Wikipedia

Japanese militarism

See also:Statism in Shōwa Japan

Japanese militarism(Nhật Bản chủ nghĩa quân phiệt,Nihon gunkoku shugi)was theideologyin theEmpire of Japanwhich advocated the belief thatmilitarismshould dominate the political and social life of the nation, and the belief that the strength of themilitaryis equal to the strength of a nation.[1][2]It was most prominent from the start ofconscriptionafter theMeiji Restorationuntil theJapanese defeatinWorld War II,roughly 1873 to 1945. Since then,pacifismhas been enshrined in the postwarConstitution of Japanas one of its key tenets.

Imperial Japanese Navy land forcesmarching in occupiedNanking,1937

History

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Rise of militarism

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The military had a strong influence on Japanese society from theMeiji Restoration.Almost all leaders in Japanese society during theMeiji period(whether in the military, politics or business) were ex-samuraior descendants ofsamurai,and shared a set of values and outlooks. The early Meiji government viewed Japan as threatened by westernimperialism,and one of the prime motivations for theFukoku Kyoheipolicy ( "Enrich the Country, Strengthen the Armed Forces" ) was to strengthen Japan's economic and industrial foundations, so that a strong military could be built to defend Japan against outside powers.

The rise of universalmilitary conscription,introduced byYamagata Aritomoin 1873, along with the proclamation of theImperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailorsin 1882 enabled the military to indoctrinate thousands of men from various social backgrounds with military-patriotic values and the concept of unquestioning loyalty to the Emperor as the basis of the Japanese state(kokutai).Yamagata, like many Japanese, was strongly influenced by the recent striking success ofPrussiain transforming itself from an agricultural state to a leading modern industrial and military power. He accepted Prussian political ideas, which favored military expansion abroad and authoritarian government at home. The Prussian model also devalued the notion of civilian control over the independent military, which meant that in Japan, as in Germany, the military could develop into a state within a state, thus exercising greater influence on politics in general.[3]

Following the German victory in theFranco-Prussian War,theArmy Staff Collegeand the JapaneseGeneral Staffpaid close attention to MajorJakob Meckel's views on the superiority of the German military model over the French system as the reason for German victory. In response to a Japanese request, Prussian Chief of StaffHelmuth von Moltkesent Meckel to Japan to become anO-yatoi gaikokujin(foreign advisor).[4]In Japan, Meckel worked closely with futurePrime MinistersGeneralKatsura Tarōand GeneralYamagata Aritomo,and with army strategist GeneralKawakami Soroku.Meckel made numerous recommendations which were implemented, including reorganization of the command structure of the army intodivisionsand regiments, thus increasing mobility, strengthening the army logistics and transportation structure with the major army bases connected by railways, establishingartilleryand engineering regiments as independent commands, and revising theuniversal conscriptionsystem to abolish virtually all exceptions. A bust of Meckel was sited in front of the Japanese Army Staff College from 1909 through 1945.[5]

Although his period in Japan (1885–1888) was relatively short, Meckel had a tremendous impact on the development of the Japanese military. He is credited with having introducedClausewitz's military theories[6]and the Prussian concept of war games (Kriegsspiel) in a process of refining tactics.[7]By training some sixty of the highest-ranking Japanese officers of the time in tactics, strategy and organization, he was able to replace the previous influences of the French advisors with his own philosophies. Meckel especially reinforcedHermann Roesler's ideal of subservience to theEmperor,as expressly codified in Articles XI-XIII of theMeiji Constitution,by teaching his pupils that Prussian military success was a consequence of the officer class's unswerving loyalty to their sovereign Emperor.[8]

The rise of political parties in the late Meiji period was coupled with the rise of secret and semi-secret patriotic societies, such as theGen'yōsha(1881) andKokuryukai(1901), which coupled political activities withparamilitaryactivities andmilitary intelligence,and supportedexpansionismoverseas as a solution to Japan's domestic issues.

Japan felt looked down on by Western countries during the late 19th century. The phrasefukoku kyōhei(rich nation, strong army) was created during this time and shows how Japanese officials saw imperialism as the way to gain respect and power.[9]With a more aggressive foreign policy, and victory over China in theFirst Sino-Japanese Warand overRussiain theRusso-Japanese War,Japan joined the imperialist powers. The need for a strong military to secure Japan's new overseas empire was strengthened by a sense that only through a strong military would Japan earn the respect of western nations, and thus revision of theunequal treaties.

Economic factors

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During the 19th century,Great Powerstatus was considered dependent on resource-richcolonial empires,both as a source of raw materials for military and industrial production, and international prestige.

Due to the lack of resources inJapanese home islands,raw materials such as iron, oil, and coal largely had to be imported. The success of Japan in securingTaiwan(1895) and Korea (1910) had brought Japan primarily agricultural colonies. In terms of resources, the Japanese military looked towardsManchuria's iron and coal,Indochina'srubber,and China's vast resources. However, the army was at variance with thezaibatsufinancial and industrial corporations on how to manage economic expansion, a conflict also affecting domestic politics.[10]

Independence of the military

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Also forming part of the basis for the growth of militarism was the freedom fromcivilian controlenjoyed by the Japanese armed forces. In 1878, theImperial Japanese Armyestablished theImperial Japanese Army General Staffoffice, modelled after theGerman General Staff.This office was independent of, and equal (and later superior) to theMinistry of War of Japanin terms of authority. TheImperial Japanese Navysoon followed with theImperial Japanese Navy General Staff.These General Staff offices were responsible for the planning and execution of military operations, and reported directly to the emperor. As the Chiefs of the General Staff were not cabinet ministers, they did not report to thePrime Minister of Japan,and were thus completely independent of any civilian oversight or control.

The Army and the Navy also had decisive say on the formation (and survival) of any civilian government. Since the law required that the posts of Army Minister and Navy Minister be filled by active-duty officers nominated by their respective services, and since the law also required that a prime minister resign if he could not fill all of his cabinet posts, both the Army and the Navy had final say on the formation of a cabinet, and could bring down the cabinet at any time by withdrawing their minister and refusing to nominate a successor. In reality, while this tactic was used only one time (ironically to prevent a General,Kazushige Ugaki,from becoming Prime Minister in 1937), the threat always loomed large when the military made any demands on the civilian leadership.

Expansionism

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During theTaishō period,Japan saw a short period ofdemocratic rule(the so-called "Taisho democracy" ), and several diplomatic attempts were made to encourage peace, such as theWashington Naval Treatyand participation in theLeague of Nations.However, with the beginning of theShōwa era,the apparent collapse of the world economic order with theGreat Depressionstarting in 1929, coupled with the imposition oftrade barriersby western nations and an increasing radicalism in Japanese politics including issues of domestic terrorist violence (including an assassination attempt on the emperor in 1932 and a number of attemptedcoups d'étatby ultra-nationalist secret societies) led to a resurgence of so-called "jingoistic" patriotism, a weakening of democratic forces and a belief that the military could solve all threats both domestic and foreign.Patriotic educationalso strengthened the sense of ahakko ichiu,or a divine mission to unify Asia under Japanese rule.

Those who continued to resist the "military solution" including nationalists with unquestionable patriotism, such as generalsJotaro WatanabeandTetsuzan Nagataand ex-Foreign MinisterKijūrō Shideharawere driven from office or an active role in the government.

A turning point came with the ratification of theLondon Naval Treatyof 1930. Prime MinisterOsachi Hamaguchiand hisMinseitoparty agreed to a treaty which would severely limit Japanese naval power. This treaty was strongly opposed by the military, who claimed that it would endanger national defense, and was portrayed by the oppositionRikken Seiyukaiparty as having been forced upon Japan by a hostile United States, which further inflamed growinganti-foreign sentiment.

The Japanese system of party government finally met its demise with theMay 15 Incidentin 1932, when a group of junior naval officers and army cadets assassinated Prime MinisterInukai Tsuyoshi.Although the assassins were put on trial and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment, they were seen popularly as having acted out of patriotism and the atmosphere was set where the military was able to act with little restraint.

Growth of military adventurism

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Japanese troops march intoZhengyangmenofBeijingafter capturing the city in July 1937.

Japan had been involved in the Asian continent continuously from the First Sino-Japanese War,Boxer Rebellion,Russo-Japanese War, World War I and theSiberian Intervention.During the term of Prime MinisterTanaka Giichifrom 1927 to 1929, Japan sent troops three times to China to obstructChiang Kai-shek's unification campaign. In June 1928, adventurist officers of theKwantung Armyembarked on unauthorized initiatives to protect Japanese interests in Manchuria, including the assassination of a former ally, warlordZhang Zuolin,in hopes of sparking a general conflict.

TheManchurian Incidentof September 1931 did not fail, and it set the stage for the Japanese military takeover of all of Manchuria. Kwantung Army conspirators blew up a few meters ofSouth Manchurian RailwayCompany track nearMukden,blamed it on Chinese saboteurs, and used the event as an excuse to invade and seize the vast territory.

In Tokyo one month later, in theImperial Colors Incident,military figures failed in an attempt to establish amilitary dictatorship,but again the news was suppressed and the military perpetrators were not punished.

In January 1932, Japanese forces attacked Shanghai in theFirst Shanghai Incident,waging a three-month undeclared war there before a truce was reached. The civilian government in Tokyo was powerless to prevent these military adventures, and instead of being condemned, the Kwangtung Army's actions enjoyed considerable popular support.

TheJapanese Empirein 1939

Inukai's successors, military men chosen bySaionji Kinmochi,the last survivinggenrō,recognizedManchukuoand generally approved the army's actions in securing Manchuria as an industrial base, an area for Japanese emigration, and a potential staging ground for war with the Soviet Union. Various army factions contended for power amid increasingsuppression of dissentand more assassinations. In theFebruary 26 Incidentof 1936, the Army's eliteFirst Infantry Divisionstaged an attempted coup d'état in yet another effort to overthrow civilian rule. The revolt was put down by other military units, and its leaders were executed aftersecret trials.Despite public dismay over these events and the discredit they brought to numerous military figures, Japan's civilian leadership capitulated to the army's demands in the hope of ending domestic violence. Increases were seen in defense budgets, naval construction (Japan announced it would no longer accede todisarmamenttreaties), and patriotic indoctrination as Japan moved toward a wartime footing.[5]

In November 1936, theAnti-Comintern Pact,an agreement to exchange information and collaborate in preventing communist activities, was signed by Japan andGermany(Italyjoined a year later). War was launched against China with theMarco Polo Bridge Incidentof July 7, 1937 in which a clash near Beijing between Chinese and Japanese troops quickly escalated into the full-scale warfare of theSecond Sino-Japanese War,followed by theSoviet-Japanese Border Warsand thePacific War.

TheGreater East Asia Co-Prosperity Spherein 1942

Despite the military's long tradition of independence from civilian control, its efforts at staging a coup d'état to overthrow the civilian government, and its forcing Japan into war through insubordination and military adventurism, the military was ultimately unable to force a military dictatorship on Japan.

Under Prime MinisterKonoe Fumimaro,the Japanese government was streamlined to meet war-time conditions, and through theNational Mobilization Law,it was given absolute power over the nation's assets. In 1940, allpolitical partieswere ordered to dissolve into theImperial Rule Assistance Association,forming aone-party statebased ontotalitarian values.Even so, there was much entrenched opposition from the government bureaucrats, and in the 1942 general election for theJapanese Diet,the military was still unable to do away with the last vestiges of party politics. This was partly due to the fact that the military itself was not a monolithic structure, but was rent internally with its ownpolitical factions.Even Japan's wartime Prime Minister,Hideki Tōjō,had difficulty controlling portions of his own military.

Japan's overseas possessions, greatly extended as a result of early successes in the Pacific War were organized into aGreater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,which was to have integrated Asia politically and economically—under Japanese leadership—against Western domination.

Militarism was even reflected in the clothing trends of the 1930s. Malekimonodesigns adopted explicitly militaristic imagery, including soldiers,bombersand tanks.[11][12]These designs were not on public display but on linings and undergarments. They symbolised – or in the case of boy's clothes, were hoped to bring about – the alignment of the individual's goals with those of Japan as a whole.[13]

Opposition to militarism

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Despite the apparently monolithic national consensus on the official aggressive policies pursued by the Imperial government in the first part of theShōwa era,some substantial opposition did exist. This was one of various forms ofJapanese dissidence during the Shōwa period.

The most organized open opposition to militarism was from theJapanese Communist Party.In the early 1930s Communist activists attempted to influence army conscripts, but the party was suppressed during the mid-1930s within Japan.

Personal opposition included individuals from the fields of party politics, business and culture. Some notable examples include:

  • Hara Takashi,a commoner and liberal thinker of theRikken Seiyūkai,had becomeprime ministerin 1918 with the rallying cry of "Militarism is dead." Three years later, however, Hara was assassinated.
  • Kijūrō Shideharafollowed a non-interventionist policy toward China, attempting to stabilize its relations with Great Britain and the United States. The term "Shidehara diplomacy" came to describe Japan's liberal foreign policy during the 1920s, and was assailed by military interests who believed it was weakening the country.
  • BaronTakuma Dan,director ofMitsuiBank, was an important opponent of Japan overseas interventions and was known for his pro-American views. He was murdered on March 5, 1932, in theLeague of Blood Incident.
  • Minobe Tatsukichi,a respected professor atTokyo Imperial Universitydeclared the emperor to be a part of the constitutional structure of Japan rather than a sacred power beyond the state itself in 1935. His constitutional interpretation was overwhelmingly accepted by bureaucrats until the 1930s. In the increasingly militant 1930s, these ideas led to attacks against Minobe in theHouse of Peersand his resignation from that body.
  • Saitō Takao,a graduate ofYale Universitywas a member of theRikken Minseitoparty. On February 2, 1940, he made a speech in theDietin which he sharply questioned the prosecution and justification ofJapan's "holy war" in China.He was expelled from the Diet on March 7, 1940, and his speech also led to the creation of theLeague of Diet Members Believing the Objectives of the Holy WarbyFumimaro Konoe.
  • AdmiralSōkichi Takagi,an opponent of Japan's decision to declare war on the United States, was asked by Navy MinisterShigetarō Shimadato compile a report analyzing Japanese defeats during the Pacific campaign of 1942. His analysis convinced Takagi of Japan's inevitable defeat. Believing that the only solution for Japan was the elimination of the Tojo-led government and a truce with the United States, Takagi began planning for the assassination of Prime MinisterHideki Tōjōbefore his removal from office in July 1944.
  • Kanō Jigorō,creator ofJudoand founder of the modern Japanese educational system, member ofJapan's Olympic Committee,and de facto foreign minister for Japan was allegedly a staunch opponent of militarism. Concerned that his Judo school, the Kodokan, would be used as a military training center, he obtained a promise from the Emperor that it would not be. Alternate sources list different causes of death, and some consider his passing to be suspicious.

Japan attacking Pearl Harbor

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Main article:Attack on Pearl Harbor
Japanese EmperorHirohitoas head of theImperial General Headquarterson 29 April 1943

The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor happened on December 7, 1941.Multiple events led to the attack,such as the Japanese peoples' opposition toWesternismand the breaking off of negotiations between Japan and the United States.[14][better source needed]Japan had plans to take over other Asian countries, which resulted in the US stripping any war materials and resources to be sold to the Japanese and freezing all Japanese assets and bank accounts in the US. The US fleet moved from being stationed in California to be moved in Pearl Harbor to somewhat control Japan's aggression and imposed on an embargo of essential materials, because Japan was trying to take over and control more territories.[14][better source needed]

Postwar Japan

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Despite efforts to totally militarize Japanese society during the war, including such measures as theNational Service Draft Ordinanceand theNational Spiritual Mobilization Movement,Japanese militarism was discredited by the failure of Japan's military inWorld War IIand by theAmerican occupation.After thesurrender of Japan,many of its former military leaders were tried forwar crimesbefore theTokyo tribunal.Furthermore, its government and educational system were revised andpacifismwas written into the postwarConstitution of Japanas one of its key tenets.

Timeline

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See also

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Notes

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  1. ^Piers Brendon,The dark valley: A panorama of the 1930s(Knopf, 2000) pp 438–64, 633–60.
  2. ^Shin'ichi Kitaoka, "The army as bureaucracy: Japanese militarism revisited."Journal of Military History57.5 (1993): 67+.
  3. ^Martin, Bernd.Japan and Germany in the Modern World,p. 31.
  4. ^Nishitani, Yukoet al.(2008).Japanese and European Private International Law in Comparative Perspective,p. 29 n6.
  5. ^abWelch, Claude Emerson. (1976).Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries,p. 161.
  6. ^Bassford, Christopher. (1994).Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815–1945,p. 74.
  7. ^Schramm, Helmar. (2005).Collection, Laboratory, Theater,p. 429.
  8. ^Welch,p. 162.
  9. ^Hopper, Helen (2005).Fukuzawa yukichi: from samurai to capitalist.New York, New York: Pearson Education, Inc. p. 110.ISBN0-321-07802-0.
  10. ^Hillis, LoryJapan's Military Masters: The Army in Japanese people not live with farm on hilltop when fish swim in moist creek with bottletop bill. LifeWashington 1943 pp127-130
  11. ^Atkins, Jacqueline M. (September 2008)."Omoshirogara Textile Design and Children's Clothing in Japan 1910–1930".Textile Society of America Symposium Proceedings. Paper 77.RetrievedFebruary 21,2020.
  12. ^Perkins, Sam (November 16, 2016)."The Propaganda Kimonos Japan Kept Hidden From Outsiders".Atlas Obscura.RetrievedFebruary 21,2020.
  13. ^Jackson, Anna (2015). "Dress in the Taishō and early Shōwa periods: traditions transformed". In Jackson, Anna (ed.).Kimono: the art and evolution of Japanese fashion.London: Thames & Hudson. p. 165.ISBN9780500518021.OCLC990574229.
  14. ^ab"The Rise of Militaristic Nationalism - November '96 World War II Feature".HistoryNet.August 19, 1996.RetrievedJune 8,2018.

References and further reading

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