Wikipedia

War

"Warring" and "Warfare" redirect here. For other uses, seeWar (disambiguation),Warring (disambiguation),andWarfare (disambiguation).
"Conflict zone" redirects here. For the 2001 video game, seeConflict Zone.

Waris anarmed conflict[a]between the armed forces ofstates,or betweengovernmentalforces and armed groups that are organized under a certain command structure and have the capacity to sustain military operations, or between such organized groups.[2]It is generally characterized by extremeviolence,destruction, and mortality, usingregularorirregularmilitary forces.Warfarerefers to the common activities and characteristics of types of war, or of wars in general.[3]Total waris warfare that is not restricted to purelylegitimate military targets,and can result in massivecivilianor othernon-combatantsuffering andcasualties.

Part of the Stele of the Vultures depicting heavy infantry marching in formation
Part of the Bayeux Tapestry depicting Norman heavy cavalry charging Saxon shield wall
Nuclear mushroom cloud
Painting of Napoleon and his troops in winter retreating from Moscow
Soldiers wading ashore from landing craft on D-Day
British rhomboid tank and soldiers preparing to advance
Clockwise from top-left:
Ancient warfare:Stele of the Vultures,c.2500 BCE
Medieval warfare:Battle of Hastings,1066
Early modern warfare:Retreat from Moscow,1812
Industrial age warfare:Battle of the Somme,1916
Modern warfare:Normandy landings,1944
Nuclear warfare:Atomic bombing of Nagasaki,1945

While somewar studiesscholars consider war a universal and ancestral aspect ofhuman nature,[4]others argue it is a result of specific socio-cultural, economic, or ecological circumstances.[5]

Etymology

The English wordwarderives from the 11th-centuryOld Englishwordswyrreandwerre,fromOld Frenchwerre(alsoguerreas in modern French), in turn from theFrankish*werra,ultimately deriving from theProto-Germanic*werzō'mixture, confusion'.The word is related to theOld Saxonwerran,Old High Germanwerran,and the modern Germanverwirren,meaning'to confuse, to perplex, to bring into confusion'.[6]

History

Main article:Military history
The percentages of men killed in war in eight tribal societies, and Europe and the U.S. in the 20th century. (Lawrence H. Keeley, archeologist)

The earliest evidence ofprehistoric warfareis aMesolithiccemetery inJebel Sahaba,which has been determined to be about 13,400 years old.[7]About forty-five percent of the skeletons there displayed signs of violent death, specifically traumatic bone lesions.[8]

InWar Before Civilization,Lawrence H. Keeley,a professor at theUniversity of Illinois,says approximately 90–95% of known societies throughout history engaged in at least occasional warfare,[9]and many fought constantly.[10]Keeley describes several styles of primitive combat such as smallraids,large raids, andmassacres.All of these forms of warfare were used by primitive societies, a finding supported by other researchers.[11]Keeley explains that early war raids were not well organized, as the participants did not have any formal training. Scarcity of resources meantdefensive workswere not a cost-effective way to protect the society against enemy raids.[12]

William Rubinsteinwrote "Pre-literate societies, even those organized in a relatively advanced way, were renowned for their studied cruelty.'"[13]Since the rise of the state some 5,000 years ago,[14]military activity has continued over much of the globe. The invention ofgunpowder,and its eventual use in warfare, together with the acceleration of technological advances have fomented major changes to war itself.

In Western Europe, since the late 18th century, more than 150 conflicts and about 600 battles have taken place.[15]During the 20th century, war resulted in a dramatic intensification of the pace of social changes, and was a crucial catalyst for the growth ofleft-wing politics.[16]

Mao Zedongurged the socialist camp not to fearnuclear warwith the United States since, even if "half of mankind died, the other half would remain while imperialism would be razed to the ground and the whole world would become socialist."[17]

American tanks moving in formation during theGulf War

A distinctive feature of war since 1945 is that combat has largely been a matter of civil wars and insurgencies.[18]The major exceptions were theKorean War,theIndo-Pakistani War of 1971,theIran–Iraq War,theGulf War,theEritrean–Ethiopian War,and theRusso-Ukrainian War.

TheHuman Security Report 2005documented a significant decline in the number and severity of armed conflicts since the end of theCold Warin the early 1990s. However, the evidence examined in the 2008 edition of the Center for International Development and Conflict Management's "Peace and Conflict" study indicated the overall decline in conflicts had stalled.[19]

Types of warfare

Main article:Types of war

Aims

United States Armysoldiers engaged in a firefight withTaliban insurgentsduring theWar in Afghanistan,2009

Entities contemplating going to war and entities considering whether to end a war may formulatewar aimsas an evaluation/propaganda tool. War aims may stand as a proxy for national-military resolve.[26]

Definition

Fried defines war aims as "the desired territorial, economic, military or other benefits expected following successful conclusion of a war".[27]

Classification

Tangible/intangible aims:

  • Tangible war aims may involve (for example) the acquisition of territory (as in the German goal ofLebensraumin the first half of the 20th century) or the recognition of economic concessions (as in theAnglo-Dutch Wars).
  • Intangible war aims – like the accumulation of credibility or reputation[28]– may have more tangible expression ( "conquest restores prestige, annexation increases power" ).[29]

Explicit/implicit aims:

  • Explicit war aims may involve published policy decisions.
  • Implicit war aims[30]can take the form of minutes of discussion, memoranda and instructions.[31]

Positive/negative aims:

  • "Positive war aims" cover tangible outcomes.
  • "Negative war aims" forestall or prevent undesired outcomes.[32]

War aims can change in the course of conflict and may eventually morph into "peace conditions"[33]– the minimal conditions under which a state may cease to wage a particular war.

Effects

Global deaths in conflicts since the year 1400.[34]
Main article:Effects of war

Military and civilian casualties

Disability-adjusted life yearfor war per 100,000 inhabitants in 2004[35]
no data
less than 100
100–200
200–600
600–1000
1000–1400
1400–1800
1800–2200
2200–2600
2600–3000
3000–8000
8000–8800
more than 8800

Throughout the course of human history, the average number of people dying from war has fluctuated relatively little, being about 1 to 10 people dying per 100,000. However, major wars over shorter periods have resulted in much higher casualty rates, with 100–200 casualties per 100,000 over a few years. While conventional wisdom holds that casualties have increased in recent times due to technological improvements in warfare, this is not generally true. For instance, theThirty Years' War(1618–1648) had about the same number of casualties per capita asWorld War I,although it was higher duringWorld War II(WWII). That said, overall the number of casualties from war has not significantly increased in recent times. Quite to the contrary, on a global scale the time since WWII has been unusually peaceful.[36]

Estimates for total deaths due to war vary widely. In one estimate, primitive warfare from 50,000 to 3000 BCE has been thought to have claimed 400million±133,000 victims based on the assumption that it accounted for the 15.1% of all deaths.[37]Other scholars find the prehistoric percentage much lower, around 2%, similar to the Neanderthals and ancestors of apes and primates.[38]For the period 3000 BCE until 1991, estimates range from 151million to 2billion.[39]

Largest wars by death toll

Main articles:List of wars by death toll,Outline of war § Wars,andCasualty recording

The deadliest war in history, in terms of the cumulative number of deaths since its start, isWorld War II,from 1939 to 1945, with 70–85 million deaths, followed by theMongol conquests[40]at up to 60 million. As concerns a belligerent's losses in proportion to its prewar population, the most destructive war inmodern historymay have been theParaguayan War(seeParaguayan War casualties). In 2013 war resulted in 31,000 deaths, down from 72,000 deaths in 1990.[41]

War usually results in significant deterioration of infrastructure and the ecosystem, a decrease in social spending,famine,large-scale emigration from the war zone, and often the mistreatment ofprisoners of waror civilians.[42][43][44]For instance, of the nine million people who were on the territory of theByelorussian SSRin 1941, some 1.6 million were killed by the Germans in actions away from battlefields, including about 700,000 prisoners of war, 500,000 Jews, and 320,000 people counted as partisans (the vast majority of whom were unarmed civilians).[45]Another byproduct of some wars is the prevalence ofpropagandaby some or all parties in the conflict,[46]and increased revenues byweapons manufacturers.[47]

Three of the ten most costly wars, in terms of loss of life, have been waged in the last century. These are the two World Wars, followed by theSecond Sino-Japanese War(which is sometimes considered part ofWorld War II,or as overlapping). Most of the others involved China or neighboring peoples. The death toll of World War II, being over 60 million, surpasses all other war-death-tolls.[48]

Deaths
(millions) 		Date War
70–85
 1939–1945 World War II(seeWorld War II casualties)
60
 13th century Mongol Conquests(seeMongol invasionsandTatar invasions)[49][50][51]
40
 1850–1864 Taiping Rebellion(seeDungan Revolt)[52]
36
 755–763 An Lushan Rebellion(death toll uncertain)[53]
25
 1616–1662 Qing dynastyconquest ofMing dynasty[48]
15–22
 1914–1918 World War I(seeWorld War I casualties)[54]
20
 1937–1945 Second Sino-Japanese War[55]
20
 1370–1405 Conquests ofTamerlane[56][57]
20.77
 1862–1877 Dungan Revolt[58][59]
5–9
 1917–1922 Russian Civil WarandForeign Intervention[60]

On military personnel

Military personnelsubject to combat in war often suffer mental and physical injuries, including depression,posttraumatic stress disorder,disease, injury, and death.

In every war in which American soldiers have fought in, the chances of becoming a psychiatric casualty – of being debilitated for some period of time as a consequence of the stresses of military life – were greater than the chances of being killed by enemy fire.

— No More Heroes,Richard Gabriel[15]

Swank and Marchand's World War II study found that after sixty days of continuous combat, 98% of all surviving military personnel will become psychiatric casualties. Psychiatric casualties manifest themselves in fatigue cases, confusional states, conversion hysteria, anxiety, obsessional and compulsive states, and character disorders.[61]

One-tenth of mobilised American men were hospitalised for mental disturbances between 1942 and 1945, and after thirty-five days of uninterrupted combat, 98% of them manifested psychiatric disturbances in varying degrees.

— 14–18: Understanding the Great War,Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, Annette Becker[15]

Additionally, it has been estimated anywhere from 18% to 54% of Vietnam war veterans suffered fromposttraumatic stress disorder.[61]

Based on 1860 census figures, 8% of all white American males aged 13 to 43 died in theAmerican Civil War,including about 6% in the North and approximately 18% in the South.[62]The war remains the deadliest conflict in American history, resulting in the deaths of 620,000 military personnel.United States military casualties of warsince 1775 have totaled over two million. Of the 60 million European military personnel who were mobilized inWorld War I,8 million were killed, 7 million were permanently disabled, and 15 million were seriously injured.[63]

The remains of deadCrow Indianskilled and scalped by Siouxc. 1874

DuringNapoleon's retreat from Moscow, more French military personnel died oftyphusthan were killed by the Russians.[64]Of the 450,000 soldiers who crossed theNemanon 25 June 1812, less than 40,000 returned. More military personnel were killed from 1500 to 1914 by typhus than from military action.[65]In addition, if it were not for modern medical advances there would be thousands more dead from disease and infection. For instance, during theSeven Years' War,theRoyal Navyreported it conscripted 184,899 sailors, of whom 133,708 (72%) died of disease or were 'missing'.[66]It is estimated that between 1985 and 1994, 378,000 people per year died due to war.[67]

On civilians

See also:Civilian casualties
Les Grandes Mi sắc res de la guerredepict the destruction unleashed on civilians during theThirty Years' War.

Most wars have resulted in significant loss of life, along with destruction of infrastructure and resources (which may lead tofamine,disease, and death in thecivilianpopulation). During theThirty Years' Warin Europe, the population of theHoly Roman Empirewas reduced by 15 to 40 percent.[68][69]Civilians in war zones may also be subject to war atrocities such asgenocide,while survivors may suffer the psychological aftereffects of witnessing the destruction of war. War also results in lower quality of life and worse health outcomes. A medium-sized conflict with about 2,500 battle deaths reduces civilian life expectancy by one year and increasesinfant mortalityby 10% andmalnutritionby 3.3%. Additionally, about 1.8% of the population loses access todrinking water.[70]

Most estimates ofWorld War II casualtiesindicate around 60 million people died, 40 million of whom were civilians.[71]Deaths in theSoviet Unionwere around27million.[72]Since a high proportion of those killed were young men who had not yet fathered any children, population growth in the postwar Soviet Union was much lower than it otherwise would have been.[73]

Economic

See also:Military Keynesianism

Once a war has ended, losing nations are sometimes required to paywar reparationsto the victorious nations. In certain cases, land is ceded to the victorious nations. For example, the territory ofAlsace-Lorrainehas been traded between France and Germany on three different occasions.[74]

Typically, war becomes intertwined with the economy and many wars are partially or entirely based on economic reasons. The common view among economic historians is that theGreat Depressionended with the advent ofWorld War II.Many economists believe that government spending on the war caused or at least accelerated recovery from the Great Depression, though some consider that it did not play a very large role in the recovery, though it did help in reducing unemployment.[75][76][77][78]In most cases, such as the wars of Louis XIV, theFranco-Prussian War,andWorld War I,warfare primarily results in damage to the economy of the countries involved. For example, Russia's involvement in World War I took such a toll on the Russian economy that it almost collapsed and greatly contributed to the start of theRussian Revolution of 1917.[79]

World War II

Ruins ofWarsaw's Napoleon Square in the aftermath ofWorld War II

World War IIwas the most financially costly conflict in history; its belligerents cumulatively spent about a trillion U.S. dollars on thewar effort(as adjusted to 1940 prices).[80][81] TheGreat Depressionof the 1930s ended as nations increased their production of war materials.[82]

By the end of the war, 70% of European industrial infrastructure was destroyed.[83]Property damage in the Soviet Union inflicted by theAxis invasionwas estimated at a value of 679 billion rubles. The combined damage consisted of complete or partial destruction of 1,710 cities and towns, 70,000 villages/hamlets, 2,508 church buildings, 31,850 industrial establishments, 40,000 mi (64,374 km) of railroad, 4100 railroad stations, 40,000 hospitals, 84,000 schools, and 43,000 public libraries.[84]

Theories of motivation

See also:International relations theory

There are many theories about the motivations for war, but no consensus about which are most common.[85]Military theoristCarl von Clausewitzsaid, "Every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions."[86]

Psychoanalytic

DutchpsychoanalystJoost Meerlooheld that, "War is often...a mass discharge of accumulated internal rage (where)...the inner fears of mankind are discharged in mass destruction."[87]Other psychoanalysts such as E.F.M. Durban andJohn Bowlbyhave argued human beings areinherentlyviolent.[88]This aggressiveness is fueled bydisplacementandprojectionwhere a person transfers his or her grievances into bias and hatred against otherraces,religions,nationsorideologies.By this theory, the nation state preserves order in the local society while creating an outlet for aggression through warfare.

The Italian psychoanalystFranco Fornari,a follower ofMelanie Klein,thought war was the paranoid or projective "elaboration" of mourning.[89]Fornari thought war and violence develop out of our "love need": our wish to preserve and defend the sacred object to which we are attached, namely our early mother and our fusion with her. For the adult, nations are the sacred objects that generate warfare. Fornari focused upon sacrifice as the essence of war: the astonishing willingness of human beings to die for their country, to give over their bodies to their nation.

Despite Fornari's theory that man's altruistic desire for self-sacrifice for a noble cause is a contributing factor towards war, few wars have originated from a desire for war among the general populace.[90]Far more often the general population has been reluctantly drawn into war by its rulers. One psychological theory that looks at the leaders is advanced by Maurice Walsh.[91]He argues the general populace is more neutral towards war and wars occur when leaders with a psychologically abnormal disregard for human life are placed into power. War is caused by leaders who seek war such asNapoleonandHitler.Such leaders most often come to power in times of crisis when the populace opts for a decisive leader, who then leads the nation to war.

Naturally, the common people don't want war; neither in Russia nor in England nor in America, nor for that matter in Germany. That is understood. But, after all, it is the leaders of the country who determine the policy and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy or a fascist dictatorship or a Parliament or a Communist dictatorship.... the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same way in any country.

— Hermann Göringat theNuremberg trials,18 April 1946[92]

Evolutionary

See also:Prehistoric warfare

Several theories concern the evolutionary origins of warfare. There are two main schools: One sees organized warfare as emerging in or after the Mesolithic as a result of complex social organization and greater population density andcompetitionover resources; the other sees human warfare as a more ancient practice derived from common animal tendencies, such as territoriality and sexual competition.[93]

The latter school argues that since warlike behavior patterns are found in many primate species such aschimpanzees,[94]as well as in manyantspecies,[95]group conflict may be a general feature of animal social behavior. Some proponents of the idea argue that war, while innate, has been intensified greatly by developments of technology and social organization such as weaponry and states.[96]

Psychologist and linguistSteven Pinkerargued that war-related behaviors may have been naturally selected in the ancestral environment due to the benefits of victory.[b]He also argued that in order to have credibledeterrenceagainst other groups (as well as on an individual level), it was important to have a reputation for retaliation, causing humans to develop instincts forrevengeas well as for protecting a group's (or an individual's) reputation ( "honor").[b]

Increasing population and constant warfare among theMayacity-states over resources may have contributed to the eventualcollapseof theMaya civilizationby 900 CE.

Crofoot and Wrangham have argued that warfare, if defined as group interactions in which "coalitions attempt to aggressively dominate or kill members of other groups", is a characteristic of most human societies. Those in which it has been lacking "tend to be societies that were politically dominated by their neighbors".[98]

Ashley Montagustrongly denied universalistic instinctual arguments, arguing that social factors and childhood socialization are important in determining the nature and presence of warfare. Thus, he argues, warfare is not a universal human occurrence and appears to have been a historical invention, associated with certain types of human societies.[99]Montagu's argument is supported by ethnographic research conducted in societies where the concept of aggression seems to be entirely absent, e.g. theChewongandSemaiof the Malay peninsula.[100]Bobbi S. Low has observed correlation between warfare and education, noting societies where warfare is commonplace encourage their children to be more aggressive.[101]

Economic

Kuwaitioil wellson fire during theGulf War,1 March 1991
See also:Resource war

War can be seen as a growth of economic competition in a competitive international system. In this view wars begin as a pursuit of markets fornatural resourcesand for wealth. War has also been linked toeconomic developmentby economic historians and development economists studyingstate-buildingandfiscal capacity.[102]While this theory has been applied to many conflicts, such counter arguments become less valid as the increasing mobility of capital and information level the distributions of wealth worldwide, or when considering that it is relative, not absolute, wealth differences that may fuel wars. There are those on the extremerightof the political spectrum who provide support, fascists in particular, by asserting a natural right of a strong nation to whatever the weak cannot hold by force.[103][104]Some centrist, capitalist, world leaders, includingPresidents of the United Statesand U.S.Generals,expressed support for an economic view of war.

Marxist

Main article:Marxist explanations of warfare

TheMarxisttheory of war is quasi-economic in that it states all modern wars are caused by competition for resources and markets between great (imperialist) powers, claiming these wars are a natural result ofcapitalism.Marxist economistsKarl Kautsky,Rosa Luxemburg,Rudolf HilferdingandVladimir Lenintheorized thatimperialismwas the result of capitalist countries needing newmarkets.Expansion of themeans of productionis only possible if there is a corresponding growth inconsumer demand.Since the workers in acapitalist economywould be unable to fill the demand, producers must expand into non-capitalist markets to find consumers for their goods, hence driving imperialism.[105]

Demographic

Demographic theories can be grouped into two classes, Malthusian and youth bulge theories:

Malthusian

Malthusian theoriessee expanding population and scarce resources as a source of violent conflict.Pope Urban IIin 1095, on the eve of theFirst Crusade,advocating Crusade as a solution to European overpopulation, said:

For this land which you now inhabit, shut in on all sides by the sea and the mountain peaks, is too narrow for your large population; it scarcely furnishes food enough for its cultivators. Hence it is that you murder and devour one another, that you wage wars, and that many among you perish in civil strife. Let hatred, therefore, depart from among you; let your quarrels end. Enter upon the road to the Holy Sepulchre; wrest that land from a wicked race, and subject it to yourselves.[106]

This is one of the earliest expressions of what has come to be called the Malthusian theory of war, in which wars are caused by expanding populations and limited resources.Thomas Malthus(1766–1834) wrote that populations always increase until they are limited by war, disease, orfamine.[107]The violentherder–farmer conflicts in Nigeria,Mali,Sudanand other countries in theSahelregion have been exacerbated byland degradationand population growth.[108][109][110]

Youth bulge

Median ageby country. War reduces life expectancy. A youth bulge is evident forAfrica,and to a lesser extent in some countries in West Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia and Central America.

According toHeinsohn,who proposedyouth bulgetheory in its most generalized form, a youth bulge occurs when 30 to 40 percent of the males of a nation belong to the "fighting age" cohorts from 15 to 29 years of age. It will follow periods withtotal fertility ratesas high as 4–8 children per woman with a 15–29-year delay.[111][112]Heinsohn saw both past "Christianist" European colonialism and imperialism, as well as today's Islamist civil unrest and terrorism as results of high birth rates producing youth bulges.[113]

Among prominent historical events that have been attributed to youth bulges are the role played by the historically large youth cohorts in the rebellion and revolution waves of early modern Europe, including theFrench Revolutionof 1789,[114]and the effect of economic depression upon the largest German youth cohorts ever in explaining the rise ofNazismin Germany in the 1930s.[115]The 1994Rwandan genocidehas also been analyzed as following a massive youth bulge.[116]Youth bulge theory has been subjected to statistical analysis by the World Bank,[117]Population Action International,[118]and theBerlin Institute for Population and Development.[119]Youth bulge theories have been criticized as leading to racial, gender and age discrimination.[120]

Cultural

Geoffrey Parkerargues that what distinguishes the "Western way of war" based in Western Europe chiefly allows historians to explain its extraordinary success in conquering most of the world after 1500:

The Western way of war rests upon five principal foundations: technology, discipline, a highly aggressive military tradition, a remarkable capacity to innovate and to respond rapidly to the innovation of others and – from about 1500 onward – a unique system of war finance. The combination of all five provided a formula for military success....The outcome of wars has been determined less by technology, then by better war plans, the achievement of surprise, greater economic strength, and above all superior discipline.[121]

Parker argues that Western armies were stronger because they emphasized discipline, that is, "the ability of a formation to stand fast in the face of the enemy, where they're attacking or being attacked, without giving way to the natural impulse of fear and panic." Discipline came from drills and marching in formation, target practice, and creating small "artificial kinship groups: such as the company and the platoon, to enhance psychological cohesion and combat efficiency.[122]

Rationalist

Rationalismis aninternational relations theoryor framework. Rationalism (andNeorealism (international relations)) operate under the assumption that states or international actors are rational, seek the best possible outcomes for themselves, and desire to avoid the costs of war.[123]Under onegame theoryapproach, rationalist theories posit all actors can bargain, would be better off if war did not occur, and likewise seek to understand why war nonetheless reoccurs. Under another rationalist game theory without bargaining, thepeace war game,optimal strategies can still be found that depend upon number of iterations played. In "Rationalist Explanations for War",James Fearonexamined three rationalist explanations for why some countries engage in war:

"Issue indivisibility" occurs when the two parties cannot avoid war by bargaining, because the thing over which they are fighting cannot be shared between them, but only owned entirely by one side or the other. "Information asymmetrywith incentives to misrepresent "occurs when two countries have secrets about their individual capabilities, and do not agree on either: who would win a war between them, or the magnitude of state's victory or loss. For instance,Geoffrey Blaineyargues that war is a result of miscalculation of strength. He cites historical examples of war and demonstrates, "war is usually the outcome of a diplomatic crisis which cannot be solved because both sides have conflicting estimates of their bargaining power."[124]Thirdly, bargaining may fail due to the states' inability to make credible commitments.[125]

Within the rationalist tradition, some theorists have suggested that individuals engaged in war suffer a normal level ofcognitive bias,[126]but are still "as rational as you and me".[127]According to philosopherIain King,"Most instigators of conflict overrate their chances of success, while most participants underrate their chances of injury...."[128]King asserts that "Most catastrophic military decisions are rooted ingroupthink"which is faulty, but still rational.[129]The rationalist theory focused around bargaining, which is currently under debate. The Iraq War proved to be an anomaly that undercuts the validity of applying rationalist theory to some wars.[130]

Political science

The statistical analysis of war was pioneered byLewis Fry RichardsonfollowingWorld War I.More recent databases of wars and armed conflict have been assembled by theCorrelates of WarProject, Peter Brecke and theUppsala Conflict Data Program.[131]The following subsections consider causes of war from system, societal, and individual levels of analysis. This kind of division was first proposed byKenneth WaltzinMan, the State, and Warand has been often used by political scientists since then.[132]: 143 

System-level

There are several differentinternational relations theoryschools. Supporters ofrealism in international relationsargue that the motivation of states is the quest for security, and conflicts can arise from the inability to distinguish defense from offense, which is called thesecurity dilemma.[132]: 145 

Within the realist school as represented by scholars such asHenry KissingerandHans Morgenthau,and theneorealistschool represented by scholars such asKenneth WaltzandJohn Mearsheimer,two main sub-theories are:

  1. Balance of powertheory: States have the goal of preventing a single state from becoming a hegemon, and war is the result of the would-be hegemon's persistent attempts at power acquisition. In this view, an international system with more equal distribution of power is more stable, and "movements toward unipolarity are destabilizing."[132]: 147 However, evidence has shown powerpolarityis not actually a major factor in the occurrence of wars.[132]: 147–48 
  2. Power transition theory:Hegemons impose stabilizing conditions on the world order, but they eventually decline, and war occurs when a declining hegemon is challenged by another rising power or aims to pre-emptively suppress them.[132]: 148 On this view, unlike for balance-of-power theory, wars becomemoreprobable when power is more equally distributed. This "power preponderance" hypothesis has empirical support.[132]: 148 

The two theories are not mutually exclusive and may be used to explain disparate events according to the circumstance.[132]: 148 Liberalismas it relates to international relations emphasizes factors such as trade, and its role in disincentivizing conflict which will damage economic relations. Critics respond that military force may sometimes be at least as effective as trade at achieving economic benefits, especially historically if not as much today.[132]: 149 Furthermore, trade relations which result in a high level of dependency may escalate tensions and lead to conflict.[132]: 150 Empirical data on the relationship of trade to peace are mixed, and moreover, some evidence suggests countries at war do not necessarily trade less with each other.[132]: 150 

Societal-level

  • Diversionary theory,also known as the "scapegoat hypothesis", suggests the politically powerful may use war to as a diversion or to rally domestic popular support.[132]: 152 This is supported by literature showing out-group hostilityenhancesin-groupbonding,and a significant domestic "rally effect" has been demonstrated when conflicts begin.[132]: 152–13 However, studies examining the increased use of force as a function of need for internal political support are more mixed.[132]: 152–53 U.S. war-time presidential popularity surveys taken during the presidencies of several recent U.S. leaders have supported diversionary theory.[133]

Individual-level

These theories suggest differences in people's personalities, decision-making, emotions, belief systems, and biases are important in determining whether conflicts get out of hand.[132]: 157 For instance, it has been proposed that conflict is modulated bybounded rationalityand variouscognitive biases,[132]: 157 such asprospect theory.[134]

Ethics

The Apotheosis of War(1871) byVasily Vereshchagin

Themoralityof war has been the subject of debate for thousands of years.[135]

The two principal aspects of ethics in war, according to thejust war theory,arejus ad bellumandjus in bello.[136]

Jus ad bellum(right to war), dictates which unfriendly acts and circumstances justify a proper authority in declaring war on another nation. There are six main criteria for the declaration of a just war: first, any just war must be declared by a lawful authority; second, it must be a just and righteous cause, with sufficient gravity to merit large-scale violence; third, the just belligerent must have rightful intentions – namely, that they seek to advance good and curtail evil; fourth, a just belligerent must have a reasonable chance of success; fifth, the war must be a last resort; and sixth, the ends being sought must be proportional to means being used.[137][138]

In besiegedLeningrad."Hitler ordered that Moscow and Leningrad were to be razed to the ground; their inhabitants were to be annihilated or driven out by starvation. These intentions were part of the 'General Plan East'. "–The Oxford Companion to World War II.[139]

Jus in bello(right in war), is the set of ethical rules when conducting war. The two main principles are proportionality and discrimination. Proportionality regards how much force is necessary and morally appropriate to the ends being sought and the injustice suffered.[140]The principle of discrimination determines who are the legitimate targets in a war, and specifically makes a separation between combatants, who it is permissible to kill, and non-combatants, who it is not.[140]Failure to follow these rules can result in the loss of legitimacy for the just-war-belligerent.[141]

The just war theory was foundational in the creation of the United Nations and ininternational law's regulations on legitimate war.[135]

Lewis Coser, an American conflict theorist and sociologist, argued conflict provides a function and a process whereby a succession of new equilibriums are created. Thus, the struggle of opposing forces, rather than being disruptive, may be a means of balancing and maintaining a social structure or society.[142]

Limiting and stopping

Anti-war rally in Washington, D.C., 15 March 2003
Main article:Anti-war movement

Religious groups have long formally opposed or sought to limit war as in theSecond Vatican CouncildocumentGaudiem et Spes:"Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities of extensive areas along with their population is a crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation."[143]

Anti-war movements have existed for every major war in the 20th century, including, most prominently,World War I,World War II,and theVietnam War.In the 21st century, worldwide anti-war movements occurred in response to the United Statesinvasion of AfghanistanandIraq.Protestsopposing the War in Afghanistanoccurred in Europe, Asia, and the United States.

Pauses

During a war, brief pauses of violence may be called for, and further agreed to –ceasefire,temporary cessation, humanitarian pauses and corridors, days of tranquility, de-confliction arrangements.[144]There are a number of disadvantages, obstacles and hesitations against implementing such pauses such as ahumanitarian corridor.[145][146]Pauses in conflict can also be ill-advised, for reasons such as "delay of defeat" and the "weakening of credibility".[147]Natural causes for a pause may include events such as the 2019coronavirus pandemic.[148][149]

See also

Notes

  1. ^The term "armed conflict" is used instead of, or in addition to, the term "war" with the former being more general in scope. TheInternational Committee of the Red Crossdifferentiates between international and non-international armed conflict in their definition, "International armed conflicts exist whenever there is resort to armed force between two or more States.... Non-international armed conflicts are protracted armed confrontations occurring between governmental armed forces and the forces of one or more armed groups, or between such groups arising on the territory of a State [party to the Geneva Conventions]. The armed confrontation must reach a minimum level of intensity and the parties involved in the conflict must show a minimum of organisation."[1]
  2. ^ab The argument is made from pages 314 to 332 ofThe Blank Slate.[97]Relevant quotes include on p332 "The first step in understanding violence is to set aside our abhorrence of it long enough to examine why it can sometimes pay off in evolutionary terms.", "Natural selection is powered by competition, which means that the products of natural selection – survival machines, in Richard Dawkins metaphor – should, by default, do whatever helps them survive and reproduce.". On p323 "If an obstacle stands in the way of something an organism needs, it should neutralize the obstacle by disabling or eliminating it.", "Another human obstacle consists of men monopolozing women who could otherwise be taken as wives.", "The competition can be violent". On p324 "So people have invented, and perhaps evolved, an alternate defense: the advertised deterrence policy known aslex talionis,the law of retaliation, familiar from the biblical injunction "An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth." If you can credibly say to potential adversaries, "We won't attack first, but if we are attacked, we will survive and strike back," you remove Hobbes's first two incentives for quarrel, gain and mistrust. ". On p326" Also necessary for vengeance to work as a deterrent is that the willingness to pursue it be made public, because the whole point of deterrence is to give would-be attackers second thoughtsbeforehand.And this brings us to Hobbes's final reason for quarrel. Thirdly, glory – though a more accurate word would be "honor". "

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Bibliography

Library resourcesabout
War
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