Wikipedia

Sinicization

(Redirected fromSinify)
This article is about cultural assimilation. For the linguistic meaning, seeTranscription into Chinese characters.
"Hanhua" redirects here. For the subdistrict in Xinye County, Henan, seeHanhua Subdistrict.

Sinicization,sinofication,sinification,orsinonization(from the prefixsino-,'Chinese, relating to China') is the process by which non-Chinese societies or groups are acculturated or assimilated intoChinese culture,particularly the language, societal norms, culture, and ethnic identity of theHan Chinese—the largest ethnic group of China.

Sinicization
Chinese name
Traditional ChineseHán hóa
Simplified ChineseHán hóa
Hanyu Pinyinhànhuà
Literal meaningHan-ization
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu Pinyinhànhuà
Bopomofoㄏㄢˋㄏㄨㄚˋ
IPA[xân xwâ]
other Mandarin
Xiao'erjingهًا خُوَ
Hakka
Pha̍k-fa-sṳHon-fa
Yue: Cantonese
JyutpingHon3 Faa3
Southern Min
HokkienPOJHàn-hoa
Tâi-lôHàn-hua
Alternative Chinese name
Traditional ChineseTrung quốc hóa
Simplified ChineseTrung quốc hóa
Hanyu Pinyinzhōngguóhuà
Literal meaningChina-ization
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu Pinyinzhōngguóhuà
Bopomofoㄓㄨㄥ ㄍㄨㄛˊㄏㄨㄚˋ
IPA[ʈʂʊ́ŋ.kwǒ xwâ]
other Mandarin
Xiao'erjingجوْ قُوَع خُوَ
Hakka
Pha̍k-fa-sṳChûng-ket-fa
Yue: Cantonese
JyutpingZung1 Gwok3 Faa3
Southern Min
HokkienPOJTiong-kok-hoa
Tâi-lôTiong-kok-hua
Vietnamese name
Vietnamese alphabetHán hóa
Trung Quốc hóa
Chữ HánHán hóa
Trung quốc hóa
Literal meaningHan-ization
Chinese-ization
Japanese name
Hiraganaちゅうごくか
KyūjitaiTrung quốc hóa
ShinjitaiTrung quốc hóa
Transcriptions
RomanizationChūgokuka

Areas of influence includediet,writing,industry,education,language/lexicon,law,architectural style,politics,philosophy,religion,science and technology,value systems, andlifestyle.

The termsinicizationis also often used to refer to processes or policies ofacculturationorassimilationof norms from China on neighboringEast Asian societies,or onminority ethnic groupswithin China. Evidence of this process is reflected in the histories ofKorea,Japan,andVietnamin theadoption of the Chinese writing system,which has long been a unifying feature in theSinosphereas the vehicle for exporting Chinese culture to other Asian countries.

In recent times, sinicization has been used in reference to China's policy toward minorities, particularly toward religious minorities within China. Policies include the destruction of religious architecture and costumes, the attempt to blend religious traditions with traditions perceived as Chinese as well as the promotion of "ethnic unity".[citation needed]

Assimilation

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The assimilation policy is a type ofChinese nationalismaimed at strengthening theChinese national identity(Zhonghua minzu) among the population. Proponents believe it will help to develop shared values, pride in being the country's citizen, respect and acceptance towards cultural differences among citizens of China.[citation needed]Critics argue that assimilation destroysethnic diversity,language diversity,andcultural diversity.The historianJames A. Millwardhas claimed that the People's Republic of China has used the concept of sinicization as a means to obscure Hansettler colonialism.[1]

In China there are 292 non-Mandarinlanguagesspoken by native peoples of the region.[2]There are also a number ofimmigrantlanguages, such asKhmer,Portuguese,and English.

Sinicizations

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Historical

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Baiyue

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Before sinicization, non-Chinese indigenous peoples ofsouthern China,collectively termed by the Chinese asBaiyue(Chinese:Bách việt;lit.'Hundreds of Yue Peoples'),inhabited the coastline of China from as far north as theYangtze Riverto as far south as theGulf of Tonkin.

As early as the 11th century BC, some of the Baiyue peoples in theYangtze River Deltastarted to sinicize, marked by their establishment of theWu State.These Yue peoples, together with their southerner neighbours who formed theYue Statecenturies later, are collectively termed asYuyuepeoples. Over time, the mutual contact between Baiyue peoples and Han Chinese, as well as southward spread of Han Chinese, mostly aswar refugees,[citation needed]led to the sinicization of most of the Baiyue populations that remained in southern China, be they in theYangtze Valleyor in coastal areas from the mouth of the Yangtze to the Gulf of Tonkin.[3]The remnants of these peoples who were not fully sinicized are now recognized officially as theethnic minoritiesof thePeople's Republic of China.

Mongolic and Turkic peoples

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Main article:Taoyuan County

Tuoba Weiof northern China was a sinicized empire of Mongolic-Xianbei origin.

HistoricalShatuoTurks founded three sinicized dynasties in northern China. Descendants ofBuddhist Uyghurs(see alsoYugurs,Kingdom of QochoandGanzhou Uyghur Kingdom) who migrated toTaoyuan County, Hunan,have assimilated into theHuipopulation and adopted Chinese culture practice Chinese customs, speakingvarieties of Chineseas their language.

Han, Jin, and Sixteen Kingdoms period

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Main article:Sixteen Kingdoms

From the lateHan dynastyto the earlyJin dynasty (266–420),large numbers of non-Chinese peoples living along China's northern periphery settled in northern China. Some of these migrants such as theXiongnuandXianbeihad been pastoralist nomads from the northern steppes. Others such as theDiandQiangwere farmers and herders from the mountains of westernSichuanof southwest China. As migrants, they lived among ethnic Chinese and were sinicized to varying degrees. Many worked as farm laborers. Some attained official positions in the court and military. The numerous tribal groups in the north and northwest who had been heavily drafted into the military then exploited the chaos to seize power by local Chinese warlords.[4]

During theThree Kingdomsperiod,Cao Caoinitiated the policy of settling Xiongnu nomads away from the frontier near Taiyuan in modern Shanxi province, where they would be less likely to rebel. The Xiongnu abandoned nomadism and the elite were educated in Chinese-Confucian literate culture.[5]The migration of northern Chinese people to the south further settled China as a multi-ethnic empire.

Northern and Southern dynasties

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Main article:Northern and Southern dynasties

The Northern and Southern dynasties was a period in thehistory of Chinathat lasted from 386 to 589, following the tumultuous era of theSixteen Kingdomsperiod. Though an age ofcivil warand political chaos, it was also a time of flourishing arts and culture, advancement in technology, and the spread ofMahayana BuddhismandDaoism.The period saw large-scale migration ofHan Chineseto the lands south of theYangtze.The period came to an end with the unification of all ofChina properbyEmperor Wenof theSui dynasty.During this period, the process of sinicization accelerated among the non-Han arrivals in the north and among the indigenous people in the south. This process was also accompanied by the increasing popularity of Buddhism (introduced into China in the first century) and Daoism in bothnorthern and southern China.[6]

Tang dynasty

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During the eighth and ninth centuries in theTang dynasty,Chinese male soldiers moved intoGuizhou(formerly romanized asKweichow) and married native non-Chinese women, their descendants being known asLao-han-jen(original Chinese), in contrast to new Chinese people who colonized Guizhou at later times. They still spoke an archaic dialect as of 1929.[7]Many immigrants to Guizhou were descended from these soldiers in garrisons who married non-Chinese women.[8]

Yuan dynasty

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TheMongol-ledYuan dynastyappointed aMuslimfromBukhara,SayyidAjall Shams al-Din Omar,as governor ofYunnanafter conquering theBai-ledDali Kingdom.Sayyid Ajall is best known among Chinese for helping sinicize the Yunnan province;[9]the promotion ofIslam,Confucianism,andBuddhismwould be part of his 'civilizing mission' upon the non-Han Chinese peoples in Yunnan, who he viewed as "backward and barbarian."[10][11]

He founded a "Chinese style" city called Zhongjing Cheng, where modernKunmingis today, and ordered that aBuddhist temple,twomosques,and aConfucian templebe built in the city.[12][13]The latter temple, built in 1274 and doubled as a school, was the first Confucian temple ever to be built in Yunnan.[14]By incorporating Chinese and consequently Confucian thought in the dynasty, scholars now deem Kublai Khan as an adopted Chinese citizen of Mongol ethnicity, rather than simply being mutually excluded from the definition of fellow Chinese he governed.[15]As such, Sayyid Ajall would be the one to introduceConfucian education,rituals,and traditions into Yunnan, including Chinese social structures,funeral rituals,andmarriage customs.[10][16]He would go on to construct numerous Confucian temples throughout his reign.[17][18][19]

Confucian rituals were taught to students in newly founded schools bySichuanesescholars.[20][21]The natives of Yunnan were instructed by Sayyid Ajall in such Confucian ceremonies as weddings, matchmaking, funerals, ancestor worship, and kowtow. The native leaders had their "barbarian" clothing replaced by clothing given to them by Sayyid Ajall as well.[21][22]The governor was praised and described as making "the orangutans and butcherbirds become unicorns and phoenixes and their felts and furs were exchanged for gowns and caps" byHe Hongzuo,the Regional Superintendent of Confucian studies.[23]

Sayyid Ajall would also be the first to bring Islam to the area, and thus the widespread presence of Islam in Yunnan is credited to his work.[24]BothMarco PoloandRashid al-Din Vatvatrecorded that Yunnan was heavily populated by Muslims during the Yuan dynasty, with Rashid naming a city with all Muslim inhabitants as the "great city of Yachi."[25]It has been suggested that Yachi wasDali City(Ta-li), which had many Hui people.[26]

Sayyid Ajall's sonNasir al-Dinbecame Governor of Yunnan in 1279 after his death.[27][28]

Historian Jacqueline Armijo-Hussein has written on Sayyid Ajall's confucianization and sinicization policies in various papers, including in her dissertation "Sayyid 'Ajall Shams al-Din: A Muslim from Central Asia, serving the Mongols in China, and bringing 'civilization' to Yunnan" (1997);[29]and in "The Origins of Confucian and Islamic Education in Southwest China: Yunnan in the Yuan Period" (n.d.)[30]and "The Sinicization and Confucianization in Chinese and Western Historiography of a Muslim from Bukhara Serving Under the Mongols in China" (1989).[31]

Ming dynasty

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Main articles:Ming conquest of YunnanandMiao rebellions in the Ming dynasty

During theMing conquest of YunnanChinese military soldiers were settled in Yunnan, and many married the native women.

Qing dynasty

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The rulers of theQing dynastywereethnic Manchuswho adopted the norms of theMandate of Heavento justify their rule. The "orthodox" historical view emphasized the power of Han Chinese to "sinicize" their conquerors, although more recent research such as theNew Qing Historyschool revealed Manchu rulers were savvy in their manipulation of their subjects and from the 1630s through at least the 18th century, the emperors developed a sense of Manchu identity and usedCentral Asianmodels of rule as much as Confucian ones. There is also evidence of sinicization, however. For example, Manchus originally had their own separate style of naming from the Han Chinese, but eventually adopted Han Chinese naming practices.

Manchu namesconsisted of more than the two or one syllableChinese names,and when phonetically transcribed into Chinese, they made no sense at all.[32]The meaning of the names that Manchus used were also very different from the meanings of Chinese names.[33]The Manchus also gavenumbersas personal names.[34]

Historical records report that as early as 1776, theQianlong Emperorwas shocked to see a high Manchu official,Guo'ermin,not understand what the emperor was telling him in Manchu, despite coming from the Manchu stronghold of Shengjing (nowShenyang).[35]By the 19th century even the imperial court had lost fluency in the language. TheJiaqing Emperor(reigned 1796–1820) complained that his officials were not proficient at understanding or writing Manchu.[36]

Eventually, the Qing royal family (theAisin Gioro) gave their children Chinese names, which were separate from the Manchu names, and even adopted the Chinese practice ofgeneration names,although its usage was inconsistent and error-ridden. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Manchu royal family stopped using Manchu names.[37]

TheNiohurufamily of the Manchu changed their family name toLang,which sounded like "wolf" in Chinese, since wolf in Manchu was Niohuru; thus forming a translation.[38]

Although the Manchus replaced their Manchu names with Chinese personal names, theManchu bannermenfollowed their traditional practice in typically used their first/personal name to address themselves and not their last name, while Han Chinese bannermen used their last name and first in normal Chinese style.[39][40]

Usage of surnames was not traditional to the Manchu while it was to the Han Chinese.[41]

Nguyễn dynasty (Vietnam)

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Main article:Sinicization of Vietnam

The Vietnamese Nguyễn emperorMinh Mạngsinicized ethnic minorities such asKhmers,ChamsandMontagnards,claimed the legacy ofConfucianismand China's Han dynasty for Vietnam.[42]Directing his policies at the Khmers andhill tribes,[43]Minh Mang declared that "We must hope that their barbarian habits will be subconsciously dissipated, and that they will daily become more infected by Han [Sino-Vietnamese] customs."[44]Moreover, he would use the termHan(Hán nhân) to refer to the Vietnamese people,[42]and the nameTrung Quốc( trung quốc, the sameChinese charactersas for 'China') to refer to Vietnam.[45]Likewise, the lordNguyễn Phúc Chuhad referred to Vietnamese asHanpeople in 1712 when differentiating between Vietnamese and Chams.[46]

Chinese clothing was also adopted by the Vietnamese people. Variations of them are still being used today.[47][48][49][50]

Contemporary

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Ma Clique

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Hui Muslim GeneralMa Fuxiangcreated an assimilationist group and encouraged the integration of Muslims into Chinese society.[51]Ma Fuxiang was a hardcore assimilationist and said that Hui should assimilate into Han.[52]

Hong Kong and Macau

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Main article:Hong Kong–Mainland China conflict

Xinjiang

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Main articles:Xinjiang conflict,Xinjiang internment camps,andPersecution of Uyghurs in China

TheHui Muslim36th Division (National Revolutionary Army)governed the southern region ofXinjiangin 1934–1937. The administration that was set up was colonial in nature, importing Han cooks and baths,[53]changing theUyghur-language-only street names and signs to Chinese, as well as switching carpet patterns in state-owned carpet factories from Uyghur to Han.[54]

Strict surveillance and mass detentions of Uyghurs in theXinjiang internment campsis a part of the ongoing sinicization policy by theChinese Communist Party(CCP).[55]Since 2015, it has been estimated that over a million Uyghurs have been detained in these camps.[56][57][58][59]The camps were established underCCP General SecretaryXi Jinping'sadministrationwith the main goal of ensuring adherence to national ideology.[60]Critics of China's treatment of Uyghurs have accused the Chinese government of propagating a policy of sinicization in Xinjiang in the 21st century, calling this policy acultural genocide,orethnocide,of Uyghurs.[61][62][63][64]

Taiwan

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After the Republic of China took control ofTaiwanfrom theEmpire of Japanin 1945 andrelocated its capitaltoTaipeiin 1949, the intention ofChiang Kai-shekwas to eventually go back tomainland Chinaand retake control of it. Chiang believed that to retake mainland China, it would be necessary to re-Sinicize Taiwan's inhabitants who had undergone assimilationunder Japanese rule.Examples of this policy included the renaming of Japanese-named streets with mainland geographical names, the use ofMandarin Chinesein schools and punishments for using other regional Chinese languages (such as thefāngyán[further explanation needed]ofHakkaandHokkien), and teaching students to revere traditional ethics, develop pan-Chinese nationalism, and view Taiwan from the perspective of China.[65][66]Other reasons for the policy were to combat the Japanese influences on the culture that had occurred in the previous 50 years, and to help unite the recent immigrants from mainland China that had come to Taiwan with the KMT and among whom there was a tendency to be more loyal toone's city, county or provincethan to China as a nation.[67]

The process of re-asserting non-Chinese identity, as in the case of ethnic groups in Taiwan, is sometimes known asdesinicization.This is an issue in, for example, theTaiwan independence movementandTaiwan localization movements.

Tibet

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Main article:Sinicization of Tibet
See also:Antireligious campaigns of the Chinese Communist Party

The sinicization ofTibetis the change of Tibetan society to Han Chinese standards by means of statepropaganda,police presence,cultural assimilation,religious persecution,immigration,population transfer,land development, land transfer, andpolitical reform.[68][69][70][71]According to the U.S. branch of theOffices of Tibet,it has been underway since the Chinese regained control of Tibet in 1951.[72]Sources quoted byRadio Free Asiahave stated that in present-day Tibet, traditional Tibetan festivals have "been turned into a platform for propaganda and political theater" where "government workers and retirees are barred from engaging in religious activities, and government workers and students in Tibetan schools are forbidden from visiting local monasteries."[73]

Religion

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See also:Antireligious campaigns of the Chinese Communist Party

In April 2016, CCP general secretary Xi Jinping declared that to "actively guide the adaptation of religions to socialist society, an important task is supporting China's religions' persistence in the direction of sinicization."[74][75]He later reiterated this plan to the19th Communist Party Congresssaying "We will fully implement the Party's basic policy on religious affairs, insist on the sinicization of Chinese religions, and provide active guidance for religion and socialism to coexist."[74][76]

Protestantism

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TheThree-Self Patriotic Movement(TSPM) ofProtestantchurches in China has described theBoxer Rebellionand the anti-Christian movement of 1922–1927 as early efforts to sinicize Christianity.[77]

The TSPM andChina Christian Councilarranged a conference in Shanghai on August 4–6, 2014, commemorating the anniversary of the TSPM. This conference included a seminar on the sinicizaton of Christianity, with Fu Xianwei, chairman of the TSPM, saying "churches in China will continue to explore the sinicization of Christianity [and] ensure Christianity takes root in the soil of Chinese culture, ethnicity, and society... To advance the sinicization of Christianity, churches will need guidance and support from government agencies in charge of religious affairs."[78][79]

In 2019, TSPM chairman Xu Xiaohong made a pledge to eliminate any Western "imprint" from Chinese faith saying "[We] must recognise that Chinese churches are surnamed 'China', not 'the West'" and "No matter how much effort or time it takes, our resolution in upholding the Sinicisation of Protestantism will never change, and our determination to walk a path that is adapted to a socialist society will never waver."[77]

In December 2023,Wang Huningstated that Christian groups must "adhere to the direction of the sinicisation of Christianity."[80]

Catholicism

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Further information:Catholic Church in China

In December 2016, the Ninth National Congress of the Chinese Catholic Representatives reaffirmed their plan for theUnited Front Work Department'sCatholic Patriotic Associationto uphold the principle of independence and self-governance, along with the promotion of sinicization.[81]

In March 2018, ArchbishopPaul Gallagher,Secretary for Relations with Stateswithin theHoly See'sSecretariat of State,said that "two expressions or, more precisely, two principles stand out, which should interact with each other, namely" sinicization "and"inculturation."I am convinced that an important intellectual and pastoral challenge arises in an almost natural way from the bringing together of these two terms, which indicate two real visions of the world."[82][83]

In June 2018, the Bishops' Conference of the Catholic Church in China and the Catholic Patriotic Association issued a "Five-Year Plan on Carrying Forward the Catholic Church's Adherence to the Direction of Sinicization in Our Country".[84][85]This document calls for Catholics to accept Communist party leadership, love the motherland and obey the state, as well as to embrace the state's directive to implement Chinese cultural integration within Catholicism.Churches in Hebei provinceand theYibin DioceseofSichuan provincebegan holding training seminars immediately.[86][87]

Cardinal Parolin,the Vatican secretary of state, in a 2019 interview with the CCP-ownedGlobal Timesnewspaper, claimed that sinicization was a form of 'inculturation', which is a Catholic missionary term that refers to adopting local culture to proclaim the gospel. He cited Matteo Ricci as an example and pointed out that the Chinese leadership had promised not to undermine the doctrine and nature of each religion. He stated in the interview: "These two terms," inculturation "and" sinicization, "refer to each other without confusion and without opposition: in some ways, they can be complementary and can open avenues for dialogue on the religious and cultural level."[88][89][90][91]

Islam

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See also:Xinjiang internment camps
Mosque with dome removed due to sinicization policy

In 2015, CCP general secretaryXi Jinpingfirst raised the issue of "sinicization of Islam". In 2018, a confidential directive was issued ordering local officials to "prevent Islam from interfering with secular life and the state's functions".[92]

Yang Faming, leader of theIslamic Association of China,said in a 2018 speech that "We must allow traditional Chinese culture to permeate Islam and jointly guard the spiritual homeland of the Chinese people."[93]He encouraged Chinese characteristics to be present in religious ceremony, culture, and architecture.[74]

In 2018, over one million Chinese government workers began forcibly living in the homes of Uyghur Muslim families to monitor and assess resistance to assimilation, and to watch for frowned-upon religious or cultural practices.[94][95]These government workers were trained to call themselves "relatives" and have been described in Chinese state media as being a key part of enhancing "ethnic unity".[94]

As of 2019,it was estimated that Chinese authorities may have detained one and a half million people in secretive internment camps. The vast majority of those forcibly interned are Muslim Uyghurs butKazakhsand other minority groups have also been included.[96]

In September 2020, sinicization policies targeted MuslimUtsulsin theHainanprovince. Restrictions included limiting the size of mosques, requiring a Communist Party member on mosque management committees, forbidding the use of Arabic words on food stalls (such as "halal"), and banning thehijabin schools and government offices.[97][98]

In June 2023,CNNreported that Chinese authorities had forcibly rebuilt a number of mosques to eliminate traditional Islamic architecture (e.g. minarets, domes) and replace them with Chinese architecture.[99]In July 2023, the United Front Work Department'sCentral Institute of Socialismdeveloped a plan to "meld Islam with Confucianism" using theHan Kitabtexts as a guide.[100]

See also

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References

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  21. ^abYang, Bin (2008)."Chapter 5 Sinicization and Indigenization: The Emergence of the Yunnanese"(PDF).Between winds and clouds: the making of Yunnan (second century BCE to twentieth century CE).Columbia University Press.ISBN978-0231142540.Archived(PDF)from the original on 23 March 2014.Retrieved24 April2014.[page needed]
  22. ^Yang, Bin (2009).Between winds and clouds: the making of Yunnan (second century BCE to twentieth century CE).Columbia University Press. p. 157.ISBN978-0231142540.Archivedfrom the original on 27 September 2023.Retrieved24 April2014.
  23. ^Thant Myint-U (2011).Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia.Macmillan.ISBN978-1-4668-0127-1.Archivedfrom the original on September 27, 2023.RetrievedDecember 20,2011.claimed descent from the emir of Bokhara... and was appointed as the top administrator in Yunnan in the 1270s. Today the Muslims of Yunnan regard him as the founder of their community, a wise and benevolent ruler who 'pacified and comforted' the peoples of Yunnan. Sayyid Ajall was officially the Director of Political Affairs of the Regional Secretariat of Yunnan... According to Chinese records, he introduced new agricultural technologies, constructed irrigation systems, and tried to raise living standards. Though a Muslims, he built or rebuilt Confucian temples and created a Confucian education system. His contemporary, He Hongzuo, the Regional Superintendent of Confucian studies, wrote that through his efforts 'the orangutans and butcherbirds became unicorns and phonixes and their felts and furs were exchanged for gowns and caps'...[page needed]
  24. ^M. Th Houtsma (1993).First encyclopaedia of Islam: 1913–1936.BRILL. p. 847.ISBN90-04-09796-1.Archivedfrom the original on September 27, 2023.RetrievedDecember 20,2011.Although Saiyid-i Adjall certainly did much for the propagation of Islam in Yunnan, it is his son Nasir al-Din to whom is ascribed the main credit for its dissemination. He was a minister and at first governed the province of Shansi: he later became governor of Yunnan where he died in 1292 and was succeeded by his brother Husain. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the direction of this movement was from the interior, from the north. The Muhammadan colonies on the coast were hardly affected by it. On the other hand it may safely be assumed that the Muslims of Yunnan remained in constant communication with those of the northern provinces of Shensi and Kansu.
  25. ^(Original from the University of Virginia)Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Jāmi'at al-Malik 'Abd al-'Azīz. Ma'had Shu'ūn al Aqallīyat al-Muslimah (1986).Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Volumes 7–8.The Institute. p. 174.Archivedfrom the original on September 27, 2023.RetrievedDecember 20,2011.from the Yuan Dynasty, and indicated further Muslim settlement in northeastern and especially southwestern Yunnan. Marco Polo, who travelled through Yunnan "Carajan" at the beginning of the Yuan period, noted the presence of "Saracens" among the population. Similarly, the Persian historian Rashid al-Din (died 1318 AD) recorded in his Jami' ut-Tawarikh that the 'great city of Yachi' in Yunnan was exclusively inhabited by Muslims.
  26. ^(Original from the University of Virginia)Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Jāmi'at al-Malik 'Abd al-'Azīz. Ma'had Shu'ūn al Aqallīyat al-Muslimah (1986).Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Volumes 7–8.The Institute. p. 387.Archivedfrom the original on September 27, 2023.RetrievedDecember 20,2011.when Maroco Polo visited Yunnan in the early Yuan period he noted the presence of "Saracens" among the population while the Persian historian Rashid al-Din (died 1318 AD) recorded in his Jami' ut-Tawarikh that 'the great city of Yachi' in Yunnan was exclusively inhabited by Muslims. Rashid al-Din may have been referring to the region around Ta-li in western Yunnan, which was to emerge as the earliest centre of Hui Muslim settlement in the province.
  27. ^( )Thant Myint-U (2011).Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia.Macmillan.ISBN978-1-4668-0127-1.Archivedfrom the original on September 27, 2023.RetrievedDecember 20,2011.In this way, Yunnan became known to the Islamic world. When Sayyid Ajall died in 1279 he was succeeded by his son Nasir al-Din who governed for give years and led the invasion of Burma. His younger brother became the Transport Commissioner and the entire family entrenched their influence.[page needed]
  28. ^(Original from the University of Virginia)Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Jāmi'at al-Malik 'Abd al-'Azīz. Ma'had Shu'ūn al Aqallīyat al-Muslimah (1986).Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Volumes 7–8.The Institute. p. 385.Archivedfrom the original on September 27, 2023.RetrievedDecember 20,2011.On his death he was succeeded by his eldest son, Nasir al-Din (Ch. Na-su-la-ting, the "Nescradin" of Marco Polo), who governed Yunnan between 1279 and I284. While Arab and South Asian Muslims, pioneers of the maritime expansion of Islam in the Bay of Bengal, must have visited the
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  32. ^Mark C. Elliott (2001).The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China(illustrated, reprint ed.). Stanford University Press. p. 242.ISBN0-8047-4684-2.RetrievedMarch 2,2012.famous Manchu figure of the early Qing who belonged to the Niohuru clan) would have been the unwieldy "Niu-gu-lu E-bi-long" in Chinese. Moreover, the characters used in names were typically chosen to represent the sounds of Manchu, and not to carry any particular meaning in Chinese. For educated Han Chinese accustomed to names composed of a familiar surname and one or two elegang characters drawn from a poem or a passage from the classics, Manchu names looked not just different, but absurd. What was oneo to make of a name like E-bi-long, written in Chinese characters meaning "repress-must flourish," or Duo-er-gun, meaning "numerous-thou-roll"? S.... To them they looked like nonsense.... But they are not nonsense in Manchu: "E-bi-long" is the transcription of ebilun, meaning "a delicate or sickly child," and "Duo-er-gun" is the Chinese transcription of dorgon, the Manchu word for badger.
  33. ^Mark C. Elliott (2001).The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China(illustrated, reprint ed.). Stanford University Press. p. 242.ISBN0-8047-4684-2.RetrievedMarch 2,2012.Thus we find names like Nikan (Chinese), Ajige (little), Asiha (young), Haha (nale), Mampi (knot—a reference to the hair?), Kara (black), Fulata (red-eyed), Necin (peaceful), Kirsa (steppe fox), Unahan (colt), Jumara (squirrel), Nimašan (sea eagle), Nomin (lapis lazuli), and Gacuha (toy made out of an animal's anklebone).44 Names such as Jalfungga (long-lived), Fulingga (lucky one), Fulungga (majestic), and Hūturingga (fortunate), were not unknown, either, particularly after the seventeenth century. Although mightily foreign when written as Zha-la-feng-a, Fu-ling-a, Fu-long-a, or Hu-tu-ling-ga
  34. ^Mark C. Elliott (2001).The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China(illustrated, reprint ed.). Stanford University Press. p. 243.ISBN0-8047-4684-2.Archivedfrom the original on January 5, 2014.RetrievedMarch 2,2012.While Chinese names, too, sometimes ended in characters with the sounds "zhu," "bao," and "tai," more often than not, such names in the Qing belonged to Manchus and other bannermen (Chinese bannermen and Mongols sometimes took Manchu-sounding names), even if the attached meaning is not clear (it is not certain that all names in fact had a specific meaning). Giving "numeral names" was another unique Manchu habit. These were names that actually referred to numbers. Sometimes they were given using Manchu numbers—for example, Nadanju (seventy) or Susai (fifty). Other times number names used the Manchu transcriptions of Chinese numbers, as in the name Loišici (= Liushi qi, "sixty-seven" ), Bašinu (= bashi wu, "eight-five" ).45 Such names, unheard of among the Han, were quite common among the Manchus, an appeared from time to time among Chinese bannermen. Popular curiosity about this odd custom in Qing was partly satisfied by the nineteenth-century bannerman-writer Fu-ge, who explained in his book of "jottings" that naming children for their grandparents' ages was a way of wishing longevity to the newly born.46
  35. ^Yu Hsiao-jung,Manchu Rule over China and the Attrition of the Manchu LanguageArchived19 June 2013 at theWayback Machine
  36. ^Edward J. M. Rhoads,Manchus & Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861–1928.University of Washington Press, 2000. Pages 52–54.ISBN0-295-98040-0.Partially availableon Google BooksArchived2023-09-27 at theWayback Machine
  37. ^Edward J. M. Rhoads (2001).Manchus & Han: ethnic relations and political power in late Qing and early republican China, 1861–1928(reprint, illustrated ed.). University of Washington Press. p. 56.ISBN9780295804125.Archivedfrom the original on January 5, 2014.RetrievedMarch 2,2012.At Xiuyan, in eastern Fengtian, the Manchus in the seventh or eighth generation continued as before to give their sons polysyllabic Manchu personal names that were meaningless when transliterated into Chinese, but at the same time they began to also give them Chinese names that were disyllabic and meaningful and that conformed to the generational principle. Thus, in the seventh generation of the Gūwalgiya lineage were sons with two names, one Manchu and one Chinese, such as Duolunbu/Shiman, Delinbu/Shizhu, and Tehengbu/Shizhen. Within the family and the banner, these boys used their Manchu name, but outside they used their Han-style name. Then, from the eighth or ninth generation one, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Gūwalgiya at Xiuyan stopped giving polysyllabic Manchu names to their sons, who thereafter used Chinese names exclusively.
  38. ^Edward J. M. Rhoads (2001).Manchus & Han: ethnic relations and political power in late Qing and early republican China, 1861–1928(reprint, illustrated ed.). University of Washington Press. p. 56.ISBN9780295804125.Archivedfrom the original on January 5, 2014.RetrievedMarch 2,2012.and when the ancient and politically prominent Manchu lineage of Niohuru adopted the Han-style surname Lang, he ridiculed them for having "forgotten their roots." (The Niohuru, whose name was derived from niohe, Manchu for wolf, "had chosen Lang as their surname because it was a homophone for the Chinese word for" wolf. ")
  39. ^Edward J. M. Rhoads (2001).Manchus & Han: ethnic relations and political power in late Qing and early republican China, 1861–1928(reprint, illustrated ed.). University of Washington Press. p. 56.ISBN9780295804125.Archivedfrom the original on January 5, 2014.RetrievedMarch 2,2012.Manchu men had abandoned their original polysyllabic personal names infavor of Han-style disyllabic names; they had adopted the Han practice of choosing characters with auspicious meanings for the names; and they had assigned names on a generational basis.... Except among some Hanjun such as the two Zhao brothers, bannermen still did not, by and large, use their
  40. ^Edward J. M. Rhoads (2001).Manchus & Han: ethnic relations and political power in late Qing and early republican China, 1861–1928(reprint, illustrated ed.). University of Washington Press. p. 57.ISBN9780295804125.Archivedfrom the original on January 5, 2014.RetrievedMarch 2,2012.family name but called themselves only by their personal name—for example, Yikuang, Ronglu, Gangyi, Duanfang, Xiliang, and Tieliang. In this respect, most Manchus remained conspicuously different from Han.
  41. ^Mark C. Elliott (2001).The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China(illustrated, reprint ed.). Stanford University Press. p. 241.ISBN0-8047-4684-2.Archivedfrom the original on December 31, 2013.RetrievedMarch 2,2012.Chinese names consist typically of a single-character surname and a given name of one or two characters, the latter usually chosen for their auspicious meaning. Manchu names were different. For one thing, Manchus did not commonly employ surnames, identifying themselves usually by their banner affiliation rather than by their lineage. Even if they had customarily used both surname and given name, this would not have eliminated the difference with Han names, since Manchu names of any kind were very often longer than two characters—that is, two syllables— in length. Where a Han name (to pick at random two names from the eighteenth century) might read Zhang Tingyu or Dai Zhen, the full name of, say, Ebilun (a
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  66. ^"Starting Anew on Taiwan".Hoover Institution. 2008. Archived fromthe originalon 2009-04-08.Retrieved2009-06-05.The new KMT concluded that it must "Sinicize" Taiwan if it were ever to unify mainland China. Textbooks were designed to teach young people the dialect of North China as a national language. Pupils also were taught to revere Confucian ethics, to develop Han Chinese nationalism, and to accept Taiwan as a part of China.
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