (81 mi) fromOnslow.[44]Major GeneralJames Cassels,the Chief Liaison Officer with the United Kingdom Services Liaison Staff (UKSLS) inMelbourne,was designated the principal British contact in Australia, and Menzies nominated SirFrederick Shedden,theSecretaryof theDepartment of Defence,as the person with whom Cassels should deal.[45]

At the time Britain was still Australia's largest trading partner; it would be overtaken by Japan and the United States by the 1960s. Britain and Australia had strong cultural ties, and Menzies was strongly pro-British. Most Australians were of British descent, and Britain was still the largest source of immigrants to Australia, largely because British ex-servicemen and their families qualified for free passage, and other British migrants received subsidised passage. Australian and British troops were fighting communist forces together in theKorean Warand theMalayan Emergency.[46]Australia still maintained close defence ties with Britain through the Australia New Zealand and Malaya (ANZAM) area, which was created in 1948. Australian war plans of this era continued to be closely integrated with those of Britain, and involved reinforcing the British forces in the Middle East and Far East.[47]

Australia was particularly interested in developingatomic energyas the country was then thought to have no oil and only limited supplies of coal.[48]Plans for atomic power were considered along withhydroelectricityas part of the post-warSnowy Mountains Scheme.There was also interest in the production of uranium-235 and plutonium for nuclear weapons.[49][50]The Australian government had hopes of collaboration with Britain on nuclear energy and nuclear weapons,[48]but the 1948Modus Vivendicut Australian scientists off from information they had formerly had access to.[51]Unlike Canada, Australia was not a party to the Quebec Agreement or theModus Vivendi.Britain would not share technical information with Australia for fear that it might jeopardise its far more important relationship with the United States,[52]and the Americans were reluctant to share secret information with Australia after theVenona projectrevealed the extent of Soviet espionage activities in Australia.[53]The creation ofNATOin 1949 excluded Australia from the Western Alliance.[54]

The three-man survey party, headed byAir Vice MarshalE. D. Davis, arrived in Sydney on 1 November 1950, and embarked onHMASKarangi,under the command of Commander A. H. Cooper, who carried out a detailedhydrographicsurvey of the islands. The charts at the Admiralty had been made byHMSBeaglein August 1840. Soundings were taken of the depths of coastal waters to measure the tides, and samples of the gravel and sand were taken to assess whether they could be used for making concrete. The work afloat and ashore was complemented byRoyal Australian Air Force(RAAF) aerial photography of the islands. The British survey team returned to London on 29 November 1950. The islands were assessed as suitable for atomic testing, but, for climatic reasons, only in October.[55]

HMASKarangiwas used as a survey ship.

On 27 March 1951, Attlee sent Menzies a personal message saying that, while negotiations with the United States for use of theNevada Test Sitewere ongoing, work would need to begin if the Montebello Islands were to be used in October 1952. Menzies replied that he could not authorise the test until after theAustralian federal election,to be held on 28 April 1951, but was willing to allow work to continue. Menzies was re-elected, and the Australian government formally agreed in May 1951.[43][56]On 28 May, Attlee sent a comprehensive list of assistance that it hoped that Australia would provide. A more detailed survey was requested, which was carried out byHMASWarregoin July and August 1951.[55]The British government emphasised the importance of security, so as not to imperil its negotiations with the United States. The Australian government gave all weapon design data aclassificationof "Top Secret", other aspects of the test being "Classified". Nuclear weapons design was already covered by aD noticein the United Kingdom. Australian D Notice No. 8 was issued to cover nuclear tests.[57]

Meanwhile, negotiations continued with the Americans.Oliver Franks,theBritish Ambassador to the United States,lodged a formal request on 2 August 1951 for use of the Nevada Test Site. This was looked upon favourably by the United States Secretary of State,Dean Acheson,and the chairman of theUnited States Atomic Energy Commission,Gordon Dean,but opposed byRobert A. Lovett,the AmericanDeputy Secretary of Defenseand Robert LeBaron, theDeputy Secretary of Defence for Atomic Energy Affairs.The British government had announced on 7 June 1951 thatDonald Maclean,who had served as a British member of the Combined Policy Committee from January 1947 to August 1948, had been a Soviet spy. In view of security concerns, Lovett and LeBaron wanted the tests to be conducted by Americans, British participation being limited to Penney and a few selected British scientists. Truman endorsed this counterproposal on 24 September 1951.[58]

The Nevada Test Site would be cheaper than Montebello, although the cost would be paid in scarce dollars. Information gathered would have to be shared with the Americans, who would not share their own data. It would not be possible to test from a ship, and the political advantages in demonstrating that Britain could develop and test nuclear weapons without American assistance would be foregone.[43]The Americans were under no obligation to make the test site available for subsequent tests. Also, asLord Cherwellnoted, an American test meant that "in the lamentable event of the bomb failing to detonate, we should look very foolish indeed."[59]

A final decision was deferred until after theUK's 1951 election.This resulted in a change of government, theConservative Partyreturning to power and Churchill replacing Attlee as prime minister.[43]On 27 December 1951, theHigh Commissioner of the United Kingdom to Australiainformed Menzies of the British government's decision to use Montebello.[60]On 26 February 1952, Churchill announced in the House of Commons that the first British atomic bomb test would occur in Australia before the end of the year.[61]When queried by a UKLabour Partybackbencher,Emrys Hughes,about the impact on the local flora and fauna, Churchill joked that the survey team had only seen some birds and lizards. Among the AERE scientists was an amateur biologist, Frank Hill, who collected samples of the flora and fauna on the islands, teaming up with Commander G. Wedd, who collected marine specimens from the surrounding waters. In a paper published by theLinnean Society of London,Hill catalogued over 400 species of plants and animals. This included 20 new species of insects, six of plants, and a new species oflegless lizard.[62][63][64][65]

Preparations

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HMSPlymin 1943. The atomic bomb was exploded in her hull.

To coordinate the test, codenamed "Operation Hurricane", the British government established a Hurricane Executive Committee chaired by theDeputy Chief of the Naval Staff,Vice AdmiralEdward Evans-Lombe.It held its first meeting in May 1951.[66]To deal with it, an Australian Hurricane Panel was created, chaired by the AustralianDeputy Chief of the Naval Staff,CaptainAlan McNicoll.Its other members wereColonelJohn Wiltonfrom theAustralian Army,Group CaptainAlister Murdochfrom the RAAF andCharles SpryfromAustralian Security Intelligence Organisation(ASIO). Cassels or his representative was invited to attend its meetings.[67]A pressing question was that of observers. Churchill decided to exclude the media and members of the UK parliament. As Canada was a party to the 1948Modus Vivendi,Canadian scientists and technicians would have access to all technical data, but Australians would not.[68]

Penney was anxious to secure the services of Titterton, who had recently emigrated to Australia, as he had worked on the AmericanTrinityand Crossroads tests. Menzies asked the vice-chancellor of theAustralian National University,SirDouglas Copland,to release Titterton to work on Operation Hurricane. Cockcroft also wanted assistance fromLeslie Martin,the Department of Defence's Science Advisor, who was also a professor of physics at theUniversity of Melbourne,to work in the health physics area. The two men knew each other from their time atCambridge Universitybefore the war. After some argument, Martin was accepted as an official observer, as wasW. A. S. Butement,the Chief Scientist at theDepartment of Supply.The only other official observer was Solandt from Canada.[69]

An advance party ofNo. 5 Airfield Construction SquadronfromRAAF Base Williamtown,New South Wales, moved to Onslow in August 1951 with heavy construction equipment, taking the train toGeraldtonand then the road to Onslow. This was then transported to the Montebello Islands. A prefabricated hut was taken across byKarangai,along with equipment for establishing a meteorological station. Other materiel was moved from Onslow to the islands in 45-cubic-metre(40MTON) lots in an ALC-40 landing craft manned by the Australian Army and towed byKarangai.This included two 25-tonne (25-long-ton)bulldozers,agrader,tip trucks,portable generators,1,800-litre (400 imp gal)water tanksand a mobile radiotransceiver.The hut was erected, and the meteorological station henceforth manned by an RAAF officer and four assistants. Roads and landings were constructed, and camp sites established.[70]

HMSCampaniawas the task force flagship.

The next stage of work began in February 1952, in the wake of the December decision to proceed with the test. A detachment of No. 5 Airfield Construction Squadron was flown to Onslow fromRAAF Bankstownin two RAAFDakotaaircraft, and were then taken to the islands by theBathurst-class corvetteHMASMildura.Karangaifetched 100 cubic metres (90 MTON) ofMarston MatfromDarwinthat was used for road works andhardstands.The SSDorrigobrought in another 100 cubic metres (90 MTON) three weeks later. A water supply was also developed. To bring water from theFortescue River,a quantity of 100-millimetre (4 in)Victaulic-coupling pipe was brought from theDepartment of Worksin Sydney and theWoomera Rocket Rangein South Australia. Because the pipe was laid around obstacles, this proved to be insufficient. No more pipe was in storage, so a firm in Melbourne was asked to make some. An order was placed on a Friday evening, and the pipe was shipped the following Thursday morning, making its way to the Fortescue River by road and rail. The system delivered up to 15,000 litres (3,400 imp gal) per hour to a jetty on the Fortescue estuary, from which it was taken to the islands by the120ft Motor LighterMWL 251.[71]

The British assembled a small fleet for Operation Hurricane that included theescort carrierHMSCampania,which served as theflagship,and theLSTsNarvik,ZeebruggeandTracker,under the command ofRear AdmiralA. D. Torlesse.Leonard Tyte from the AERE was appointed the technical director.[72]Campaniahad five aircraft embarked, threeWestland WS-51 Dragonflyhelicopters and twoSupermarine Sea Otteramphibians.Between them, the LSTs carried fiveLCMsand twelveLCAs.[73]The bomb, less its radioactive components, was assembled atFoulness,and then taken to theRiver-class frigateHMSPlymon 5 June 1952 for transport to Australia.[74]It tookCampaniaandPlymeight weeks to make the voyage, as they sailed around theCape of Good Hopeinstead of traversing theSuez Canal,[72]because there wasunrest in Egyptat the time.[75]

The Montebello Islands were reached on 8 August.[76]Plymwas anchored in 12 metres (39 ft) of water, 350 metres (1,150 ft) off Trimouille Island.[77]The radioactive components, the plutoniumcoreandpolonium-berylliumneutron initiator,went by air, flying fromRAF Lynehamto Singapore inHandley Page Hastingsaircraft via Cyprus,Sharjahand Ceylon. From Singapore they made the final leg of their journey in aShort Sunderlandflying boat.[78]The British bomb design was similar to that of the AmericanFat Man,[79]but for reasons of safety and efficiency the British design incorporated alevitated pit,in which there was an air gap between the uraniumtamperand the plutonium core. This gave the explosion time to build up momentum, similar in principle to a hammer hitting a nail, enabling less plutonium to be used.[80]

A radio antenna is erected for the test.

The British fleet was joined by eleven RAN ships, including theaircraft carrierHMASSydneywith805and817 Squadronsembarked, and its four escorts, thedestroyerHMASTobruk,and frigatesShoalhaven,MacquarieandMurchison.[81][82][83]The Defence (Special Undertakings) Act (1952) was passed through theParliament of Australiabetween 4 and 6 June 1952, and receivedassenton 10 June. Under this act, the area within a 72-kilometre (45 mi) radius of Flag Island was declared a prohibited area for safety and security reasons. That some of this was outside Australia's 4.8-kilometre (3 mi)territorial watersattracted comment.[84]The frigateHMASHawkesburywas tasked with patrolling the prohibited area, while itssister shipHMASCulgoaacted as a weather ship. Logistical support was provided byHMASWarreen,LimicolaandMildura,the motor water lighterMWL 251and the motor refrigeration lighterMRL 252,and thetugboatHMASReserve,which towed a fuel barge.[83]Dakotas ofNo. 86 Wing RAAFprovided air patrols and a weekly courier run.[85]

Operation

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The main site, known as H1, was established on the south-east corner of Hermite Island. This was the location of the control room from which the bomb would be detonated, along with the equipment to monitor the firing circuits and telemetry. It was also the location of the generators that provided electric power and recharged the batteries of portable devices, and ultra-high-speed cameras operating at up to 8,000 frames per second. Other camera equipment was set up on Alpha Island and Northwest Island. Most of the monitoring equipment was positioned on Trimouille Island, closer to the explosion. Here, there were a plethora of blast, pressure and seismographic gauges. There were also some 200 empty fuel containers for measuring the blast, a technique that Penney had employed on Operation Crossroads. There were thermometers and calorimeters for measuring the flash, and samples of paints and fabrics for determining the effect on them. Plants would be studied to measure their uptake offission products,particularly radioactiveiodineandstrontium.[86]Stores were unloaded at beachhead H2 on Hermite Island, between Brandy Bay and Buttercup Island, whence the RAAF had built a road to H1. A stores compound was established at Gladstone Beach on Trimouille Island, known as T3.[87]

Cloud from Britain's first atomic bomb 30 minutes after the detonation

The original intention was that the scientists would stay onCampania,commuting to the islands each day, but the survey party had misjudged the tides;Campaniacould not enter the lagoon, and had to anchor in the Parting Pool. Thepinnacescould not tie up alongsideCampaniaat night, and had to be moored several miles away. Transferring to the boats in choppy waters was hazardous.[86]One scientist fell in the sea and was rescued by Commander Douglas Bromley,Campania's executive officer.[88][89]Rough seas prevented much work being done between 10 and 14 August.[87]It took about an hour and a half to get fromCampaniato H2, and travelling betweenPlymandCampaniatook between two and three hours. Even when a boat was on call it could take 45 minutes to respond. Boat availability soon became a problem with only five LCMs, leaving personnel waiting for one to arrive.[86][90]The twelve smaller LCAs were also employed; although they could operate when the tides made waters too shallow for the pinnaces, their wooden bottoms were easily holed by coral outcrops.[90][91]On 15 August, some men were transferred fromCampaniaby one of its three Dragonfly helicopters, but the weather closed in and they could not be picked up again, having to find shelter onTrackerandZeebrugge,which were moored in the lagoon.[87][92]To get around these problems, tented camps were established for the scientists at H1 on Hermite Island and Cocoa Beach (also known as T2) on Trimouille Island.[91]

Scientific rehearsals were held on 12 and 13 September. This was followed by an operational rehearsal on 19 September, which included fully assembling the bomb,[93]since the radioactive components had arrived the day before on a Sunderland.[94]Penney arrived by air on 22 September.[94]Everything was ready by 30 September, and the only remaining factor was the weather. This was unfavourable on 1 October but improved the following day, when Penney designated 3 October as the date for the test. The final countdown commenced at 07:45 local time on 3 October 1952.[94]Plymwas moored a few hundred metres west of T2 (approx 20°24'16 "S, 115°34" E). The bomb was successfully detonated at 07:59:24 on 3 October 1952 local time, which was 23:59:24 on 2 October 1952UTC,00:59:24 on 3 October in London, and 07:59:24 on 3 October inPerth.[77][95]The explosion occurred 2.7 metres (8 ft 10 in) below the water line, and left a saucer-shaped crater on the seabed 6 metres (20 ft) deep and 300 metres (980 ft) across.[77]The yield was estimated at 25 kilotons of TNT (100 TJ).[96]All that was left ofPlymwas a "gluey black substance" that washed up on the shore of Trimouille Island.[97]Derek Hickman, aRoyal Engineerobserving the blast aboardZeebrugge,later said ofPlym,"all that was left of her were a few fist-sized pieces of metal that fell like rain, and the shape of the frigate scorched on the sea bed."[98]The bomb had performed exactly as expected.[99][100]

Two Dragonfly helicopters flew in to gather a sample of contaminated seawater from the lagoon. Scientists in gas masks and protective gear visited points in pinnaces to collect samples and retrieve recordings.Trackercontrolled this aspect, as it had the decontamination facilities. Air samples were collected by RAAFAvro Lincolnaircraft. Although the feared tidal surge had not occurred,radioactive contaminationof the islands was widespread and severe. It was clear that had an atomic bomb exploded in a British port, it would have been a catastrophe worse than thebombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[92][101]The fallout cloud rose to 3,000 metres (10,000 ft) and was blown out to sea, as intended; but later reversed direction and blew over the Australian mainland. Very low levels of radioactivity were detected as far away asBrisbane.[102]

Penney and some of his staff returned by air on 9 October.[103]He was appointed aKnight Commander of the Order of the British Empireon 23 October 1952 for his role in Operation Hurricane.[104][105]Torlesse was supposed to accompany him, but in view of the degree of radioactive contamination, he felt he could not leave his command. He sent Captain D. P. Willan, the skipper ofNarvikin his stead.[97]The Royal Navy ships departed the Montebello Islands on 31 October. Most of the scientific staff were dropped off atFremantle,and returned to Britain onRAF Transport Commandaircraft. The rest returned onCampania,which arrived in the United Kingdom on 15 December.[106]Hawkesburycontinued to patrol the area until 15 January 1953.[107]

Outcome

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Two more nuclear tests were conducted in the Montebello Islands as part ofOperation Mosaicin 1956, the detonations taking place on Alpha and Trimouille Islands.[108]By the 1980s the radioactivity had decayed to the point where it was no longer hazardous to the casual visitor, but there were still radioactive metal fragments containingcobalt-60,the remains ofPlym.[109]The island remained a prohibited area until 1992.[110]A 2006 zoological survey found that the wildlife had recovered, and that theAprasia rostrata,the legless lizard discovered by Hill, was not extinct.[65]As part of theGorgon gas project,rats and feral cats were eradicated from the Montebello Islands in 2009, and birds and marsupials were transplanted from nearbyBarrow Islandto Hermite Island.[110]Today, the Montebello Islands are a park. Visitors are advised not to spend more than an hour per day at the test sites, or to take relics of the tests as souvenirs.[110]A pyramid-shaped obelisk marks the site of the explosion on Alpha Island.[111]

In 1992, Australian scientists Keith Wise and John Moroney of theAustralian Radiation Laboratoryestimated that thecollective doseto the Australian population due to the test was 110-man-sieverts, statistically enough to have caused one death from cancer.[112]Of the 1,518 personnel involved who were issued with film badges, 1,263 recorded no measurable amount of radiation, and 14 recorded 5millisieverts(mSv) over the course of the whole operation. None recorded more than 50 mSv. Dosimeters and film badges were not issued to the crews of the RAAF Lincolns who gathered radioactive samples, but later experience showed that exposure would not have been medically significant.[113]Studies of British veterans of all nuclear tests in 1983, 1988, 1993 and 2003 did not find conclusive evidence of increased mortality or health effects.[114]A 2006 study of nearly 11,000 Australian participants of the British nuclear testing program showed that participants had an 18% increased mortality from cancers and a 23% increase in overall cancer incidence, but the increase in cancer mortality and incidence could not be linked to the radiation exposure from nuclear testing, but rather to solar radiation.[115]

With the success of Operation Hurricane, Britain became the third nuclear power after the United States and the Soviet Union.[116]The first production bombs, of theBlue Danubedesign, based on the Hurricane device,[117]were delivered to the RAF in November 1953 and, two years later, the RAF had bombers capable of carrying them.[118][119]In the interim, the UK relied on the USStrategic Air Command(SAC) for its nuclear deterrent. SAC began deploying nuclear-capable bombers to the UK in April 1949.[120]Four weeks after Operation Hurricane, the United Statessuccessfully demonstratedahydrogen bomb.The technology mastered in Operation Hurricane was six years old, and with the hydrogen bomb in hand, the US Congress saw no benefit in renewing cooperation.[104]All the while Britain strove for independence, at the same time it sought interdependence in the form of a renewal of the Special Relationship with the United States. As successful as it was, Operation Hurricane fell short on both counts.[37]

Summary

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United Kingdom's Hurricane series tests and detonations[117]
Name Date and time Location Elevation + height Delivery, purpose Device Yield Fallout Notes
Hurricane 23:59:24 2 October (UTC)
07:59:24 3 October (AWST) 		Trimouille Island, Montebello Islands, Western Australia20°24′19″S115°33′59″E/ 20.40528°S 115.56639°E/-20.40528; 115.56639(Hurricane) 0–2.7 metres (0.0–8.9 ft) Barge,
weapon effect 		BritishBlue Danubedesign,levitated pit 25 kt Unknown Exploded in the hull ofHMSPlym

Notes

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  1. ^Gowing 1964,pp. 23–29.
  2. ^Gowing 1964,pp. 39–41.
  3. ^Gowing 1964,pp. 108–111.
  4. ^Hewlett & Anderson 1962,p. 277.
  5. ^Gowing 1964,pp. 250–256.
  6. ^Gowing 1964,pp. 226–227, 256–258.
  7. ^Jones 1985,pp. 246–247.
  8. ^Szasz 1992,pp. 148–151.
  9. ^Gowing 1964,pp. 260–268.
  10. ^Gowing 1964,pp. 236–239.
  11. ^Gowing 1964,p. 242.
  12. ^Gowing & Arnold 1974a,p. 93.
  13. ^Goldberg 1964,p. 410.
  14. ^Farmelo 2013,p. 326.
  15. ^Gott 1963,p. 240.
  16. ^Gowing & Arnold 1974a,pp. 73–77.
  17. ^Hewlett & Anderson 1962,p. 468.
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References

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Further reading

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