Wikipedia

Kampfgeschwader3

Kampfgeschwader3 "Blitz"(KG 3) was aLuftwaffebomber wing duringWorld War II.

Kampfgeschwader3
ActiveFormed: 1 May 1939
Disbanded officially: 18 August 1944
Disbandment still underway by 10 September 1944.[1]
CountryNazi Germany
BranchLuftwaffe
TypeBomberWing
RoleAir interdiction
close air support
Offensive counter air
Maritime interdiction
Strategic bombing
SizeAir Force Wing
Nickname(s)Blitz
EngagementsPolish Campaign
Battle of Belgium
Battle of France
German invasion of Yugoslavia
Battle of Greece
Battle of Crete
Eastern Front
Insignia
Identification
symbol		Geschwaderkennung
of5K

KG 3 was created in 1939 as the Luftwaffe reorganised and expanded to meetAdolf Hitler's rearmament demands. It was founded in May 1939 and by December 1939, had three activeGruppen(Groups). KG 3 operated theDornier Do 17andJunkers Ju 88medium bombers.

KG 3 served in theInvasion of Polandon 1 September 1939 which began the war in Europe. It spent thePhoney Waronreconnaissanceoperations anddropping propaganda leafletsoverFrance.In May and June 1940 it fought in theBattle of BelgiumandBattle of France.In July 1940, the force took part in theBattle of BritainandThe Blitz.

In June 1941 it supportedOperation Barbarossa,the invasion of theSoviet Union.KG 3 remained on theEastern Frontfor the duration of the wing's existence as a bomber unit. III./KG 3 became the lastGruppein the Luftwaffe to operate the Dornier Do 17.[2]TheGruppewas also converted to theHeinkel He 111and used as a delivery platform to launchV-1 flying bombsagainst theUnited Kingdomfrom the spring to late summer, 1944.

KG 3 was ordered to disband on 18 August 1944 but by the 10 September the dissolution of the wing was still ongoing. AllGruppenceased to exist by October 1944 and were merged with other Luftwaffe units before the German capitulation in May 1945.

History

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Kampfgeschwader3 was formed on 1 May 1939 atFürstenwaldein eastern Germany withStab/KG 3 on 1 May 1939.[1]The Stab unit was transferred toEbling,East Prussiabefore the end of May.OberstWolfgang von Chamier-Glisczinskibecame the firstGeschwaderkommodore.KG 3 was equipped with theDornier Do 17Z.

II and IIIGruppenwere formed nearMagdeburgandAltenburg–Thuringia,respectively, on the same day. AllGruppenwere allocated the Do 17. IIIGruppewas formed from III./KG 153. From May–August 1939 the three units underwent intensive training in the Do 17. II./KG 3 was placed under the command ofHauptmannErnst Exss from 1 May 1939, but he was replaced byOberstViktor Seebauer until the 1 July.OberstleutnantErich Munske was theGruppenkommandeurupon the outbreak of war. III./KG 3 was commanded byOberstleutnantHans Grund, but he was replaced byOberstleutnantKarl Neuhüttler on 1 July.OberstAlbrecht Jahn was the group's first wartime commanding officer.[3]

IGruppewas not formed until 19 September 1939 nearBurg,made up of personnel from II., and III.Gruppe.The group was placed under the command ofOberstleutnantRudolf Gabelmann. It likely became operational on 1 March 1940, after over five weeks of training during the winter, during which it "worked up" on the Dornier Do 17Z.[4]

War service

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In August 1939, the operationalGruppenwere transferred toLuftflotte 1.The mechanics of the Elbing airfield were able to ensure seven of the nine Do 17s belonging to Stab/KG 3 were operational. At Heiligenbeil II./KG 3 could commit 36 operational bombers from 38 to action. III./KG 3 were quipped with 39 bombers, with 30 combat ready at Heiligenbeil. KG 3 were in a position to offer supportFallWeiss,the attack onPoland,with 86 bombers.[5]Luftflotte 1 was to support theGerman 3rd Army,attacking from Prussia, and the main elements ofArmy Group NorthattackingPolish Corridor.[6]By 1 September KG 3 was based atHeiligenbeilunder theLuftwaffenkommando Ostpreussen(Luftwaffe Command East Prussia) under the command of Wilhelm Wimmer.[7]The command was independent from Luftflotte 1, and was to support the 3rd Army's driveToruń,Płock,Warsawand Polish Corridor.[8]

Poland and the Phoney War

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Main articles:German invasion of Poland (1939)andPhoney War

On the 1 September 1939 German forcesinvaded Poland.III./KG 3 attacked Polish positions defending theTczewbridge. Despite the attack, and another fromStG 1,the Poles repaired the wires and blew up the bridge two hours later.[9]BothGruppenwere involved in theBattle of Grudziądz.They were involved in operations over theNarew,Praha.[10]KG 3, paired withKG 27under Wimmer, pushed southward from 6 September to isolate Warsaw from the east.[11]They supported the advance on Warsaw and thesubsequent siege.Both groups bombed targets in theBattle of Modlin.[10]KG 3 losses are unknown, but II./KG 3 lost a bomber in mid-air explosion owing to a faulty fuze; with III./KG 4,and I./KG 152 from 3–6 September 1939.[12]KG 3 bombed targets around Płock,LidaandBiała Podlaska.Both groups participated in theBattle of the Bzuraand the destructionArmy PoznańandArmy Pomorze.[10]

TheGeschwaderceased operations on 21 September 1939 and were ordered to western Germany to face a possibleAllied attack,which petered out. III./KG 3 was ordered toFritzlar,southwest ofKasseland then moved toWürzburgfor five months until 5 April 1940.[13]Karl Neuhuttler handed over command to Albrecht Jahn on 1 July and Jahn was replaced as group commander on 2 March, byMajorWilhelm-Georg von Kunowski, with Jahn moving to II./KG 3.[14]II./KG 3 was based atSchweinfurtuntil May 1940.[10]The group command was change toOberstleutnantAlbrecht Jahn in April, but only to the 16 May, when he was replaced mid-campaign, butHauptmannOtto Pilger.[15]I./KG 3 was based atKitzingenfrom 16 April 1940 in preparation for the offensive.[4]The unit did not participate inOperation Weserübungbut instead spent the spring training and resting in preparation for the western offensive in 1940.[16]

Western Europe

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Main articles:Battle of the Netherlands,Battle of Belgium,andBattle of France

Stab./KG 3 was placed under the command ofII.FliegerkorpsGeneraloberstBruno Loerzerat Würzburg. von Chamier-Gliczinski's command unit had all six Do 17s operational on the opening day ofFall Gelb,the attack onFranceand theLow Countries.[1]Gableman and I./KG 3 mustered 35 Dornier Do 17s, with 31 combat ready atAschaffenburg.[4]Jahn's II./KG 3 fielded a lower number of serviceable aircraft, 27, from 36 available.[10]Kunowski's IIIGruppehad 28 serviceable from the 35 Dorniers allotted to them.[13]AllGruppenwere placed under Loerzer's command. KG 3 was to support the operations ofArmy Group A,as it sought a break through in theArdennesregion—thecritical objective of theManstein Plan.[13]

Dornier Do 17s over France, June 1940. The Do 17 bomber was operated by KG 3 until November 1941, more than any other unit.

On 10 May 1940 the offensive began and the Luftwaffe sought to gainair superiority.III./KG 3 struck atFrench Air Forcebases in theMetzandVerdunarea—Toul-Croix de Metz AirfieldandÉtain-Rouvres Air Base.[13]The result was a disaster for KG 3 and IIFliegerkorps,which lost 23 aircraft and destroyed only 19 Allied aircraft.[17]It was the highest daily loss of any German air corps in the campaign. Among the destroyed bombers were 19 Do 17Zs, eight of them from KG 3, and all to theCurtiss P-36 HawksofGroupe de ChasseI/5.[17]The French fighters intercepted the elements of KG 3 as they attackedSuippesairfield—very little damage was done though the nearby village was destroyed and casualties were heavy.[18]8.Staffelare known to have been engaged byNo. 1 Squadron RAFand lost at least one bomber, over the northernMaginot Line.9./KG 3 were intercepted byEdgar Kain,fromNo. 73 Squadron RAF,and lost one bomber near Metz.[19]A lone bomber from 7./KG 3, piloted byUnteroffizierWolfganag Gräfe was shot down by 1 Squadron over Metz, but return fire forced aHawker Hurricaneto crash-land.[20]

KG 3 was active in supporting the advance in southernBelgium.On 12 May the main area of operations for the Luftwaffe was in theCharleville-MézièresandRethelareas. Loerzer's command was offered support for thePanzer Divisionsof the German12th Army.I. and II./KG 3 operated in theVouzierssector.[21]Large air battles developed and II./KG 3 were intercepted byNo. 501 Squadron RAF,GC II/2 and GC III/7. The German formation lost two bombers destroyed and one damaged.[22]One Hurricane was shot down by return-fire.[23]

The bomber groups supported theGerman breakthrough at Sedanfrom 12 May. I./KG 3 bombed and destroyedReims – Champagne Air Baseon 15 May. II./KG 3 was also active in theCompiegnearea on 19 May. KG 3 supported the destruction of theBelgian Armyin bothOstendandZeebrugge.In late May it bombed harbours and Allied shipping in theEnglish Channelfor the duration of theSiege of CalaisandBattle of Dunkirk,in a bid to prevent theBritish ArmyandFrench Armyevacuations, at least until 27 May 1940, and perhaps to early June.[24]On 25 May the Luftwaffe began its first major attacks on Dunkirk. It dropped 320 bombs and destroyed the lock gates and inner and out harbour facilities. Air operations cost the Germans 30 aircraft. KG 3 lost 12 Dorniers.[25]Loerzer also used KG 3 in night harassing attacks and bombing French railways.[26]

KG 3'sGruppenwere at unknown bases in June. They may have still operated from Germany. The wing was involved inOperation Paulaon 3 June 1940. The purpose of the operation was to attack airfields and factories in theParisarea.[27]KG 3 operations for the duration ofFall Rotare not clear. It is believed that it supported Army Group A andArmy Group Cencircle the Maginot Line and supported the advance toSwitzerland.[1]KG 3 were one of four bomber formations ordered to assist the storming of the Maginot defences on 18 June 1940. In the event, theArmistice of 22 June 1940preempted the operation.[28]

Battle of Britain

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Main article:Battle of Britain

The Luftwaffe rapidly reorganised the Luftflotten in France, Belgium and the Netherlands in June and July 1940. The British refusal to surrender or come to terms with Germany, precipitated Adolf Hitler's order forOperation Sealion,an amphibious invasion of Britain which was to take place after Luftwaffe had securedair superiorityover the English Channel. The German Air Staff,Oberkommando der Luftwaffe(OKL), was ordered byHermann Göring,to begin attacks on targets in southern England after the publication of his 30 June 1940 directive.[29]

Stab./KG 3 was moved toLe Culot,Belgium with seven aircraft (three operational). It remained under the command of IIFliegerkorps.The air group was assigned toLuftflotte 2underAlbert Kesselring.I./KG 3 was placed under the command of Wilhelm-Georg von Kunowski from 23 July, replacing Gablemann who continued to command in the early stages of Channel operations. First group was moved to Le Culot also. The group mustered 28 operational Do 17Z bombers from 36.[4]Otto Pilger's II./KG 3 had 27 bombers from 36 available atAntwerpand III./KG 3 had 25 from 30 available by 13 August under Erich Rathmann atSint-Truiden Air Base.[30]

The initial German air raids against shipping became known as theKanalkampf.I./KG 3 had begun probing attacks on theUnited Kingdomthe day after the French surrender. It carried out a night sortie on 23 June. I./KG 3 experienced its first loss of the air campaign on 2 July 1940 when an I./KG 3 Do 17 piloted byOberleutnantScharpkowski and three crew were postedmissing in action.[31]On 9 July it carried out a night bombing raid on theEast MidlandsandWest Midlands.[32]In the morning II./KG 3 lost an aircraft toNo. 257 Squadron RAF,and another the following day toNo. 66 Squadron RAF.On 23 July II./KG 3 lost a bomber to the RAFFighter Interception Unit,equipped withairborne radar.The last loss of the Kanalkampf phase occurred on 6 August in action withNo. 85 Squadron RAFplus two in accidents.[33]

Dornier Do 17ZWerknummer1160: one of the KG 3 Dorniers lost on 26 August 1940
The fuselage, upside down with the cockpit area nearest the camera
Port engine nacelle; note the tyre is still pressurized

On 13 August, the Germans initiatedAdlertag(Eagle Day), intended to strike a crippling blow atRAF Fighter Command.In the afternoon, a force of 80 Do 17s of KG 3—escorted byJG 51,JG 52,JG 54and 60JG 26(some 270 aircraft in all)—headed forRAF Eastchurchairfield and theShort Brothersfactory atRochester.III./KG 3 broke away from the main formation and attacked Eastchurch while II./KG 3 headed for Rochester. The RAF'sNo. 3,No. 64,No. 111,No. 151,No. 234,No. 249,No. 601andNo. 609 Squadronsintercepted. According to the account of JG 26, the British fighters made little impression on the bombers.[34]Three JG 51 Bf 109s were shot down in skirmishes with RAF fighters, but KG 3 reported no losses.[35]Over 100high explosivebombs were dropped withincendiary bombs.The Airmen's quarters was severely damaged along with the officer's mess and 16 men were killed. All the hangars were hit andNo. 266 Squadron RAF's hangar was destroyed. OneSupermarine Spitfirewas destroyed but all ammunition stores and tanks and much equipment was lost. The water mains were also damaged.[36]The attack on the factory producing theShort Stirlingheavy bomber—carried out by Otto Pilger—was so devastating it ended production for three months.[37]

On 15 August 88 Do 17s from KG 3, led by von Chamier-Glisczinski were ordered to destroyRAF Croydon.Around 130Messerschmitt Bf 109sfrom JG 51, JG 52 and JG 54 provided fighter escort while another 60 Bf 109s fromJG 26carried out fighter patrols overDover.OverDeal, Kent,the bombers were engaged by 36 British fighters from three airborne squadrons,111,151and64 Squadrons.Four more were scrambled. The fighter screen was effective and only two KG 3 losses were reported. No claim was made for a bomber by British fighters: presumably the pilots responsible for the two missing German crews were killed in the combat. Five Do 17s were damaged: one from 2staffeland four from 6.Staffel,which also lost the two bombers.[38]Among the casualties was IIGruppecommander CarlFreiherrvon Wechmar, who was wounded in action. Wechmar had taken command from Kunowski on 5 August, and was replaced by Günther Heinze.[10]

On 20 August III./KG 3 struck at Eastchurch again.[13]27 Do 17s escorted by 30 Bf 109s from I./JG 51 flew up theThames Estuary.No. 615 Squadron RAFaccounted for the lost 9./KG 3 machine reported missing on the raid.[39]On 21 August II./KG 3 carried out attacks onRAF Horsham St Faith.[32]The weather was poor, but keen to keep the pressure on Fighter Command, Kesselring sent out small raids of three aircraft. The 6./KG 3 Dorniers flew overNorfolkwere detected andNo. 611 Squadron RAFdestroyed all three aircraft. Another 4./KG 3 was lost in action withNo. 242 Squadron RAF.[40]

Astaffelof Do 17s from KG 3 running their engines up prior to a sortie, September/October 1940.

Five days later 80 Do 17s—40 from KG 3 and 40 fromKG 2—were ordered to bombRAF DebdenandRAF Hornchurch.The bombers were escorted by 80Messerschmitt Bf 110sand 40 Bf 109s.[41]The heavy fighters were fromZG 26andZG 76.[42]A large number of Bf 109s were sent ahead of the bombers and found no British aircraft. They returned low on fuel as the German bombers started out. Their absence would cause the failure of the attacks. The formation split in the Thames Estuary. KG 2 proceeded north to Debden but aborted the attack well south. Only six to eight Dorniers carried out the attack and escaped in pairs. The KG 3 element also failed to reach the target, returning west ofRochford,with1,65and 615 squadrons in pursuit. Some bombers headed due south, north ofChatham,SittingbourneandFaversham.[43]The Dornier gunners managed to shoot down three 1 Squadron fighters, killing one pilot. The escorting fighters shot down four 615 Squadron pilots, all of whom survived. 7./KG 3 lost one bomber and another damaged to 1 Squadron and another destroyed to610.Boulton Paul Defiantfighters fromNo. 264 Squadron RAFdamaged another.[41]One of these aircraft was recovered from theGoodwin Sandsin 2013.[44][45]It wasWerknummer1160, which failed to return.[46]

On 28 August I./KG 3 bombed Eastchurch and II./KG 3 attacked Rochford airfield. KG 3 carried out a joint operation with I. and III./KG 53.The bomber stream split, 27 Do 17s from I./KG 3 headed to Eastchurch and 77Heinkel He 111sfrom KG 53 headed to Rochford. The KG 53 attacked failed but escorted by 60 Bf 109s from I. and II./JG 51, KG 3 forced their way through. The Bf 109s repulsed attacks by501and 615 Squadron. KG 3 dropped 100 bombs on the field which destroyed several light bombers and caused extensive damage to the airfield. Air reconnaissance reported the failure of KG 53's attack. In response II. and III./KG 3 was ordered to undertake a high altitude (18,000 ft (5,500 m)) bombing raid up the Thames Estuary to Rochford. 1 Squadron destroyed a Do 17 from 6./KG 3. 54 Squadron lost two fighters to Bf 109s but KG 3 suffered two damaged and one destroyed to 615 Squadron.[47][48]KG 3's raid on Rochford was a success. The defences had used up their ammunition on KG 53 and all of264Squadron was caught and destroyed on the ground.[49]On the last day of August, I and II./KG 3 repeated attacks on Hornchurch.72,151 and310squadrons inflicted four losses and one damaged on II.Gruppe,while I.Gruppelost a bomber to 72 Squadron.[50][51]

On 2 September oneGruppecarried out an attack covered by 50 Bf 110s fromZG 26and JG 51.[52]Labelled Raid 49, KG 3 split overMaidstoneand small groups went on to bombRAF Biggin Hill,Rochford, Eastchurch andRAF North Weald.60 fighters were scrambled but only 20 made contact.253 Squadronwas unable to penetrated the fighter screen, and 72 Squadron was engaged by Bf 110s. While the RAF interceptors were busy several Do 17s carried out a low-level attack on Biggin Hill. A few bombs landed on Gravesend, wounding soldiers.[53]9./KG 3 lost three Dorniers—two to 72 Squadron and one to 249 Squadron.[54]

The Blitz

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Main article:The Blitz

On 7 September 1940 the battle over the airfields receded and the Luftwaffe turned toLondon,beginning the Blitz. All three groups were involved in the daylight attack on London which began the nine-month aerial bombardment of British cities.[13]I./KG 3 had 29 aircraft (25 operational); II./KG 3 27 aircraft (23 operational); III./KG 3 could muster 28 (19 operational), on 7 September.

KG 3 lost two bombers.[55]On 15 September KG 3 formed part of themassed attacks against London.In the afternoon the phalanx of the German bombers headed forDungeness,before turning to London. At the head were 43 Do 17s from KG 2; next, a couple of miles behind, came 24 He 111s of KG 53; finally, a couple of miles further behind, came 19 Do 17s from KG 3; followed by 28 He 111s ofKG 26.KG 3 bore the brunt of the next attack from 63 fighters from17,46,249,257,504and 603 Squadrons.[56]The first pass saw three Do 17s go down, includingHauptmannErnst Püttmann, leading 5.Staffel.[57]The raid was costly; KG 3 lost six Dorniers destroyed and four damaged.[58]On 24 and 30 September KG 3 suffered the respective loss on one damaged, and two damaged and one destroyed in daylight attacks.[59]KG 3's last losses in the daylight raids occurred on 6 (one destroyed), 27 (two damaged) and 28 October (one destroyed).[60]

On the night of 14/15 November, a large force hit Coventry. "Pathfinders" from 12Kampfgruppe100led 437 bombers fromKG 1,KG 3, KG 26,KG 27,KG 55 andLG 1which dropped 394 short tons (357 t) of high explosive, 56 short tons (51 t) of incendiaries, and 127 parachute mines.[61]Other sources say 449 bombers and a total of 530 short tons (480 t) of bombs were dropped.[62]The raid against Coventry was particularly devastating, and led to widespread use of the phrase "to conventrate".[61]

KG 3 was used sparingly in comparison to other German bomber units. It did take part in theBristol Blitzon 27/28 November 1940 and the attack onAvonmouththe same night.[63]It was also a participating force in theBirmingham Blitz(12/13 December 1940, 4/5 May 1941); theLondon Blitz(19/20 and 27/28 December 1940, 5, 9/10, 19/20 January 1941);Derby(15/16 January);Watton(18 January, 4 February);Wattisham(31 January);Grantham(23/24 February);Ipswich(25/26 February);Hull Blitz(1/2 March);Newcastle upon Tyne(3/4 March);Gorleston(7 March);Portsmouth Blitz(17/18 March);Chatham(24/25 May)[64]

Balkan Campaign

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Main articles:Invasion of Yugoslavia,Battle of Greece,andBattle of Crete

In mid-March 1941 III./KG 3 staged down through France toMünchendorf,Austria and carried out training exercises from 27 to 29 March 1941. The group had 28 Dorniers, with 26 combat ready and threeJunkers Ju 88s.It placed under the command ofLuftflotte 4under the command ofAlexander Löhruntil 5 April. The group supported the invasion ofYugoslavia,and was involved thebombing of Belgradeon 6 April. 102 Do 17s, carrying 18 SC 50 kg (110 lb) fragmentation bombs, and 2 AB 36 cluster bombs attacked the capital. Some 82 Do 17s remained operational after the first day, with only one reported loss, a KG 3 machine.[65]Another sources states two; both from 8.Staffel.The campaign terminated on 18 April, with a swift Axis victory.[66]

German forces also invadedGreece.The group assisted the rapid southward advance and was known to have operated overCorinthon 23 April, losing one Do 17 toanti-aircraft artillery.[67]KG 3 specifically targeted theCorinth Canal.[13]III./KG 3 moved toTatoi Airporton 11 May, once the campaign on the mainland on 30 April 1941.[13]KG 3 also played a significant part in theBattle of Crete.[68]It supported the airborne landings throughout the third and fourth week of May.[13]The group was based at Medidi before transferring to Tatoi. It was ordered toGoslar,Germany on 1 June to prepare for further campaigns.[13]

Eastern Front

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Main articles:Operation BarbarossaandEastern Front (World War II)
Ju 88A of KG 3Blitz,over Russia, September–October 1942

On 22 June 1941 Operation Barbarossa began the war on the Eastern Front. Stab. and I./KG 3 was based atDęblin–Podlokowka with three and 41 aircraft respectively. Stab./KG 3 had two Ju 88s and a single Do 17 and I./KG 3 had 32 of its 41 Ju 88s operational. Both were under IIFliegerkorps,Luftflotte2, supportingArmy Group Centre.

Dęblin–Ulez was home to II./KG 3, which fielded 32 operational Do 17s to of the 38 available. III./KG 3 moved toSuwałki,but owing to operations in theBalkans,only 18 of the 44 Do 17s were operational. Third group was placed under the command ofFliegerkorpsVIII,Luftflotte2.

On 22 June I./KG 3 attackedPinskairfield. The target was theRed Air Force10th Composite Air Division. The lack of preparedness on the Soviet side allowed theStaffelkapitän,3./KG 3, Ernst-Wilhelm Ihrig was free to make six low-level passes. He claimed to have destroyed 60 aircraft on the ground. Soviet records showed the 39th High Speed Bomber Regiment (SBAP) of the Division lost 43Tupolev SBbombers and fivePetlyakov Pe-2s.[69]I./KG 3 assisted in the capture ofBrest-Livotskand thedestruction of the city fortress,flying operations on 28 June, along with II./KG 3 which specifically targetedBrest Fortress.

II./KG 3 carried out bombing operation in theSmolensk(1 July),BobruiskandBryanskareas (3 July). I./KG 3 was mainly operational in theMogilevregion from 4 to 5 July. III./KG 3 attackPolotskand Nevel on 4 July and on 5 July assisted III./KG 2 in attackVitebsk.[13]The raid destroyed 22 of the 183 aircraft claimed by the Luftwaffe on this date.[70]II. fought in theBattle of Smolenskon 7 July while III./KG 3 rendered aid to Army Group Centre from 10 to 13 July.[13]I./KG 3 bombed targets aroundOrshaon 19 July. All threeGruppenbombedMoscowon 22 July. On 24 July, III./KG 3, with I./KG 2, attacked the SovietReserve Front,with the24th Armyand13th Armyoffensive in the Belyy andYartsevo sector.The two German units claimed 40 vehicles that day.[71]The aircraft of Luftflotte 2 destroyed 100 tanks, 1,500 motor vehicles, 41 artillery guns, 24 anti aircraft batteries between 29 July and 4 August supporting the destruction of the Smolensk encirclement.[72]

III./KG 3 was transferred to northward to supportArmy Group North.It was still under the command ofFliegerkorpsVIII on 3 August. It was placed under the tactical command of Stab./KG 2. based at Dedovichi, it operated over theLake Ilmenarea. It staged through to Ryebitsy, and bombed Dno on 30 August. It supported the advance of the18th Amyand the4th Panzer ArmytoLake LadogaandLeningrad.II./KG 3, based at Orsha from 1 August, bombedVyazmaon 8 August andKurskon 1 September. I./KG 3, based at Orsha from 30 July, and assisted the advance onOrelon 15 September and raided Vyazma again on 16th. I./KG 3 was involved in theBattle of Kievin September.[2]

By 9 September 1941, KG 3 had been credited with the destruction of 450 aircraft on the ground, 21 in aerial combat, 30 tanks, 488 vehicles, 349 rail cars, sevenarmoured trains,27 artillery guns and 14 bridges from 22 June.[1]The Do 17 elements disrupted flew 290 sorties against troop concentrations, barracks, supply depots and interrupted rail traffic on 332 occasions.[73]

In October 1941 KG 3 supported Operation Typhoon, theBattle of Moscow.In the initial attacks, KG 3, with KG 53, focused on bombing Soviet airfields.[74]III./KG 3 operated from Vitebsk on 1 October and when the offensive began the following day, the3rd Panzer Armyand the9th Armytoward Moscow. I./KG 3 was involved in the advance in the southeast, completing operations atTambovon 25 November before withdrawing to Germany. It bombed Moscow twice during the offensive, on 20 October and 6 November. II./KG 3 bombedKirovon the opening day, Moscow on the 27 October and 9 November, as well asKalugaon 21 December, weeks after the Soviet counteroffensive. II./KG 3 lingered on the front until 22 February, and between then and April 1942 left for Germany to refit and rest. III./KG 3 remained in combat with theKalinin Frontand in action over the Vyazma sector until 6 December when it too left the front to convert to the Ju 88. It handed the remaining Do 17s to theCroatian Air Force.[2]I./KG 3 ended the year with the loss of its commanderOberstleutnantFridtjof Pasquay who was postedmissing in actionon 25 November.[10]

Northern, Central and Southern sector of the Eastern Front

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Information for the period January 1942 – December 1943 is extremely sparse since much fewer of KG 3's records survive in comparison to other bomber wings.[1]I./KG 3 operated south ofLeningradover March—June 1942. It was then moved to the central sector until June 1943. It was briefly placed under the command of Stab./KG 1on 31 May for an undetermined amount of time. It carried out rail interdiction operations and then carried out an unusual long-range bombing operation againstKirov, Kirov Oblaston 18 June 1942. From November to 6 December 1942 it was used to help defeat the SovietOperation Marsalongside the German 9th army.[10]

From 7–23 July it supported the Second Panzer Army in theOrelsector. The group was on the move during this time and it recorded atKurskon 16 July. I./KG 3 supported German forces for at least 24 hours in theBattle of Voronezh.By 20 September 1942 it had 24 Ju 88s but only 15 were combat ready. The group was moved toMünsterand thenGüterslohby 26 June 1943. A specialist training busting unit—2 staffel—was possibly left atPoltava.[10]

II./KG 3 continued to support Army Group Centre and formed part of VIIIFliegerkorps.It probably operated fromOrsha22 February 1942. In May 1942 it moved toKharkovand was involved in theSecond Battle of Kharkovand lost is commander Major Waldemar Krüger killed on 22 May. He was replaced by Günther Dörffel. 6th Staffel was trained and deployed as a train-busting unit equipped with the Ju 88C and P. The group returned to Shatalovka 26 May and then toVelikiye Lukion 14 June. It bombed Moscow on 23 July 1942 and supported the German9tharmy in theBattle of Rzhev, Summer 1942.The group was assigned to support theSecond Panzer Armyfor a time. As theBattles of Rzhevconcluded, and the front in the centre stabilised, operational losses for the group stood at 70 aircrew over the spring and summer, 1943.[15]

III./KG 3 held on to their Do 17s until May 1942 when they became the last bomber group to convert to the Ju 88 at Gütersloh. It fought near Orel andToropetsand operated in the former area from 18 to 25 May. It was involved in the Rzhev battles against theSoviet 39th ArmyandXI Cavalry Corps.KG 3 succeed in assisting the encirclement and destruction of the Soviet forces.[2]

The battles cost KG 3 theirGeschwaderkommodoreJobst-Heinrich von Heydebreck who was posted missing on 3 January 1943—he had only served as wing commander for two months after taking over from Heinrich Conrady on 1 November 1942.[4]The third group supportedWaffen SSand German army forces in theThird Battle of Kharkov.It moved to Bagerovo in theCrimeaon 13 April 1943 and spend several weeks on attacks along theBlack Seacoast until returned to Munster in June 1943. It lost two commanding officers in action over this period—Hauptmann Ernst-Wilhelm Ihrig on 30 November 1942 and his successor Siegfried Jungklaus on 22 April 1943.[14]

Through 1943 KG 3 struck at the vital enemy rail system. By December 1942 three dedicated railway (Eisenbahn)Staffeln(squadrons) had been established and produced several expert train-busting pilots.LeutnantUdo Cordes of 9.(Eis)/KG 3, claimed 41locomotivesand 19 complete trains in three weeks whileHauptmannErnst Fach claimed 216 locomotives on lone sorties hunting lightly defended rail lines deep into the Soviet rear. The claim count is likely to include wagons and not just locomotives. Fach's prolific run ended on 14 May 1943 when he was killed in action.[75]Aside from one loss on 13 April in a Soviet air raid and two Ju 88s lost on 5 July 1943, little else is known about the unit.[14]

All three groups supportedOperation Citadelat Kursk. After the rapid failure of the offensive KG 3 covered the retreat. I./ KG 3 was transferred from Poltava toKirovogradbetween 21 and 23 August 1943. It moved to Kalinovka by mid-October and was based at Terespol near Brest-Litovsk for retraining in night operations by 16 December. It was still there by 16 March 1944. It is known to have covered the retreats in theBelorussian SSRand bombed targets in theSmolenskarea in May 1944. It was ordered toAltenburgnearLeipzigon 2 June. Within four weeks all pilots had been reassigned to fighter units and the ground personnel to anti-aircraft battalions. According to the record, the dissolution was complete on 18 August.[10]II./KG 3 was also disbanded on the same date after carrying out similar operations and moves from July 1943. Pilots and personnel were reassigned and it does not appear onLuftflotte 6's order of battle on 26 June 1944.[15]

Operations against Britain

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III./KG 3 remained the sole surviving group in late 1944. It was assigned to the 30th Jagddivision from 26 September 1943 to January 1944. It was reshaped as an illumination (pathfinder) group for single engine, none radar-equipped,night fightersengaged in theDefence of the Reich.It was renamed I.(Bel)./NJG 7(Night Fighter Wing 7) in January 1944 and transferred from Luftflotte 6 toLuftflotte Reich.

III./KG 3 was reformed on 6 February 1944 nearLublin,Poland. It was trained to use theHeinkel He 111H-22 in night operations, as a weapon platform, for the V-1 flying bomb (FZG 76). It began this operations in late June 1944 under Fliegrkorps IX fromVenloand Gilze-Rijen in theNetherlandswith nine He 111s.

On 7 and 9 July it launched V-1s atSouthamptonand London respectively. From 18 to 20 July it launched approximately 50 V-1s. It may have flown a last sortie on 5 October 1944, but may have been in the process of disbanding. It was subordinated toGefechtsverband Hallensleben.It had lost four aircraft by 20 October to RAF night fighters. The groups ranks had swelled to 25 He 111s by 16 October. According to sources, from 7 July—20 October 1944 it launched around 1,100 V-1s but 40 percent failed. There is no further mention of III./KG 3 activity.[76]

Commanding officers

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  • OberstWolfgang von Chamier-Glisczinski,1 May 1939 – 1 September 1941
  • Oberst Heinrich Conrady, 1 September 1941 – 31 October 1942
  • Oberst Erich Rathmann (acting), 1942
  • Major Jobst-Heinrich von Heydebreck, 1 November 1942 – 3 January 1943 (MIA)
  • OberstltWalter Lehweß-Litzmann,January 1943 – 7 September 1943 (MIA, Oberst promotion was posthumous)
  • Major Fritz Auffhammer, 24 September 1943 – 18 August 1944

References

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Citations

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  1. ^abcdefde Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007,p. 36.
  2. ^abcdde Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007,p. 43.
  3. ^de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007,pp. 38, 42.
  4. ^abcdede Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007,p. 37.
  5. ^de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007,pp. 36, 37, 38, 42.
  6. ^Hooton 1994,p. 175.
  7. ^Hooton 2007a,p. 94.
  8. ^Hooton 2007a,p. 85.
  9. ^Hooton 1994,p. 179.
  10. ^abcdefghijde Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007,p. 38.
  11. ^Hooton 1994,pp. 184–185.
  12. ^Hooton 1994,p. 188.
  13. ^abcdefghijklde Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007,p. 42.
  14. ^abcde Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007,p. 44.
  15. ^abcde Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007,p. 41.
  16. ^de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007,pp. 36–48.
  17. ^abHooton 1994,p. 243.
  18. ^Jackson 1974,p. 71.
  19. ^Cull, Lander & Weiss 1999,pp. 21–22.
  20. ^Cull, Lander & Weiss 1999,p. 23.
  21. ^Cull, Lander & Weiss 1999,p. 87.
  22. ^Cull, Lander & Weiss 1999,p. 88.
  23. ^Cull, Lander & Weiss 1999,p. 97.
  24. ^de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007,pp. 36, 42.
  25. ^Hooton 2007b,pp. 72–73.
  26. ^Hooton 2007b,p. 66.
  27. ^Jackson 1974,p. 80.
  28. ^Hooton 2007b,p. 89.
  29. ^Hooton 1997,p. 17.
  30. ^de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007,pp. 40, 42.
  31. ^Mason 1969,p. 136.
  32. ^abde Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007,p. 40.
  33. ^Mason 1969,pp. 151, 159, 187, 212.
  34. ^Baker 1996,p. 113.
  35. ^Mason 1969,p. 242.
  36. ^Mason 1969,p. 238.
  37. ^Bergström 2015,p. 122.
  38. ^Mason 1969,pp. 257, 261.
  39. ^Mason 1969,pp. 288–289.
  40. ^Mason 1969,pp. 289–290.
  41. ^abMason 1969,pp. 306–307, 310.
  42. ^Bowyer 2010,p. 239.
  43. ^Mason 1969,pp. 306–307.
  44. ^"Dornier Do 17Z Werke nr. 1160".Royal Air Force Museum,6 December 2012. Retrieved: 5 May 2013.
  45. ^"Dornier 17 Conservation: Identification".Royal Air Force Museum,6 December 2012. Retrieved: 5 May 2013.
  46. ^Mason 1969,p. 310.
  47. ^Mason 1969,pp. 313–315.
  48. ^Bowyer 2010,pp. 246–247.
  49. ^Bergström 2015,p. 162.
  50. ^Mason 1969,p. 330.
  51. ^Bergström 2015,p. 173.
  52. ^Bergström 2015,p. 181.
  53. ^Mason 1969,p. 339.
  54. ^Mason 1969,p. 341.
  55. ^Mason 1969,p. 367.
  56. ^Price 1990,pp. 81–83, 74–75.
  57. ^Bungay 2000,p. 329.
  58. ^Mason 1969,p. 393.
  59. ^Mason 1969,pp. 410, 424.
  60. ^Mason 1969,pp. 434, 462–463.
  61. ^abShores, Cull & Malizia 1987,p. 57.
  62. ^Hooton 1997,p. 35.
  63. ^Goss 2010,p. 218.
  64. ^Goss 2010,pp. 223–248.
  65. ^Ciglić & Savić 2007,p. 53.
  66. ^Shores, Cull & Malizia 1987,p. 200.
  67. ^Shores, Cull & Malizia 1987,p. 280.
  68. ^Shores, Cull & Malizia 1987,p. 325.
  69. ^Brookes 2003,p. 25.
  70. ^Bergström 2007a,p. 46.
  71. ^Bergström 2007a,p. 48.
  72. ^Bergström 2007a,p. 50.
  73. ^Brookes 2003,p. 54.
  74. ^Brookes 2003,p. 57.
  75. ^Hooton 1997,p. 188.
  76. ^de Zeng, Stankey & Creek 2007,p. 45.

Bibliography

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  • Baker, David (1996).Adolf Galland: The Authorised Biography.London: Windrow & Green.ISBN978-1-85915-017-7.
  • Bergström, Christer[in Swedish](2007a).Barbarossa - The Air Battle: July–December 1941.London: Chevron/Ian Allan.ISBN978-1-85780-270-2.
  • Bergström, Christer[in Swedish](2015).The Battle of Britain: An Epic Conflict Revisited.Oxford, UK: Casemate.ISBN978-1612-00347-4.
  • Bowyer, Michael (2010).Battle of Britain: The Fight for Survival in 1940.Crecy Publishing.ISBN978-0-85979-147-2.
  • Brookes, Andrew (2003).Air War Over Russia.Hersham, Surrey: Ian Allan Publishing.ISBN978-0-7110-2890-6.
  • Bungay, Stephen(2000).The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain.London, UK: Aurum Press.ISBN978-1-85410-721-3.
  • Ciglić, Boris; Savić, Dragan (2007).Dornier Do 17 – The Yugoslav Story: Operational Record 1937–1947.Belgrade: Jeroplan Books.ISBN978-86-909727-0-8.
  • Cull, Brian; Lander, Bruce; Weiss, Heinrich (1999).Twelve Days in May.London: Grub Street Publishing.ISBN978-1-90230-412-0.
  • de Zeng, H.L.; Stankey, D.G.; Creek, E.J. (2007).Bomber Units of the Luftwaffe 1933–1945; A Reference Source, Volume 1.Ian Allan Publishing.ISBN978-1-85780-279-5.
  • Goss, Chris (2010).The Luftwaffe's Blitz: The Inside Story, November 1940 – May 1941.Manchester: Crecy.ISBN978-0-85979-148-9.
  • Hooton, E.R. (1994).Phoenix Triumphant; The Rise and Rise of the Luftwaffe.London: Arms & Armour Press.ISBN978-1-85409-181-9.
  • Hooton, E. R. (1997).Eagle in Flames: The Fall of the Luftwaffe.Brockhampton Press.ISBN978-1-86019-995-0.
  • Hooton, E.R. (2007a).Luftwaffe at War; Gathering Storm 1933–39: Volume 1.London: Chevron/Ian Allan.ISBN978-1-903223-71-0.
  • Hooton, E.R. (2007b).Luftwaffe at War; Blitzkrieg in the West: Volume 2.London: Chevron/Ian Allan.ISBN978-1-85780-272-6.
  • Jackson, Robert (1974).Air War Over France, 1939–1940.London: Ian Allan.ISBN978-0-7110-0510-5.
  • Mason, Francis (1969).Battle Over Britain.London: McWhirter Twins Ltd.ISBN978-0-901928-00-9.
  • Price, Alfred(1990).Battle of Britain Day: 15 September 1940.London: Greenhill books.ISBN978-1-85367-375-7.
  • Shores, Christopher; Cull, Brian; Malizia, Nicola (1987).Air War for Yugoslavia, Greece, and Crete, 1940–41.London: Grub Street.ISBN978-0-948817-07-6.

Further reading

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  • Air Power History, Volumes 44–45, 1997.
  • Bergström, Christer (2007b).Stalingrad – The Air Battle: 1942 through January 1943.Midland Puplishing, Hinkley.ISBN978-1-85780-276-4
  • Bergström, Christer (2015).The Battle of Britain: An Epic Conflict Revisited.Casemate: Oxford.ISBN978-1612-00347-4.
  • Bergström, Christer; Mikhailov, Andrey (2001).Black Cross / Red Star Air War Over the Eastern Front, Volume II, Resurgence January–June 1942.Pacifica, California: Pacifica Military History.ISBN978-0-935553-51-2.
  • Hayward, Joel S (1998).A. Stopped At Stalingrad.Univ. of Kansas; Lawrence.ISBN978-0-7006-1146-1
  • James, T.C.G andCox, Sebastian.The Battle of Britain.Frank Cass, London. 2000.ISBN978-0-7146-8149-8
  • Muller, Richard(1992).The German Air War in Russia.Nautical & Aviation Publishing. Baltimore, Maryland.ISBN1-877853-13-5
  • Parker, Nigel (2013).Luftwaffe Crash Archive: Volume 1: A Documentary History of Every Enemy Aircraft Brought Down Over the United Kingdom, September 1939 – 14 August 1940.Red Kite, London.ISBN978-1906592097
  • Wakefield, Ken (1999). Pfadfinder: Luftwaffe Pathfinder Operations Over Britain. NPI Media Group.ISBN978-0-75241-692-2
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