Energy transition

(Redirected fromRenewable transition)

Anenergy transition(orenergy system transformation) is a major structural change toenergy supplyandconsumptionin anenergy system.Currently, a transition tosustainable energyis underway tolimit climate change.Most of the sustainable energy isrenewable energy.Therefore, another term forenergy transitionisrenewable energy transition.The current transition aims to reducegreenhouse gas emissionsfrom energy quickly and sustainably, mostly byphasing-down fossil fuelsand changing as many processes as possible to operate onlow carbon electricity.[2]A previous energy transition perhaps took place during theIndustrial Revolutionfrom 1760 onwards, fromwoodand otherbiomasstocoal,followed byoiland laternatural gas.[3][4]

Progress of current energy transition to renewable energy:Fossil fuelssuch as coal, oil, and natural gas still remain the world's primary energy sources, even asrenewablesare increasing in use.[1]

Over three-quarters of theworld's energy needsare met by burningfossil fuels,but this usage emits greenhouse gases.[5]Energy production and consumptionare responsible for most human-caused greenhouse gas emissions.[6]To meet the goals of the 2015Paris Agreementon climate change, emissions must be reduced as soon as possible and reachnet-zeroby mid-century.[7]Since the late 2010s, therenewable energytransition has also been driven by therapidly falling costof bothsolarandwind power.[8]Another benefit of the energy transition is its potential to reduce the health andenvironmental impacts of the energy industry.[9]

Heating of buildingsis beingelectrified,withheat pumpsbeing the most efficient technology by far.[10]To improve the flexibility ofelectrical grids,the installation ofenergy storageandsuper gridsare vital to enable the use of variable, weather-dependent technologies.[11]Howeverfossil-fuel subsidiesare slowing the energy transition.[12][13]

Definition

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An energy transition is a broad shift in technologies and behaviours that are needed to replace one source of energy with another.[14]: 202–203 A prime example is the change from a pre-industrial system relying on traditional biomass, wind, water and muscle power to an industrial system characterized by pervasive mechanization, steam power and the use of coal.

TheIPCCdoes not defineenergy transitionin the glossary of itsSixth Assessment Reportbut it does definetransitionas: "The process of changing from one state or condition to another in a given period of time. Transition can occur in individuals, firms, cities, regions and nations, and can be based on incremental or transformative change."[15]

Development of the term

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After the1973 oil crisis,the termenergy transitionwas coined by politicians and media. It was popularised byUS President Jimmy Carterin his 1977 Address on the Nation on Energy, calling to "look back into history to understand our energy problem. Twice in the last several hundred years, there has been a transition in the way people use energy... Because we are nowrunning out of gas and oil,we must prepare quickly for a third change to strictconservationand to the renewed use of coal and to permanent renewable energy sources likesolar power."[16]The term was later globalised after the 1979 second oil shock, during the 1981 United Nations Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy.[17]

From the 1990s, debates on energy transition have increasingly takenclimate change mitigationinto account. Parties to the agreement committed "to limit global warming to" well below 2 °C, preferably 1.5 °C compared to pre-industrial levels ".[18]This requires a rapid energy transition with a downshift of fossil fuel production to stay within thecarbon emissions budget.[19]

Example ofDistributed generationuse of renewable energies:Agriculturalbusiness withbiogasplant andphotovoltaicroof

In this context, the termenergy transitionencompasses a reorientation ofenergy policy.This could imply a shift from centralized to distributed generation. It also includes attempts to replaceoverproductionand avoidable energy consumption with energy-saving measures and increasedefficiency.[20]

The historical transitions from locally supplied wood, water and wind energies to globally supplied fossil and nuclear fuels has induced growth in end-use demand through the rapid expansion of engineering research, education and standardisation. The mechanisms for the whole-systems changes include new discipline inTransition Engineeringamongst all engineering professions, entrepreneurs, researchers and educators.[21]

Examples of past energy transitions

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Over centuries, energy consumption has evolved from burning wood to fossil fuels (coal, oil, natural gas), and in recent decades to using nuclear, hydroelectric and other renewable energy sources.[22]

Historic approaches to past energy transitions are shaped by two main discourses. One argues that humankind experienced several energy transitions in its past, while the other suggests the term "energy additions" as better reflecting the changes in global energy supply in the last three centuries.

The chronologically first discourse was most broadly described byVaclav Smil.[23]It underlines the change in the energy mix of countries and the global economy. By looking at data in percentages of the primary energy source used in a given context, it paints a picture of the world's energy systems as having changed significantly over time, going from biomass to coal, to oil, and now a mix of mostly coal, oil and natural gas. Until the 1950s, the economic mechanism behind energy systems was local rather than global.[24]

The second discourse was most broadly described by Jean-Baptiste Fressoz.[25]It emphasises that the term "energy transition" was first used by politicians, not historians, to describe a goal to achieve in the future – not as a concept to analyse past trends. When looking at the sheer amount of energy being used by humankind, the picture is one of ever-increasing consumption of all the main energy sources available to humankind.[26]For instance, the increased use of coal in the 19th century did not replace wood consumption, indeed more wood was burned. Another example is the deployment of passenger cars in the 20th century. This evolution triggered an increase in both oil consumption (to drive the car) and coal consumption (to make the steel needed for the car). In other words, according to this approach, humankind never performed a single energy transition in its history but performed several energy additions.

Contemporary energy transitions differ in terms of motivation and objectives, drivers and governance. As development progressed, different national systems became more and more integrated becoming the large, international systems seen today. Historical changes of energy systems have been extensively studied.[27]While historical energy changes were generally protracted affairs, unfolding over many decades, this does not necessarily hold true for the present energy transition, which is unfolding under very different policy and technological conditions.[28]

For current energy systems, many lessons can be learned from history.[29][30][obsolete source][dubiousdiscuss]The need for large amounts of firewood in early industrial processes in combination with prohibitive costs for overland transportation led to a scarcity of accessible (e.g. affordable) wood, and eighteenth century glass-works "operated like a forest clearing enterprise".[31]When Britain had to resort to coal after largely having run out of wood, the resulting fuel crisis triggered a chain of events that two centuries later culminated in theIndustrial Revolution.[32][33]Similarly, increased use of peat and coal were vital elements paving the way for theDutch Golden Age,roughly spanning the entire 17th century.[34]Another example whereresource depletiontriggered technological innovation and a shift to new energy sources is 19th centurywhaling:whale oil eventually became replaced bykeroseneand other petroleum-derived products.[35]To speed up the energy transition it is also conceivable that there will be government buyouts orbailoutsof coal mining regions.[36]

Drivers for current energy transition

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Drivers for transition to renewable energy
With increasing adoption of renewable energy sources, costs have declined, most notably for energy generated by solar panels.[37][38]
(Levelized cost of energy(LCOE) is a measure of the average net present cost of electricity generation for a generating plant over its lifetime.)
Deaths caused as a result offossil fuelelectricity generation (areas of rectangles in chart) greatly exceed those resulting from production ofrenewable energy(rectangles barely visible in chart).[39]

Climate change mitigation and co-benefits

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A rapid energy transition to very-low or zero-carbon sources is required to mitigate theeffects of climate change.[40]: 66 [41]: 11 Coal, oil and gas combustion account for 89% of CO2emissions[42]: 20 and still provide 78% ofprimary energyconsumption.[43]: 12 

Despite the knowledge about the risks of climate change and the increasing number of climate policies adopted since the 1980s, however, energy transitions have not accelerated towards decarbonization beyond historical trends and remain far off track in achieving climate targets.[44]

The deployment ofrenewable energycan generateco-benefits of climate change mitigation:positive socio-economic effects on employment, industrial development, health and energy access. Depending on the country and the deployment scenario, replacing coal power plants can more than double the number of jobs per average MW capacity.[45]The energy transition could create manygreen jobs,[46]for example in Africa.[47][48]The costs for retraining workers for the renewable energy industry was found to be trivial for both coal[49]in the U.S. and oil sands in Canada.[50]The latter of which would only demand 2–6% of federal, provincial, and territorial oil and gas subsidies for a single year to be reallocated to provide oil and gas workers with a new career of approximately equivalent pay.[50][51]In non-electrified rural areas, the deployment of solar mini-grids can significantly improve electricity access.[52]

Employment opportunities by the green transition are associated with the use of renewable energy sources or building activity for infrastructure improvements and renovations.[53][54]

Energy security

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Another important driver isenergy securityand independence, with increasing importance in Europe and Taiwan[55]because of the2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.[56]Unlike Europes 2010s dependence on Russian gas, even if China stops supplying solar panels those already installed continue generating electricity.[57]Militaries are using and developing electric vehicles, particularly for their stealthiness,[58]but nottanks.[59]As of 2023 renewable energy in Taiwan is far too small to help in a blockade.[60]

Centralised facilities such asoil refineries[61]andthermal power plantscan be put out of action by air attack, whereas although solar can be attacked[62]decentralised power such as solar and wind[63]may be less vulnerable.[64][65]Solar and batteries reduces risky fuel convoys.[66][67]However large hydropower plants are vulnerable.[68]Some say that nuclear power plants are unlikely to be military targets,[69]but others conclude that civil NPPs in war zones can be weaponised and exploited by the hostile forces not only for impeding energy supplies (and thus shattering the public morale of the adversary) but also for blackmailing and coercing the decisionmakers of the attacked state and their international allies with a vision of man-made nuclear disaster.[70]

Economic development

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For many developing economies, for example in the mineral-rich countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, the transition to renewable energies is predicted to become a driver of sustainable economic development. TheInternational Energy Agency(IEA) has identified 37 minerals as critical for clean energy technologies and estimates that by 2050 global demand for these will increase by 235 per cent.[71][72][need quotation to verify]Africa has large reserves of many of these so-called "green minerals, such asbauxite,cobalt,copper,chromium,manganeseandgraphite.[73]TheAfrican Unionhas outlined a policy framework, the Africa Mining Vision, to leverage the continent's mineral reserves in pursuit of sustainable development and socio-economic transformation.[74]Achieving these goals requires mineral-rich African economies to transition from commodity export to manufacture of higher value-added products.[75]

Cost competitiveness of renewable energies

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From 2010 to 2019, the competitiveness of wind and solar power substantially increased. Unit costs of solar energy dropped sharply by 85%, wind energy by 55%, andlithium-ion batteriesby 85%.[76]: 11 This has made wind and solar power the cheapest form for new installations in many regions. Levelized costs for combined onshore wind or solar with storage for a few hours are already lower than for gaspeaking power plants.[77]In 2021, the new electricity generating capacity of renewables exceeded 80% of all installed power.[78]: 3 

Key technologies and approaches

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The emissions reductions necessary to keep global warming below 2°C will require a system-wide transformation of the way energy is produced, distributed, stored, and consumed.[79]: 46 For a society to replace one form of energy with another, multiple technologies and behaviours in the energy system must change.[14]: 202–203 

Many climate change mitigation pathways envision three main aspects of alow-carbon energysystem:

  • The use of low-emission energy sources to produce electricity
  • Electrification– that is increased use of electricity instead of directly burning fossil fuels
  • Accelerated adoption of energy efficiency measures[80]: 7.11.3 

Renewable energy

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Examples of renewable energy options:concentrated solar powerwithmolten salt heat storagein Spain;wind energyin South Africa; theThree Gorges Damon theYangtze Riverin China;biomass energyplant inScotland.
Investment
Companies, governments and households have committed increasing amounts to decarbonization, including solar, wind, electric vehicles, charging infrastructure, storage, heating systems,CCSand hydrogen.[81][82][83]
Bloomberg NEFreported that in 2022, global energy transition investment equaled fossil fuels investment for the first time.[84]
Growth in capacity
Renewable energy sources provide an increasing share of overall power capacity.[85]
Renewable energy capacity has steadily grown, led bysolar photovoltaicpower.[86]
In 2023, electricity generation from wind and solar sources was projected to exceed 30% by 2030, as fossil fuels' use continues to decline.[87]
Rechargeable battery prices for electric vehicles fell, given economies of scale and new cell chemistries improving energy density.[88]However, general inflationary pressures, and rising costs of raw materials and components, inhibited price declines in the early 2020s.[88]

The most important energy sources in the low carbon energy transition arewind powerandsolar power.They could reduce net emissions by 4 billion tonsCO2equivalentper year each, half of it with lower net lifetime costs than the reference.[76]: 38 Other renewable energy sources includebioenergy,geothermal energyandtidal energy,but they currently have higher net lifetime costs.[76]: 38 

By 2022,hydroelectricityis the largest source of renewable electricity in the world, providing 16% of the world's total electricity in 2019.[89]However, because of its heavy dependence on geography and the generally high environmental and social impact of hydroelectric power plants, the growth potential of this technology is limited. Wind and solar power are considered more scalable, but still require vast quantities of land and materials. They have higher potential for growth.[90]These sources have grown nearly exponentially in recent decades thanks to rapidly decreasing costs. In 2019, wind power supplied 5.3% worldwide electricity while solar power supplied 2.6%.[89]

While production from most types of hydropower plants can be actively controlled, production from wind and solar power depends on the weather.Electrical gridsmust be extended and adjusted to avoid wastage. Dammed hydropower is adispatchablesource, while solar and wind arevariable renewable energysources. These sources require dispatchable backup generation orenergy storageto provide continuous and reliable electricity. For this reason, storage technologies also play a key role in the renewable energy transition. As of 2020, the largest scale storage technology ispumped storage hydroelectricity,accounting for the great majority of energy storage capacity installed worldwide. Other important forms of energy storage areelectric batteriesandpower to gas.

The "Electricity Grids and Secure Energy Transitions" report by theIEAemphasizes the necessity of increasing grid investments to over $600 billion annually by 2030, up from $300 billion, to accommodate the integration of renewable energy. By 2040, the grid must expand by more than 80 million kilometers to manage renewable sources, which are projected to account for over 80% of the globalpower capacityincrease over the next two decades. Failure to enhance grid infrastructure timely could lead to an additional 58 gigatonnes ofCO2 emissionsby 2050, significantly risking a 2°C global temperature rise.[91][92]

Integration of variable renewable energy sources

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With the integration of renewable energy, local electricity production is becoming more variable. It has been recommended that "coupling sectors,energy storage,smart grids,demand side management,sustainable biofuels,hydrogen electrolysisand derivatives will ultimately be needed to accommodate large shares of renewables in energy systems ".[76]: 28 Fluctuations can be smoothened by combining wind and sun power and byextending electricity grids over large areas.This reduces the dependence on local weather conditions.

With highly variable prices, electricity storage and grid extension become more competitive. Researchers have found that "costs for accommodating the integration of variable renewable energy sources in electricity systems are expected to be modest until 2030".[76]: 39 Furthermore, "it will be more challenging to supply the entire energy system with renewable energy".[76]: 28 

Fast fluctuations increase with a high integration of wind and solar energy. They can be addressed byoperating reserves.Large-scale batteries can react within seconds and are increasingly used to keep the electricity grid stable.

100% renewable energy

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100% renewable energyis the goal of the userenewable resourcesfor all energy. 100%renewable energyfor electricity, heating, cooling and transport is motivated byclimate change,pollution and other environmental issues, as well as economic andenergy securityconcerns. Shifting the total globalprimary energysupply to renewable sources requiresa transition of the energy system,since most of today's energy is derived from non-renewablefossil fuels.

Research into this topic is fairly new, with few studies published before 2009, but has gained increasing attention in recent years. The majority of studies show that a global transition to 100% renewable energy across all sectors – power, heat, transport and industry – is feasible and economically viable.[93][94][95][96][need quotation to verify]A cross-sectoral, holistic approach is seen as an important feature of 100% renewable energy systems and is based on the assumption "that the best solutions can be found only if one focuses on the synergies between the sectors" of the energy system such as electricity, heat, transport or industry.[97]

The main barriers to the widespread implementation of large-scale renewable energy and low-carbon energy strategies are seen to be primarily social and political rather than technological or economic.[98]The key roadblocks are:climate change denial,thefossil fuels lobby,political inaction,unsustainable energy consumption,outdatedenergy infrastructure,and financial constraints.[99]

Nuclear power

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Timeline of commissioned and decommissioned nuclear capacity since the 1950s[100]

In the 1970s and 1980s,nuclear powergained a large sharein some countries.InFranceandSlovakiamore than half of the electrical power is still nuclear. It is alow carbon energy sourcebut comes with risks and increasing costs. Since the late 1990s, deployment has slowed down. Decommissioning increases as many reactors are close to the end of their lifetime or long before because of anti-nuclear sentiments.Germanystopped its last three nuclear power plants by mid April 2023. On the other hand, theChina General Nuclear Power Groupis aiming for 200 GW by 2035, produced by 150 additional reactors.[101]

Electrification

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With the switch to clean energy sources where power is generated via electricity, end uses of energy such as transportation and heating need to be electrified to run on these clean energy sources. Concurrent with this switch is an expansion of the grid to handle larger amounts of generated electricity to supply to these end uses. Two key areas of electrification are electric vehicles and heat pumps.

It is easier to sustainably produce electricity than it is to sustainably produce liquid fuels.[citation needed]Therefore, adoption ofelectric vehiclesis a way to make transport more sustainable.[102]While electric vehicle technology is relatively mature in road transport, electric shipping and aviation are still early in their development, hence sustainable liquid fuels may have a larger role to play in these sectors.[103]: 139 

A key sustainable solution to heating is electrification (heat pumps,or the less efficientelectric heater). The IEA estimates that heat pumps currently provide only 5% of space andwater heatingrequirements globally, but could provide over 90%.[104]Use ofground source heat pumpsnot only reduces total annual energy loads associated with heating and cooling, it also flattens the electric demand curve by eliminating the extreme summer peak electric supply requirements.[105]However, heat pumps andresistive heatingalone will not be sufficient for the electrification of industrial heat. This because in several processes higher temperatures are required which cannot be achieved with these types of equipment. For example, for the production of ethylene via steam cracking temperatures as high as 900 °C are required. Hence, drastically new processes are required. Nevertheless, power-to-heat is expected to be the first step in the electrification of thechemical industrywith an expected large-scale implementation by 2025.[106]

Economic and geopolitical aspects

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Countries that managed to reduce theirgreenhouse gas emissions(working towards alow-carbon economy) while still growing their economy. This is calledeco-economic decoupling.

A shift in energy sources has the potential to redefine relations and dependencies between countries, stakeholders and companies. Countries or land owners with resources – fossil or renewable – face massive losses or gains depending on the development of any energy transition. In 2021, energy costs reached 13% of globalgross domestic product.[107] Global rivalries have contributed to the driving forces of the economics behind the low carbon energy transition. Technological innovations developed within a country have the potential to become an economic force.[108]

Influences

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Acceptance of wind and solar facilities in one's community is stronger among Democrats (blue), while acceptance of nuclear power plants is stronger among Republicans (red).[109]

The energy transition discussion is heavily influenced by contributions from thefossil fuel industries.[110] One way that oil companies are able to continue their work despite growing environmental, social and economic concerns is bylobbyinglocal and national governments.

Historically, thefossil fuel lobbyhas been highly successful in limiting regulations. From 1988 to 2005,Exxon Mobil,one of the largest oil companies in the world, spent nearly $16 million in anti-climate change lobbying and providing misleading information about climate change to the general public.[111]The fossil fuel industry acquires significant support through the existing banking and investment structure.[112]The concept that the industry should no longer be financially supported has led to the social movement known as divestment.Divestmentis defined as the removal of investment capital from stocks, bonds or funds in oil, coal and gas companies for both moral and financial reasons.[113]

Banks, investing firms, governments, universities, institutions and businesses are all being challenged with this new moral argument against their existing investments in the fossil fuel industry and many; such as Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the University of California, New York City and more; have begun making the shift to more sustainable, eco-friendly investments.[114]

In 2024 theInternational Renewable Energy Agency(IRENA) projected that by 2050, over half of the world's energy will be carried by electricity and over three-quarters of the global energy mix will be from renewables. Although overtaken by both biomass and clean hydrogen, fossil fuels were still projected to supply 12% of energy. The transition is expected to reshape geopolitical power by reducing reliance on long-distance fossil fuel trade and enhancing the importance of regional energy markets.[115]

Social and environmental aspects

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Impacts

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A renewable energy transition can present negative social impacts for some people who rely on the existing energy economy or who are affected by mining for minerals required for the transition. This has led to calls for ajust transition,which theIPCCdefines as, "A set of principles, processes and practices that aim to ensure that no people, workers, places, sectors, countries or regions are left behind in the transition from a high-carbon to alow carbon economy."[15]

Use of local energy sources may stabilise and stimulate some local economies,[116]create opportunities for energy trade between communities, states and regions,[117][need quotation to verify]and increaseenergy security.[118]

Coal mining is economically important in some regions, and a transition to renewables would decrease its viability and could have severe impacts on the communities that rely on this business.[119]Not only do these communities faceenergy povertyalready,[need quotation to verify]but they also face economic collapse when the coal mining businesses move elsewhere or disappear altogether.[120]This broken system perpetuates the poverty and vulnerability that decreases theadaptive capacityof coal mining communities.[120]Potential mitigation could include expanding the program base[clarification needed]for vulnerable communities to assist with new training programs, opportunities for economic development and subsidies to assist with the transition.[121]

Increasing energy prices resulting from an energy transition may negatively impact developing countries including Vietnam and Indonesia.[122]

Increased mining for lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper, and other critical minerals needed for expansion of renewable energy infrastructure has created increasedenvironmental conflictandenvironmental justiceissues for some communities.[123][124]

Labour

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A large portion of the global workforce works directly or indirectly for thefossil fuel economy.[125][need quotation to verify]Moreover, many other industries are currently dependent on unsustainable energy sources (such as thesteel industryorcement and concrete industry). Transitioning these workforces during the rapid period of economic change requires considerable forethought and planning. The international labor movement has advocated for ajust transitionthat addresses these concerns.[citation needed]

Recently,[126]an energy crisis is upon the nations of Europe as a result of dependence on Russia's natural gas, which was cut off during the Russia-Ukraine war. This goes to show that humanity is still heavily dependent on fossil fuel energy sources and care should be taken to have a smooth transition, less energy-shortage shocks cripple the very efforts to effectively energise the transition.[citation needed]

Risks and barriers

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Amongst the key issues to consider in relation to the pace of the global transition to renewables is how well individual electric companies are able to adapt to the changing reality of the power sector. For example, to date, the uptake of renewables by electric utilities has remained slow, hindered by their continued investment in fossil fuel generation capacity.[127]

Incomplete regulations on clean energy uptake and concerns about electricity shortages have been identified as key barriers to the energy transition in coal-dependent, fast developing economies such as Vietnam.[122]

Examples by country

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Global energy consumption by source (raw quantities)
Global energy consumption by source (percent share)

From 2000 to 2012 coal was the source of energy with the total largest growth. The use of oil and natural gas also had considerable growth, followed by hydropower and renewable energy. Renewable energy grew at a rate faster than any other time in history during this period. The demand for nuclear energy decreased, in part due to fear mongering and inaccurate media portrayal of some nuclear disasters (Three Mile Islandin 1979,Chernobylin 1986, andFukushimain 2011).[128][129] More recently, consumption of coal has declined relative to low carbon energy. Coal dropped from about 29% of the global total primary energy consumption in 2015 to 27% in 2017, and non-hydro renewables were up to about 4% from 2%.[130][needs update]

Asia

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China

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Most energy in China comes from coal
Development ofcarbon dioxideemissions in China
The 22,500MWThree Gorges Damhydroelectric power plant in China, the largest hydroelectric power station in the world.

Chinais both theworld's largest energy consumerand thelargest industrial country,and ensuring adequateenergy supplyto sustain economic growth has been a core concern of theChinese Governmentsince thefounding of the People's Republic of Chinain 1949.[131]Sincethe country's industrializationin the 1960s, China is currently the world's largest emitter ofgreenhouse gases,andcoal in Chinais a major cause ofglobal warming.[132]China is also the world's largestrenewable energyproducer (seethis article), and the largest producer ofhydroelectricity,solar powerandwind powerin the world. Theenergy policyof China is connected to itsindustrial policy,where the goals of China'sindustrial productiondictate itsenergy demand managements.[133]

Being a country thatdepends heavilyon foreignpetroleumimportfor both domestic consumption and asraw materialsforlight industrymanufacturing,electrificationis a huge component of the Chinese national energy policy.

India

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India has setrenewable energygoals to transition 50%[134]of its total energy consumption into renewable sources in theParis climate accords.As of 2022 theCentral Electricity Authorityare well on track of achieving their goals, producing 160 GW electricity from clean sources likesolar,wind,hydro powerandnuclear power plants,this is 40% of its total capacity. India is ranked third onErnst and Young'srenewable energy country attractive index behind the US and China.

Hydro electric power plants are a major part of India's energy infrastructure since the days of itsindependencein 1947. Former prime MinisterJawahar Lal Nehrucalled them the "temples of modern India"and believed them to be key drivers of modernity and industrialism for the nascent republic. Notable examples of hydro power stations include the 2400 MWTehri hydropower complex,the 1960 MWKoyna hydroelectric projectand the 1670 MWSrisailam Dam.Recently, India has given due importance to emerging renewable technologies like solar power plants and wind farms. They house 3 of the world's top 5 solar farms, including world's largest 2255 MWBhadla Solar Parkin and world's second-largest solar park of 2000 MW Pavgada Solar Park and 100 MWKurnoolUltra mega solar park.

While there has been positive change, air pollution from coal still kills many people[135]and India has to cut down its reliance on traditional coal based power production as it still accounts for around 50% of itsenergy production.India is also moving towards its goal for electrification of the automotive industry,[136]aiming to have at least 30%EVownership among private vehicles by 2030.

Vietnam

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Vietnam has led the Southeast Asia in solar and wind uptake, achieving about 20 GW in 2022 from almost zero in 2017.[137]Thailand has the highest number of EV registrations, with 218,000 in 2022.[138]The energy transition in Southeast Asia can be summarized as: Challenging, achievable, and interdependent. This implies that while there are obstacles, feasibility largely relies on international support.[138]

Public demand for improved local environmental quality and government's aims to promote a green economy are found to be key drivers in Vietnam.[137]

Governments ambition to attract international support forgreen growthinitiatives and public demand for a clean environment have been found to be drivers of the energy transition in developing countries, such as Vietnam.[139][140]Thanks to a relatively more conducive investment environment, Vietnam is poised to a faster energy transition than some other ASEAN members[141]

Europe

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European Union

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The European Green Deal is a set of policy initiatives by theEuropean Commissionwith the overarching aim of making Europe climate neutral in 2050.[142][143]An impact assessed plan will also be presented to increase theEU's greenhouse gas emissionreductions target for 2030 to at least 50% and towards 55% compared with 1990 levels. The plan is to review each existing law on its climate merits, and also introduce new legislation on thecircular economy,building renovation,biodiversity,farming andinnovation.[143]The president of the European Commission,Ursula von der Leyen,stated that the European Green Deal would be Europe's "man on the Moon moment", as the plan would make Europe the first climate-neutral continent.[143]

A survey found that digitally advanced companies put more money into energy-saving strategies. In the European Union, 59% of companies that have made investments in both basic and advanced technologies have also invested in energy efficiency measures, compared to only 50% of US firms in the same category. Overall, there is a significant disparity between businesses' digital profiles and investments in energy efficiency.[144]

Germany

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Gross generation of electricity by source in Germany 1990–2020

Germany has played an outsized role in the transition away from fossil fuels and nuclear power to renewables. The energy transition in Germany is known asdieEnergiewende(literally, "the energy turn" ) indicating a turn away from old fuels and technologies to new one. The key policy document outlining theEnergiewendewas published by the German government in September 2010, some six months before theFukushima nuclear accident;legislative support was passed in September 2010.

The policy has been embraced by the German federal government and has resulted in a huge expansion of renewables, particularly wind power. Germany's share of renewables has increased from around 5% in 1999 to 17% in 2010, reaching close to the OECD average of 18% usage of renewables.[145]In 2022 Germany has a share of 46,2 % and surpassed the OECD average.[146]A large driver for this increase in the shares of renewables energy are decreases incost of capital.Germany boasts some of the lowest cost of capitals for renewable solar and wind onshore energy worldwide. In 2021 theInternational Renewable Energy Agencyreported capital costs of around 1.1% and 2.4% for solar and wind onshore.[147]This constitutes a significant decrease from previous numbers in the early 2000s, where capital costs hovered around 5.1% and 4.5% respectively.[148]This decrease in capital costs was influenced by a variety of economic and political drivers. Following theglobal financial crisisof 2008–2009, Germany eased the refinancing regulations on banks by giving out cheap loans with low interest rates in order to stimulate the economy again.[149]

During this period, the industry around renewable energies also started to experiencelearning effectsin manufacturing, project organisation as well as financing thanks to rising investment and order volumes. This coupled with various forms of subsidies contributed to a large reduction of the capital cost and thelevelized cost of electricity(LCOE) for solar and onshore wind power. As the technologies have matured and become integral parts of the existing sociotechnical systems it is to be expected that in the future, experience effects and general interest rates will be key determinants for the cost-competitiveness of these technologies.[148]

Producers have been guaranteed a fixed feed-in tariff for 20 years, guaranteeing a fixed income. Energy co-operatives have been created, and efforts were made to decentralize control and profits. The large energy companies have a disproportionately small share of the renewables market. Nuclear power stations were closed, and the existing nine stations will close earlier than necessary, in 2022.

The reduction of reliance on nuclear stations has had the consequence of increased reliance on fossil fuels. One factor that has inhibited efficient employment of new renewable energy has been the lack of an accompanying investment in power infrastructure to bring the power to market. It is believed 8300 km of power lines must be built or upgraded.[145]

DifferentLänderhave varying attitudes to the construction of new power lines. Industry has had their rates frozen and so the increased costs of theEnergiewendehave been passed on to consumers, who have had rising electricity bills. Germans in 2013 had some of the highest electricity costs in Europe.[150]Nonetheless, for the first time in more than ten years, electricity prices for household customers fell at the beginning of 2015.[151]

Switzerland

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Switzerland electricity generation by source - percentage share

Due to the high share of hydroelectricity (59.6%) and nuclear power (31.7%) in electricity production, Switzerland's per capita energy-related CO2emissions are 28% lower than the European Union average and roughly equal to those of France. On 21 May 2017,Swiss voters acceptedthe new Energy Act establishing the 'energy strategy 2050'. The aims of the energy strategy 2050 are: to reduceenergy consumption;to increaseenergy efficiency;and to promoterenewable energies(such aswater,solar,windandgeothermal poweras well asbiomass fuels).[152]The Energy Act of 2006 forbids the construction of newnuclear power plantsin Switzerland.[152]

United Kingdom

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United Kingdom electricity generation by source - percentage share

By law production ofgreenhouse gas emissions by the United Kingdomwill be reduced to net zero by 2050.[153]To help in reaching this statutory goalnational energy policyis mainly focusing onthe country's off-shore wind powerand delivering new and advanced nuclear power. The increase innational renewable power – particularly from biomass– together with the 20% of electricity generated bynuclear power in the United Kingdommeant that by 2019 low carbonBritish electricityhad overtaken that generated by fossil fuels.[154]

In order to meet the net zero targetenergy networksmust be strengthened.[155]Electricity is only a part ofenergy in the United Kingdom,so natural gas used for industrial and residential heat[156]and petroleum used fortransport in the United Kingdommust also be replaced[157]by either electricity or another form of low-carbon energy, such as sustainable bioenergy crops[158]orgreen hydrogen.[159]

Although the need for the energy transition is not disputed by any major political party, in 2020 there is debate about how much of the funding to try and escape theCOVID-19 recessionshould be spent on the transition, and how many jobs could be created, for example in improvingenergy efficiency in British housing.[160]Some believe that due to post-covid government debt that funding for the transition will be insufficient.[161]Brexitmay significantly affect the energy transition, but this is unclear as of 2020.[162]The government is urging UK business to sponsorthe climate change conference in 2021,possibly including energy companies but only if they have a credible short-term plan for the energy transition.[163]

See also

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References

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