Sophist(dialogue)

TheSophist(Greek:Σοφιστής;Latin:Sophista^[1]) is aPlatonic dialoguefrom the philosopher's late period, most likely written in 360 BC. In it the interlocutors, led byEleaticStranger employ themethod of divisionin order to classify and define thesophistand describe his essential attributes and differentia vis a vis thephilosopherandstatesman. Like its sequel, theStatesman,the dialogue is unusual in thatSocratesis present but plays only a minor role. Instead, theEleaticStranger takes the lead in the discussion. Because Socrates is silent, it is difficult to attribute the views put forward by the Eleatic Stranger to Plato, beyond the difficulty inherent in taking any character to be an author's "mouthpiece".

Background

The main objective of the dialogue is to identify what asophistis and how a sophist differs from a philosopher and statesman. Because each seems distinguished by a particular form of knowledge, the dialogue continues some of the lines of inquiry pursued in theepistemologicaldialogue,Theaetetus,which is said to have taken place the day before. Because theSophisttreats these matters, it is often taken to shed light onPlato'sTheory of Formsand is compared with theParmenides,which criticized what is often taken to be the theory of forms.

InCratylus,contemporary or slightly preceding theRepublic,Plato poses the problem, decisive for the use of dialectics for cognitive purposes, of the relationship between name and thing, between word and reality. Thus the ‘Sophist’ has its major background in theCratylus.This dialogue is resolved in a contrast between the thesis of Hermogenes, who considers the name a simple sequence of sounds conventionally chosen to refer to an object, and the thesis of Cratylus, a pupil of the oldHeraclitus,who supported the full expression of the essence of the “nominatum” in the name, and who considered the names as expressions forged by an Onomaturge, capable of expressing the essence of the thing named. Following this research, all the ‘Sophist’ is dedicated to find the right definition of the name “sophist”.

Some contemporary scholars, based on their orientations, have argued that in theCratylusPlato gave his assent now to the thesis of Hermogenes, now to the thesis of Cratylus.Gérard Genette,in the work ‘Mimologique. Voyage en Cratilie’ (1976), starts from Plato's speech to argue the idea of arbitrariness of the sign: according to this thesis, already supported by the great linguistFerdinand de Saussure,the connection between language and objects is not natural, but culturally determined. The ideas developed in theCratylus,although dated, have historically been an important point of reference in the development ofLinguistics.On the basis of theCratylus,Gaetano Licatahas reconstructed, in the essay ‘Plato’s theory of language. Perspectives on the concept of truth’ (2007, Il Melangolo), the relationship between theCratylusand the ‘Sophist’ and the Platonic conception of semantics, according to which names have a natural link, (an essential foundation) with their "nominatum". This author argues that Plato accepts Cratylus' thesis. Finally, the concept of language and of “true discourse” ofCratyluswill be very important for the study ofdiaireticdialectic in the ‘Sophist’.

Introduction

This dialogue takes place a day after Plato'sTheaetetusin an unspecified gymnasium inAthens.The participants areSocrates,who plays a minor role, the elder mathematicianTheodorus,the young mathematicianTheaetetus,and a visitor fromElea,the hometown ofParmenidesandZeno,who is often referred to in English translations as the Eleatic Stranger or the Eleatic Visitor. Other young mathematicians are also silently present. The dialogue begins when Socrates arrives and asks the Eleatic Stranger, whether in his homeland, the sophist, statesperson, and philosopher are considered to be one kind or three. The Eleatic Stranger responds that they are three and then sets about to give an account of the sophist through dialectical exchange with Theaetetus.

Method of definition (216a–236d)

The Eleatic Stranger pursues a different definition than features in Plato's other dialogues by using a model, comparing the model with the target kind, collection, and division (diairesis) of the collected kinds. At first, he starts using a mundane model (a fisherman), which shares some qualities in common with the target kind (the sophist). This common quality is the certain expertise (techne) in one subject. Then through the method of collection of different kinds (farming, caring for mortal bodies, for things that are put together or fabricated and imitation), he tries to bring them together into one kind, which he callsproductive art.The same is true with the collection of learning, recognition, commerce, combat and hunting, which can be grouped into the kind ofacquisitive art.

After these two collections, he proceeds to the division of the types of expertise intoproductionandacquisition.Then he tries to find out to which of these two sub-kinds the fisherman belongs (classification) case, the acquisitive kind of expertise. By following the same method, namely, diairesis through collection, he divides the acquisitive art intopossession takingandexchanging goods,to which sophistry belongs. The sophist is a kind of merchant. After many successive collections and divisions he finally arrives at the definition of the model (fisherman). Throughout this process the Eleatic Stranger classifies many kinds of activities (hunting, aquatic-hunting, fishing, strike-hunting).

After the verbal explanation of the model (definition), he tries to find out what the model and the target kind share in common (sameness) and what differentiates them (difference). Through this comparison, and after having been aware of the different kinds and sub-kinds, he can classify sophistry also among the other branches of the ‘tree’ of division of expertise as follows: "1. production, hunting by persuasion and money-earning, 2. acquisition, soul wholesaling, 3. soul retailing, retailing things that others make, 4. soul retailing, retailing things that he makes himself, 5. possession taking, competition, money-making expertise in debating."

Throughout the process of comparison of the distinguished kinds through his method of collection, the Eleatic Stranger discovers some attributes in relation to which the kinds can be divided (difference in relation to something). These are similar to theCategoriesofAristotle,so to say: quantity, quality, relation, location, time, position, end, etc.

After having failed to define sophistry, the Stranger attempts a final diairesis through the collection of the five definitions of sophistry. Since these five definitions share in common one quality (sameness), which is theimitation,he finally qualifies sophistry asimitation art.Following the division of the imitation art incopy-making and appearance-making,he discovers that sophistry falls under theappearance-making art,namely the Sophist imitates the wise man.

The sophist is presented negatively, but he can be said to be someone who merely pretends to have knowledge or to be a purveyor of false knowledge only ifright opinionand false opinion can be distinguished. It seems impossible to say that the sophist presents things that are not as though they were, or passes off "non-being" as "being," since this would suggest that non-being exists, or that non-existence exists. Otherwise, the sophist couldn't "do" anything with it. The Stranger suggests that it is Parmenides' doctrine of being and non-being that is at the root of this problem, and so proceeds to criticize Parmenides' ideas, namely that "it is impossible that things that are not are."

Puzzles of being and not-being, great kinds (236d–264b)

The Eleatic Stranger, before proceeding to the final definition of sophistry, has to make clear the concepts that he used throughout the procedure of definition. In other words, he has to clarify what is the nature of theBeing(that which is), Not-Being, sameness (identity), difference, motion (change), and rest, and how they are interrelated. Therefore, he examinesParmenides’ notion in comparison withEmpedoclesandHeraclitus’ in order to find out whether Being is identical withchangeorrest,or both.

The conclusion is that rest and change both "are," that is, both are beings; Parmenides had said that only rest "is." Furthermore,Beingis a "kind" that all existing things share in common.Samenessis a "kind" that all things which belong to the same kind or genus share with reference to a certain attribute, and due to which diaeresis through collection is possible.Differenceis a "kind" that makes things of the same genus distinct from one another; therefore it enables us to proceed to their division. Finally, so-calledNot-Beingis not the opposite of Being, but simply different from it. Therefore, the negation of Being is identified with "difference." Not-being is difference, not the opposite of Being.

Following these conclusions, the true statement can be distinguished from the false one, since each statement consists of a verb and a name. The name refers to the subject, and because a thought or a speech is always about something, and it cannot be about nothing (Non-Being). The verb is the sign of the action that the subject performs or the action being performed to or on the subject. When the verb states something that is about the subject, namely one of his properties, then the statement is true. While when the verb states something that isdifferent(it is not) from the properties of the subject, then the statement is false, but is not attributing being to non-being.

It is plausible then, that ‘things that are not (appearing and seeming) somehow are’, and so it is also plausible that the sophist produces false appearances and imitates the wise man.

Final definition (264b–268d)

After having solved all these puzzles, that is to say the interrelation between being, not-being, difference and negation, as well as the possibility of the "appearing and seeming but not really being," the Eleatic Stranger can finally proceed to define sophistry. "Sophistry is a productive art, human, of the imitation kind, copy-making, of the appearance-making kind, uninformed and insincere in the form of contrary-speech-producing art."

Texts and translations

Plato: Theaetetus, Sophist.Greek with translation by Harold N. Fowler. Loeb Classical Library 123. Harvard Univ. Press (originally published 1921).ISBN 978-0674991378 HUP listing
Fowler translation atPerseus
Sophist.Translated byBenjamin Jowett
- Jowett translation also available atStandardEbooks
Plato.Opera,volume I. Oxford Classical Texts.ISBN 978-0198145691
Plato.Complete Works.Hackett, 1997.ISBN 978-0872203495

Notes

^Henri Estienne(ed.),Platonis opera quae extant omnia,Vol. 1, 1578,p. 217.

References

Ackrill, J. L. 1997.Essays on Plato and Aristotle.Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ambuel, David. 2007.Image and Paradigm in Plato's Sophist.Parmenides Publishing.ISBN 9781930972049
Bakalis, N. 2005.Handbook of Greek Philosophy: From Thales to the Stoics Analysis and FragmentsISBN 1-4120-4843-5
Benardete, S. 1986.Plato's Sophist. Part II of The Being of the Beautiful.Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Cornford, F. M.1935.Plato's Theory of Knowledge.London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Eck, J. van. 2002. “Not Being and Difference: on Plato's Sophist 256d5-258e3."Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy23: 63-84.
Frede, M. 1992. “Plato's Sophist on False Statements.” InThe Cambridge Companion to Plato.Edited by Richard Kraut, 397-424. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Frede, M. 1996. “The Literary Form of the Sophist.” InForm and Argument in Late PlatoEdited by C. Gill and M. M. McCabe, 135-151. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Gill, C. and M. M. McCabe eds. 1996.Form and Argument in Late Plato.Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Harte, V. 2002.Plato on Parts and Wholes: The Metaphysics of Structure,Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Heidegger, M.1997. Plato's Sophist. Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press.
Moravcsik, J. M. E. 1992.Plato and Platonism.Oxford: Blackwell.
Nehamas, A. 1982. “Participation and Predication in Plato's Later Thought.”Review of Metaphysics26: 343-74.
Gaetano Licata,Teoria platonica del linguaggio. Prospettive sul concetto di verità,Il Melangolo, Genova 2007.
Sallis, J.1996.Being and Logos: Reading the Platonic Dialogues.Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Plato. 1996.Plato's Sophist. The Professor of Wisdom: With Translation, Introduction and Glossary by Eva Brann, Peter Kalkavage, Eric Salem.Newburyport: Focus Publishing.
Stenzel, J. 1940 [1931].Plato's Method of Dialectic.Translated and Edited by D. J. Allan. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Vlastos, G.1973. “An Ambiguity in the Sophist”, inPlatonic StudiesEdited by G. Vlastos, 270-322. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
White, N. P. 1993.Plato: Sophist,Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett.
Zaks, Nicolas (2023).Apparences et dialectique: un commentaire du Sophiste de Platon.Leiden Boston (Mass.): Brill.ISBN 9789004533066.

External links

Sophist,in a collection of Plato's DialoguesatStandard Ebooks
Greek text of the dialogue atPerseus
Sophist,english translation by Benjamin Jowettpublic domain audiobook atLibriVox
Gill, Mary Louise."Method and Metaphysics in Plato'sSophistandStatesman".InZalta, Edward N.(ed.).Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Semantics, Predication, Truth and Falsehood in Plato'sSophist
Plato'sSophist,Annotated Bibliography of the studies in English

[1] Henri Estienne(ed.),Platonis opera quae extant omnia,Vol. 1, 1578,p. 217.

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