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TheLebanese National Movement(LNM;Arabic:الحركة الوطنية اللبنانية,Al-Harakat al-Wataniyya al-Lubnaniyya) was a front ofLeftist,pan-ArabistandSyrian nationalistpartiesandorganizationsactive during the early years of theLebanese Civil War,which supported thePalestine Liberation Organization(PLO). It was headed byKamal Jumblatt,a prominentDruzeleader of theProgressive Socialist Party(PSP). The Vice-President was Inaam Raad, leader of theSyrian Social Nationalist PartyandAssem Qansoof thepro-Syrian Lebanese Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party.The general secretary of the LNM wasMohsen Ibrahim,leader of theCommunist Action Organization in Lebanon(CAOL).[1]
The LNM was one of two main coalitions during the first rounds of fighting in the Lebanese Civil War, the other being the militias of the mainlyChristianLebanese Front,which comprised thenationalistPhalange,theNational Liberal Partyand others; as well as parts of theMaronite-dominated central government.
Composition
editThe Lebanese National Movement had its genesis in a previous organization, theFront of National and Progressive Parties and Forces – FNPPF(Arabic:Jabhat al-Ahzab wa al-Quwa al-Taqaddumiyya wa al-Wataniyya) orFront for Progressive Parties and National Forces(FPPNF), also known as theRevisionist Front,an alliance of anti-status quo political parties originally formed in 1969, which later ran in the 1972 general elections on areformistsecularplatform. Overwhelmingly left-wing andPan-Arabistin both its composition and orientation, the LNM claimed to be a "democratic,progressiveandnon-sectarian"broad organization that gathered parties and organizations opposing theMaronite-dominatedsectarianorder inLebanon.It was reorganized as the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) in the 1970s, and led byKamal Jumblattas the main force on the anti-government side in the early years of theLebanese Civil War.
Among the members were theProgressive Socialist Party(PSP), theSyrian Social Nationalist Party(SSNP), theLebanese Communist Party(LCP) and severalNasseristandMarxistgroups. It was also joined byPalestinianfactions based in Lebanon'srefugee camps,mainly from theRejectionist Front.
Membership and political organization
editIts membership was overwhelmingly left-wing and professed to be secular, although the fairly obvious sectarian appeal of Jumblatt'sProgressive Socialist Party(PSP) and some of theSunniArab nationalistorganizations in some cases made this claim debatable. However, to say that the LNM was an all-Muslimorganization would be a grossoversimplification.Its main ideological positions were: the abrogation of sectarianism, political and social reforms, the clear proclamation of the Arab identity ofLebanon,and increased support for thePalestinians.In order to coordinate the military and political actions of the LNM an executive structure, theCentral Political Council – CPC(Arabic:Majliss Tajammu al-kinda) orBureau Politique Central (BPC)inFrench,was set up shortly after the outbreak of the hostilities at the town ofAley,a mountain tourist resort in theChouf District,which became the military headquarters of the Front. The Council was presided over from its inception by Kamal Jumblatt of the PSP, withMohsen Ibrahimof the OCAL appointed as Executive Secretary; after Kamal's death in 1977, he was replaced by his sonWalid Jumblatt,who led the LNM until 1982.
Among the participants in the LNM were theLebanese Communist Party(LCP), theCommunist Action Organization in Lebanon(CAOL or OCAL), the PSP, theSyrian Social Nationalist Party in Lebanon(SSNP), both aSyrian-led Ba'ath Party branchand anIraqi-led Ba'ath Party branch,al-Mourabitoun(aNasseristgroup) and several other minor Nasserist and Marxist groupings. Several Palestinian organizations joined the LNM, notably many from theRejectionist Front.Both thePopular Front for the Liberation of Palestine(PFLP) and theDemocratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine(DFLP) were active participants.
TheShiaAmal Movement,although supporting some of the LNM's positions, did not join it formally.[2]
Minor groups
editAbove and beyond this, an ' Alpha bet soup' of other lesser-known smaller Parties were associated with the LNM.
- Revolutionary Communist Group– RCG
- the Lebanese Revolutionary Party – LRP
- the Front of Patriotic Christians – PFC
- the Democratic Lebanese Movement – DLM
- the Movement of Arab Lebanon – MAL
- the Arab Revolutionary Movement – ARM
- the Partisans of the Revolution
- the Vanguards of Popular Action – VPA
- the Organization of Arab Youth – OAY
- the Units of the Arab Call – UAC
- the Movement of Arab Revolution – MAR
- theSixth of February Movement
- the24 October Movement– 24 OM
- theLebanese Movement in Support of Fatah– LMSF
- theUnion of Working People's Forces– UWPF
- theUnion of Working People's Forces-Corrective Movement– UWPF-CM
- theKnights of Ali
- the Black Panthers
Most of them were marginal political organizations ofrevolutionaryorpopulisttrend (Arab nationalist,libertarian/anarchist,liberal/idealist,radicalsocialist,Marxist–Leninist,Hoxhaist,Trotskyist,orMaoist) that emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and despite their rather limited base of support, they were quite active. Anti-status quo,Pan-Arabist,and pro-Palestinian in policy, they strived for a social revolution that would transform Lebanese society, therefore sharing the same objectives as the leading LNM secular parties – the recognition ofLebanonas anArab countryand unwavering support for the PLO.
However, apart this minority of committed idealists, the vast majority of the remainder 'movements' were actually façades or 'shops' (Arabic:dakakin) – slightly politicised neighbourhood militias operating under grandiose pseudo-revolutionary labels – set up by PLO factions (mainlyFatah) in a misguided effort to widen its base of local support among the unemployed Lebanese urban youth. In most cases, their small, poorly disciplined, ill-equipped militia establishments weread hocformations made of lightly armed and largely untrainedChristianorMuslimyouths that rarely surpassed the 100-300 fighters' mark – about the size of an understrengthcompanyorbattalion.Some groupings were lucky enough to possess a fewtechnicalsarmed withheavy machine-gunsandrecoilless riflesbut others, for the most part, fought on foot aslight infantry,withsmall armspilfered from the government forces, acquired on the black market or obtained via the Palestinian factions. Those groups either unable or unwilling to raise their own militias played a political role only by engaging in propaganda activities, keeping themselves out of the 1975-76 savage street battles and sectarian killings, with some of their militants preferring instead to join themedical relief agenciesorganized by the LNM.
The decline of the LNM in the late 1970s, culminating in its collapse in the aftermath of theIsraeli invasion of June 1982,sounded the death toll for many of the minor Lebanese leftist organizations. As the war progressed, many of these small factions – at least the more politically oriented ones – were destroyed in the violent power struggles of the 1980s. For the most part forced to go underground, some evolved toIslamic fundamentalistgroups, whilst the less politicized simply degenerated intocriminal street-gangsthat engaged in assassinations, theft, smuggling, and extortion. As a result, only a small fraction of the truly ideologically committed groupings managed to survive the war to re-emerge in the 1990s as politically active organizations.
Military strength and organization
editAt the beginning of the war in 1975, the different LNM militias were grouped into a military wing, designated the"Common Forces"(Arabic:القوات المشتركة,Al-Quwwat al-Mushtaraka), but best known as"Joint Forces" (LNM-JF),which numbered some 18,900 militiamen (not including allied Palestinian factions). Manpower was distributed as follows: the PSP militia (thePeople's Liberation Army) and the LCP militia (thePopular Guard) each had 5,000 men; the SSNP militia had 4,000 men; the pro-Syria Ba'athists and pro-Iraqi Ba'athists had 2,000 and 1,500 men respectively. The others militias shared the remainder.
This number was to increase in the following months with the inclusion of 21,900 Palestinian guerrilla fighters from both theRejectionist Front(RF) and mainstream PLO factions, later joined by 4,400 Lebanese regular soldiers from theLebanese Arab Army(LAA) led by Lieutenant Ahmad al-Khatib who went over to the LNM-PLO side in January 1976. In the end, the LNM-PLO-LAA combined military forces reached an impressive total of 45,200 troops by March that year, aligned against the 12,000-16,000 right-wing troops theirLebanese Frontadversaries were able to muster.
| Group | Manpower |
|---|---|
| LCP (Popular Guard) | 5,000 |
| PSP (PLA) | 5,000 |
| SSNP-L | 4,000 |
| Pro-Syrian Baath | 2,000 |
| Pro-Iraqi Baath | 1,500 |
| Remaining militias | 1,400 |
| Total | 18,900 |
| Lebanese Arab Army | 4,400 |
| PLO&Rejectionist Front | 21,900 |
| Total | 45,200 |
Sponsor countries and organizations
editThe LNM-JF received financial aid and arms from many countries such asSyria,Libya,IraqandSouth Yemen,in addition to Palestinian support; besides lending their political backing and contributing with their organizational skills, experienced Palestinian cadres from RF and PLO groups provided weapons, equipment, and in many cases, military leadership to the Lebanese leftist militias. In addition, they also provided training, which was conducted at therefugee campsin the major cities or at PLO bases in southern Lebanon, mainly in theBeqaa Valley(a.k.a. "Fatahland" ).
Participation in the Lebanese Civil War 1975-1982
editAs fighting escalated, the LNM allied itself with the umbrellaPalestine Liberation Organization(PLO), and by early 1976 the LNM controlled 80% of Lebanon's territory.[4]But as its relations withDamascusdeteriorated, thepro-Syrian Ba'athbranch,Union of Working People's Forcesand an important SSNP faction left the movement, and formed alongsideAmal MovementtheFront of Patriotic and National Parties.
In June 1976, the Syrian Army, fearing that a Palestinian victory would weaken its own strategic position, received a request from theLebanese Frontto intervene on their behalf.[5]After strong initial resistance, the LNM/PLO forces began losing ground, and once theArab stateseventually approved the Syrian intervention after theCairoandRiyadhconferences, the common forces accepted a cease-fire. The Syrian Army then took the role of peace-keepers, as part ofArab League'sArab Deterrent Force(ADF), between the belligerents. In 1977,Walid Jumblattbecame the head of the LNM after the murder of his resigning father, Kamal, in an ambush widely accredited to either pro-Syrian Palestinian militants or Lebanese SSNP agents working for the Syrian intelligence services.[6][7][8][9][10]Despite this, Walid aligned himself with Syria, and maintained a good working relationship with Syrian PresidentHafez al-Assad(who had shared with his father a mutual distrust).
In 1978 theIsraeliOperation Litaniin southern Lebanon was partly directed against LNM militias, then fighting alongside the PLO after relations improved with Syria. In June 1982, the Movement was virtually dissolved after theIsraeli invasion of Lebanon,and replaced by theLebanese National Resistance Front– LNRF (Arabic:جبهة المقاومة الوطنية اللبنانية,Jabhat al-Muqawama al-Wataniyya al-Lubnaniyya), which commenced resistance operations against theIsrael Defense Forces(IDF) in September of that same year.
See also
editNotes
edit- ^Organization for Communist Action, Michele Salkind, Fawwaz Trabulsi, MERIP Reports, No. 61 (Oct., 1977), pp. 5-8+21
- ^Amal Movement, 30 years after its foundation
- ^El-Khazen, Farid (2000).The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967–1976.Harvard University Press.ISBN978-0674081055.
- ^Fawwaz Traboulsi, "La réforme par les armes"
- ^Investigating Bashir Gemayel Part I: Bashir and the Israelis
- ^Tim Llewellyn (1 June 2010).Spirit of the Phoenix: Beirut and the Story of Lebanon.I.B.Tauris. pp. xiii.ISBN978-1-84511-735-1.Retrieved15 March2013.
- ^Knudsen, Are (2010). "Acquiescence to Assassinations in Post-Civil War Lebanon?".Mediterranean Politics.15(1):1–23.doi:10.1080/13629391003644611.S2CID154792218.
- ^Collelo,Lebanon: A Country Study(1989), p. 241.
- ^Rabinovich,The War for Lebanon(1989), p. 77.
- ^Menargues,Les Secrets de la guerre du Liban(2004), p. 50.
References
edit- Alain Menargues,Les Secrets de la guerre du Liban: Du coup d'état de Béchir Gémayel aux massacres des camps palestiniens,Albin Michel, Paris 2004.ISBN978-2226121271(inFrench)
- Denise Ammoun,Histoire du Liban contemporain: Tome 2 1943-1990,Fayard, Paris 2005.ISBN978-2-213-61521-9(inFrench) –[1]
- Edgar O'Ballance,Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-92,Palgrave Macmillan, London 1998.ISBN0-333-72975-7
- Fawwaz Traboulsi,Identités et solidarités croisées dans les conflits du Liban contemporain; Chapitre 12: L'économie politique des milices: le phénomène mafieux,Thèse de Doctorat d'Histoire – 1993, Université de Paris VIII, 2007 (inFrench)
- Itamar Rabinovich,The war for Lebanon, 1970–1985,Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 1989 (revised edition).ISBN978-0-8014-9313-3,0-8014-9313-7 –[2]
- Rex Brynen,Sanctuary and Survival: the PLO in Lebanon,Boulder: Westview Press, Oxford 1990.ISBN0 86187 123 5–[3]
- Robert Fisk,Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War,London: Oxford University Press, (3rd ed. 2001).ISBN0-19-280130-9–[4]
- Marius Deeb,The Lebanese Civil War,Praeger Publishers Inc., New York 1980.ISBN978-0030397011
- Thomas Collelo (ed.),Lebanon: a country study,Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Headquarters, Department of the Army (DA Pam 550-24), Washington D.C., December 1987 (Third edition 1989). –[5]