Wikipedia

Nikolai Vatutin

In this name that followsEastern Slavic naming customs,thepatronymicisFyodorovichand thefamily nameisVatutin.

Nikolai Fyodorovich Vatutin(Russian:Николай Фёдорович Ватутин;16 December 1901 – 15 April 1944) was aSovietmilitary commander duringWorld War IIwho was responsible for manyRed Armyoperations in theUkrainian SSRas the commander of theSouthwestern Front,[1]and of theVoronezh Frontduring theBattle of Kursk.[2]During theSoviet offensive to retake right-bank Ukraine,Vatutin led the1st Ukrainian Front,which was responsible for the Red Army's offensives to the west and the southwest ofKievand the eventualliberation of the city.[3]

Nikolai Vatutin
Vatutinc.1940s
Native name
Николай Фёдорович Ватутин
Nickname(s)Grandmaster
General Offensive
Born(1901-12-16)16 December 1901
Chepukhino,Voronezh Governorate,Russian Empire(now inBelgorod Oblast,Russia)
Died15 April 1944(1944-04-15)(aged 42)
Kiev,Ukrainian SSR,Soviet Union
AllegianceSoviet Union
Years of service1920–1944
RankArmy General
Commands
Battles / wars
Awards
ChildrenElena (1930–?)
Viktor (1932–?)
RelationsTatiana Romanovna Vatutina (wife)
Jelena (daughter, 1930–2016)
Viktor (son, 1932–?)
Signature

He was ambushed and mortally wounded in February 1944 by theUkrainian Insurgent Army.

Early life

edit

Vatutin was born inChepukhinovillage in theValuysky Uyezd,Voronezh Governorate(namedVatutino,Belgorod Oblastafter him in 1968), into a peasant family ofRussianethnicity.[4]

Pre-war military service

edit

Commissioned in 1920 to theRed Army,he fought against thepeasant partisansof the anarchistNestor Makhno.The following year, he became a member of theRussian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)and served diligently in junior command positions. From 1926, he spent the next decade alternating service with studies in the eliteFrunze Military Academyand theGeneral Staff Academy.The 1937–1938purge of Red Army commandersopened the road to his promotion. In 1938, he received the rank ofKomdiv,and he was appointed Chief of Staff of the importantKiev Special Military District.Throughout that period, Vatutin combined military service with intensive party activities.

In 1939, Vatutin planned operations for theSoviet invasion of Polandin conjunction with theGerman invasion.He served as Chief of Staff of the Red Army Southern Group. In 1940, under the command ofGeorgy Zhukov,that groupseized BessarabiafromRomania.As a reward for the non-combat campaigns,Joseph Stalinpromoted him to the rank oflieutenant generaland appointed him to the critical post of Chief of theOperational Directorateof theGeneral Staff.Vatutin was, however, not up to his new appointment. While innovative and hard-working, he lacked any combat experience, and his knowledge of operational art and strategy was too abstract. Still, his peasant roots, relative youthful age and party zeal made him one of Stalin's few favorites in the Soviet military. Vatutin, together with the rest of the Red Army high command, failed to prepare the army for theGerman attack of 22 June 1941.

On 30 June 1941, he was appointed Chief of Staff of theNorth-Western Front,which enabled him to exercise his better qualities. In that role, Vatutin did not try to claim success for himself in battles, but he made a point of identifying and promoting talented subordinates. He was notable for his audacity. Most of the Soviet generals, shattered by defeats, were then reluctant to carry out offensive operations, but Vatutin thrived on attack.

The Battles in North

edit
Vatutin (2nd from right) with other officers of the Northwestern Front, February 1942

The Northwestern Front was defendingLeningradfrom the approaches by theGerman Army Group North,spearheaded by the armored corps led byErich von Manstein.Vatutin took command of the Soviet forces nearNovgorod,rallied them for offense, and attempted to encircle a largeGermanforce. He surprised Manstein, put him on the defensive, and forced the entire German Army Group North to regroup its troops to halt the Soviet offensive.[citation needed]TheWehrmachtlost the precious summer season needed for an effective attack on Leningrad, and the Red Army got additional time to strengthen the fortifications of the city. The Germans thus failed in their best shot to capture Leningrad, one of the key German strategic failures during the early phase of war. Vatutin's immediate operational results were far less impressive. He overestimated the capacities of his troops and created overly ambitious objectives, and his coordination of his forces and control over the unfolding of the battle were poor. Additionally, he did not take into account the difficult terrain, which benefited the German defenses and slowed his attack. Vatutin's casualty figures were staggering and in one army reached nearly 60%. The ineptitude of his subordinate commanders exacerbated Vatutin's own shortcomings. One striking exception to that pattern of deficiency was the brilliance ofIvan Chernyakhovsky,an obscure young colonel in command of the 28th Tank Division. Both men had much in common, most prominently their penchant for unorthodox approaches to military art, and soon became close friends.

In January 1942, during the Sovietwinter offensiveafter the Red Army victory at theBattle of Moscow,Vatutin's forces trapped two German corps inDemyanskand achieved the first large Soviet encirclement of German forces. The German and the Soviet Armies were equal in size. During the battle, Vatutin employed innovative tactics and actions, but the Germans responded more conventionally. The Red Army was unable to destroy the German defenses, mainly because of the weakness of theSoviet Air Force.

In April 1942, Vatutin finally breached the German lines just as a German relief force arrived. However, post-warAmericanexperts have evaluated the result of that operation as a draw. The German command drew self-congratulatory and misleading lessons from their narrow escape by concluding that they could overcome Soviet encirclements with supplies from the air while mounting a relief operation. That thinking contributed to theWehrmacht's disaster at theBattle of Stalingradsince the Soviet Air Force proved much more capable of disrupting theLuftwaffe's resupply efforts.

Voronezh and Stalingrad

edit

From early May to July 1942, Vatutin served briefly as deputy of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army until theGerman Army Group Southembarked on its huge strategic offense,Operation Blau.Initially, the Germans' assault focused onVoronezh.They wanted to breach the Soviet front line at theBattle of Voronezhand then to attack theSoviet Southern Frontand theSouthwestern Frontfrom the rear. On 1 July 1942, Stalin sent Vatutin as an all-powerfulStavkarepresentative to the criticalBryansk Front;within a few days, it was renamed asVoronezh Frontand placed under Vatutin's command.

During the battle, Vatutin again met Chernyakhovsky, who had just been appointed commander of the 18th Tank Corps of the 60th Army. The German attack was on the verge of breaching the Soviet front line when Cherniakhovsky's corps arrived by train. He unloaded one of his brigades and, without waiting for the rest of his troops, led that brigade against the German forces, and threw them back. After that action, Vatutin asked Stalin to give command of the 60th army to Cherniakhovsky. Initially, Stalin opposed the request, mostly because he had reservations about appointing such a young general to lead a field army. However, Vatutin finally convinced Stalin to promote Cherniakhovsky, who would rapidly rise to become one of the major Red Army field commanders.

Although the Germans captured the city, their attempt to breach Vatutin's front line failed. The Germans abandoned their initial plan and shifted their efforts towardStalingrad.On 22 October 1942, Vatutin received command of the newly-formedSouthwestern Frontand played an important role in planning the Soviet counter-offensive and the encirclement of theGerman 6th Armyin theBattle of Stalingrad.In December 1942, to secure the Soviet ring around Stalingrad, Vatutin's forces encircled and destroyed two thirds of the 130,000-strongItalian 8th Armyin operationLittle Saturn.That contributed to the defeat of Manstein'sOperation Wintergewitter( "Winter Storm" ), the relief effort for the 6th Army.

Kharkov and Kursk

edit

In January 1943, Vatutin's Southwest Front drove the Germans fromEastern Ukraine.His actions enabled the Voronezh Front under GeneralFilipp Golikovto captureKharkov,but he had overextended his depleted troops and not paid sufficient attention to the changing strategic situation. In February 1943, Manstein, using the forces extricated from the Caucasus, took advantage of Vatutin's lapse in situational awareness and managed to surprise and to defeat Vatutin south of Kharkov, which led to the encirclement of Golikov's advance troops in Kharkov and the recapture of the city at theThird Battle of Kharkov.The Stavka removed Golikov from his command but did not see Vatutin's debacle as significant. Vatutin's audacity made Stalin award him the rank ofArmy General.

Vatutin in 1943

On 28 March 1943, Vatutin took command of the Voronezh Front, which was preparing for the momentousBattle of Kursk.At Kursk, he rejected conventional echeloning of armies, and his innovative deployment allowed him to not only conduct a skillful defence against the technically superior Germans, but also gave him the opportunity to quickly switch from defense to offense. Following the Soviet victory at Kursk,Belgorodwas recaptured.

Recapture of Kiev and Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket

edit

After the Soviet victory at Kursk, Vatutin now aspired to retakeKiev.He regrouped his forces and surprised Manstein by sweeping tank forces through swampland and scattering the Germans from the unexpected direction. On 6 November 1943,Kiev was retaken.Vatutin relentlessly exploited his victory in Kiev, pushed deep into the German defenses, and destroyed the German defensive line. However, Vatutin overextended his armies, and Manstein used his reserve forces in theXLVIII Panzerkorpsto counterattack. At the Battle ofRadomyshl(6–15 November 1943) and the Battle of the Meleni Pocket (16–23 December 1943), Manstein unleashed successful counter-attacks, which took terrain back and inflicted heavy losses on the Red Army's forces.[5]

Regaining the initiative in winter weather, Vatutin's front and the 2nd Ukrainian Front of Army GeneralIvan Konevcarried out in January the sudden encirclement of theKorsunsalientat theDnieper Riverduring theKorsun–Shevchenkovsky Offensive.Although Vatutin started the operation two days after Konev and his striking formation, and the6th Tank Armyhad been only recently formed, Vatutin achieved the element of surprise by committing his tanks to the battle from the first echelon and once again attacking from unexpected terrain. That allowed the 6th Tank Army to penetrate deep into German defenses, and on 3 February, it linked with the advancing armor of Konev's front and trapped 56,000 German troops. By 17 February, Vatutin and Konev's forces had eliminated theKorsun-Cherkassy Pocket,but many of the encircled troops had managed to escape.

Death

edit

On 28 February 1944, Vatutin, regrouping for a new operation and heading toSlavuta(Khmelnytskyi Oblast), was ambushed byUkrainian Insurgent Army(UPA) insurgents far behind the front lines near the village of Myliatyn inOstroh Raion(Rivne Oblast). He died ofsepsis,caused by the injuries, in a hospital at Kiev six weeks later. Vatutin's brothers, Afanasy Fyodorovich and Semyon Fyodorovich, were killed in action in February and March 1944. Their mother, Vera Yefimovna, buried her three sons in two months.[6]

Nikolai Vatutin was given a state funeral inKievand was succeeded byGeorgy Zhukov.

After the war, theChekistsdocumented two more versions of the attack on Vatutin. During one of the Chekist operations, on January 15, 1946, Fedir Vorobets (Vereshchak), the former commander of the "Tiutiunnyk" UPA group, was captured. During one of the interrogations, he said that the attack on Nikolai Vatutin had taken place in the area ofSotniaof Derkach and had been one by units of theSluzhba Bezpeky(OUN Security Service) in the villages of Mikhalkivtsi and Siancy of Ostrovsky district ofRivne region.According to various sources, 17 to 27 fighters took part in the operation.

Another version of Vatutin's death was told in the 1990s by the UPA veteran Yevhen Basyuk ( "Chernomorets" ). According to him, a detachment of 30 people under the command of Primak ( "Troian" ) took part in the clash with the general's bodyguard. When the column appeared, the UPA soldiers unloaded the carts of the convoy, which had been seized from the Red Army, and the carts opened fire spontaneously without any ambush.[7]

Vatutin was buried inKiev'sMariinskyi Parknear theUkrainian Parliament.[8][9][10]Amonument dedicated to himwas erected at his burial site in 1948.[11]This monument was designed by a prominent SovietsculptorYevgeny Vuchetich.[12]TheKyiv City State Administrationdismantled the Vatutin monument on 9 February 2023.[8][13]In June 2017, theKyiv City Councilhad already renamed the city's General Vatutin Avenue intoRoman ShukhevychAvenue.[14][15]During the war Shukhevych fought against Soviet forces, first being a company commander and the highest-ranking Ukrainian officer in theNachtigall Battalion,then serving as an officer in theSchutzmannschaft Battalion 201,and later becoming one of the military leaders of UPA.[16]

Legacy

edit

His influence on the Red Army strategic planning, operational, and tactical techniques continued even after his death. After theCold War,a decline in Germanocentric analyses of theEastern Fronthas made Vatutin win recognition among Western military experts as one of World War II's most creative commanders:

At Kursk, Vatutin was able to stop Manstein's powerful armoured spearheads well short of their objectives and then shift to a counteroffensive that shattered the German front. Vatutin surprised Manstein at Belgorod in August and thoroughly outmanoeuvred him at Kiev in December. Vatutin demonstrated great flexibility during the Korsun offensive, taking advantage of fleeting opportunities rather than reinforcing failure, which resulted in his armour encircling two German corps. However, Vatutin was unable to prevent Manstein from relieving the Korsun Pocket, but this limited success squandered Manstein's last operational reserves. Vatutin would surely have played a major role in finishing off Manstein's command in the Kamenets-Podolsky offensive if Ukrainian partisans had not fatally wounded him after Korsun. Nevertheless, Vatutin had demonstrated that Manstein's style ofBewegungskriegdid not work against a steady opponent and that the Red Army had some commanders who could turn the tables and conduct a form of manoeuvre warfare that astonished even Manstein.[17]

In November 2014, theUkrainian Institute of National Memoryincluded Vatutin on the list of 'persons involved in the struggle against Ukraine's independence, the organization offamines,andpolitical repressions.'[10]

On 9 February 2023, amonument to Vatutinatop his grave in Kyiv'sMariinskyi Parkwas dismantled and relocated to the local Aviation Museum.[13]Also in February 2023, the village ofVatutinein northeastern Ukraine, previously named for Vatutin, was set to be renamedZaluzhne,after Ukrainian generalValerii Zaluzhnyi.[18]On 11 November 2023 theCabinet of Ministers of Ukraineremoved the status of monument from the grave of Vatutin that was still existing at the feet of the then already removed monument in order to comply with2023 derussification-laws.[19]

In April 2023 thePoltavaCity Council voted to dismantle the monument to Vatutin in this city.[20]

References

edit
  1. ^Keegan, pp. 106–107
  2. ^Keegan, pp. 124–125
  3. ^Keegan, pp. 126–127
  4. ^Герой Советского Союза Ватутин Николай Фёдорович:: Герои страны.Warheroes.ru. Retrieved on 16 May 2016.
  5. ^Newton, Steven H. (2005).Panzer Operations: The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941–1945.Cambridge, MA.:Da Capo Press.pp. 256–262.ISBN0-306-81409-9.
  6. ^Russian: Каманин, Н.П., "Летчики и космонавты", М, 1971, p.269. Some sources give the date of the attack as 29 February and the date of Vatutin's death as 15 April.
  7. ^Гогун А. Как погиб генерал Ватутин // Посев, 2004 год, No. 5 (1520)
  8. ^ab(in Ukrainian)Minkult allowed the dismantling of monuments to Chkalov and Vatutin in Kyiv: the first is already being demolished,Ukrainska Pravda(8 February 2023)
  9. ^(in Russian)Monument to General Vatutin continue to stand outside the building in Kyiv, Rada,RIA Novosti(30 June 2016)
  10. ^ab(in Ukrainian)Vatutin's monument in Kyiv: to be or not to be a monument to a Soviet general?,Radio Free Europe(9 May 2020)
  11. ^(in Ukrainian)Vatutina's grandson: if you carry the grave from Kyiv, then with military honors,Radio Free Europe(9 May 2020)
  12. ^(in Ukrainian)Minkultura recommends that Kyiv dismantle the Vatutin monument near the Verkhovna Rada,Ukrainska Pravda(27 January 2023)
  13. ^ab(in Ukrainian)Mariinsky Park without Vatutin. The monument to the Soviet general was finally demolished,Ukrainska Pravda – Zhyttia(9 February 2023)
  14. ^"Kyiv's General Vatutin Avenue renamed Roman Shukhevych Avenue".Kyiv Post.1 June 2017.
  15. ^"Court leaves avenues named after Bandera, Shukhevych in Kyiv".Kyiv Post.9 December 2019.
  16. ^Rudling, Per Anders (2016)."The Cult of Roman Shukhevych in Ukraine: Myth Making with Complications"(PDF).Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies.5(1): 26–65.doi:10.1163/22116257-00501003.
  17. ^Forczyk, Dr. Robert (2010).Erich von Manstein: leadership, strategy conflict.Oxford:Osprey Publishing.p. 57.ISBN978-1-84603-465-7.OCLC436030170.
  18. ^"Ukrainian village renamed after top general fighting Russia".
  19. ^"The government has adopted a decision that removes the protection status from a number of monuments of the Soviet and imperial era"(in Ukrainian).Istorychna Pravda.11 November 2023.Retrieved15 November2023.
  20. ^"Poltava decided to demolish monuments to two Soviet generals and Pushkin".Ukrayinska Pravda(in Ukrainian). 7 April 2023.Retrieved14 April2023.

Sources

edit

Further reading

edit
  • David Glantz,"Vatutin" in Harold Shukman, ed.,Stalin's Generals(New York, NY, 1993), pp. 287–298.
  • David Glantz,Jonathan M. House,When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler(Lawrence, KS, 1995).
  • David Glantz, Jonathan M. House,The Battle of Kursk(Lawrence, KS, 1999).
  • David Glantz,The Battle for Leningrad, 1941–1944(Lawrence, KS, 2002).
edit
Wikimedia Commons has media related toNikolai Vatutin.

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Nikolai_Vatutin&oldid=1253501751"