Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

TheGreater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere(Japanese:Thuyết Đại Đông Á,Hepburn:Dai Tōa Kyōeiken),also known as theGEACPS,was apan-Asianunion that theEmpire of Japantried to establish. Initially, it covered Japan (includingannexed Korea),Manchukuo,andChina,but as thePacific Warprogressed, it also included territories inSoutheast Asiaand parts ofIndia.The term was first coined byMinister for Foreign AffairsHachirō Aritaon June 29, 1940.

Members of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and territories occupied by the Japanese army at maximum height in 1942. Japan and itsAxisalliesThailandandAzad Hindare in dark red; occupied territories/puppet states are in lighter red.Korea,Taiwan,Karafuto (South Sakhalin),and Kuril were integral parts of Japan.

Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
Japanese name
Kana	だいとうあきょうえいけん
Kyūjitai	Thuyết Đại Đông Á
Shinjitai	Đại đông á cộng vinh quyển
Transcriptions Revised Hepburn Dai Tōa Kyōeiken

The proposed objectives of this union were to ensureeconomic self-sufficiencyandcooperationamong the member states, along with resisting the influence ofWestern imperialismandSoviet communism.In reality, militarists and nationalists saw it as an effective propaganda tool to enforce Japanese hegemony.The latter approach was reflected in a document released by Japan'sMinistry of Health and Welfare,An Investigation of Global Policy with the Yamato Race as Nucleus,which promoted racial supremacist theories.Japanese spokesmen openly described the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as a device for the "development of the Japanese race."WhenWorld War IIended, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere became a source of criticism and scorn for Allies.

Development of the concept

Main articles:Japanese nationalismandPropaganda in Japan during the Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II

1935 propaganda poster ofManchukuopromoting harmony betweenJapanese,Chinese,andManchu.The caption from right to left says: "With the help of Japan, China, and Manchukuo, the world can be in peace." The flags shown are, right to left: the "Five Races Under One Union"flag ofChina,theflag of Japan,and theflag of Manchukuo.

The concept of a unifiedAsiaunder Japanese leadership had its roots dating back to the 16th century. For example,Toyotomi Hideyoshiproposed to make China, Korea, and Japan into "one". Modern conceptions emerged in 1917. During the proceedings of theLansing-Ishii Agreement,Japan explained to Western observers that their expansionism in Asia was analogous to theUnited States'Monroe Doctrine.This conception was influential in the development of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity concept, with theJapanese Armyalso comparing it to theRoosevelt Corollary.One of the reasons why Japan adopted imperialism was to resolve domestic issues such asoverpopulationandresource scarcity.Another reason was to withstand Western imperialism.

On November 3, 1938,Prime MinisterFumimaro Konoeand Minister for Foreign AffairsHachirō Aritaproposed the development of theNew Order in East Asia(Đông á tân trật tự,Tōa Shin Chitsujo),which was limited to Japan, China, and the puppet state of Manchukuo.They believed that the union had 6 purposes:

1. Permanent stability of Eastern Asia
2. Neighbourly amity and international justice
3. Joint defence against communism
4. Creation of a new culture
5. Economic cohesion and co-operation
6. World peace

The vagueness of the above points were effective in making people more agreeable tomilitarismandcollaborationism.

On June 29, 1940, Arita renamed the union theGreater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,which he announced by radio address. AtYōsuke Matsuoka's advice, Arita emphasised on the economic aspects more. On August 1, Konoe, who still used the original name, expanded the scope of the union to include the territories of Southeast Asia.On November 5, Konoe reaffirmed that a Japan–Manchukuo–Chinayenblocwould continue and be "perfected".

History

Main articles:Japanese colonial empireandMilitary history of Japan § Shōwa era and World War II (1926–1945)

The outbreak of World War II in Europe gave the Japanese an opportunity to fulfill the objectives of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, without significant pushback from the Western powers or China.This entailed the conquest of Southeast Asian territories to extract their natural resources. If territories were unprofitable, the Japanese would encourage their subjects, including those in mainland Japan, to endure "economic suffering" and prevent outflow of material to the enemy. Nonetheless, they preached the moral superiority of cultivating a "spiritual essence" instead of prioritising material gain like Western powers.

After Japanese advancements intoFrench Indochinain 1940, knowing that Japan was completely dependent on other countries for natural resources,U.S. PresidentFranklin D. Rooseveltordered a trade embargo onsteelandoil,raw materials that were vital to Japan's war effort.Without steel and oil imports, Japan's military could not fight for long.As a result of the embargo, Japan decided to attack the British and Dutch colonies in Southeast Asia from 7 to 19 December 1941, seizing the raw materials needed for the war effort.These efforts were successful, with Japanese politicianNobusuke Kishiannouncing via radio broadcast that vast resources were available for Japanese use in the newly conquered territories.

As part of its war drive in the Pacific,Japanese propagandaincluded phrases like "Asia for the Asiatics" and talked about the need to "liberate" Asian colonies from the control of Western powers.They also planned to change the Chinese hegemony in the agricultural market in Southeast Asia with Japanese immigrants to boost its economic value, with the former being despised by Southeast Asian natives.The Japanese failure to bring the ongoingSecond Sino-Japanese Warto a swift conclusion was blamed in part on the lack of resources; Japanese propaganda claimed this was due to the refusal by Western powers to supply Japan's military.Although invading Japanese forces sometimes received rapturous welcomes throughout recently captured Asian territories due to anti-Western and occasionally, anti-Chinese sentiment,the subsequent brutality of the Japanese military led many of the inhabitants of those regions to regard Japan as being worse than their former colonial rulers.The Japanese government directed that economies of occupied territories be managed strictly for the production of raw materials for the Japanese war effort; a cabinet member declared, "There are no restrictions. They are enemy possessions. We can take them, do anything we want".For example, according to estimates, under Japanese occupation, about 100,000 Burmese and Malay Indian labourers died while constructing theBurma-Siam Railway.The Japanese sometimes spared ethnic groups, such as Chinese immigrants, if they supported the war effort, whether sincerely or not.

An Investigation of Global Policy with the Yamato Race as Nucleus– a secret document completed in 1943 for high-ranking government use – laid out that Japan, as the originator and strongest military power within the region, would naturally take the superior position within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, with the other nations under Japan's umbrella of protection.Japanese propaganda was useful in mobilizing Japanese citizens for the war effort, convincing them Japan's expansion was an act of anti-colonial liberation from Western domination.The bookletRead This and the War is Won—for the Japanese Army—presented colonialism as an oppressive group of colonists living in luxury by burdening Asians. According to Japan, since racial ties of blood connected other Asians to the Japanese, and Asians had been weakened by colonialism, it was Japan'sself-appointed roleto "make men of them again" and liberate them from their Western oppressors.

According to Foreign MinisterShigenori Tōgō(in office 1941–1942 and 1945), should Japan be successful in creating this sphere, it would emerge as the leader of Eastern Asia, and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere would be synonymous with the Japanese Empire.

Greater East Asia Conference

Main article:Greater East Asia Conference

Attendees of the Greater East Asia Conference
:Japan and colonies
:Japanese allies and occupied territory
:Territories disputed and claimed by Japan and its allies

TheGreater East Asia Conferencein November 1943. Participants left to right:Ba Maw,Zhang Jinghui,Wang Jingwei,Hideki Tojo,Wan Waithayakon,José P. Laurel,andSubhas Chandra Bose

Fragment of a Japanese propaganda booklet published by the Tokyo Conference (1943), depicting scenes of situations in Greater East Asia, from the top, left to right: theJapanese occupation of Malaya,Thailand under Plaek Phibunsongkramgaining the territories ofSaharat Thai Doem,theRepublic of ChinaunderWang Jingweiallied with Japan,Subhas Chandra Boseformingthe Provisional Government of Free India,theState of Burmagaining independence underBa Maw,the Declaration of theSecond Philippine Republic,and people ofManchukuo

The Greater East Asia Conference(Đại Đông Á hội nghị,Dai Tōa Kaigi)took place inTokyoon 5–6 November 1943: Japan hosted theheads of stateof various component members of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The conference was also referred to as theTokyo Conference.The common language used by the delegates during the conference wasEnglish.The conference was mainly used as propaganda.

At the conference, Tojo greeted them with a speech praising the "spiritual essence" of Asia instead of the "materialistic civilisation" of the West.Their meeting was characterised by the praise of solidarity and condemnation of Western colonialism but without practical plans for either economic development or integration.Because of a lack of military representatives at the conference, the conference served little military value.

With the simultaneous use ofWilsonianand Pan-Asian rhetoric, the goals of the conference were to solidify the commitment of certain Asian countries to Japan's war effort and to improve Japan's world image; however, the representatives of the other attending countries were in practice neither independent nor treated as equals by Japan.

The following dignitaries attended:

• Hideki Tojo,Prime Minister of theEmpire of Japan
• Zhang Jinghui,Prime Minister of theEmpire of Manchuria
• Wang Jingwei,President of theRepublic of China
• Ba Maw,Head of State of theState of Burma
• Subhas Chandra Bose,Head of State of theProvisional Government of Free India
• José P. Laurel,President of theRepublic of the Philippines
• PrinceWan Waithayakon,envoy from theKingdom of Thailand

Imperial rule

The ideology of theJapanese colonial empire,as it expanded dramatically during the war, contained two contradictory impulses. On the one hand, it preached the unity of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, a coalition of Asian races directed by Japan againstWestern imperialism in Asia.This approach celebrated the spiritual values of the East in opposition to the "crassmaterialism"of the West.In practice, however, the Japanese installed organisationally-minded bureaucrats and engineers to run their new empire, and they believed in ideals of efficiency, modernisation, and engineering solutions to social problems.Japanesewas the official language of the bureaucracy in all of the areas and was taught at schools as a national language.

Japan set up puppet regimes in Manchuria and China; they vanished at the war's end. The Imperial Army operated ruthless administrations in most conquered areas but paid more favourable attention to theDutch East Indies.The main goal was to obtain oil but the Dutch colonial government destroyed the oil wells. However, the Japanese could repair and reopen them within a few months of their conquest. However, most tankers transporting oil to Japan were sunk byU.S. Navysubmarines, so Japan's oil shortage became increasingly acute. Japan also sponsored an Indonesian nationalist movement underSukarno.Sukarno finally came to power in the late 1940s after several years of fighting the Dutch.

Philippines

To build up the economic base of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, the Japanese Army envisioned using the Philippine islands as a source of agricultural products needed by its industry. For example, Japan had a surplus ofsugarfromTaiwan,and a severe shortage ofcotton,so they tried to grow cotton on sugar lands with disastrous results; they lacked the seeds, pesticides, and technical skills to grow cotton. Jobless farm workers flocked to the cities, where there was minimal relief and few jobs. The Japanese Army also tried usingcane sugarfor fuel,castor beansandcoprafor oil,Derrisforquinine,cotton for uniforms, andabacáfor rope. The plans were difficult to implement due to limited skills, collapsed international markets, bad weather, and transportation shortages. The program failed, giving very little help to Japanese industry and diverting resources needed for food production.As Stanley Karnow writes, Filipinos "rapidly learned as well that 'co-prosperity' meant servitude to Japan's economic requirements".

Living conditions were poor throughout the Philippines during the war. Transportation between the islands was difficult because of a lack of fuel. Food was in short supply, with sporadic famines and epidemic diseases that killed hundreds of thousands of people.In October 1943, Japan declared the Philippines an independent republic. The Japanese-sponsoredSecond Philippine Republic,headed by PresidentJosé P. Laurel,proved to be ineffective and unpopular as Japan maintained very tight control.

Failure

The Co-Prosperity Sphere collapsed withJapan's surrenderto theAlliesin September 1945.Ba Maw,wartime President of Burma under the Japanese, blamed the Japanese military for the failure of the Co-Prosperity Sphere:

The militarists saw everything only from a Japanese perspective and, even worse, they insisted that all others dealing with them should do the same. For them, there was only one way to do a thing, the Japanese way; only one goal and interest, the Japanese interest; only one destiny for the East Asian countries, to become so many Manchukuos or Koreas tied forever to Japan. This racial impositions... made any real understanding between the Japanese militarists and the people of our region virtually impossible.

In other words, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere operated not for the betterment of all the Asian countries but for Japan's interests, and thus the Japanese failed to gather support in other Asian countries. Nationalist movements did appear in these Asian countries during this period, and these nationalists cooperated with the Japanese to some extent. However, Willard Elsbree, professor emeritus ofpolitical scienceatOhio University,claims that the Japanese government and these nationalist leaders never developed "a real unity of interests between the two parties, [and] there was no overwhelming despair on the part of the Asians at Japan's defeat".

The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere at its greatest extent

The failure of Japan to understand the goals and interests of the other countries involved in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere led to a weak association of countries bound to Japan only in theory and not in spirit. Ba Maw argued that Japan should've acted according to the declared aims of "Asia for the Asiatics". He claimed that if Japan had proclaimed this maxim at the beginning of the war and acted on that idea, they could have engineered a very different outcome.

No military defeat could then have robbed her of the trust and gratitude of half of Asia or even more, and that would have mattered a great deal in finding for her a new, great, and abiding place in a postwar world in which Asia was coming into her own.

Propaganda efforts

Pamphlets were dropped by airplane on the Philippines, Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak, Singapore, and Indonesia, urging them to join the movement.Mutual cultural societies were founded in all conquered lands to ingratiate with the natives and try to supplant English with Japanese as the commonly used language.Multi-lingual pamphlets depicted many Asians marching or working together in happy unity, with the flags of all the states and a map depicting the intended sphere.Others proclaimed that they had given independent governments to the countries they occupied, a claim undermined by the lack of power given to these puppet governments.

In Thailand, a street was built to demonstrate it, to be filled with modern buildings and shops, but9⁄10of it consisted offalse fronts.A network of Japanese-sponsored film production, distribution, and exhibition companies extended across the Japanese Empire and was collectively referred to as the Greater East Asian Film Sphere. These film centers mass-produced shorts, newsreels, and feature films to encourage Japanese language acquisition as well as cooperation with Japanese colonial authorities.

Projected territorial extent

A Japanese10 senstamp from 1942 depicting the approximate extension of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

Prior to the escalation of World War II to the Pacific and East Asia, Japanese planners regarded it as self-evident that the conquests secured in Japan's earlier wars withRussia(South SakhalinandKwantung),Germany(South Seas Mandate), and China (Manchuria) would be retained, as well as Korea (Chōsen), Taiwan (Formosa), the recently seized additional portions of China, and occupied French Indochina.

Land Disposal Plan

A reasonably accurate indication as to the geographic dimensions of the Co-Prosperity Sphere are elaborated on in a Japanese wartime document prepared in December 1941 by the Research Department of theMinistry of War.Known as the "Land Disposal Plan in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" (Đại đông á cộng vinh quyển における thổ địa 処 phân án)it was put together with the consent of and according to the directions of the Minister of War (later Prime Minister)Hideki Tōjō.It assumed that the already established puppet governments of Manchukuo,Meng gian g,and the Wang Jingwei regime in Japanese-occupied China would continue to function in these areas.Beyond these contemporary parts of Japan'ssphere of influenceit also envisaged the conquest of a vast range of territories covering virtually all of East Asia, thePacific Ocean,and even sizable portions of theWestern Hemisphere,including in locations as far removed from Japan asSouth Americaand the easternCaribbean.

Although the projected extension of the Co-Prosperity Sphere was extremely ambitious, the Japanese goal during the "Greater East Asia War" was not to acquire all the territory designated in the plan at once, but to prepare for a future decisive war some 20 years later by conquering the Asian colonies of the defeated European powers, as well as the Philippines from the United States.When Tōjō spoke on the plan to theHouse of Peershe was vague about the long-term prospects, but insinuated that the Philippines and Burma might be allowed independence, although vital territories such asHong Kongwould remain under Japanese rule.

TheMicronesianislands that had been seized from Germany inWorld War Iand which were assigned to Japan asC-Class Mandates,namely theMarianas,Carolines,Marshall Islands,and several others do not figure in this project.They were the subject of earlier negotiations with the Germans and were expected to be officially ceded to Japan in return for economic and monetary compensations.

The plan divided Japan's future empire into two different groups.The first group of territories were expected to become either part of Japan or otherwise be under its direct administration. Second were those territories that would fall under the control of a number of tightly controlled pro-Japanesevassal statesbased on the model of Manchukuo, as nominally "independent" members of the Greater East Asian alliance.

German and Japanese direct spheres of influence at their greatest extents in fall 1942. Arrows show planned movements to the proposed demarcation line at 70° E, which was, however, never even approximated.

Parts of the plan depended on successful negotiations withNazi Germanyand a global victory by theAxis powers.After Germany andItalydeclared war on the United Stateson 11 December 1941, Japan presented the Germans witha drafted military conventionthat would specifically delimit the Asian continent by a dividing line along the70th meridian eastlongitude.This line, running southwards through theOb River's Arctic estuary, southwards to just east ofKhostinAfghanistanand heading into theIndian Oceanjust west ofRajkotinIndia,would have split Germany'sLebensraumand Italy'sspazio vitaleterritories to the west of it, and Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and its other areas to the east of it.The plan of the Third Reich for fortifying its ownLebensraumterritory's eastern limits, beyond which the Co-Prosperity Sphere's northwestern frontier areas would exist in East Asia, involved the creation ofa "living wall"ofWehrbauer"soldier-peasant" communities defending it. However, it is unknown if the Axis powers ever formally negotiated a possible, complementaryseconddemarcation line that would have divided the Western Hemisphere.

Japanese-governed

• Government-General of Formosa

Hong Kong, the Philippines,Portuguese Macau(to be purchased fromPortugalor taken by force), theParacel Islands,andHainan Island(to be purchased from the Chinese puppet regime). Contrary to its name it was not intended to include the island of Formosa (Taiwan)

• South Seas Government Office

Guam,Nauru,Ocean Island,theGilbert Islands,andWake Island

• Melanesian Region Government-GeneralorSouth Pacific Government-General

British New Guinea,Australian New Guinea,theAdmiralties,New Britain,New Ireland,theSolomon Islands,theSanta Cruz Archipelago,theEllice Islands,theFiji Islands,theNew Hebrides,New Caledonia,theLoyalty Islands,and theChesterfield Islands

• Eastern Pacific Government-General

Hawaii Territory,Howland Island,Baker Island,thePhoenix Islands,theMarquesasandTuamotu Islands,theSociety Islands,theCookandAustral Islands,all of theSamoan Islands,andTonga.The possibility of re-establishing the defunctKingdom of Hawaiiwas also considered, based on the model of Manchukuo.Those favouring annexation of Hawaii (on the model ofKarafuto) intended to use thelocal Japanese community,which had constituted 43% (c. 160,000) of Hawaii's population in the 1920s, as a leverage.Hawaii was to become self-sufficient in food production, while theBig Fivecorporations of sugar andpineappleprocessing were to be broken up.No decision was ever reached regarding whether Hawaii would be annexed to Japan, become a puppet state, or be used as a bargaining chip for leverage against the U.S.

• Australian Government-General

All ofAustraliaincludingTasmania.Australia andNew Zealandwere to accommodate up to two million Japanese settlers.However, there are indications that the Japanese were also looking for a separate peace with Australia, and a satellite state rather than colony status similar to that of Burma and the Philippines.

• New Zealand Government-General

The New ZealandNorthandSouth Islands,Macquarie Island,as well as the rest of the Southwest Pacific

• Ceylon Government-General

Ceylon and all of India below a line running approximately fromPortugueseGoato the coastline of theBay of Bengal

• Alaska Government-General

TheAlaska Territory,theYukon Territory,the western portion of theNorthwest Territories,Alberta,British Columbia,andWashington.There were also plans to make theAmerican West Coast(comprisingCaliforniaandOregon) a semi-autonomous satellite state. This latter plan was not seriously considered as it depended upon a global victory of Axis forces.

• Government-General of Central America

Guatemala,El Salvador,Honduras,British Honduras,Nicaragua,Costa Rica,Panama,Colombia,theMaracaibo(western) portion ofVenezuela,Ecuador,Cuba,Haiti,theDominican Republic,Jamaica,andThe Bahamas.In addition, if eitherMexico,Peru,orChilewere to enter the war against Japan, substantial parts of these states would also be ceded to Japan.Events that transpired between May 22, 1942, when Mexico declared war on the Axis, throughPeru's declaration of war on February 12, 1944, and concluding with Chile only declaring war on Japan by April 11, 1945 (as Nazi Germany was nearly defeated at that time), brought all three of these southeastPacific Rimnations of the Western Hemisphere's Pacific coast into conflict with Japan by the war's end. The future ofTrinidad,BritishandDutch Guiana,and theBritishandFrenchpossessions in theLeeward Islandsat the hands of Imperial Japan were meant to be left open for negotiations with Nazi Germany had the Axis forces been victorious.

Asian puppet states

• East Indies Kingdom

Dutch East Indies,British Borneo,Christmas Islands,Cocos Islands,Andaman,Nicobar Islands,andPortuguese Timor(to be purchased from Portugal)

• Kingdom of Burma

Burma proper,Assam(a province of the British Raj), and a large part ofBengal.

• Kingdom of Malaya

Remainder of theMalay states

• Kingdom of Annam

Annam,Laos,andTonkin

• Kingdom of Cambodia

CambodiaandFrench Cochinchina

Puppet states which already existed at the time, the Land Disposal Plan has been drafted, were:

• Empire of Manchuria

Chinese Manchuria

• Republic of China

Other parts of China occupied by Japan

• Meng gian g

Inner Mongoliaterritories west of Manchuria, since 1940 officially a part of the Republic of China. It was meant as a starting point for a regime which would cover all of Mongolia.

Contrary to the plan Japan installed a puppet state on the Philippines instead of exerting direct control. In the former French Indochina, theEmpire of Vietnam,theKingdom of Kampuchea,and theKingdom of Luang Prabangwere founded. Vietnam attempted to work for independence and made progressive reforms.The State of Burma did not become a kingdom.

Political parties and movements with Japanese support

• Azad Hind(Indian nationalistmovement)
• Indian Independence League(Indian nationalist movement)
• Indonesian National Party(Indonesian nationalist movement)
• Kapisanan ng Paglilingkod sa Bagong Pilipinas(Philippine nationalist ruling party of the Second Philippine Republic)
• Kesatuan Melayu Muda(Malayan nationalist movement)
• Khmer Issarak(Cambodian-Khmer nationalist group)
• Dobama Asiayone(We Burmans Association) (Burmesenationalist association)
• Đại Việt National Socialist Party(Vietnamese nationalistmovement)

See also

Administration

• Collaboration with Imperial Japan
• East Asia Development Board
• Imperial Rule Assistance Association
• List of East Asian leaders in the Japanese sphere of influence (1931–1945)
• Ministry of Greater East Asia

People

• Hachirō Arita:an army thinker who thought up the Greater East Asian concept
• Ikki Kita:a Japanese nationalist who developed a similar pan-Asian concept
• Satō Nobuhiro:the alleged developer of the Greater East Asia concept

Related topics

• Flying geese paradigm
• Japanese war crimes
• Kantokuen
• Political extremism in Japan
• Tanaka Memorial(Tanaka Jōsōbun) – an alleged Japanese strategic planning document from 1927 in which Prime Minister BaronTanaka Giichi,who laid out a strategy to take over the world forEmperorHirohito

Others

• Balkan Federation
• Civilizing mission
• Eurasianism
• Greater Germanic Reich
• Greater Serbia
• Latin Bloc (proposed alliance)
• Monroe Doctrine
• New Order (Nazism)
• Pan-Slavism
• Russkiy mir
• Scramble for Africa
• White man's burden

References

Further reading

• Baskett, Michael (2008).The Attractive Empire: Transnational Film Culture in Imperial Japan.Honolulu:University of Hawai'i Press.ISBN978-0-8248-3223-0.
• Dower, John W.(1986).War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War.New York:Pantheon Books.ISBN978-0-394-50030-0;OCLC13064585
• Fisher, Charles A. (1950)"The Expansion of Japan: A Study in Oriental Geopolitics: Part II. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."The Geographical Journal(1950): 179–193.
• Huff, Gregg (2020).World War II and Southeast Asia: Economy and Society under Japanese Occupation.Cambridge University Press.ISBN9781316162934.
• Iriye, Akira. (1999).Pearl Harbor and the Coming of the Pacific War: A Brief History with Documents and Essays.Boston:St. Martin's Press.ISBN978-0-312-21818-8;OCLC40985780
• Lebra, Joyce C.(ed.) (1975).Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II: Selected Readings and Documents.Oxford:Oxford University Press.ISBN978-0-19-638265-4;OCLC1551953
• Levine, Alan J. (1995).The Pacific War: Japan versus the AlliesArchived5 July 2019 at theWayback Machine(Santa Barbara: Greenwood,ISBN0-275-95102-2)
• Myers, Ramon Hawley and Mark R. Peattie. (1984)The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945.Princeton:Princeton University Press.ISBN978-0-691-10222-1
• Peattie, Mark R.(1988)."The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945,"inThe Cambridge History of Japan: The Twentieth Century(editor, Peter Duus). Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.ISBN978-0-521-22357-7
• Swan, William L. (1996)in JSTOR"Japan's Intentions for Its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as Indicated in Its Policy Plans for Thailand"Journal of Southeast Asian Studies27#1 (1996) pp. 139–149
• Toll, Ian W.(2011).Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941–1942.New York: W. W. Norton.
• ——— (2015).The Conquering Tide: War in the Pacific Islands, 1942–1944.New York: W. W. Norton.
• ——— (2020).Twilight of the Gods: War in the Western Pacific, 1944–1945.New York: W. W. Norton.
• Ugaki, Matome.(1991).Fading Victory: The Diary of Ugaki Matome, 1941–1945.Pittsburgh:University of Pittsburgh Press.ISBN978-0-8229-3665-7
• Vande Walle, Willyet al.The 'Money Doctors' from Japan: Finance, Imperialism, and the Building of the Yen Bloc, 1894–1937(abstract). FRIS/Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 2007–2010.
• Yellen, Jeremy A. (2019).The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: When Total Empire Met Total War.Ithaca:Cornell University Press.ISBN978-1501735547

External links

• Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphereat Britannica
• Foreign Office Files for Japan and the Far East
• WW2DB: Greater East Asia Conference