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Śūnyatā

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Śūnyatā(/ʃuːnjəˈtɑː/shoon-yə-TAH;Sanskrit:शून्यता;Pali:suññatā), translated most often as "emptiness",[1]"vacuity",and sometimes" voidness ",[2]or "nothingness"[3]is an Indian philosophical concept. In Buddhism, Jainism, Hinduism, andother Indian philosophical traditions,the concept has multiple meanings depending on its doctrinal context. It is either anontologicalfeature of reality, a meditative state, or aphenomenologicalanalysis of experience.

Translations of
Śūnyatā
Englishemptiness, voidness, vacuity, openness, thusness, nothingness
SanskritŚūnyatā
(Dev:शून्यता)
PaliSuññatā
(Dev:सुञ्ञता)
Bengaliশূন্যতা
(Shunnôta)
Burmeseသုညတ
(thone nya ta)
ChineseKhông
(Pinyin:Kōng)
JapaneseKhông
(Rōmaji:Kū)
Khmerសុញ្ញតា
(UNGEGN:Sŏnhnhôta)
Korean공성 ( không tính )
(RR:gong-seong)
Mongolianхоосон
Tibetanསྟོང་པ་ཉིད་
(Wylie:stong-pa nyid
THL:tongpa nyi)
TagalogSunyata (ᜐᜓᜈ᜔ᜌᜆ)
Thaiสุญตา (S̄uỵtā)
VietnameseKhông ( không )
Glossary of Buddhism

InTheravāda Buddhism,Pali:suññatāoften refers to thenon-self(Pāli:anattā,Sanskrit:anātman)[note 1]nature of thefive aggregates of experienceand thesix sense spheres.Pali:Suññatāis also often used to refer to ameditative state or experience.

InMahāyāna Buddhism,śūnyatārefers to the tenet that "all things are empty of intrinsic existence and nature (svabhava) ",[5][6]but may also refer to theBuddha-natureteachings and primordial or empty awareness, as inDzogchen,Shentong,orChan.

Etymology

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"Śūnyatā"(Sanskrit) is usually translated as "devoidness", "emptiness", "hollow", "hollowness", "voidness". It is the noun form of the adjectiveśūnya,plus-tā:

  • śūnya,in the context of buddha dharma, primarily means "empty", or "void," but also means "zero," and "nothing,"[7]and derives from the rootśvi,meaning "hollow"
  • -tāis a suffix denoting a quality or state of being, equivalent to English "-ness"

Development of the concept

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The concept ofśūnyatāas "emptiness" is related to the concept ofanattainearly Buddhism.[8]Over time, many different philosophical schools or tenet-systems (Sanskrit:siddhānta)[9]have developed within Buddhism in an effort to explain the exactphilosophical meaningof emptiness.

After the Buddha, emptiness was further developed by theAbhidharmaschools,Nāgārjunaand theMādhyamakaschool, an earlyMahāyānaschool. Emptiness ( "positively" interpreted) is also an important element of theBuddha-natureliterature, which played a formative role in the evolution of subsequent Mahāyāna doctrine and practice.

Early Buddhism

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Main article:Pre-sectarian Buddhism

Pāli Nikāyas

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A simile from the Pali scriptures (SN 22.95) comparesformandfeelingswith foam and bubbles.
See also:Sati (Buddhism)

ThePāli Canonuses the termśūnyatā( "emptiness" ) in three ways: "(1) as a meditative dwelling, (2) as an attribute of objects, and (3) as a type of awareness-release."[10]

According toBhikkhu Analayo,in thePāli Canon"the adjective suñña occurs with a much higher frequency than the corresponding noun suññatā" and emphasizes seeing phenomena as 'being empty' instead of an abstract idea of "emptiness."[11]

One example of this usage is in thePheṇapiṇḍūpama Sutta(SN22:95), which states that on close inspection, each of the five aggregates are seen as being void (rittaka), hollow (tucchaka), coreless (asāraka). In the text a series of contemplations is given for each aggregate: form is like "a lump of foam" (pheṇapiṇḍa); sensation like "a water bubble" (bubbuḷa); perception like "a mirage" (marici); formations like "a plantain tree" (kadalik-khandha); and cognition like "a magical illusion" (māyā).[12]

According to Shi Huifeng, the terms "void" (rittaka), "hollow" (tucchaka), and "coreless" (asāraka) are also used in the early texts to refer to words and things which are deceptive, false, vain, and worthless.[12]This sense of worthlessness and vacuousness is also found in other uses of the termmāyā,such as the following:

"Monks, sensual pleasures are impermanent, hollow, false, deceptive; they are illusory (māyākatame), the prattle of fools. "[12]

TheSuñña Sutta,[13]part of thePāli Canon,relates that the monkĀnanda,Buddha'sattendant asked,

It is said that the world is empty, the world is empty, lord. In what respect is it said that the world is empty? "The Buddha replied," In so far as it is empty of a self or of anything pertaining to a self: Thus it is said, Ānanda, that the world is empty.

According to the American monasticThanissaro Bhikku:

Emptiness as a quality ofdharmas,in the early canons, means simply that one cannot identify them as one's own self or having anything pertaining to one's own self... Emptiness as a mental state, in the early canons, means a mode of perception in which one neither adds anything to nor takes anything away from what is present, noting simply, "There is this." This mode is achieved through a process of intense concentration, coupled with the insight that notes more and more subtle levels of the presence and absence of disturbance (see MN 121).[14]

Meditative state

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Main article:Buddhist meditation
Further information:Samadhi § Vimokṣamukha

Emptiness as a meditative state is said to be reached when "not attending to any themes, he [the bhikkhu] enters & remains in internal emptiness" (MN 122). This meditative dwelling is developed through the "four formless states" of meditation orArūpajhānasand then through "themeless concentration of awareness."[10]

TheCūlasuññata-sutta(MN III 104) and theMahāsuññata-sutta(MN III 109) outline how a monk can "dwell in emptiness" through a gradual step-by-step mental cultivation process, they both stress the importance of the impermanence of mental states and the absence of a self.

In theKāmabhu SuttaS IV.293, it is explained that abhikkhucan experience atrancelike contemplationin which perception and feeling cease. When he emerges from this state, he recounts three types of "contact" (phasso):

  1. "emptiness" (suññato),
  2. "signless" (animitto),
  3. "undirected" (appaṇihito).[15]

The meaning of emptiness as contemplated here is explained at M I.297 and S IV.296-97 as the "emancipation of the mind by emptiness" (suññatā cetovimutti) being consequent upon the realization that "this world is empty of self or anything pertaining to self" (suññam idaṃattena vā attaniyena vā).[16][17]

The term "emptiness" (suññatā) is also used in two suttas in theMajjhima Nikāya,in the context of a progression of mental states. The texts refer to each state's emptiness of the one below.[18]

Chinese Āgamas

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Main article:Chinese Buddhism

TheChineseĀgamascontain various parallels to thePheṇapiṇḍūpama Sutta.One partial parallel from theEkottara Āgamadescribes the body with different metaphors: "a ball of snow", "a heap of dirt", "a mirage", "an illusion" (māyā), or "an empty fist used to fool a child".[12]In a similar vein, the Mūla-SarvāstivādinMāyājāla Sūtra,gives two sets of metaphors for each of the sensory consciousnesses to illustrate their vain, illusory character.[12]

OtherSarvāstivādinĀgama sutras (extant in Chinese) which have emptiness as a theme include Samyukta Āgama 335 -Paramārtha-śunyatā-sūtra( "Sutra on ultimate emptiness" ) and Samyukta Āgama 297 -Mahā-śunyatā-dharma-paryāya( "Greater discourse on emptiness" ). These sutras have no parallel Pāli suttas.[19]These sutras associate emptiness withdependent origination,which shows that this relation of the two terms was already established in pre-Nagarjunasources. The sutra on great emptiness states:

"What is the Dharma Discourse on Great Emptiness? It is this—'When this exists, that exists; when this arises, that arises.'"[20]

The phrase "when this exists..." is a common gloss ondependent origination.Sarvāstivādin Āgamas also speak of a certain "emptinesssamadhi"(śūnyatāsamādhi) as well as stating that all dharmas are "classified as conventional".[21]

Mun-Keat Choong andYin Shunhave both published studies on the various uses of emptiness in theEarly Buddhist texts(Pāli CanonandChineseĀgamas).[22][23]Choong has also published a collection of translations of Āgama sutras from the Chinese on the topic of emptiness.[24]

Early Buddhist schools and Abhidharma

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Many of theearly Buddhist schoolsfeaturedśūnyatāas an important part of their teachings.

TheSarvastivadinschool's Abhidharma texts like theDharmaskandhapāda Śāstra,and the laterMahāvibhāṣa,also take up the theme of emptiness vis-a-vis dependent origination as found in the Agamas.[25]

Schools such as theMahāsāṃghikaPrajñaptivādins as well as many of the Sthavira schools (except thePudgalavada) held that all dharmas were empty (dharma śūnyatā).[25]This can be seen in the earlyTheravadaAbhidhammatexts such as thePatisambhidamagga,which also speak of the emptiness of the five aggregates and ofsvabhavaas being "empty of essential nature".[26]The TheravadaKathavatthualso argues against the idea that emptiness is unconditioned.[27]TheMahāvastu,an influentialMahāsāṃghikawork, states that the Buddha

"has shown that the aggregates are like a lightning flash, as a bubble, or as the white foam on a wave."[28]

One of the main themes of Harivarman'sTattvasiddhi-Śāstra (3rd-4th century) isdharma-śūnyatā,the emptiness of phenomena.[28]

Theravāda

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Seafrothat sunset

TheravādaBuddhists generally take the view that emptiness is merely thenot-selfnature of thefive aggregates.Emptiness is an important door to liberation in theTheravādatradition just as it is in Mahayana, according to Insight meditation teacherGil Fronsdal.[29]The classicTheravādatext known as thePatisambhidamagga(c. 3rd century BCE) describes thefive aggregatesas being empty (suññam) of essence or intrinsic nature (sabhava).[30]ThePatisambhidamaggaalso equatesnot-selfwith the emptiness liberation in a passage also cited byBuddhaghosain theVisuddhimagga(Vism XXI 70):

"When one who has great wisdom brings [volitional formations] to mind as not-self, he acquires the emptiness liberation" -Patis. II 58.[31]

TheVisuddhimagga(c. 5th century CE),the most influential classical Theravāda treatise, states that not-self does not become apparent because it is concealed by "compactness" when one does not give attention to the various elements which make up the person.[32]TheParamatthamañjusa VisuddhimaggatikaofAcariya Dhammapala,a 5th-century Theravāda commentary on theVisuddhimagga,comments on this passage by referring to the fact that we often assume unity and compactness regarding phenomena or functions which are instead made up of various elements, but when one sees that these are merely empty dhammas, one can understand the not-self characteristic:

"when they are seen after resolving them by means of knowledge into these elements, they disintegrate like froth subjected to compression by the hand. They are mere states (dhamma) occurring due to conditions and void. In this way the characteristic of not-self becomes more evident. "[32]

The modern Thai teacherBuddhadasareferred to emptiness as the "innermost heart" of the Buddhist teachings and the cure for the disease of suffering. He stated that emptiness, as it relates to the practice of Dhamma, can be seen both "as the absence ofDukkhaand the defilements that are the cause of Dukkha and as the absence of the feeling that there is a self or that there are things which are the possessions of a self. "[33]He also equatednibbanawith emptiness, writing that "Nibbana, the remainderless extinction of Dukkha, means the same as supreme emptiness."[33]Emptiness is also seen as a mode of perception which lacks all the usual conceptual elaborations we usually add on top of our experiences, such as the sense of "I" and "Mine". According toThanissaro Bhikku,emptiness is not so much a metaphysical view, as it is a strategic mode of acting and of seeing the world which leads to liberation:[34]

Emptiness is a mode of perception, a way of looking at experience. It adds nothing to and takes nothing away from the raw data of physical and mental events. You look at events in the mind and the senses with no thought of whether there's anything lying behind them. This mode is called emptiness because it's empty of the presuppositions we usually add to experience to make sense of it: the stories and world-views we fashion to explain who we are and the world we live in. Although these stories and views have their uses, the Buddha found that some of the more abstract questions they raise — of our true identity and the reality of the world outside — pull attention away from a direct experience of how events influence one another in the immediate present. Thus they get in the way when we try to understand and solve the problem of suffering.

Some Theravādins, such asDavid Kalupahana,seeNagarjuna's view of emptiness as compatible with thePali Canon.In his analysis of theMulamadhyamikakarika,Kalupahana sees Nagarjuna's argument as rooted in theKaccānagotta Sutta(which Nagarjuna cites by name). Kalupahana states that Nagarjuna's major goal was to discredit heterodox views ofSvabhava(own-nature) held by theSarvastivadinsand establish the non-substantiality of all dharmas.[31]According to Peter Harvey, the Theravāda view of dhammas and sabhava is not one of essences, but merely descriptive characteristics and hence is not the subject ofMadhyamakacritique developed by Nagarjuna (see below).[35]

In Theravāda, emptiness as an approach to meditation is also seen as a state in which one is "empty of disturbance." This form of meditation is one in which meditators become concentrated and focus on the absence or presence of disturbances in their minds; if they find a disturbance they notice it and allow it to drop away; this leads to deeper states of calmness.[34]Emptiness is also seen as a way to look at sense-experience that does not identify with the "I-making" and "my-making" process of the mind. As a form of meditation, this is developed by perceiving thesix sense-spheresand their objects as empty of any self, this leads to aformless jhanaof nothingness and a state of equanimity.[34]

Mathew Kosuta sees the Abhidhamma teachings of the modern Thai teacher Ajaan Sujin Boriharnwanaket as being very similar to the Mahayana emptiness view.[36]

Mahayana Buddhism

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There are two main sources of Indian Buddhist discussions of emptiness: theMahayana sutra literature,which is traditionally believed to be the word of the Buddha in Mahayana Buddhism, and the shastra literature, which was composed by Buddhist scholars and philosophers.

Prajñāpāramitā sūtras

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In the Prajñaparamita sutras, the emptiness of phenomena is often illustrated by metaphors like drops ofdew.
Main article:Mahayana sutras

ThePrajñāpāramitā(Perfection of Wisdom) Sutras taught that all entities, includingdharmas,are empty of self, essential core, or intrinsic nature (svabhava), being only conceptual existents or constructs.[37][38]The notion ofprajña(wisdom, knowledge) presented in these sutras is a deep non-conceptual understanding of emptiness.[39]The Prajñāpāramitā sutras also use various metaphors to explain the nature of things as emptiness, stating that things are like "illusions" (māyā) and "dreams" (svapna). TheAstasahasrikaPrajñaparamita,possibly the earliest of these sutras,states:

If he knows the five aggregates as like an illusion, But makes not illusion one thing, and the aggregates another; If, freed from the notion of multiple things, he courses in peace— Then that is his practice of wisdom, the highest perfection.[12]

Perceiving dharmas and beings like an illusion (māyādharmatām) is termed the "great armor" (mahāsaṃnaha) of theBodhisattva,who is also termed the 'illusory man' (māyāpuruṣa).[40]TheVajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtraadds the following similes to describe how all conditioned things are to be contemplated: like a bubble, a shadow, like dew or a flash of lightning.[41]In the worldview of these sutras, though we perceive a world of concrete and discrete objects, these objects are "empty" of the identity imputed by their designated labels.[42]In that sense, they are deceptive and like an illusion. The Perfection of Wisdom texts constantly repeat that nothing can be found to ultimately exist in some fundamental way. This applies even to the highest Buddhist concepts (bodhisattvas,bodhicitta,and evenprajñaitself).[43]Evennirvanaitself is said to be empty and like a dream or magical illusion.[44]

In a famous passage, theHeart sutra,a later but influentialPrajñāpāramitātext, directly states that thefive skandhas(along with the five senses, the mind, and the four noble truths) are said to be "empty" (sunya):

Form is emptiness, emptiness is form
Emptiness is not separate from form, form is not separate from emptiness
Whatever is form is emptiness, whatever is emptiness is form.[45][note 2][note 3]

In the Prajñāpāramitā sutras the knowledge of emptiness, i.e.prajñāpāramitāis said to be the fundamental virtue of the bodhisattva, who is said to stand on emptiness by not standing (-stha) on any other dharma (phenomena). Bodhisattvas who practice this perfection of wisdom are said to have several qualities such as the "not taking up" (aparigṛhīta) and non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) of anything, non-attainment (aprapti), not-settling down (anabhinivesa) and not relying on any signs (nimitta,mental impressions).[46][47]Bodhisattvas are also said to be free of fear in the face of the ontological groundlessness of the emptiness doctrine which can easily shock others.[48]

Mādhyamaka school

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NāgārjunaandĀryadeva,two classicIndian philosophersof the Buddhist emptiness doctrine
Main article:Madhyamaka

Mādhyamakais aMahāyānaBuddhist school of philosophywhich focuses on the analysis of emptiness, and was thus also known asśūnyatavāda.The school is traditionally seen as being founded by the Indian Buddhist philosopherNāgārjuna.[49][50]

Nāgārjuna's goal was to refute theessentialismof certainAbhidharmaschools and the HinduNyayaschool.[51]His best-known work is theMūlamadhyamakakārikā(MMK), in which he usedreductioarguments (Skt:prasanga) to show the non-substantiality of everything.Nāgārjunaequated the emptiness ofdharmaswith theirdependent origination,and thus with their being devoid any permanent substance or primary, substantial existence (svabhava).[52][53][54][note 4]Nāgārjunawrites in the MMK:

We state that conditioned origination is emptiness. It is mere designation depending on something, and it is the middle path. (24.18)

Since nothing has arisen without depending on something, there is nothing that is not empty. (24.19)[55]

Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamaka states that since things have the nature of lacking true existence or own being (niḥsvabhāva), all things are mere conceptual constructs (prajñaptimatra) because they are just impermanent collections of causes and conditions.[56]Because of this, Mādhyamaka is also known asNiḥsvabhāvavāda.This also applies to the principle of causality itself, sinceeverythingis dependently originated.[54]If one is unaware of this, things may seem to arise as existents, remain for a time and then subsequently perish. In reality, dependently originated phenomena do not arise or remain as inherently existent phenomena and yet they still appear as a flow of conceptual constructs.[57]<[58][note 5]Thus both existence and nihilism are ruled out.[59][60]Any enduringessential naturewould prevent the process of dependent origination, or any kind of origination at all. For things would simply always have been, and will always continue to be, without any change.[61][note 6]For Nāgārjuna, the realization of emptiness is a key understanding which allows one to reach liberation because it is nothing but the elimination of ignorance.

There has been significant debate, both in ancient India and in modern scholarship, as to how to interpret Mādhyamaka and whether it is nihilistic (a claim that Mādhyamaka thinkers vehemently denied).[62][63][64]Some scholars like F.Shcherbatskoyhave also interpreted emptiness as described by Nāgārjuna as a Buddhist transcendentalabsolute,while other scholars such asDavid Kalupahanaconsider this interpretation to be a mistake.[65][66]According to Paul Williams, Nāgārjuna associates emptiness with theultimate truthbut his conception of emptiness is not some kind ofAbsolute,but rather it is the very absence of true existence with regards to the conventional reality of things and events in the world.[67]

For Nāgārjuna the phenomenal world is the limited truth (samvrtisatya) and does not really exist in the highest reality (paramarthasatya) and yet it has a kind of conventional reality which has its uses for reaching liberation. This limited truth includes everything, including the Buddha himself, the teachings (Dharma), liberation and even Nāgārjuna's own arguments.[68]Thistwo-truth schemawhich did not deny the importance of convention allowed him to defend himself against charges ofnihilism.Because of his philosophical work, Nāgārjuna is seen by some modern interpreters as restoring theMiddle Wayof the Buddha, which had become influenced by absolutist metaphysical tendencies of schools like theVaibhasika.[69][52]

Nāgārjuna is also famous for arguing that his philosophy of emptiness was not a view, and that he in fact did not take any position or thesis whatsoever since this would just be another form of clinging. In hisVigrahavyavartaniNāgārjuna outright states that he has no thesis (pratijña) to prove.[70]This idea would become a central point of debate for later Mādhyamaka philosophers. After Nāgārjuna, his pupilĀryadeva(3rd century CE) commented on and expanded Nāgārjuna's system. An influential commentator on Nāgārjuna wasBuddhapālita(470–550) who has been interpreted as developing the 'prāsaṅgika' approach to Nāgārjuna's works, which argues that Madhyamaka critiques of essentialism are done only throughreductio ad absurdumarguments. Like Nāgārjuna, instead of putting forth any positive position of his own,Buddhapālitamerely seeks to show how all philosophical positions are untenable and self contradictory without putting forth a positive thesis.[71]

Buddhapālitais often contrasted with the works ofBhāvaviveka(c. 500 – c. 578), who argued for the use of logical arguments using thepramana-based epistemology of Indian logicians likeDignāga.Bhāvavivekaargued that Madhyamika's could put forth positive arguments of one's own, instead of just criticizing others' arguments, a tactic calledvitaṇḍā(attacking) which was seen in bad form in Indian philosophical circles. He argued that the position of a Mādhyamaka was simply that phenomena are devoid of inherent nature.[71]This approach has been labeled thesvātantrikastyle of Madhyamaka by Tibetan philosophers and commentators. Another influential commentator,Candrakīrti(c. 600–650), critiqued Bhāvaviveka's adoption of thepramanatradition on the grounds that it contained a subtle essentialism and argued that Mādhyamikas must make no positive assertions and need not construct formal arguments.[72]

Yogācāra school

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Main article:Yogacara

The central text of theYogācāraschool, theSaṃdhinirmocana-sūtra,explains emptiness in terms of the three natures theory, stating that its purpose is to "establish the doctrine of thethree-own-beings(trisvabhāva) in terms of their lack of own-nature (niḥsvabhāvatā). "[73]According to Andrew Skilton, in Yogācāra, emptiness is the "absence of duality between perceivingsubject(lit. "grasper",Skt:grāhaka,Tib:'dzin-pa) and the perceivedobject( "grasped", Skt:grāhya,Tib:bzhung-ba). "[74]This is seen in the following quote from theMadhyāntavibhāga:

There exists the imagination of the unreal, there is no duality, but there is emptiness, even in this there is that.[73]

In his commentary, the Indian Yogācāra philosopherVasubandhuexplains that imagination of the unreal (abhūta-parikalpa) is the "discrimination between the duality of grasped and grasper." Emptiness is said to be "the imagination of the unreal that is lacking in the form of being graspable or grasper." Thus in Yogacara, it can be said that emptiness is mainly that subject and object and all experiences which are seen in the subject–object modality are empty.[73]

According to Yogācāra thought, everything we conceive of is the result of the working of theEight Consciousnesses.[note 7]The "things" we are conscious of are "mere concepts" (vijñapti), not 'the thing in itself'.[75]In this sense, our experiences are empty and false, they do not reveal the true nature of things as an enlightened person would see them, which would benon-dual,without the imputed subject object distinction.

The Yogācāra school philosophersAsaṅgaandVasubandhucriticized those in the Madhyamika school who "adhere to non-existence" (nāstikas, vaināśkas) and sought to move away from their negative interpretation of emptiness because they feared any philosophy of 'universal denial' (sarva-vaināśika) would stray into 'nihilism' (ucchedavāda), an extreme which was not themiddle way.[73]Yogacarins differed from Madhyamikas in positing that there really was something which could be said to 'exist' in experience, namely some kind of nonobjective and empty perception. This Yogacara conception of emptiness, which states that there issomethingthat exists (mainly,vijñapti,mental construction), and that it is empty, can be seen in the following statement of Vasubandhu:

Thus, when something is absent [in a receptacle], then one, seeing that [receptacle] as devoid of that thing, perceives that [receptacle] as it is, and recognises that [receptacle], which is left over, as it is, namely as something truly existing there.[73]

This tendency can also be seen inAsaṅga,who argues in hisBodhisattvabhūmithat there must be something that exists which is described as empty:

Emptiness is logical when one thing is devoid of another because of that [other's] absence and because of the presence of the empty thing itself.[73]

Asaṅgaalso states:

The nonexistence of duality is indeed the existence of nonexistence; this is the definition of emptiness. It is neither existence, nor nonexistence, neither different nor identical.[73]

This "existence of nonexistence" definition of emptiness can also be seen in Asaṅga'sAbhidharmasamuccayawhere he states that emptiness is "the non-existence of the self, and the existence of the no-self."[73]

In the sixth century, scholarly debates between Yogacarins and Madhyamikas centered on the status and reality of theparatantra-svabhāva(the "dependent nature" ), with Madhyamika's like Bhāvaviveka criticizing the views of Yogacarins likeDharmapālaof Nalanda as reifyingdependent origination.[73]

Buddha-nature

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Main articles:Buddha-natureandTathāgatagarbha Sutras

An influential division of 1st-millennium CE Buddhist texts develop the notion ofTathāgatagarbhaor Buddha-nature.[76][77]TheTathāgatagarbhadoctrine, at its earliest, probably appeared about the later part of the 3rd century CE, and is verifiable in Chinese translations of 1st millennium CE.[78]

TheTathāgatagarbhais the topic of theTathāgatagarbha sūtras,where the title itself means agarbha(womb, matrix, seed) containingTathāgata(Buddha). In theTathāgatagarbha sūtrasthe perfection of the wisdom of not-self is stated to be the true self. The ultimate goal of the path is characterized using a range of positive language that had been used in Indian philosophy previously byessentialistphilosophers, but which was now transmuted into a new Buddhist vocabulary to describe a being who has successfully completed the Buddhist path.[79]

TheseSutrassuggest, states Paul Williams, that 'all sentient beings contain aTathāgataas their 'essence, core or essential inner nature'.[78]They also present a further developed understanding of emptiness, wherein the Buddha-nature, the Buddha and Liberation are seen as transcending the realm of emptiness, i.e. of the conditioned and dependently originated phenomena.[80]

One of these texts, theAngulimaliya Sutra,contrasts between empty phenomena such as the moral and emotional afflictions (kleshas), which are like ephemeral hailstones, and the enduring, eternal Buddha, which is like a precious gem:

The tens of millions of afflictive emotions like hail-stones are empty. The phenomena in the class of non-virtues, like hail-stones, quickly disintegrate. Buddha, like a vaidurya jewel, is permanent... The liberation of a buddha also is form... do not make a discrimination of non-division, saying, "The character of liberation is empty".'[81]

TheŚrīmālā Sūtrais one of the earliest texts onTathāgatagarbhathought, composed in the 3rd century in south India, according to Brian Brown. It asserted that everyone can potentially attain Buddhahood, and warns against the doctrine ofŚūnyatā.[82]TheŚrīmālā Sūtraposits that the Buddha-nature is ultimately identifiable as thesupramundane nature of the Buddha,thegarbhais the ground for Buddha-nature, this nature is unborn and undying, has ultimate existence, has no beginning nor end, is nondual, and permanent.[83]The text also adds that thegarbhahas "no self, soul or personality" and "incomprehensible to anyone distracted by sunyata (voidness)"; rather it is the support for phenomenal existence.[84]

The notion of Buddha-nature and its interpretation was and continues to be widely debated in all schools ofMahayanaBuddhism. Some traditions interpret the doctrine to be equivalent to emptiness (like the TibetanGelugschool); the positive language of the textsTathāgatagarbha sutrasare then interpreted as being of provisional meaning, and not ultimately true. Other schools, however (mainly theJonangschool), seeTathāgatagarbhaas being an ultimate teaching and see it as an eternal, true self, whileŚūnyatāis seen as a provisional, lower teaching.[85]

Likewise, western scholars have been divided in their interpretation of theTathāgatagarbha,since the doctrine of an 'essential nature' in every living being appears to be confusing, since it seems to be equivalent to a 'Self',[note 8][86]which seems to contradict the doctrines in a vast majority of Buddhist texts. Some scholars, however, view such teachings as metaphorical, not to be taken literally.[80]

According to some scholars, the Buddha-nature which these sutras discuss does not represent a substantial self (ātman). Rather, it is a positive expression of emptiness, and represents the potentiality to realize Buddhahood through Buddhist practices. In this view, the intention of the teaching of Buddha-nature is soteriological rather than theoretical.[87][79]According to others, the potential of salvation depends on the ontological reality of a salvific, abiding core reality – the Buddha-nature, empty of all mutability and error, fully present within all beings.[88]Japanese scholars of the "Critical Buddhism"movement meanwhile see Buddha-nature as anessentialistand thus an un-Buddhist idea.[79]

Tibetan Buddhism

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Main article:Madhyamaka § Tibetan_Buddhism
In Tibetan Buddhism, emptiness is often symbolized by and compared to the open sky[89]which is associated withopennessandfreedom.[90]

InTibetan Buddhism,emptiness (Wylie:stong-pa nyid) is mainly interpreted through the lens ofMādhyamakaphilosophy, though theYogacara- andTathāgatagarbha-influenced interpretations are also influential. The interpretations of the IndianMādhyamakaphilosopherCandrakīrtiare the dominant views on emptiness in Tibetan Buddhist philosophy.[91]

In Tibet, a distinction also began to be made between the autonomist (svātantrika,rang rgyud pa) and consequentialist (prāsaṅgika,thal 'gyur pa) approaches toMādhyamakareasoning about emptiness. The distinction was invented by Tibetan scholarship, and not one made by classical Indian Madhyamikas.[92]

Further Tibetan philosophical developments began in response to the works of the influential scholarDolpopa(1292–1361) and led to two distinctly opposed TibetanMādhyamakaviews on the nature of emptiness and ultimate reality.[93][94]

One of these is the view termedshentong(Wylie:gzhan stong,'other empty'), which is a further development of IndianYogacara-Madhyamakaand the Buddha-nature teachings byDolpopa,and is primarily promoted in theJonang,Nyingma,and modernKagyuschools. This view states that ultimate reality is empty of the conventional, but it is itselfnotempty of being ultimateBuddhahoodand theluminous nature of mind.[95]Dolpopa considered his view a form ofMādhyamaka,and called his system "GreatMādhyamaka".[96]InJonang,this ultimate reality is a "ground or substratum" which is "uncreated and indestructible, noncomposite and beyond the chain of dependent origination."[97]

Dolpopawas roundly critiqued for his claims about emptiness and his view that they were a kind ofMādhyamaka.His critics include Tibetan philosophers such as the founder of theGelugschoolJe Tsongkhapa(1357–1419) andMikyö Dorje, the 8th Karmapa of the Karma Kagyu(1507–1554).[98]

Rangtong(Wylie:rang stong;'self-empty') refers to views which opposeshentongand state that ultimate reality is that which is empty of self-nature in a relative and absolute sense; that is to say ultimate reality is empty of everything, including itself. It is thus not a transcendental ground or metaphysicalabsolute,but just the absence of true existence (svabhava). This view has sometimes been applied to theGelugschool because they tend to hold that emptiness is "an absolute negation" (med dgag).

However, many Tibetan philosophers reject these terms as descriptions of their views on emptiness. TheSakyathinkerGorampa Sonam Senge(1429-1489), for example, called his version ofMādhyamaka,"freedom from extremes" or "freedom from proliferations" (spros bral) and claimed that the ultimate truth was ineffable, beyond predication or concept.[99]For Gorampa, emptiness is not just the absence of inherent existence, but it is the absence of the four extremes in all phenomena i.e. existence, nonexistence, both and neither (see:catuskoti).[100]

The14th Dalai Lama,who generally speaks from theGelugperspective, states:

According to the theory of emptiness, any belief in an objective reality grounded in the assumption of intrinsic, independent existence is simply untenable.
All things and events, whether 'material', mental or even abstract concepts like time, are devoid of objective, independent existence... [T]hings and events are 'empty' in that they can never possess any immutable essence, intrinsic reality or absolute 'being' that affords independence.[101]

Chinese Buddhism

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Sānlùn school

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Main article:Madhyamaka § Sānlùn_school

When Buddhism was introduced in China it was initially understood in terms of indigenous Chinese philosophical culture. Because of this, emptiness (Ch.,kong,Không;) was at first understood as pointing to a kind of transcendental reality similar to theTao.[102]It took several centuries to realize thatśūnyatādoes not refer to an essential transcendental reality underneath or behind the world of appearances.[102]

Chinese Mādhyamaka(known asSānlùn,or the "three treatise school" ) began with the work ofKumārajīva(344–413 CE) who translated the works of Nāgārjuna into Chinese.Sānlùnfigures like Kumārajīva's pupilSengzhao(384–414), and the laterJizang(549–623) were influential in introducing a more orthodox and non-essentialist interpretation of emptiness to Chinese Buddhism. Sengzhao argues, for example, that the nature of phenomena could not be said to be either existent or non-existent and that it was necessary to go beyond conceptual proliferation to realize emptiness.Jizang(549–623) was another central figure in Chinese Madhyamaka who wrote numerous commentaries on Nāgārjuna andAryadevaand is considered to be the leading representative of the school.[103]Jizangcalled his method "deconstructing what is misleading and revealing what is corrective". He insisted that one must never settle on any particular viewpoint or perspective but constantly reexamine one's formulations to avoidreificationsof thought and behavior.[103]

In the modern era, one major Chinese figure who has written onMādhyamakais the scholar monkYin Shun(1906–2005).[104]

Tiantai and Huayan

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Later Chinese philosophers developed their own unique interpretations of emptiness. One of these wasZhiyi,the intellectual founder of theTiantaischool, who was strongly influenced by theLotus sutra.The Tiantai view of emptiness anddependent originationis inseparable from their view of the "interfusion of phenomena" and the idea that the ultimate reality is an absolute totality of all particular things which are "Neither-Same-Nor-Different" from each other.[105]

In Tiantai metaphysics, every event, function, or characteristic is the product of the interfusion of all others, the whole is in the particular and every particular event/function is also in every other particular. This also leads to the conclusion that all phenomena are "findable" in each and every other phenomena, even seemingly conflicting phenomena such as good and evil or delusion and enlightenment are interfused with each other.[106]

TheHuayanschool understood emptiness and ultimate reality through the similar idea ofinterpenetrationor "coalescence" (Wylie:zung-'jug;Sanskrit:yuganaddha), using the concept ofIndra's netto illustrate this.[107]

Chán

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Main articles:ZenandChinese Chán

Chan Buddhismwas influenced by all the previous Chinese Buddhist currents. TheMādhyamakaof Sengzhao, for example, influenced the views of the Chan patriarchShen Hui(670-762), a critical figure in the development of Chan, as can be seen by his "Illuminating the Essential Doctrine" (Hsie Tsung Chi). This text emphasizes that true emptiness orSuchnesscannot be known throughthoughtsince it is free from thought (wu-nien).[108]Shen Hui also states that true emptiness is not nothing, but it is a "Subtle Existence" (miao-yu), which is just "GreatPrajña."[108]

The Chinese Chan presentation of emptiness, influenced byYogacaraand theTathāgatagarbhasutras, also used more positive language and poetic metaphors to describe the nature of emptiness. For example,Hongzhi Zhengjue(1091–1157), a key figure in theCaodonglineage, wrote:

"The field of boundless emptiness is what exists from the very beginning. You must purify, cure, grind down, or brush away all the tendencies you have fabricated into apparent habits. [Those tendencies are the clouds in our eyes.] Then you can reside in a clear circle of brightness. Utter emptiness has no image. Upright independence does not rely on anything. Just expand and illuminate the original truth unconcerned by external conditions. Accordingly, we are told to realize that not a single thing exists. In this field birth and death do not appear. The deep source, transparent down to the bottom, can radiantly shine and can respond unencumbered to each speck of dust [each object] without becoming its partner. The subtlety of seeing and hearing transcends mere colors and sounds. The whole affair functions without leaving traces and mirrors without obscurations. Very naturally, mind and Dharmas emerge and harmonize."[109]
"Vast and far-reaching without boundary, secluded and pure, manifesting light, this spirit is without obstruction. Its brightness does not shine out but can be called empty and inherently radiant. Its brightness, inherently purifying, transcends causal conditions beyond subject and object. Subtle but preserved, illumined and vast, also it cannot be spoken of as being or nonbeing, or discussed with images or calculations. Right in here the central pivot turns, the gateway opens. You accord and respond without laboring and accomplish without hindrance. Everywhere turn around freely, not following conditions, not falling into classifications. Facing everything, let go and attain stability. Stay with that just as that. Stay with this just as this. That and this are mixed together with no discriminations as to their places. So, it is said that the earth lifts up the mountain without knowing the mountain's stark steepness. A rock contains jade without knowing the jade's flawlessness. This is how truly to leave home, how home-leaving must be enacted."[109]

Western Buddhism

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Various western Buddhists note thatŚūnyatārefers to the emptiness of inherent existence, as in Madhyamaka; but also to the emptiness of mind or awareness, as open space and the "ground of being," as in meditation-orientated traditions and approaches such as Dzogchen andShentong.[110][111]

Hinduism

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Influence on Advaita Vedanta

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Gaudapada has developed his concept of"ajāta",[112][113]which uses the term "anutpāda":[114]

  • "An" means "not", or "non"
  • "Utpāda" means "genesis", "coming forth", "birth"[115]

Taken together "anutpāda" means "having no origin", "not coming into existence", "not taking effect", "non-production".[115]

According to Gaudapada, the Absolute is not subject tobirth, change and death.The Absolute isaja,the unborn eternal.[116]Theempirical worldofappearancesis consideredMaya(unreal as it is transitory), and notabsolutely existent.[116]Thus, Gaudapada's concept ofajativadais similar to Buddhist term "anutpāda" for the absence of an origin[112][114]or śūnyatā.[117][note 9]

But Gaudapada's perspective is quite different from Nagarjuna.[121]Gaudapada's perspective found inMandukya Karikais based on theMandukya Upanishad.[121]According to Gaudapada, the metaphysical absolute calledBrahmannever changes, while the phenomenal world changes continuously, so the phenomenal world cannot arise independently from Brahman. If the world cannot arise, yet is an empirical fact, then the perceived world has to be a transitory (unreal) appearance of Brahman. And if the phenomenal world is a transitory appearance, then there is no real origination or destruction, only apparent origination or destruction. From the level of ultimate truth (paramārthatā) the phenomenal world ismāyā,"illusion",[121]apparently existing but ultimately not metaphysically real.[122]

InGaudapada-Karika,chapter III, verses 46–48, he states thatBrahmannever arises, is never born, is never unborn, it rests in itself:

When the mind does not lie low, and is not again tossed about, then that being without movement, and not presenting any appearance, culminates intoBrahman.Resting in itself, calm, with Nirvana, indescribable, highest happiness, unborn and one with the unborn knowable, omniscient they say. No creature whatever is born, no origination of it exists or takes place. This is that highest truth where nothing whatever is born.

— Gaudapada Karika, 3.46-48, Translated by RD Karmarkar[123]

In contrast to Renard's view,[112]Karmarkar states the Ajativada of Gaudapada has nothing in common with theŚūnyatāconcept in Buddhism.[124]While the language of Gaudapada is undeniably similar to those found in Mahayana Buddhism, states Comans, their perspective is different because unlike Buddhism, Gaudapada is relying on the premise of "Brahman,Atmanor Turiya "exist and are the nature of absolute reality.[121]

In Shaivism

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Sunyaandsunyatisunyaare concepts which appear in someShaivatexts, such as theVijñāna Bhairava Tantra,which contains several verses mentioning voidness as a feature of ultimate reality -Shiva:

The Absolute void is Bhairava who is beyond the senses and the mind, beyond all the categories of these instruments. From the point of view of the human mind, He is most void. from the point of view of Reality, He is most full, for He is the source of all manifestation.[125]

The yogi should concentrate intensely on the idea (and also feel) that this universe is totally void. In that void, his mind would become absorbed. Then he becomes highly qualified for absorption i.e. his mind is absorbed in the absolute void (sunyatisunya).[126]

In a series of Kannada language texts ofLingayatism,a Shaivism tradition,shunyais equated to the concept of the supreme. In particular, theShunya Sampadanetexts present the ideas ofAllama Prabhuin a form of dialogue, whereshunyais that void and distinctions which a spiritual journey seeks to fill and eliminate. It is the described as a state of union of one's soul with the infinite Shiva, the state of blissful moksha.[127][128]

In Vaishnavism

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Shunya Brahmais a concept found in certain texts ofVaishnavism,particularly inOdiya,such as the poeticPanchasakhas.It explains theNirguna Brahmanidea of Vedanta, that is the eternal unchanging metaphysical reality as "personified void". Alternative names for this concept of Hinduism, includeshunya purushaandJagannatha(Vishnu) in certain text.[127][129]However, both in Lingayatism and various flavors of Vaishnavism such asMahima Dharma,the idea ofShunyais closer to the Hindu concept of metaphysicalBrahman,rather than to theŚūnyatāconcept of Buddhism.[127]However, there is some overlap, such as in the works of Bhima Bhoi.[127][130]

In theVaishnavismofOrissa,the idea of shunyabrahmanor shunyapurushais found in the poetry of the OrissanPanchasakhas(Five Friends), such as in the compositions of 16th-centuryAcyutananda.Acyutananda'sShunya Samhitaextols the nature of shunya brahman:

nāhi tāhāra rūpa varṇa, adṛsha avarṇa tā cinha.
tāhāku brahmā boli kahi, śūnya brahmhati se bolāi.

It has no shape, no colour,
It is invisible and without a name
This Brahman is called Shunya Brahman.[131][full citation needed]

ThePanchasakhaspracticed a form ofBhakticalled Jnana-mishrita Bhakti-marga, which saw the necessity of knowledge (Jnana) and devotion -Bhakti.[citation needed]

In Shaktism

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Mahāśūnya (महाशून्य) refers to the “great void”, according to Arṇasiṃha’s Mahānayaprakāśa verse 134.—Accordingly, “The Śāmbhava (state) is the one in which the power of consciousness (citi) suddenly (sahasā) dissolves away into the Great Void [i.e., mahāśūnya] called the Inactive (niḥspanda) that is profound and has no abode. Cognitive awareness (jñāna) arises here in the form of a subtle wave of consciousness out of that ocean of emptiness, which is the perfectly peaceful condition of the dissolving away of destruction. [...] Again, that same (principle) free of the cognitive process (saṃvittikalanā) is the supreme absolute (niruttara) said to be the Śāmbhava state of emptiness (vyomaśāmbhava)”.[132]

Alternative translations

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See also

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References

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Notes

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  1. ^A common translation is "no-self", without a self, but thePāli Canonusesanattāas a singular substantive, meaning "not-self".[4]
  2. ^Original: "Rupan śūnyatā śūnyatāiva rupan. Rupan na prithak śūnyatā śūnyatā na prithag rupan. Yad rupan sa śūnyatā ya śūnyatā tad rupan."
  3. ^TheFive Skandhasare: Form, Feeling, Perceptions, Mental Formations and Consciousness.
  4. ^Mūlamadhyamakakārikā24:18
  5. ^Chapter 21 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā goes into the reasoning behind this.[57]
  6. ^Nāgārjuna equates svabhāva (essence) with bhāva (existence) in Chapter 15 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
  7. ^Translations do differ, which makes a difference.Vijñānacan be translated as "consciousness", but also as "discernement".[75]
  8. ^Williams 2008,pp. 104–105, 108: "Some texts of thetathagatagarbhaliterature, such as theMahaparinirvana Sutraactually refer to anatman,though other texts are careful to avoid the term. This would be in direct opposition to the general teachings of Buddhism onanatta.Indeed, the distinctions between the general Indian concept ofatmanand the popular Buddhist concept of Buddha-nature are often blurred to the point that writers consider them to be synonymous. "
  9. ^The term is also used in theLaṅkāvatāra Sūtra.[118]According to D.T Suzuki, "anutpada" is not the opposite of "utpada", but transcends opposites. It iskenshō,seeing into the true nature of existence,[119]the seeing that "all objects are without self-substance Śūnyatā".[120]

Citations

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  1. ^Dale Mathers; Melvin E. Miller; Osamu Ando (2013).Self and No-Self: Continuing the Dialogue Between Buddhism and Psychotherapy.Routledge. p. 81.ISBN978-1-317-72386-8.
  2. ^Nyanatiloka."Suñña".Manual of Buddhist Terms and Doctrines.Archived fromthe originalon February 28, 2014.
  3. ^Chattopadhyay, Madhumita (2017), Sarao, K. T. S.; Long, Jeffery D. (eds.),"Śūnyatā",Buddhism and Jainism,Encyclopedia of Indian Religions, Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, pp. 1148–1155,doi:10.1007/978-94-024-0852-2_364,ISBN978-94-024-0852-2,retrievedJuly 16,2023
  4. ^Bronkhorst 2009,p. 124.
  5. ^Williams 2008,pp. 68–69.
  6. ^Gowans, Christopher W. (2014).Buddhist Moral Philosophy: An Introduction.Routledge. pp. 69–70.ISBN978-1-317-65934-1.
  7. ^Monier-Williams, Sir Monier (1899).A Sanskrit-English Dictionary(2nd ed.). p. 1085.
  8. ^Sue Hamilton (2000).Early Buddhism: A New Approach: the I of the Beholder.Routledge. pp. 21–27.ISBN978-0-7007-1357-8.
  9. ^Klein, Anne C. (1991).Knowing Naming & Negation a sourcebook on Tibetan, Sautrantika.Snowlion publications,ISBN0-937938-21-1
  10. ^abMN 122. See, e.g.,Maha-suññata Sutta: The Greater Discourse on Emptiness translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu,"Retrieved on 30 July 2013 from" Access to Insight "at accesstoinsight.org
  11. ^Analayo, Bhikkhu(2012).Excursions into the Thought-World of the Pali Discourses.Pariyatti.p. 272.ISBN9781928706984.
  12. ^abcdefHuifeng, Shi (2016), "Is 'Illusion' a Prajñāpāramitā Creation? The Birth and Death of a Buddhist Cognitive Metaphor",Journal of Buddhist Philosophy,2,Fo Guang University: 214–262,doi:10.1353/jbp.2016.0010.
  13. ^Bhikkhu 1997d.
  14. ^Thanissaro Bhikku, The Buddhist Religions: An Historical Introduction, P 96.
  15. ^"Kamabhu Sutta: With Kamabhu (2)".accesstoinsight.org.
  16. ^"Mahavedalla Sutta: The Greater Set of Questions-and-Answers".accesstoinsight.org.
  17. ^"Godatta Sutta: To Godatta".accesstoinsight.org.
  18. ^MN 121 and MN 122. See, e.g., respectively, Thanissaro (1997a) and Thanissaro (1997b).
  19. ^Shì hùifēng, "Dependent Origination = Emptiness" —Nāgārjuna's Innovation? An Examination of the Early and Mainstream Sectarian Textual Sources, page 26
  20. ^Shì hùifēng, "Dependent Origination = Emptiness" —Nāgārjuna's Innovation? An Examination of the Early and Mainstream Sectarian Textual Sources, page 28.
  21. ^Shì hùifēng, "Dependent Origination = Emptiness" —Nāgārjuna's Innovation? An Examination of the Early and Mainstream Sectarian Textual Sources, page 22, 27.
  22. ^Choong, Mun-Keat; The Notion of Emptiness in Early Buddhism, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1999.
  23. ^Yìn Shùn; An Investigation into Emptiness (Kōng zhī Tànjìu không chi tìm tòi nghiên cứu ) (1985)
  24. ^Choong; Annotated Translation of Sutras from the Chinese Samyuktagama relevant to the Early Buddhist Teachings on Emptiness and the Middle Way (2004); second edition, International Buddhist College, Thailand, 2010.
  25. ^abShì hùifēng, "Dependent Origination = Emptiness" —Nāgārjuna's Innovation? An Examination of the Early and Mainstream Sectarian Textual Sources
  26. ^Potter, Karl H; Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D., page 98
  27. ^Shì hùifēng, "Dependent Origination = Emptiness" —Nāgārjuna's Innovation? An Examination of the Early and Mainstream Sectarian Textual Sources, page 36.
  28. ^abSkilton, Andrew (2004),A Concise History of Buddhism,pp. 91–92.[full citation needed]
  29. ^"Emptiness in Theravada Buddhism – Insight Meditation Center".
  30. ^Ronkin, Noa; Early Buddhist Metaphysics, page 91
  31. ^abKalupahana, D.Mulamadhyamakakarika of Nagarjuna.p. 26.[full citation needed]
  32. ^abBuddhaghosa (1991),The Path of Purification: Visuddhimagga,translated by Ñāṇamoli Bhikkhu, Buddhist Publication Society, p. 668.
  33. ^abBuddhadasa, Ajahn (1961),"Emptiness",Heart-wood from the Bo Tree
  34. ^abcThanissaro Bhikkhu. "The Integrity of Emptiness" Access to Insight, 5 June 2010, Retrieved on 30 July 2013
  35. ^Harvey, Peter. Introduction to Buddhism, page 87.
  36. ^"Kosuta, Theravada emptiness, The abhidhammic theory of Ajaan Sujin Boriharnwanaket"(PDF).Archived fromthe original(PDF)on January 5, 2016.
  37. ^Williams & Tribe 2000,pp. 68, 134–5.
  38. ^Williams 2008,pp. 52–3.
  39. ^Williams 2008,pp. 50.
  40. ^Orsborn, Matthew Bryan. "Chiasmus in the Early Prajñāpāramitā: Literary Parallelism Connecting Criticism & Hermeneutics in an Early Mahāyāna Sūtra", University of Hong Kong, 2012, page 165-66.
  41. ^"The Diamond of Perfect Wisdom Sutra". Chung Tai Translation Committee.
  42. ^Kalupahana 1994,p. 160-169.
  43. ^"No wisdom can we get hold of, no highest perfection, No Bodhisattva, no thought of enlightenment either. When told of this, if not bewildered and in no way anxious, A Bodhisattva courses in the Well-Gone's [Sugata's] wisdom." (Conze 1973a: 9) quoted inWilliams 2008,p. 50.
  44. ^"Even Nirvana, I say, is like a magical illusion, is like a dream. How much more so anything else!...Even if perchance there could be anything more distinguished, of that too I would say that it is like an illusion, like a dream." (trans. Conze: 99) quoted inWilliams & Tribe 2000,p. 135.
  45. ^"The Heart Sutra Prajna Paramita Hrydaya Sutra".Buddhanet.net.RetrievedFebruary 4,2013.
  46. ^Conze, Edward; The Ontology of the Prajnaparamita, Philosophy East and West Vol.3 (1953) PP.117-129, University of Hawaii Press
  47. ^Orsborn, Matthew Bryan. "Chiasmus in the Early Prajñāpāramitā: Literary Parallelism Connecting Criticism & Hermeneutics in an Early Mahāyāna Sūtra", University of Hong Kong, 2012, page 180-81.
  48. ^Orsborn, Matthew Bryan. "Chiasmus in the Early Prajñāpāramitā: Literary Parallelism Connecting Criticism & Hermeneutics in an Early Mahāyāna Sūtra", University of Hong Kong, 2012, page 139-40.
  49. ^Williams & Tribe 2000,p. 140.
  50. ^Wynne, Alexander, Early Buddhist Teaching as Proto-sunyavada.
  51. ^Wasler, Joseph.Nagarjuna in Context.New York: Columibia University Press. 2005, pgs. 225-263.
  52. ^abKalupahana 1992,p. 120.
  53. ^Tsondru, Mabja.Ornament of Reason.Snow Lion Publications. 2011, pages 66-71, 447-477.
  54. ^abWilliams & Tribe 2002,p. 142.
  55. ^Bronkhorst 2009,p. 146.
  56. ^Williams & Tribe 2002,p. 141.
  57. ^abTsondru, Mabja.Ornament of Reason.Snow Lion Publications. 2011, pages 56-58, 405-417.
  58. ^Williams & Tribe 2002,pp. 151–152.
  59. ^Tsondru, Mabja.Ornament of Reason.Snow Lion Publications. 2011, pages 56-58, 405-417
  60. ^unclear
  61. ^Tsondru, Mabja.Ornament of Reason.Snow Lion Publications. 2011, pages 40-41, 322-333.
  62. ^Junjirō Takakusu (1998).The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy.Motilal Banarsidass. pp. 4, 105–107.ISBN978-81-208-1592-6.
  63. ^Hajime Nakamura (1991).Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples: India, China, Tibet, Japan.Motilal Banarsidass. pp. 590–591 footnote 20.ISBN978-81-208-0764-8.,Quote: "Already in India, 'sunyata' was liable to be misunderstood as nothingness or nihil'. (...) TheSarvastivadinsof Hinayana Buddhism viewed the Madhyamika school as 'one that argues that everything is nothing. (...) It is only natural that most of the Western scholars call theprajnaparamita sutraor the doctrine of the Madhyamika school nihilism since criticisms were already expressed in India. Against such criticisms, however, Nagarjuna, founder of the Madhyamika school says, 'you are ignorant of the function of sunyata, the meaning of the sunyata and sunyata itself'. "
  64. ^G. C. Nayak (2001).Mādhyamika Śūnyatā, a Reappraisal: A Reappraisal of Mādhyamika Philosophical Enterprise with Special Reference to Nāgārjuna and Chandrakīrti.Indian Council of Philosophical Research. pp. 9–12.ISBN978-81-85636-47-4.
  65. ^Jorge Noguera Ferrer,Revisioning Transpersonal Theory: A Participatory Vision of Human Spirituality.SUNY Press, 2002, page 102-103.
  66. ^David J. Kalupahana,Mulamadhyamakakarika of Nagarjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way.SUNY Press, 1986, pages 48-50.
  67. ^Williams & Tribe 2002,p. 147.
  68. ^Bronkhorst 2009,p. 149.
  69. ^Kalupahana 1994.
  70. ^Williams & Tribe 2002,p. 146.
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Works cited

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Primary
  • Bhikkhu, Thanissaro (trans.) (1997d),SN 35.85, Suñña Sutta, Empty,Access to Insight.
  • Knibbe, Hans (2014),Zie, je bent al vrij! Schets van een non-duaal pad,Asoka.
  • Ringu Tulku (2005),Daring Steps Toward Fearlessness: The Three Vehicles of Tibetan Buddhism,Snow Lion.
Secondary
  • Bhattacharya, Vidhushekhara (1943),Gauḍapādakārikā,Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
  • Bronkhorst, Johannes(2009),Buddhist Teaching in India,Wisdom Publications.
  • Brunnholzl, Karl (2004),Luminous Heart: The Third Karmapa on Consciousness, Wisdom, and Buddha Nature.[full citation needed]
  • Comans, Michael (2000),The Method of Early Advaita Vedānta: A Study of Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara, Sureśvara, and Padmapāda,Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
  • Cornu, Philippe (2001), "Nawoord",Schijn en werkelijkheid. De twee waarheden in de vier boeddhistische leerstelsels,KunchabPublicaties.
  • Hiriyanna, M. (2000),The Essentials of Indian Philosophy,Motilal Banarsidass,ISBN978-8120813304.
  • Hookham, S. K.(1991),The Buddha within: Tathagatagarbha doctrine according to the Shentong interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhaga,Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,ISBN978-0791403587.
  • Hopkins, Jeffrey (2006),Mountain Doctrine: Tibet's Fundamental Treatise on Other-Emptiness and the Buddha Matrix,London: Snow Lion.
  • Kalupahana, David J. (1992),The Principles of Buddhist Psychology,Delhi: ri Satguru Publications.
  • Kalupahana, David J. (1994),A history of Buddhist philosophy,Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited.
  • Lai, Whalen (2003),Buddhism in China: A Historical Survey. In Antonio S. Cua (ed.): Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy(PDF),New York: Routledge, archived fromthe original(PDF)on November 12, 2014.
  • Renard, Philip (2010),Non-Dualisme. De directe bevrijdingsweg,Cothen: Uitgeverij Juwelenschip.
  • Sarma, Chandradhar (1996),The Advaita Tradition in Indian Philosophy,Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
  • Snelling, John (1987),The Buddhist Handbook. A Complete Guide to Buddhist Teaching and Practice,London: Century Paperbacks.
  • Suzuki, Daisetz Teitarō(1999),Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra,Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
  • Williams, Paul; Tribe, Anthony (2000),Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition,Routledge,ISBN978-0-415-20700-3.
  • Williams, Paul; Tribe, Anthony (2002),Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition,Taylor & Francis,ISBN978-1-134-62325-9.
  • Williams, Paul (2008),Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations,Routledge,ISBN978-1-134-25056-1.

Further reading

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