Wikipedia

Japanese battleshipYamato

For other ships with the same name, seeList of ships named Yamato.

Yamato(Japanese:Đại cùng,named after the ancientYamato Province)was thelead shipofher classofbattleshipsbuilt for theImperial Japanese Navy(IJN) shortly beforeWorld War II.She and hersister ship,Musashi,were the heaviest and most powerfully armed battleships ever constructed, displacing nearly 72,000tonnes(71,000long tons) atfull loadand armed with nine 46 cm (18.1 in)Type 94main guns, which were the largest guns ever mounted on a warship.

Yamatoundertakingsea trialsin theBungo Channel,20 October 1941
History
Empire of Japan
NameYamato
NamesakeYamato Province,and an archaic name forJapan
OrderedMarch 1937
BuilderKure Naval Arsenal
Laid down4 November 1937
Launched8 August 1940
Commissioned16 December 1941
Stricken31 August 1945[1]
FateSunk by American planes duringOperation Ten-Go,7 April 1945
General characteristics (as built)
Class and typeYamato-classbattleship
Displacement
Length263 m (862 ft 10 in) (o/a)
Beam38.9 m (127 ft 7 in)
Draft11 m (36 ft 1 in)
Installed power
Propulsion4 shafts; 4steam turbines
Speed27knots(50 km/h; 31 mph)
Range7,200nmi(13,300 km; 8,300 mi) at 16 knots (30 km/h; 18 mph)
Complement3,233
Armament
Armor
Aircraft carried7Nakajima E8NorNakajima E4N
Aviation facilities2catapults

Yamatowas designed to counter the numerically superior battleship fleet of theUnited States,Japan's main rival in the Pacific. She was laid down in 1937 and formally commissioned a week after theattack on Pearl Harborin December 1941. Throughout 1942, she served as theflagshipof theCombined Fleet,and in June 1942 AdmiralIsoroku Yamamotodirected the fleet from her bridge during theBattle of Midway,a disastrous defeat for Japan.Musashitook over as the Combined Fleet flagship in early 1943, andYamatospent the rest of the year moving between the major Japanese naval bases ofTrukandKurein response to American threats. In December 1943,Yamatowas torpedoed by an American submarine which necessitated repairs at Kure, where she was refitted with additional anti-aircraft guns and radar in early 1944. Although present at theBattle of the Philippine Seain June 1944, she played no part in the battle.

The only timeYamatofired her main guns at enemy surface targets was in October 1944, when she was sent to engage American forces invading the Philippines during theBattle of Leyte Gulf.While threatening to sink American troop transports, they encountered a lightescort carriergroup of theU.S. Navy'sTask Force 77,"Taffy 3", in theBattle off Samar,sinking or helping to sink the escort carrierUSSGambier Bayand the destroyersUSSJohnstonandHoel.The Japanese turned back after American air attacks convinced them they were engaging a powerful U.S. carrier fleet.

During 1944, the balance of naval power in the Pacific decisively turned against Japan, and by early 1945 its fleet was much depleted and badly hobbled by critical fuel shortages in thehome islands.In a desperate attempt to slow theAlliedadvance,Yamatowas dispatched ona one-way missiontoOkinawain April 1945, with orders to beach herself and fight until destroyed, thus protecting the island. The task force was spotted south ofKyushuby U.S. submarines and aircraft, and on 7 April 1945 she was sunk by American carrier-based bombers and torpedo bombers with the loss of most of her crew.

Design and construction

Main article:Yamato-class battleship

During the 1930s the Japanese government adopted anultranationalistmilitancy with a view to greatly expand theJapanese Empire.[2]Japan withdrew from theLeague of Nationsin 1934, renouncing its treaty obligations.[3]After withdrawing from theWashington Naval Treaty,which limited the size and power of capital ships, the Imperial Japanese Navy began their design of the newYamatoclassof heavy battleships. Their planners recognized Japan would be unable to compete with the output of U.S. naval shipyards should war break out, so the 70,000-ton[4]vessels of theYamatoclass were designed to be capable of engaging multiple enemy battleships at the same time.[5][6]

ThekeelofYamato,the lead ship of the class,[7]waslaid downat theKure Naval Arsenal,Hiroshima,on 4 November 1937 in a dockyard that had to be adapted to accommodate her enormous hull.[8][9]The dock was deepened by one meter, and gantry cranes capable of lifting up to 350 tonnes were installed.[8][10]Extreme secrecy was maintained throughout construction,[8][11]a canopy even being erected over part of thedry dockto screen the ship from view.[12]Yamatowas launched on 8 August 1940, with Captain (later Vice Admiral) Miyazato Shutoku in command.[13]

Armament

Yamatonear the end of herfitting out,20 September 1941[14]

Yamato's main battery consisted of nine 45-caliber 46-centimetre (18.1 in)Type 94guns—the largest ever fitted to a warship,[15]although the shells were not as heavy as those fired by theBritish 18-inch naval gunsofWorld War I.Each gun was 21.13 metres (69.3 ft) long, weighed 147.3 tonnes (162.4 short tons), and was capable of firing high-explosive or armor-piercing shells 42 kilometres (26 mi).[16]Her secondary battery comprised twelve155-millimetre (6.1 in)guns mounted in four triple turrets (one forward, one aft, two amidships), and twelve12.7-centimetre (5 in)guns in six twin mounts (three on each side amidships). These turrets had been taken off theMogami-class cruiserswhen those vessels were converted to a main armament of20.3-centimetre (8 in)guns. In addition,Yamatocarried twenty-four25-millimetre (1 in)anti-aircraft guns, primarily mounted amidships.[15]When refitted in 1944 and 1945 for naval engagements in the South Pacific,[17]the secondary battery configuration was changed to six 155 mm guns and twenty-four 127 mm guns, and the number of 25 mm anti-aircraft guns was increased to 162.[18]

Service

Trials and initial operations

Yamatoduring sea trials, October 1941

During October or November 1941Yamatounderwentsea trials,reaching her maximum possible speed of 27.4 knots (50.7 km/h; 31.5 mph).[13][N 1]As war loomed, priority was given to accelerating military construction. On 16 December, months ahead of schedule, the battleship was formally commissioned at Kure, in a ceremony more austere than usual, as the Japanese were still intent on concealing the ship's characteristics.[13]The same day, under Captain (later Vice Admiral) Gihachi Takayanagi, she joined fellow battleshipsNagatoandMutsuin the 1st Battleship Division.[20]

On 12 February 1942,Yamatobecame theflagshipof AdmiralIsoroku Yamamoto'sCombined Fleet.[13][19]A veteran of Japan's crushing victory over Russia at theBattle of Tsushimain theRusso-Japanese War,thePearl Harbor victorwas planning a decisive engagement with the United States Navy atMidway Island.After participating inwar gamesYamatodepartedHiroshima Bayon 27 May for duty with Yamamoto's main battleship group.[13][21]U.S. codebreakers were aware of Yamamoto's intentions, and theBattle of Midwayproved disastrous for Japan's carrier force, with four fleet carriers and 332 aircraft lost.[13]Yamamoto exercised overall command fromYamato's bridge,[21]but his battle plan had widely dispersed his forces to lure the Americans into a trap, and the battleship group was too far away to take part in the engagement.[13]On 5 June, Yamamoto ordered the remaining ships to return to Japan, soYamatowithdrew with the main battleship force toHashirajima,before making her way back to Kure.[19][20]

Yamatoleft Kure forTrukon 17 August 1942.[22][N 2]After 11 days at sea, she was sighted by the American submarineUSSFlying Fish,which fired four torpedoes, all of which missed;Yamatoarrived safely at Truk later that day.[19][22][N 3]She remained there throughout theGuadalcanal campaignbecause of a lack of 46 cm ammunition suitable for shorebombardment,uncharted seas around Guadalcanal, and her high fuel consumption.[13][17]Before the year's end, Captain (later Rear Admiral)Chiaki Matsudawas assigned to commandYamato.[22]

Yamatoanchored off Truk, 1943

On 11 February 1943,Yamatowas replaced by her sister shipMusashias flagship of the Combined Fleet.[13]Yamatospent only a single day away from Truk between her arrival in August 1942 and her departure on 8 May 1943.[13][23]On that day, she set sail forYokosukaand from there for Kure, arriving on 14 May.[13][23]She spent nine days in dry dock for inspection and general repairs,[22]and after sailing to Japan's westernInland Seashe was again dry-docked in late July for significant refitting and upgrades. On 16 August,Yamatobegan her return to Truk, where she joined a large task force formed in response to Americanraids on the TarawaandMakin atolls.[22]She sortied in late September withNagato,three carriers, and smaller warships to intercept U.S. Task Force 15, and again a month later with six battleships, three carriers, and eleven cruisers. Intelligence had reported thatNaval Station Pearl Harborwas nearly empty of ships,[13]which the Japanese interpreted to mean that an American naval force would strike atWake Island.[13]But there were no radar contacts for six days, and the fleet returned to Truk, arriving on 26 October.[13]

Yamatoescorted Transport Operation BO-1 from Truk to Yokosuka during 12–17 December.[23]Subsequently, because of their extensive storage capacity and thick armor protection,YamatoandMusashiwere pressed into service as transport vessels.[24]On 25 December, while ferrying troops and equipment—which were wanted as reinforcements for the garrisons atKaviengand theAdmiralty Islands—from Yokosuka to Truk,Yamatoand her task group were intercepted by the American submarineSkateabout 180 miles (290 km) out at sea.[13][25]Skatefired a spread of four torpedoes atYamato;one struck the battleship's starboard side toward the stern.[13]A hole 5 metres (16 ft) below the top of heranti-torpedo bulgeand measuring some 25 metres (82 ft) across was ripped open in the hull, and a joint between the upper and lower armored belts failed, causing the rear turret's upper magazine to flood.[14]Yamatotook on about 3,000 tons of water[14][25]but reached Truk later that day. The repair shipAkashieffected temporary repairs,[22]andYamatodeparted on 10 January 1944 for Kure.[25]

YamatoandMusashianchored in the waters off of theTruk Islandsin 1943

On 16 JanuaryYamatoarrived at Kure for repairs of the torpedo damage and was dry-docked until 3 February.[22]During this time, armor plateslopedat 45° was fitted in the area of damage to her hull. It had been proposed that 5,000 long tons (5,100 t) of steel be used to bolster the ship's defense against flooding from torpedo hits outside the armored citadel, but this was rejected out of hand because the additional weight would have increasedYamato's displacement anddrafttoo much.[14]WhileYamatowas dry-docked, Captain Nobuei Morishita—former captain of the battleshipHaruna—assumed command.[22]On 25 February,YamatoandMusashiwere reassigned from the 1st Battleship Division to the Second Fleet.

Yamatowas again dry-docked at Kure for further upgrades to all her radar and anti-aircraft systems from 25 February to 18 March 1944.[22]Each of the two beam-mounted 6.1 inch (155-mm) triple turrets was removed and replaced by three pairs of 5-inch (127-mm) AA guns in double mounts. In addition, 8 triple and 26 single 25mm AA mounts were added, increasing the total number of 127 mm and 25 mm anti-aircraft guns to 24 and 162, respectively.[18]Shelters were also added on the upper deck for the increased AA crews. A Type 13 air search and Type 22, Mod 4, surface search/gunnery control radar were installed, and the main mast was altered. Her radar suite was also upgraded to include infrared identification systems and aircraft search and gunnery control radars.[22]She left the dry dock on 18 March and went through several trials beginning on 11 April.[25]Yamatoleft Kure on 21 April and embarked soldiers and materiel the following day atOkinoshimafor a mission to Manila, reaching the Philippines on 28 April.[14]She then moved on to Malaya to join Vice AdmiralJisaburo Ozawa's Mobile Fleet atLingga;[22]this force arrived atTawi-Tawion 14 May.[22]

Battle of the Philippine Sea

Line drawing ofYamatoas she appeared in 1944–1945 (specific configuration from 7 April 1945)
Main article:Battle of the Philippine Sea

In early June 1944,YamatoandMusashiwere again requisitioned as troop transports, this time to reinforce the garrison and naval defenses of the island ofBiakas part ofOperation Kon.[24][26]The mission was cancelled when word reached Ozawa's headquarters of American carrier attacks on theMariana Islands.[24]Instead, the Imperial Japanese Navy reorganized, concentrating the majority of its remaining fighting strength in the hope of achieving a decisive success against the Americans. By this time though, the entire Japanese navy was inferior in numbers and experience to theU.S. Pacific Fleet.[26]Between June 19 and June 23,Yamatoescorted forces of Ozawa's Mobile Fleet during theBattle of the Philippine Sea,dubbed by American pilots "The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot".[26][27]The Japanese lost three aircraft carriers and 426 aircraft;[26]Yamato's only significant contribution was mistakenly opening fire on returning Japanese aircraft.[22]

Following the battle,Yamatowithdrew with the Mobile Fleet to the Hashirajima staging area near Kure to refuel and re-arm. WithMusashishe left the fleet on 24 June for the short journey to Kure, where she received five more triple 25 mm anti-aircraft mounts.[26]The opportunity was taken to put in place "emergency buoyancy keeping procedures". These resulted in the removal of almost every flammable item from the battleship, includinglinoleum,bedding, and mattresses. In place of the latter, men slept on planks which could be used to repair damage. Flammable paints received asilicone-based overcoat, and additional portable pumps and fire fighting apparatuses were installed.[26]Leaving Japan on 8 July,Yamato—accompanied by the battleshipsMusashi,Kongō,Nagato,and 11 cruisers and destroyers—sailed south.YamatoandMusashiheaded for theLingga Islands,arriving on 16–17 July. By this stage of the war, Japan's tanker fleet had been much reduced by marauding American submarines, so major fleet units were stationed in the East Indies to be near the source of their fuel supply.[26]The battleships remained at the islands for the next three months.[26]

Battle of Leyte Gulf

Main article:Battle of Leyte Gulf
Yamatoafter being hit by a bomb during theBattle of the Sibuyan Seaon 24 October 1944; the hit did not cause serious damage

Between 22 and 25 October 1944, as part of AdmiralTakeo Kurita's Center Force (also known as Force A or First Striking Force),Yamatotook part in one of the largest naval engagements in history—theBattle of Leyte Gulf.[28]In response to the American invasion of the Philippines, Operation Shō-Gō called for a number of Japanese groups to converge on the island of Leyte, whereAmerican troops were landing.On 18 October,Yamatowas given a coating of black camouflage in preparation for her nighttime transit of theSan Bernardino Strait;the main ingredient wassoottaken from her smokestack.[22]While en route to Leyte, the forcewas attackedin thePalawan Passageon 23 October by the submarinesUSSDarterandDace,which sank twoTakao-classheavy cruisersincluding Kurita's flagship,Atago,and damaged a third.[29]Kurita survived the loss ofAtagoand transferred his flag toYamato.[22]

Battle of the Sibuyan Sea

The following day theBattle of the Sibuyan Seahurt the Center Force badly with the loss of one more heavy cruiser, eliminating a substantial part of the fleet's anti-aircraft defence. During the course of the day, American carrier aircraft sortied 259 times. Aircraft from theUSSEssexstruckYamatowith two armor-piercing bombs and scored one near miss;Yamatosuffered moderate damage and took on about 3,370 tonnes (3,320 long tons) of water but remained battleworthy.[30]However, her sister shipMusashibecame the focus of the American attacks and eventually sank after being hit with 17 bombs and 19 torpedoes.[31]

Battle off Samar

Main article:Battle off Samar
Yamatoand aTone-class cruiserentering thebattle off Samar

Unknown to Kurita, the main American battle group under the command of AdmiralWilliam Halsey Jr.,departed the Leyte Gulf area on the evening of 24 October. Convinced that Kurita's Center Force had been turned back, Halsey took his powerfulTask Force 38in pursuit of the Japanese Northern Force, a decoy group composed of one fleet aircraft carrier (Zuikaku), three light carriers, twoIse-classhybrid battleship-carriers, and their escorts.[29]The deception was a success, drawing away five fleet carriers and five light carriers with more than 600 aircraft among them, six fast battleships, eight cruisers, and over 40 destroyers.

Yamatofiring onUSSWhite Plains

During the hours of darkness, Kurita's force navigated theSan Bernardino Strait,and shortly after dawn attacked an American formation that had remained in the area to provide close support for the invading troops. Known as "Taffy 3", this small group comprised sixescort carriers,three destroyers, and fourdestroyer escorts.At 6:57, from a distance of 35,000 yards,Yamatofired frontal salvos against the American warships, her first and only surface action against enemy vessels. However, Kurita mistook the escort carriers for full-sized fleet carriers, and ordered his ships to firearmor-piercing ammunitionthat would over penetrate the small ship's unarmored hulls without exploding. Despite this,Yamatoscored the first damage of the battle. Immediately on her 3rd salvo from 34,500 yards, a single 18.1-inch (46 cm) shell exploded mere feet underneath the keel of the escort carrierUSSWhite Plains,knocking out a boiler and electrical power for three minutes. The near miss damaged her hull so badly,White Plainsnever saw frontline service again and was demoted to an aircraft ferry.[32][33]

At 7:30,Yamatospotted a US "cruiser" and prepared to rain fire.[22]The "cruiser" in question was actually the destroyerUSSJohnston,which had just finished a torpedo charge which blew off the bow of the heavy cruiserKumanowithout being hit by a single Japanese shell. From a distance of 20,300 yards,Yamatofired a full broadside, gougingJohnstonwith three direct 18.1-inch (46 cm) shell hits.Yamatothen fired off her secondary guns, hittingJohnstonwith an additional three 6.1-inch (155 mm) shells.[34][35]With the crippledJohnstondisappearing behind a rain squall, Yamato recorded the "cruiser" as sunk, though her AP shells allowedJohnstonto survive for a time being.[22]Still, the damage inflicted was devastating asYamato's 6.1-inch (155 mm) shells mostly landed on her superstructure. One hit amidships, taking out an anti-aircraft fire director, while the remaining two hit forward, destroying her torpedo director and shredding her bridge, injuring CommanderErnest E. Evansby blowing off two of his fingers and his entire shirt, and killing much of his command staff. Meanwhile, two 18.1-inch (46 cm) shells hit amidships, cuttingJohnston's speed to 17 knots, while the third 18.1-inch (46 cm) shell hit aft, disabling three ofJohnston's five5-inch (127 mm) guns.According to the state of her wreck,Johnstonlater split in two where she was hit by an 18.1-inch (46 cm) shell fromYamatowhile under fire from Japanese destroyers.[36][35]

Yamatoresumed firing on the escort carriers, but due to the extreme range failed to score any hits for the time being. Around 7:50, the Japanese battleships were attacked by the destroyersUSSHoelandHeermann.Both ships opened fire, withHoelhittingYamatowith two 5-inch (127 mm) shells, though neither caused any notable damage. By 7:54, both destroyers launched their torpedoes, which missed their intended target, the battleshipHaruna,but headed towardsYamato.Turning to evade them, she was caught in between both spreads, and forced to steam out of the battle for around 10 minutes. While earlier accounts of the battle by US sailors stateYamatowas forced out of the battle permanently by this point, Japanese records firmly disprove this. Once the torpedoes ran out of fuel she turned around and raced back to the battle, making contact with Taffy 3 again at around 8:10, immediately training her guns on the escort carrierUSSGambier Bay.[37]

From 22,000 yards,Yamatofired her main guns, immediately hittingGambier Bayon her first salvo with an 18.1-inch (46 cm) shell that smashed through her hangar bay.[38][39]Meanwhile, the heavy cruiserChikumalanded hits toGambier Bay's flight deck that started a large fire visible in several photographs of the ship under attack. At 8:20,Yamatoscored what is commonly attributed as the most fatal hit to the flat top as an 18.1-inch (46 cm) shell hitGambier Bay's engine room below the waterline, immediately cutting her speed to 10 knots as she gradually slowed until dead in the water, withYamatofollowing up with another hit at 8:23.[39]By 8:30, American destroyers coveredGambier Bay,leading to a number of Japanese warships switching fire from the carrier to said destroyers. However,Yamatocontinued to poundGambier Baywith her main battery, and observed her listing more and more to port. Meanwhile, her 6.1-inch (155 mm) secondary guns reengagedHoel.AfterHoelhad been scorched by gunfire fromYamato,the battleshipNagatoand the heavy cruiserHaguro,Yamatoscored a critical hit that disabledHoel's last boiler, with further gunfire from the three ships finishing her off by 8:50. Meanwhile, by 9:07,YamatoobservedGambier Baycapsizing and sinking under her sustained gunfire.[40][35]

The Japanese ships were taking a toll on Taffy 3, sinking four ships, withYamatoeither sinking or helping to sink all besides the destroyer escortUSSSamuel B. Roberts.However, relentless air attacks sank three Japanese heavy cruisers.Suzuya's torpedoes were detonated, and her propellers were blown off from bomb hits, whileChōkaiwas hit by a bomb down the stack that destroyed her engines, leading to both cruisers being scuttled.[41][42]Finally,Chikumawas outright sunk by American torpedo bombers.[43]With Kurita concluding he had sunk at least two fleet carriers, two cruisers, and two destroyers, and under fear of follow up air attacks causing more losses, he ordered the Japanese ships,Yamatoincluded, to retreat from the battle, meaning the Japanese's primary objectives, the American troop convoys, remained untouched by Japanese surface forces. In the aftermath of the battle,Yamatowas attacked by aircraft fromUSSHornetand damaged by two more bomb hits, one destroying some crew quarters and the other impacting on her turret 1, rounding out her engagement in the battle.[22]

Following the engagement,Yamatoand the remnants of Kurita's force returned toBrunei.[44]On 15 November 1944, the 1st Battleship Division was disbanded, andYamatobecame the flagship of the Second Fleet.[22]On 21 November, while transiting theEast China Seain a withdrawal to Kure Naval Base,[45]Yamato's battle group was attacked by the submarineUSSSealion.The battleshipKongōand destroyerUrakazewere lost.[46]Yamatowas immediately dry docked for repairs and anti-aircraft upgrades on reaching Kure, where several of the battleship's older anti-aircraft guns were replaced. On 25 November, CaptainAruga Kōsakuwas namedYamato's commander.[22]

Operation Ten-Go

Main article:Operation Ten-Go
Yamatounder attack off Kure on 19 March 1945
Yamato's senior officers prior to Ten-Go

On 1 January 1945,Yamato,HarunaandNagatowere transferred to the newly reactivated 1st Battleship Division.Yamatoleft dry dock two days later for Japan's Inland Sea.[22]This reassignment was brief; the 1st Battleship Division was deactivated once again on 10 February, andYamatowas allotted to the 1st Carrier Division.[47]On 19 March, American carrier aircraft fromTG 58.1attacked Kure Harbour.Although 16 warships were hit,Yamatosustained only minor damage from several near misses and from one bomb that struck her bridge.[48]The intervention of a squadron ofKawanishi N1K1"Shiden" fighters (named "George" by the Allies) flown by veteran Japanese fighter instructors prevented the raid from doing too much damage to the base and assembled ships,[49][N 4]whileYamato's ability to maneuver – albeit slowly – in the Nasami Channel benefited her.[48]

Yamatophotographed by US floatplanes on 6 April. The destroyersAsashimo,Kasumi,andHatsushimoare seen to her port side

As the final step before theirplanned invasionof the Japanese mainland, Allied forcesinvaded Okinawaon 1 April.[50]The Imperial Japanese Navy's response was to organise a mission codenamedOperation Ten-Gothat would commit much of Japan's remaining surface strength.Yamatoand nine escorts (the cruiserYahagiand eight destroyers) would sail to Okinawa and, in concert withkamikazeand Okinawa-based army units, attack the Allied forces assembled on and around Okinawa.Yamatowould then bebeachedto act as an unsinkable gun emplacement and continue to fight until destroyed.[51][52]In preparation for the mission,Yamatohad taken on a full stock of ammunition on 29 March.[22]According to the Japanese plan, the ships were supposed to take aboard only enough fuel for a one way voyage to Okinawa, but additional fuel amounting to 60% of capacity was issued on the authority of local base commanders. Designated the "Surface Special Attack Force", the ships leftTokuyamaat 15:20 on 6 April.[51][52]

However, the Allies had intercepted and decoded their radio transmissions, learning the particulars of Operation Ten-Go. Further confirmation of Japanese intentions came around 20:00 when the Surface Special Attack Force, navigating theBungo Strait,was spotted by the American submarinesThreadfinandHackleback.Both reportedYamato's position to the mainAmerican carrier strike force,[17][52]but neither could attack because of the speed of the Japanese ships – 22 knots (25 mph; 41 km/h) – and their extremezigzagging.[52]

Yamatofiring a salvo oftype 3 AA shellsfrom her main guns

The Allied forces around Okinawa braced for an assault. AdmiralRaymond Spruanceordered six battleships already engaged in shorebombardmentin the sector to prepare for surface action againstYamato.These orders were countermanded in favor of strikes from AdmiralMarc Mitscher's aircraft carriers, but as a contingency the battleships together with 7 cruisers and 21 destroyers were sent to interdict the Japanese force before it could reach the vulnerable transports and landing craft.[52][N 5]

Yamato's crew were atgeneral quartersand ready for anti-aircraft action by dawn on 7 April. The first Allied aircraft made contact with the Surface Special Attack Force at 08:23; twoflying boatsarrived soon thereafter, and for the next five hours,Yamatofired "Common Type 3 orbeehive"(3 Shiki tsûjôdan) shells at the Allied seaplanes but could not prevent them from shadowing the force.Yamatoobtained her first radar contact with aircraft at 10:00; an hour later, AmericanF6F Hellcatfighters appeared overhead to deal with any Japanese aircraft that might appear. None did.[53][N 6]

At about 12:30, 280 bomber and torpedo bomber aircraft arrived over the Japanese force.Asashimo,which had fallen out of formation with engine trouble, was caught and sunk by a detachment of aircraft fromUSSSan Jacinto.The Surface Special Attack Force increased speed to 24 knots (28 mph; 44 km/h), and following standard Japanese anti-aircraft defensive measures, the destroyers began circlingYamato.The first aircraft swooped in to attack at 12:37.Yahagiturned and raced away at 35 knots (40 mph; 65 km/h) in an attempt to draw off some of the attackers; it drew off only an insignificant number.

Yamatowas not hit for four minutes, but at 12:41 two bombs obliterated two of her triple 25 mm anti-aircraft mounts and blew a hole in the deck. A third bomb destroyed her radar room and the starboard aft 127 mm mount. At 12:45 a single torpedo struckYamatofar forward on her port side, sending shock waves throughout the ship. These had only minor effects, but no detailed information about this hit survived the battle. At 12:46, another two bombs struck the port side, one slightly ahead of the aft 155 mm centreline turret and the other right on top of the gun. These caused a great deal of damage to the turret and its magazines; only one man survived.[53][N 7]

Shortly afterward, two or three more torpedoes struckYamato:two impacts, on the port side near theengine roomand on one of theboilerrooms, are confirmed; the third is disputed but regarded by Garzke and Dulin as probable, as it explains the flooding reported inYamato's auxiliary steering room. The attack ended around 12:47, leaving the battleshiplisting5–6° to port; deliberately counterflooding flooding compartments on the other side of the ship reduced the list to just 1°. One boiler room had been disabled, slightly reducingYamato's top speed, and strafing had incapacitated many of the gun crews who mannedYamato's unprotected 25 mm anti-aircraft weapons, sharply curtailing their effectiveness.[53]

Close miss on the port side.Yamatois burning and emitting white smoke from the rear.
Yamatophotographed during the battle by an aircraft fromUSSYorktown(CV-10).The battleship is on fire and visibly listing to port.

The second attack started just before 13:00. In a coordinated strike, dive bombers flew high overhead to begin their runs while torpedo bombers approached from all directions at just above sea level. Overwhelmed by the number of targets, the battleship's anti-aircraft guns were ineffective, and the Japanese tried desperate measures to break up the attack.Yamato's main guns were loaded with "beehive"shells fused to explode one second after firing – a mere 1,000 m (3,300 ft) from the ship – but these had little effect. Three or four torpedoes struck the battleship on the port side, and one to starboard. Three hits, close together on the port side, are confirmed: one struck a fire room that had already been hit, one impacted a different fire room, and the third hit the hull adjacent to a damaged outboard engine room, increasing the water flow into that space and possibly flooding nearby locations. The fourth hit, unconfirmed, may have struck aft of the third; Garzke and Dulin believe this would explain the rapid flooding reported in that location.[54]This attack leftYamatoin a perilous position, listing 15–18° to port. Counterflooding of all remaining starboard void spaces lessened this to 10°, but further correction would have required repairs or flooding the starboard engine and fire rooms. Although the battleship was not yet in danger of sinking, the list meant the main battery was unable to fire, and her speed was limited to 18 knots (33 km/h; 21 mph).[55]

The third and most damaging attack began around 13:40. At least four bombs hit the ship's superstructure and caused heavy casualties among her 25 mm anti-aircraft gun crews. Many near misses drove in her outer plating, compromising her defense against torpedoes. Most serious were four more torpedo impacts. Three exploded on the port side, increasing water flow into the port inner engine room and flooding yet another fire room and the steering gear room. With the auxiliary steering room already under water, the ship lost maneuverability and became stuck in a starboard turn. The fourth torpedo most likely hit the starboard outer engine room, which, along with three other rooms on the starboard side, was being counterflooded to reduce the port list. The torpedo strike accelerated the rate of flooding and trapped many crewmen.[56]

The explosion ofYamato's magazines

At 14:02, the order was belatedly given to abandon ship. By this time,Yamato's speed had dropped to 10 knots (19 km/h; 12 mph) and her list was increasing. Fires raged out of control, and alarms on the bridge warned of critical temperatures in the forward main battery magazines.[N 8]Protocol called for flooding the magazines to prevent explosion, but the pumping stations had been knocked out.[58]

At 14:05,Yahagisank, the victim of twelve bombs and seven torpedoes. At the same time, a final flight of torpedo bombers attackedYamatofrom her starboard side. Her list was such that the torpedoes – set to a depth of 6.1 m (20 ft) – struck the bottom of her hull. The battleship continued her inexorable roll to port.[22]By 14:20, the power went out, and her remaining 25 mm anti-aircraft guns began to drop into the sea. Three minutes later,Yamatocapsized.Her main 46 cm turrets fell off, and as she rolled suction was created that drew swimming crewmen back toward the ship. When the roll reached approximately 120°, one of the two bow magazines detonated in a tremendous explosion.[58]The resultingmushroom cloud– over 6 kilometres (3.7 mi) high – was seen 160 kilometres (99 mi) away onKyūshū.[59][failed verification]Yamatosank rapidly, losing an estimated 3,055 of her 3,332 crew, including fleet commander Vice AdmiralSeiichi Itōand Captain Aruga both of whom chose togo down with the ship.[22][N 9]The few survivors were recovered by the four surviving destroyers, which withdrew to Japan.[22]

From the first attack at 12:37 to the explosion at 14:23,Yamatohad been hit by at least 11 torpedoes and 6 bombs. There may have been two more torpedo and bomb hits, but that is not confirmed.[58][60]The experience of the sinking of the ship was described by a Japanese survivor (Yoshida Matsuro) inSenkan Yamato no Saigo,[61]translated into English asRequiem for Battleship Yamato.[62]

Wreck discovery

Because of often confused circumstances and incomplete information regarding their sinkings, it took until 2019 to discover and identify most wrecks of Japanesecapital shipslost in World War II.[57]Drawing on U.S. wartime records, an expedition to the East China Sea in 1982 produced some results, but the wreckage discovered could not be clearly identified.[63]A second expedition returned to the site two years later, and the team's photographic and video records were later confirmed by one of the battleship's designers, Shigeru Makino, to show theYamato's last resting place. The wreck lies 290 kilometres (180 mi) southwest of Kyushu under 340 metres (1,120 ft) of water in two main pieces; a bow section comprising the front one third of the ship, and a separate stern section.[63]

On 16 July 2015, a group of JapaneseLiberal Democratic Partylawmakers began meetings to study the feasibility of raising the ship from the ocean floor and recovering the remains of crewmembers entombed in the wreckage. The group said it plans to request government funds to research the technical feasibility of recovering the ship.[64]In May 2016, the wreckage was surveyed using digital technology, giving a more detailed view and confirming the earlier identification. The resulting video revealed many details such as theImperial chrysanthemumon the bow, the massive propeller, and the detached main gun turret. A nine-minute video of this survey is shown at theYamatoMuseumin Kure.[65][66]

Cultural significance

The 1:10 scale model at theYamatoMuseum

From the time of their construction,Yamatoand her sisterMusashicarried significant weight in Japanese culture. The battleships represented the epitome of Imperial Japanesenaval engineering,and because of their size, speed, and power, visibly embodied Japan's determination and readiness to defend its interests against theWestern Powersand the United States in particular.Shigeru Fukudome,chief of the Operations Section of theImperial Japanese Navy General Staff,described the ships as "symbols of naval power that provided to officers and men alike a profound sense of confidence in their navy."[67]Yamato's symbolic might was such that some Japanese citizens held the belief that their country could never fall as long as the ship was able to fight.[68]

Decades after the war,Yamatowas memorialised in various forms by the Japanese. Historically, the word "Yamato" was used as a poetic name for Japan; thus, her name became a metaphor for the end of the Japanese empire.[69][70]In April 1968, a memorial tower was erected at Cape Inutabu onTokunoshima,an island in theAmami IslandsofKagoshima Prefecture,to commemorate the lives lost in Operation Ten-Go. In October 1974,Leiji Matsumotocreated a television series,Space Battleship Yamato,about rebuilding the battleship as a starship and its interstellar quest to save Earth. The series was a huge success, spawning eight feature films and four more TV series, the most recent of which was released in 2017. The series popularised thespace opera.As post-war Japanese tried to redefine the purpose of their lives,Yamatobecame a symbol of heroism and of their desire to regain a sense of masculinity after their country's defeat in the war.[71][72]Brought to the United States asStar Blazers,the animated series proved popular and established a foundation for anime in the North American entertainment market.[73]The motif inSpace Battleship Yamatowas repeated inSilent Service,a popular manga and anime that explores issues of nuclear weapons and the Japan–U.S. relationship. It tells the story of a nuclear-powered super submarine whose crew mutinies and renames the vesselYamato,in allusion to the World War II battleship and the ideals she symbolises.[74]

In 2005, theYamatoMuseumwas opened near the site of the former Kure shipyards. Although intended to educate on the maritime history of postMeiji eraJapan,[75]the museum gives special attention to its namesake; the battleship is a common theme among several of its exhibits, which includes a section dedicated to Matsumoto's animated series.[76]The centrepiece of the museum, occupying a large section of the ground floor, is a 26.3-metre (86 ft) long model ofYamato(1:10 scale).[77]

In 2005,Toeireleased a 143-minute movie,Yamato,based on a book byJun Henmi,to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II;Tamiyareleased special editions of scale models of the battleship in conjunction with the film's release.[78]The film is a tale about the sailors aboard the doomed battleship and the concepts of honour and duty. The film was shown on more than 290 screens across the country and was a commercial success, taking in a record 5.11 billionyenat the domestic box office.[79][80]

See also

Notes

  1. ^Garzke/Dulin and Whitley's books do not give specific dates, and disagree on the month; the former gives October, and the latter gives November.[13][19]
  2. ^Whitley says thatYamatoleft six days earlier.[19]
  3. ^Garzke and Dulin report thatYamatoentered Truk on the 29th.[13]
  4. ^Led by the man who planned theattack on Pearl Harbor,Minoru Genda,the appearance of these fighters, which were equal or superior in performance to the F6F Hellcat, surprised the attackers and several American planes were shot down.[49]
  5. ^Authors Garzke and Dulin speculate that the likely outcome of a battle between the two forces would have been a victory for the Allies, but at a serious cost, because theYamatoheld a large margin of superiority over the old battleships in firepower (460 mm vs. 356 mm), armor and speed (27 knots (50 km/h; 31 mph) vs. 21 knots (39 km/h; 24 mph).[52]
  6. ^The poor quality of the Japanese naval radar during World War II meant that only large groups of planes could be detected. Smaller detachments were usually picked up via line of sight.
  7. ^This account is based on Garzke and Dulin'sBattleships: Axis and Neutral Battleships in World War II.Other works generally agree, although the exact timings of events can vary between sources.[13]
  8. ^Garzke and Dulin state in their 1985 account that the alarms were for the aft magazines.Yamato's wreck was discovered that same year and more detailed surveys were completed in 1999; these conclude that it was the fore magazines that exploded. Corroborating evidence comes fromYamato's Executive Officer,Nomura Jiro,who testified that he saw warning lights for the forward magazines.[57]
  9. ^Garzke and Dulin give a slightly different number of 3,063 out of 3,332 lost. An exact number is unknown.[citation needed]

Footnotes

  1. ^Muir, Malcolm (October 1990). "Rearming in a Vacuum: United States Navy Intelligence and the Japanese Capital Ship Threat, 1936–1945".The Journal of Military History.54(4): 485.doi:10.2307/1986067.JSTOR1986067.
  2. ^Willmott (2000), p. 32.
  3. ^Garzke and Dulin (1985), p. 44.
  4. ^Jackson (2000), p. 74; Jentshura, Jung and Mickel (1977), p. 38.
  5. ^Johnston and McAuley (2000), p. 122.
  6. ^Willmott (2000), p. 35. The Japanese Empire produced 3.5% of the world's industrial output, while the United States produced 35%.
  7. ^Skulski (2004), pp. 8–11.
  8. ^abcJohnston and McAuley (2000), p. 123.
  9. ^Garzke and Dulin (1985), pp. 52–54.
  10. ^Garzke and Dulin (1985), p. 53.
  11. ^Hough, p. 205
  12. ^Garzke and Dulin (1985), pp. 50–51.
  13. ^abcdefghijklmnopqrsGarzke and Dulin (1985), p. 54.
  14. ^abcdeGarzke and Dulin (1985), p. 55.
  15. ^abJackson (2000), p. 75.
  16. ^Johnston and McAuley (2000), p. 123. Because of the size of the guns and thickness of armor, each of the three main turrets weighed more than a good-sized destroyer.
  17. ^abcJackson (2000), p. 128.
  18. ^abJohnston and McAuley (2000), p. 180.
  19. ^abcdeWhitley (1998), p. 211.
  20. ^abSkulski (2004), p. 10.
  21. ^abBallard (1999), p. 36.
  22. ^abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxy"Combined Fleet – tabular history ofYamato".Parshall, Jon; Bob Hackett, Sander Kingsepp, & Allyn Nevitt. 2009.Archivedfrom the original on 29 November 2010.Retrieved1 April2010.
  23. ^abcWhitley (1998), p. 212.
  24. ^abcSteinberg (1978), p. 147.
  25. ^abcdWhitley (1998), p. 213.
  26. ^abcdefghGarzke and Dulin (1985), p. 56.
  27. ^Reynolds (1982), p. 139.
  28. ^Reynolds (1982), p. 152.
  29. ^abGarzke and Dulin (1985), p. 57.
  30. ^Garzke and Dulin (1985), p. 58.
  31. ^Skulski (2004), p. 11.
  32. ^Lundgren (2014) pp. 29–36
  33. ^"White Plains I (CVE-66)".public1.nhhcaws.local.Retrieved21 November2024.
  34. ^Lundgren (2014) p. 78
  35. ^abc"Yamato and Musashi Internet Photo Archive".30 March 2022. Archived fromthe originalon 30 March 2022.Retrieved27 May2024.
  36. ^"Johnston I (DD-557)".NHHC.Retrieved1 June2024.
  37. ^Lundgren (2014) p. 110
  38. ^Six, Ronald (8 December 2015)."Clash in the Sibuyan Sea: Gambier Bay".Warfare History Network.Retrieved27 May2024.
  39. ^abLundgren (2014) p. 113
  40. ^Lundgren (2014) p. 153
  41. ^"Imperial Cruisers".combinedfleet.Retrieved28 May2024.
  42. ^"Imperial Cruisers".combinedfleet.Retrieved27 May2024.
  43. ^"Imperial Cruisers".combinedfleet.Retrieved27 May2024.
  44. ^Steinberg (1980), p. 63.
  45. ^Wheeler (1980), p. 183.
  46. ^Jackson (2000), p. 129.
  47. ^Reynolds (1982), p. 160.
  48. ^abGarzke and Dulin (1985), p. 59.
  49. ^abReynolds (1968), p. 338.
  50. ^Feifer (2001), p. 7.
  51. ^abReynolds (1982), p. 166.
  52. ^abcdefGarzke and Dulin (1985), p. 60.
  53. ^abcGarzke and Dulin (1985), pp. 60–61.
  54. ^Garzke and Dulin (1985), pp. 62–63.
  55. ^Garzke and Dulin (1985), p. 63.
  56. ^Garzke and Dulin (1985), pp. 64–65.
  57. ^abTully, Anthony (4 September 2009)."Located/Surveyed Shipwrecks of the Imperial Japanese Navy".Mysteries/Untold Sagas of the Imperial Japanese Navy.Archivedfrom the original on 6 June 2011.Retrieved23 January2010.
  58. ^abcGarzke and Dulin (1985), p. 65.
  59. ^Reynolds (1982), p. 169.
  60. ^Whitley (1998), p. 216.
  61. ^Yoshida, Mitsuru (1994).Senkan yamato no saigo.Kōdansha bungei bunko. Tōkyō: Kōdansha.ISBN978-4-06-196287-3.
  62. ^Yoshida, Mitsuru; Minear, Richard H. (1985).Requiem for Battleship Yamato.Seattle: University of Washington Press.ISBN978-0-295-96216-0.
  63. ^ab"Remains of sunken Japanese battleshipYamatodiscovered ".Reading Eagle.Associated Press. 4 August 1985.Archivedfrom the original on 14 May 2013.Retrieved31 March2010.
  64. ^Jiji,"LDP lawmakers aim to raise battleship Yamato wreckageArchived31 July 2015 at theWayback Machine",Japan Times,29 July 2015
  65. ^Yohei Izumida (8 May 2016)."Kure to embark on underwater survey of mighty Yamato warship".The Asahi Shimbun.Archived fromthe originalon 23 August 2016.Retrieved22 August2016.
  66. ^Yohei Izumida (17 July 2016)."New footage of sunken Yamato given to media before showing".The Asahi Shimbun.Archived fromthe originalon 23 August 2016.Retrieved22 August2016.
  67. ^Evans and Peattie (1997), pp. 298, 378.
  68. ^"A bomb survivors leery of battleship hype".Yomiuri Shimbun.6 August 2006.
  69. ^Yoshida and Minear (1985), p. xvii; Evans and Peattie (1997), p. 378.
  70. ^Skulski (2004), p. 7.
  71. ^Mizuno (2007), pp. 106, 110–111, 121–122.
  72. ^Levi (1998), p. 72.
  73. ^Wright (2009), p. 99.
  74. ^Mizuno (2007), pp. 114–115.
  75. ^"Outline".Hiroshima, Japan:Yamato Museum.2008.Archivedfrom the original on 23 July 2011.Retrieved29 March2010.
  76. ^"Yamato Museum Leaflet"(PDF).Hiroshima, Japan: Yamato Museum. 2005. Archived fromthe original(PDF)on 27 June 2011.Retrieved2 April2010.
  77. ^"Yamato – Kure Maritime Museum Leaflet"(PDF).Hiroshima, Japan: Yamato Museum. 2008. Archived fromthe original(PDF)on 26 March 2010.Retrieved2 April2010.
  78. ^"Chiến hạm đại cùng ・ ánh họa “Nam たち の đại cùng ／Yamato” đặc biệt sĩ dạng "[Battleship Yamato – Special Edition forYamatothe Movie] (in Japanese).Tamiya Corporation.14 December 2005. Archived fromthe originalon 17 June 2010.Retrieved28 March2010.
  79. ^"“One piece” が bạo phát ヒット, “Nam たち の đại cùng” “Tương bổng” を siêu えた bối cảnh とは... "[One Pieceis a Runaway Hit, Could It SurpassYamatoandAibou...].Hollywood Channel(in Japanese). Japan: Broadmedia. 13 December 2009. Archived fromthe originalon 5 March 2010.Retrieved27 March2010.
  80. ^“Tương bổng” 5 tỷ yên siêu えちゃう đại ヒット の dư cảm? Thủy cốc と chùa hiếp が sơ ngày にノリノリで lên sân khấu![SeemsAibouWill be a 5 Billion Yen Big Hit? Mizutani and Terawaki Makes an Entrance on Opening Day in High Spirits!].CinemaToday(in Japanese). Japan: Welva. 1 May 2008.Archivedfrom the original on 12 March 2009.Retrieved27 March2010.

References

Further reading

  • Morris, Jan(2017).Battleship Yamato: Of War, Beauty and Irony.New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation.ISBN9781631493423.
  • Thorne, Phil (March 2022). "Battle of the Sibuyan Sea".Warship International.LIX(1):34–65.ISSN0043-0374.
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