Wikipedia

Neo-Ba'athism

(Redirected fromAssadism)

Neo-Ba'athismis afar-left[1]variant ofBa'athismthat became the state ideology ofBa'athist Syria,afterArab Socialist Ba'ath party's sixth national congress in September 1963. As a result of the1966 Syrian coup d'étatlaunched by theneo-Ba'athist military committeeled bySalah JadidandHafez al-Assad,Ba'ath party'sSyrian regional branchwas transformed into amilitaristorganization that became completely independent of theNational Commandof the originalBa'ath Party.

Theflag of the United Arab Republicthat was readopted byBa'athist Syria,used from 1980 to 2024, is commonly used to represent Neo-Ba'athism. This flag is used as a symbol by loyalists of the deposed regime.

Neo-Ba'athism has been described as a divergence from Ba'athism proper that had gone beyond itspan-Arabistideological basis by stressing the precedent of themilitaryand purging the classical Ba'athist leadership of the old guard, includingMichel AflaqandSalah al-Din al-Bitar.[2][3]The Neo-Ba'athist regime in Syria, which espousedradical leftideologies such asrevolutionary socialism[4]andMarxism,abandonedpan-Arabism,sought to strengthen ties with theSoviet Union,and came into conflict withArab nationalistssuch asNasseristsand theIraqi Ba'athists,particularlySaddamists,with whom theymaintained a bitter rivalry.[5]From their seizure of power in theSyrian Arab Republicas a result of the1963 Syrian coup d'état,neo-Ba'athist officers purged traditional civilian elites to establish amilitary dictatorshipoperating intotalitarianlines.[6]

Neo-Ba'athism is primarily associated withAssadism,based on the policies of the successive governments of Hafez al-Assad and his sonBashar al-Assad.This system was largely characterized bynepotismandsectarianism,with Hafez al-Assad's seizure of power in the1970 Syrian coup d'étatleading to the consolidation ofAlawiteminority dominancewithin the military and security forces.[7]State propaganda portrayed Assadism as a neo-Ba'athist current that evolved Ba'athist ideology with the needs of the modern era.[8]Neo-Ba'athism has been criticized by the founder of Ba'athist ideology, Michel Aflaq, for diverging from the original principles of Ba'athism.[9]

Aseries of revolutionary offensiveslaunched by theMilitary Operations Commandand allied militias in late 2024 led to thecollapse of the Assad regimein December 2024. Since then, remnants of the Ba'athist military apparatus andAssad familyloyalists have engaged inviolent clashesacross Alawite strongholds inLatakia,Tartusand parts of Western Syria.[10][11]

Ideology

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Salah Jadid,strongman and leader of the1966 Syrian coup d'étatthat brought neo-Ba'athists to power

The pro-Marxistresolutions and declarations, such as the espousal of "class struggle"and"scientific socialism",adopted by the Ba'ath party during its 6th national congress set the ideological foundation of neo-Ba'athism. Between 1963 and 1966, neo-Ba'athists exercised thede-factopolitical power in Ba'athist Syria and were able to steer their ideological goals through the 1963 provisional Ba'athist constitution and its 1964 amendment. They also carried out purges within theSyrian Arab Armed Forces,as part of their efforts to subordinate the civilian old guard of theNational Command of the Ba'ath Partyand create an "ideological army" that was loyal to neo-Ba'athist officers. In foreign policy, neo-Ba'athists favoured theSocialist Blocand were proponents of establishing a close alliance with theSoviet Union.TheMaoistmilitary concept of "people's war of liberation"played a central role in neo-Ba'athist ideology, and this was reflected in Ba'athist Syria's endorsement of socialist and left-wingPalestinian fedayeengroups in their guerrilla war against Israelis. In the economic sphere, neo-Ba'athists faoured the establishment of a socialistcommand economic system;and advocated the nationalization of private industries and radical land confiscation policies.[12]

Neo-Ba'athism advocated the creation of a "vanguard"ofleftistrevolutionaries committed to build anegalitarian,socialist statein Syria and other Arab countries before making steps to achieve pan-Arab unity. The vanguard organisation in neo-Ba'athist ideology was the Arab Socialist Ba'ath party; which advocatedclass-struggleagainst the traditional Syrian economic elite classes; the big agriculturalists, industrialists, bourgeoisie and feudal landlords. By the 1970s, 85% of agricultural lands were distributed to landless peasant populations and tenant farmers. Banks, oil companies, power production and 90% of large-scale industries were nationalised. The neo-Ba'athists faction led bySalah Jadidconcentrated on organizing the Syrian economy along socialist lines and exporting the doctrines of class-conflict and militantsocialist revolutionto the neighbouring countries. This view was challenged by GeneralHafez al-Assadand his neo-Ba'ath faction; who were proponents of a military-centric approach and focused on a strategy of strengthening theSyrian militaryto defend thesocialist governmentagainst imperialist forces and their alleged internal collaborators. Assad favoured reconciliation of various leftist factions and pursued better relations with other Arab states. Although majority of the party members favoured Salah, Hafez was able to gain the upperhand following the events of the1970 coupdubbed the "Corrective Movement" in official Syrian Ba'ath history. Assad's victory also marked the supersedure of the military over the Ba'ath party structures; making the armed forces a central centre of political power.[13][14][15][16]

The 6th National Congress of the Ba'ath party declared the party's ideological end-goal to be the socialist transformation of society through aLeniniststrategy.Some Theoretical Propositions,a core ideological document adopted by the congress stated: "Socialismis the true goal of Arab unity.... Arab unity is the obligatory basis for constructing a socialist society. "Thus, neo-Ba'athists viewed pan-Arabism as a means to achieve their radical socialist objectives.[17]

Stance on religion

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Neo-Ba'athism viewsreligionas the "foremost symbol of reaction" preventing the birth of a modernsocialistsociety, and advocate strict state supervision over religious activities for sustaining what its ideologues regard as a healthy,secularistsociety. DuringSalah Jadid's reign in power, the Ba'ath postured itself as a stronglyanti-religiouspolitical entity; adhering to theMarxist–Leninistapproach of top-down regimentation of the society throughliquidationof what it regarded as "reactionary"classes such as the traditionalulema.TheGrand Mufti's official status was downgraded by the Ba'athist government and the conventional role of religious clergy in state functioning was curtailed. While state ministers, officials, educators, etc. regularly preached about the "perils of religion"; party periodicals and magazines during the 1960s regularly made predictions about the "impending demise" of religion through thesocialist revolution.[18]

During the rule of Salah Jadid, neo-Ba'athist ideologues openly denounced religion as a source of what they considered as the backwardness of the Arabs.[19]Following popular revulsion at Jadid's blatant anti-religious policies, Hafez al-Assad began to tone down thesecularisationprogramme during the 1970s, by co-opting some pro-government clerics likeRamadan al-Boutito counter the Islamic opposition and granted them a degree of autonomy from the regime. Simultaneously, the regime began the "nationalization"of religious discourse through a loyal clerical network, and condemned anyone deviating from the state-promoted" Ba'thist version of Islam "as a threat to the society.[20]The state-sponsored religious discourse during the rule of Hafez al-Assad promoted aleft-wing nationalistworldview that sought to anathematize Islamists and re-inforce loyalty towards the Alawite president.[21]

Criticism

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Salah al-Din al-Bitar,a member of the classical Ba'athist leadership, stated that the1966 Syrian coup d'état"marked the end of Ba'athist politics in Syria". Ba'ath party founderMichel Aflaqshared the sentiment by stating, "I no longer recognise my party!"[9]

According toJamal al-Atassi,co-founder of theArab Ba'ath Party,stated that "Assadism is a falsenationalism.It's the domination of a minority, and I'm not talking just of the Alawites, who control the society's nervous system. I include also the army and themukhabarat.[...] And despite itssocialistslogans, the state is run by a class who has made a fortune without contributing—anouvellebourgeoisieparasitaire."[22]

President of theUnited Arab Republic,Gamal Abdel Nasser,accused the neo-Ba'athists of Syria ofanti-religionandsectarianism.[23]

History

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Neo-Ba'athist domination of Syrian Ba'ath party: 1963 – 66

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Military Committee membersSalim Hatum(left),Muhammad Umran(center) andSalah Jadid(right) celebrating after the 1963 coup d'état

Following theseizure of power in 1963by the neo-Ba'athist military committe, the Syrian regional branch of the Ba'ath party experienced severe factionalism and splintering, leading to a succession of governments and new constitutions.[24]One of the most consequential outcomes of the coup and subsequent purges was the dominance of Alawite commanders in theneo-Ba'athistofficer corps, who assumed control of theBa'athist Syrian military forces.[25]The neo-Ba'athist radicals, who dominated the Syrian regional structures of theBa'ath party,initiated a power struggle against the party's old guard, culminating in the1966 neo-Ba'athist coup.[26][27]

The neo-Ba'athist military officers, through their increased political and military influence, began initiating pruges across bureacratic structures of the Syrian state and rapidly monopolized control over various organs of the Syrian Ba'ath party. Military Ba'athists also took control of theNational Council for the Revolutionary Command(NCRC), which exercised thede-factopower in the new Ba'athist regime in Syria. Civilian wing of the Ba'ath party, consisting of classical Ba'athists led byAflaqandBitar,had little influence over the ideological direction of the Syrian regional branch. During the sixth national congress of the Ba'ath party, officers of the Ba'athist military committe, in collaboration with radical leftists, formally gained ideological and political control of the Syrian regional branch of the Ba'ath party. The ideological programme and political platform adopted by the Syrian Ba'ath party during the 6th National Congress of the Ba'ath party in September 1963 became the official doctrine of the neo-Ba'ath and the state ideology of Ba'athist Syria. Subsequently, the Ba'athist regime began implementing its social, economic and political policies across Syria, which imposed the neo-Ba'athist agenda.[28][29][30]

The far-leftneo-Ba'athisttendency gained control of the Syrian regional branch at the Ba'ath party's 6th National Congress of 1963, where hardliners from the dominant Syrian and Iraqi regional parties joined forces to impose a radical leftist line, which advocated the imposition of "socialist planning",[31]"collective farmsrun by peasants "," workers' democratic control of the means of production ", a party based on workers and peasants, and other demands reflecting emulation ofSoviet-style socialism.[32]In a coded attack onMichel Aflaq,the congress also condemned "ideological notability", criticizing his middle-class background, within the party.[33]Aflaq, angry at this transformation of his party, retained a nominal leadership role, but theNational Commandas a whole came under the control of the radicals.[34]

In line with their clandestine vanguardist nature, the neo-Ba'athists ignored efforts to gain popular support and moved to consolidate their control over the Ba'athist Syrian military apparatus.[35]Hundreds of Syrian military officers were purged, and neo-Ba'athist recruits were installed at senior positions of theSyrian Arab Armed Forces.[36]Most of the newly recruited Ba'athist officers came from the countryside or from a low social class.[37]The neo-Ba'athist officer corps had a predominantly rural background and many Ba'athist recruits were "the kinsmen of the leading minority officers".[38]The neo-Ba'athist movement had a minoritarian character and was dominated byAlawite,Druze,andIsma'ilirural recruits from the countryside. Its opponents were primarilySunni Muslimsand non-Sunnis from urban backgrounds.[39]

After pushing out the Aflaqites during the 6th National Ba'ath Party Congress, theMilitary Committeeand its supporters incorporated a new radicalized form of Ba'athism – a Ba'athism strongly influenced byMarxism–Leninism- as the official ideology of the Syrian regional branch of the Ba'ath party.[40]This new form of Ba'athism laid emphasis on "revolution in one country" rather than the classical Ba'athist goal of a Pan-Arab union.[41]At the same time, the 6th National Congress implemented a resolution which stressed the implementation of asocialist revolutionin Syria.[42]Under thisform of socialism,neo-Ba'athists envisioned the establishment of a Soviet-stylecommand economicsystem, the nationalization of banks,foreign trade,large and medium industries, etc. as well as the replacement of private enterprise with state planning and investment.[43]They believed these policies would endexploitation of labour,thatcapitalismwould disappear, and in agriculture they envisioned a plan were land was given "to he who works it".[44]These changes and more refashioned the Syrian Ba'ath Party into aLeninist organization.[45]

Syrian Ba'ath party's left-wing argued that thebourgeoisiecould never be won over unless they were given total control over the economy.[46]It was this power struggle between the Aflaqites who dominated theNational Commandof the Ba'ath Party and the radicals who dominated theSyrian Regional Commandof the Ba'ath Party which led to the neo-Ba'athist coup d'état in 1966.[47]Between 1963 and 1966, neo-Ba'athist radicals, who controlled the Ba'athist Syrian military apparatus, steadily amassed power and influence within the Syrian regional wing of the Ba'ath party.[48]

According toMunif al-Razzaz,the last secretary general of theNational Commandof the originalBa'ath Party,from 1961 onwards, there existed two Ba'ath parties – "themilitary Ba'ath Partyand the Ba'ath Party, and real power lay with the former. "[49]He also argued that the military Ba'ath was "little more than a military clique with civilian hangers-on; and that from the initial founding of the Military Committee by disgruntled Syrian officers exiled in Cairo in 1959, the chain of events and the total corruption of Ba'athism proceeded with intolerable logic."[50]

1966 Neo-Ba'athist coup and Ba'ath Party schism

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1966 neo-Ba'athist coup d'état marked the complete structural transformation of the Ba'ath party's Syrian regional branch into amilitaristneo-Ba'ath organization which became independent of theNational Commandof the originalBa'ath party.[51]Following its violent seizure of power, which resulted in the killing of approximately 400 people,[52]the neo-Ba'athistmilitary committeepurged the old guard Ba'athist leaders likeMichel AflaqandSalah al-Din Bitar.[53]This coup led to a permanent schism between the Syrian andIraqi regional branchesof the Ba'ath Party, and many Syrian Ba'athist leaders defected to Iraq.[54]

The ousting of Aflaq, Bitar, and the National Command became the deepest schism in the Ba'ath movement's history.[55]The 1966 coup brought a new generation of radical leftist leaders to power who had different ideological aims than their predecessors.[56]While Aflaq and Bitar still had supporters in Syria and in non-Syrian Regional Branches, they were hampered by the lack of financial means – the neo-Ba'athist Syrian Regional Branch of the Ba'ath party had funded them since 1963.[57]Jadid and his supporters now had the Ba'athist Syrian state under their formal political control. While neo-Ba'athists were theoretically able to establish new party organisations or coerce pro-Aflaq opinion, this failed to work since most of the regional branches of the Ba'ath party changed their allegiance to Baghdad.[58]Later in 1966, the first post-Aflaqite National Congress, officially designated the 9th, was held, and a new National Command was elected.[59]Following the 1966 neo-Ba'athist coup, the National Command became subservient in all but name to the Syrian Regional Command, and ceased to have an effective role in Arab or Syrian politics.[60]

Following the exile of the National Command, some of its members, including Hafiz, convened the 9th Ba'ath National Congress (to differentiate it from the Syrian "9th National Congress" ) and elected a new National Command, with Aflaq, who did not attend the congress, as the National Command's Secretary General.[61]For those like Bitar and Razzaz, the exile from Syria was too hard, and they left the party.[62]Michel Aflaqmoved toBrazil,remaining there until 1968.[63]

When theNational Command of the Ba'ath partywas toppled in 1966, the Iraqi Regional Branch of the Ba'ath party remained supportive of what it viewed as the "legitimate leadership" of Michel Aflaq.[64]When the Iraqi Ba'ath party gained power in 1968 in the17 July Revolutionno attempts were made at a merger, to achieve their supposed goal ofArab unity,or reconciliation with the Syrian Ba'ath.[65]After the establishment of Ba'ath rule in Iraq, many members of the Syrian-dominated Ba'ath movement defected to its Iraqi-counterpart, few if any Iraqi-loyal Ba'athists attempted to change its allegiance to Damascus.[66]The reason for this was that those defecting from Damascus were loyal to the old, Aflaqite National Command.[67]Several older members such as Bitar, Hafiz,Shibli al-AysamiandElias Farah,either visited Iraq or sent a congratulatory message toAhmed Hassan al-Bakr,the Regional Secretary of theIraqi Regional Command.[68]Aflaq did not visit Iraq until 1969, but from late 1970, he would become a leading Iraqi Ba'ath official,[69]although he never acquired any decision-making power.[70]

From the beginning, the neo-Ba'athist regime in Damascus launched an overwhelmingly anti-Iraqi Ba'athist propaganda campaign, to which their counterparts in Baghdad responded.[71]TheSyrian Ba'ath partydenounced Aflaq as a "thief" and claimed that he had stolen the Ba'athist ideology fromZaki al-Arsuziand proclaimed it as his own,[72]with Assad hailing Arsuzi as the principal founder of Ba'athist thought.[73]The Iraqi Regional Branch, however, still proclaimed Aflaq as the founder of Ba'athism.[74]Assad referred to Arsuzi as the "greatest Syrian of his day" and claimed him to be the "first to conceive of the Ba'ath as a political movement."[75]Bitar was sentenced to death "in absentia" in 1969,[76][77]and Aflaq was condemned to deathin absentiain 1971 by Assad's regime.[78]The Syrian Regional Branch also erected a statue of Arsuzi not long after the 1966 coup.[79]Nevertheless, the majority of Ba'athists outside Syria continued to view Aflaq, not Arsuzi, as the principal founder of Ba'athism.[80]

When the Iraqi Ba'ath party seized power in 1968, the Syrian Ba'ath party responded by not mentioning in its press release that a Ba'athist organisation had taken power in Iraq.[81]For instance, it mentioned that Bakr became president of Iraq, but did not mention his party affiliation, and instead referred to the incident as a military coup.[82]While the Syrian Ba'ath denied giving any legitimacy to Iraqi Ba'ath, the Iraqi Ba'athists were more conciliatory.[83]The anti-Iraqi Ba'athist propaganda reached new heights withinBa'athist Syriaat the same time that Assad was strengthening his position within the party and state.[84]

Assadist-Jadidist conflict: 1966 – 1970

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After the 1967Six-Day War,tensions betweenSalah JadidandHafez al-Assadincreased, and al-Assad and his associates were strengthened by their hold on the military. In late 1968,[85]Assadists began dismantling Jadid's support network, facing ineffectual resistance from the civilian branch of the party that remained under Jadid's control.[86]

Assadist rule: 1970 – 2024

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1970 Assadist coup d'etat

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The dual polarisation of power in Ba'athist Syria between Hafez al-Assad and Salah Jadid persisted until theAssadist coupof November 1970, when al-Assad ousted and imprisoned Atassi and Jadid.[87]He then set upon a project of rapid institution-building, reopened parliament and adopted a permanent constitution for the country, which had been ruled by military fiat and a provisional constitutional documents since 1963.[87]

Yom Kippur war

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Hafez al-Assad's reign was marked by the virtual abandonment ofPan-Arabideology; replacing it with the doctrine of socialist transformation and giving overriding priority in constructingsocialist societywithin Syria.[88]Political participation was limited to theNational Progressive Front,the ruling coalition of Syrian Baath andMarxist–Leninistparties; entrenching itself firmly within theSoviet Bloc.The Party also began building apersonality cultaround Assad and brought the elite of thearmed forcesunder Assad's grip and the officer corps were installed withAlawiteloyalists, further alienating theSunnimajority from the party.[89]When Hafez al-Assad came to power in 1971, the army began to modernize and change. In the first 10 years of Assad's rule, the army increased by 162%, and by 264% by 2000. At one point, 70% of the country's GDP went only to the army. On 6 October 1973, Syria and Egypt initiated theYom Kippur Waragainst Israel. TheIsrael Defense Forcesreversed the initial Syrian gains and pushed deeper into Syrian territory. The village ofQuneitrawas largely destroyed by the Israeli army.[90]

Islamist uprising in Syria

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Photo of Syrian military general Hafez al-Assad during the 1970 coup

By the late 1970s, the state apparatus of the neo-Ba'athist regime under Assad had consolidated into ananti-Sunniorientation. Official propaganda incited Alawite farmers against richSunnilandowners and regularly disseminated stereotypes of Sunni merchants and industrialists, casting them as enemies ofnationalizationandsocialist revolution.Bitterness towards theAssadistregime and theAlawiteelite in the neo-Ba'ath and armed forces became widespread amongst the Sunni majority, laying the beginnings of an Islamic resistance. Prominent leaders ofMuslim BrotherhoodlikeIssam al-Attarwere imprisoned and exiled. A coalition of the traditional Syrian Sunniulema,Muslim Brotherhood revolutionaries andIslamistactivists formed the Syrian Islamic Front in 1980 with objective of overthrowing Assad throughJihadand establishing anIslamic state.In the same year, Hafez officially supported Iran in itswar with Iraqand controversially began importing Iranian fighters and terror groups intoLebanonand Syria. This led to rising social tensions within the country which eventually became a full-fledgedIslamist rebellionin 1982; led by the Islamic Front. The regime responded byslaughtering the Sunni inhabitants in Hamaand Aleppo and bombarding numerous mosques, killing around 20,000–40,000 civilians. The uprising was brutally crushed and Assad regarded the Muslim Brethren as demolished.[91]

Soviet alliance

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Syria under Hafez al-Assad was a staunchSoviet allyand firmly aligned itself withSoviet Blocduring the height of theCold War.Soviet Unionsaw Syria as the lynchpin of its Middle-East strategy and signed theTreaty of Friendship and Co-operationin 1980; directly committing itself to Syria's defense and incorporating the Syrian armed forces into Soviet standards. For his part, Hafez committed himself to socialist economic and foreign policies; and was one of the few autocrats to openly support theSoviet invasion of Afghanistan.Theend of the Cold Warandcollapse of the Soviet Uniondealt a deep blow to Assad, who retained the nostalgia for the old Soviet-ledsocialist order.[92][93]Assad continued to rule Syria until his death in 2000, by centralizing powers in thestate presidency.[94]

Syrian occupation of Lebanon

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Syria was invited into Lebanon by its president,Suleiman Frangieh,in 1976, to intervene on the side of the Lebanese government againstPalestine Liberation Organizationguerilla fighters and Lebanese Maronite forces amid theLebanese Civil War.TheArab Deterrent Forceoriginally consisted of a Syrian core, up to 25,000 troops, with participation by some otherArab Leaguestates totaling only around 5,000 troops.[95][96][97]In late 1978, after the Arab League had extended the mandate of the Arab Deterrent Force, theSudanese,theSaudisand theUnited Arab Emiratesannounced intentions to withdraw troops from Lebanon, extending their stay into the early months of 1979 at the Lebanese government's request.[98]The Libyan troops were essentially abandoned and had to find their own way home, and the ADF thereby became a purely Syrian force, although it did include thePalestine Liberation Army.[99]A year afterIsraelinvaded and occupiedSouthern Lebanonduring the1982 Lebanon War,the Lebanese government failed to extend the ADF's mandate, thereby effectively ending its existence, although not the Syrian or Israeli military presence in Lebanon.[100]Eventually the Syrian presence became known as theSyrian occupation of Lebanon.

Syrian forces lingered in Lebanon throughout the civil war in Lebanon, eventually bringing most of the nation under Syrian control as part of a power struggle with Israel, which hadoccupied areas of southern Lebanonin 1978. In 1985, Israel began to withdraw from Lebanon, as a result of domestic opposition in Israel and international pressure.[101]In the aftermath of this withdrawal, theWar of the Campsbroke out, with Syria fighting their former Palestinian allies. TheSyrian occupation of Lebanoncontinued until 2005.[102]

Diplomatic efforts

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In a major shift in relations with both otherArab statesand the Western world, Syria participated in the United States-ledGulf WaragainstSaddam Hussein.The country participated in the multilateralMadrid Conference of 1991,and during the 1990s engaged in negotiations with Israel along withPalestineandJordan.These negotiations failed, and there have been no further direct Syrian-Israeli talks since President Hafiz al-Assad's meeting with then PresidentBill ClintoninGenevain 2000.[103]

Bashar al-Assad's presidency

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Hafez al-Assaddiedon 10 June 2000. His son,Bashar al-Assad,was elected president inan electionin which he ran unopposed.[104]His election saw the birth of theDamascus Springand hopes of reform, but by autumn 2001, the authorities had suppressed the movement, imprisoning some of its leading intellectuals.[105]Instead, reforms have been limited to some market reforms.[106][107][108]On 5 October 2003, Israelbombed a site near Damascus,claiming it was a terrorist training facility for members ofIslamic Jihad.[109]In March 2004,Syrian Kurdsand Arabsclashedin the northeastern city ofal-Qamishli.Signs of rioting were seen in the cities of Qamishli andHasakeh.[110]In 2005, Syria ended its military presence in Lebanon.[111]AssassinationofRafic Haririin 2005 led to international condemnation and triggered a popularIntifadainLebanon,known as "the Cedar Revolution" which forced the Assad regime to withdraw its 20,000 Syrian soldiers in Lebanon and end its 29-year-longmilitary occupation of Lebanon.[112][113]On 6 September 2007, foreign jet fighters, suspected as Israeli, reportedly carried outOperation Orchardagainst a suspectednuclear reactorunder construction byNorth Koreantechnicians.[114]

Syrian civil war

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Military situation in December 2015.Islamic State-controlled territory is in grey.

TheSyrian civil warbegan in 2011 as a part of the widerArab Spring,a wave of upheaval throughout theArab World.Public demonstrations across Syria began on 26 January 2011 and developed into a nationwide uprising. Protesters demanded the resignation of PresidentBashar al-Assad,the overthrow of his government, and an end to nearly five decades ofBa’ath Party rule.Since spring 2011, theSyrian governmentdeployed theSyrian Armyto quell the uprising, and several cities were besieged,[115][116]though the unrest continued. According to some witnesses, soldiers, who refused to open fire on civilians, were summarily executed by the Syrian Army.[117]The Syrian government denied reports of defections, and blamed armed gangs for causing trouble.[118]Since early autumn 2011, civilians and army defectors began forming fighting units, which began an insurgency campaign against the Syrian Army. The insurgents unified under the banner of theFree Syrian Armyand fought in an increasingly organized fashion; however, the civilian component of the armed opposition lacked an organized leadership.[119]

The uprising has sectarian undertones, though neither faction in the conflict has described sectarianism as playing a major role. The opposition is dominated bySunniMuslims, whereas the leading government figures areAlawites,[120]affiliated with Shia Islam. As a result, the opposition is winning support from the Sunni Muslim states, whereas the government is publicly supported by the Shia dominatedIranand the LebaneseHezbollah.According to various sources, including theUnited Nations,up to 13,470–19,220 people have been killed, of which about half were civilians, but also including 6,035–6,570 armed combatants from both sides[121][122][123][124]and up to 1,400 opposition protesters.[125]Many more have been injured, and tens of thousands of protesters have been imprisoned. According to the Assad regime, between March 2011 and May 2012, 9,815–10,146 people, including 3,430 members of the security forces, 2,805–3,140 insurgents and up to 3,600 civilians, were killed in fighting with what the Ba'athist regime characterized as "armed terrorist groups."[126]To escape the violence, tens of thousands ofSyrian refugeeshave fled the country to neighboringJordan,IraqandLebanon,[127]as well toTurkey.[128]The total official UN numbers of Syrian refugees reached 42,000 at the time,[129]while unofficial number stood at as many as 130,000.

Government collapse and insurgency

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Military situation after the start of theopposition offensivesin late 2024.

On 27 November 2024, violence flared up once again. Rebel factions, led by the Islamist group HayatTahrir al-Sham(HTS) and the Turkish-backedSyrian National Army(SNA), hadtaken control of Aleppo,prompting a retaliatory airstrike campaign by Syrian PresidentBashar al-Assad,supported by Russia. The strikes, which targeted population centers and several hospitals inrebel-heldcity ofIdlib,resulted in at least 25 deaths, according to theWhite Helmetsrescue group. The NATO countries issued a joint statement calling for the protection of civilians and critical infrastructure to prevent further displacement and ensure humanitarian access. They stressed the urgent need for a Syrian-led political solution, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which advocates for dialogue between the Syrian government and opposition forces. Therebel offensive,which had begun on 27 November 2024, continued itsadvance into Hama Provincefollowing their capture of Aleppo.[130][131][132]Thegovernmentof Bashar al-Assadwas overthrownon 8 December 2024 after thecapture of Damascusby theSyrian opposition.[133]The Baath party suspended its activities in Syria after Islamist-led rebel forces toppled Assad's government.[134]

By late December 2024, aninsurgencyby loyalists of the deposed Assad regime began in Western Syria against theSyrian transitional government.[135]On December 26, 2024,Mohammad Kanjo Hassan,the leader of the insurgency was arrested in the town ofKhirbet al-Ma'zahalong with 20 of his loyalists.

See also

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References

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  1. ^*Cavoški, Jovan (2022).Non-Aligned Movement Summits: A History.UK: Bloomsburry. p. 101.ISBN978-1-3500-3209-5.Syria, headed by the radical leftist Baath Party overtly challenged Nasser's leadership credentials by highlighting his diminished revolutionary spirit.
    • I. Dawisha, Adeed (1980). "3: External and Internal Setting".Syria and the Lebanese Crisis.London, UK: Macmillan Press Ltd. p. 45.ISBN978-1-349-05373-5.The change has been particularly marked under Asad. He has created a fairly popular Presidential regime: radical left, the most advanced socialist regime in the Arab world, it is progressively widening the frame to include more peasants and labourers.
    • The Israel Economist.Vol.26–27. University of Minnesota: Kollek & Son, Limited. 1970. p. 61.The ideology propounded by the Ba'ath changed completely. The accent on Arab nationalism was discarded as was moderate socialism. Their place was taken by Syrian nationalism and extreme left-wing ideas verging on communism.
    • Abadi, Jacob (2004).Israel's Quest for Recognition and Acceptance in Asia: Garrison State Diplomacy.London, UK: Frank Class Publishers. p. 22.ISBN0-7146-5576-7.radical left-wing Ba'ath party in Syria.
    • S. Abu Jaber, Kamel (1966).The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology and Organization.Syracuse, New York, USA: Syracuse University Press. pp.xii–xiii,33–47,75–97.LCCN66-25181.The leadership now in control of Syria does not represent the gamut of the Ba'th party. It is composed mainly of extreme leftists vesting almost exclusive authority in the military wing of the party.
    • Hopwood, Derek (2013).Syria 1945–1986: Politics and Society.Routledge. pp.45–46,73–75, 90.doi:10.4324/9781315818955.ISBN9781317818427.The period 1963 to 1970 when Asad finally succeeded was marked ideologically by uncertainty and even turbulence. It was a period of transition from the old nationalist politicians to the radical socialist Baathis... struggle between 'moderates' and radicals was centred on the dispute whether to impose a radical left wing government and a social revolution on Syria or to follow a more moderate Arab unionist course which would possibly appease opponents of the Baath. The radicals largely held the upper hand and worked to strengthen the control of the party over the state.
    • Phillips, Christopher (2020).The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East.London, UK: Yale University Press. p. 11.ISBN978-0-300-21717-9.In 1963... the socialist Ba'ath Party, seized power. The radical left wing of the party then launched an internal coup in 1966, initiating accelerated land reform
    • Mikhaĭlovich Vasil'ev, Alekseĭ (1993).Russian Policy in the Middle East: From Messianism to Pragmatism.University of Michigan, USA: Ithaca Press. pp. 63, 76.ISBN978-0863721687.Syrian Baathist version of Arab nationalism and socialism offered plenty of points of contact with Soviet policy... when the left-wing Baathist faction led by Nureddin Atasi came to power, accelerated Syria's rapprochement with the Soviet Union... for the USSR Syria remained an uneasy ally whose actions were beyond control, often unpredictable and the cause of complications. The ultra-leftist slogans originating from Damascus (such as a 'people's war') were not received enthusiastically in Moscow. Mustafa Tlas, the new Syrian chief of staff, was a theoretician of guerrilla warfare and had even translated works by Che Guevara who was not particularly popular among the Soviet leaders.
    • Climent, James (2015).World Terrorism: An Encyclopedia of Political Violence from Ancient Times to the Post-9/11 Era(2nd ed.). New York: Routledge. p. 383.ISBN978-0-7656-8284-0.influence of different views, came from the more radical left-wing nationalist groups. These groups included... Syria's Ba'ath party which seized power in Damascus in 1963
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