Wikipedia

Werner von Blomberg

Werner Eduard Fritz von Blomberg(2 September 1878 – 13 March 1946) was aGerman General Staffofficer and the firstMinister of WarinAdolf Hitler's government.After serving on theWestern FrontinWorld War I,Blomberg was appointed chief of theTruppenamt( "Troop Office" ) during theWeimar Republic.Following the Nazis' rise to power, he was named Minister of War andCommander-in-Chiefof the German Armed Forces. In this capacity, Blomberg played a central role in Germany's military build-up during the years leading toWorld War II.However, by 20 January 1938, he was forced to resign after his rivals,Hermann GöringandHeinrich Himmler,presented Hitler with evidence that his wife had posed in the past for pornographic photos.

Werner von Blomberg
Blomberg in 1934
Reichsministerof War
In office
21 May 1935 – 27 January 1938
Preceded byHimself
asMinister of Defense
Succeeded byWilhelm Keitel
asChief of the High Command
Minister of Defence
In office
29 January 1933 – 21 May 1935
Preceded byKurt von Schleicher
Succeeded byHimself
asReichsminister of War
Chief of the Troop Office
In office
27 January 1927 – 30 September 1929
Preceded byGeorg Wetzell
Succeeded byKurt von Hammerstein-Equord
Personal details
Born
Werner Eduard Fritz von Blomberg

(1878-09-02)2 September 1878
Stargard,Pomerania,Kingdom of Prussia,German Empire
Died13 March 1946(1946-03-13)(aged 67)
Nuremberg,Bavaria,Allied-occupied Germany
Cause of deathColorectal cancer
Resting placeBad Wiessee
Spouses
Charlotte Hellmich
​
​
(m.1904; died 1932)​
Erna Gruhn
​
(m.1938)​
RelationsAxel von Blomberg(son)
Children5
Signature
NicknameRubber Lion[1]
Military service
AllegianceGerman Empire
Weimar Republic
Nazi Germany
Branch/serviceGerman Army
Years of service1897–1938
RankGeneralfeldmarschall
Commands1st Infantry Division,Reichskriegsministerium
Battles/warsWorld War I
AwardsPour le Mérite

Early life and career

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Born inStargard,Germany(now Stargard,Poland) to anoble Baltic German family,Werner von Blomberg joined the army in 1897 and attended thePrussian Military Academyin 1904. In April 1904, he married Charlotte Hellmich. The couple had five children.

Graduated from the academy in 1907, Blomberg entered theGerman General Staffin 1908. Serving with distinction on theWestern Frontduring theFirst World War,Blomberg was awarded thePour le Mérite.[2]

In 1920, Blomberg was appointed chief of staff of the Döberitz Brigade; in 1921, he was appointed chief of staff of theStuttgartArmy Area. In 1925, GeneralHans von Seecktappointed him chief of army training. By 1927, Blomberg was amajor-generaland chief of theTroop Office(German:Truppenamt), the thin disguise for theGerman General Staff,which had been forbidden by theTreaty of Versailles.[3]

In the Weimar Republic

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In 1928, Blomberg visited theSoviet Union,where he was much impressed by the high status of theRed Army,and left a convinced believer in the value of totalitariandictatorshipas the prerequisite for military power.[4]

This was part of a broader shift on the part of the German military to the idea of atotalitarianWehrstaat(transl. Defence State) which, beginning in the mid-1920s, became increasingly popular with military officers. The German historianEberhard Kolbwrote that:

from the mid-1920s onwards the Army leaders had developed and propagated new social conceptions of a militarist kind, tending towards a fusion of the military and civilian sectors and ultimately a totalitarian military state (Wehrstaat).[5]

Blomberg's visit to the Soviet Union in 1928 confirmed his view that totalitarian power fosters the greatest military power. Blomberg believed the next world war, as the previous one, would become atotal war,requiring full mobilization of German society and economy by the state, and that a totalitarian state would best prepare society in peacetime, militarily and economically, for war.[3]As most of Nazi Germany's military elite, Blomberg took for granted that, for Germany to achieve the world power that it had unsuccessfully sought in the First World War would require another war, and that such a war would be total war of a highly mechanized, industrial type.[6]

In 1929, Blomberg came into conflict with GeneralKurt von Schleicherat theTruppenamtand was removed from his post and appointed military commander inEast Prussia.Early that year, Schleicher had started a policy of "frontier defense" (Grenzschutz) under which theReichswehrwould stockpile arms in secret depots and begin training volunteers beyond the limits imposed by the Treaty of Versailles in the eastern parts of Germany bordering Poland; in order to avoid incidents with France, there was to be no suchGrenzschutzin western Germany.[7]

The French planned to withdraw from the Rhineland in June 1930 – five years earlier than specified by the Treaty of Versailles – and Schleicher wanted no violations of the Treaty that might seem to threaten France before French troops left the Rhineland. When Blomberg, whom Schleicher personally disliked, insisted on extendingGrenzschutzto areas bordering France, Schleicher in August 1929 leaked to the press that Blomberg had attended armed maneuvers by volunteers inWestphalia.[8]Defence MinisterGeneralWilhelm Groenercalled Blomberg to Berlin to explain himself. Blomberg expected Schleicher to stick to the traditionalReichswehrpolicy of denying everything, and was shocked to see Schleicher instead attack him in front of Groener as a man who had recklessly exposed Germany to the risk of providing the French with an excuse to remain in the Rhineland until 1935.[8]

As a result, Blomberg was demoted from command of theTruppenamtand sent to command a division in East Prussia.[8]SinceEast Prussiawas cut off from the rest of Germany and had only one infantry division stationed there, Blomberg—to increase the number of fighting men in the event of a war with Poland—started to make lists of all the men fit for military service, which further increased the attraction of a totalitarian state able to mobilize an entire society for war to him, and of an ideologically motivatedlevée en masseas the best way to fight the next war.[3]During his time as commander ofWehrkreisI, the military district which comprised East Prussia, Blomberg fell under the influence of aNazi-sympathizing Lutheran chaplain,Ludwig Müller,who introduced Blomberg to Nazism.[9]Blomberg cared little for Nazi doctrinesper se,his support for the Nazis being motivated by his belief that only a dictatorship could make Germany a great military power again, and that the Nazis were the best party to establish a dictatorship in Germany.[10]

Because he had the command of only one infantry division in East Prussia, Blomberg depended very strongly onGrenzschutzto increase the number of fighting men available. This led him to co-operate closely with theSAas a source of volunteers forGrenzschutzforces.[11]Blomberg had excellent relations with the SA at this time, which led to the SA serving by 1931 as an unofficial militia backing up theReichswehr.Many generals saw East Prussia as a model for future Army-Nazi co-operation all over Germany.[11]

Blomberg's interactions with the SA in East Prussia led him to the conclusion that Nazis made for excellent soldiers, which further increased the appeal of Nazism for him.[11]But at the same time, Blomberg saw the SA only as a junior partner to theArmy,and utterly opposed the SA's ambitions to replace theReichswehras Germany's main military force. Blomberg, like almost all German generals, envisioned a future Nazi-Army relationship where the Nazis would indoctrinate ordinary people with the right sort of ultra-nationalist, militarist values so that when young German men joined theReichswehrthey would be already half-converted into soldiers while at the same time making it clear that control of military matters would rest solely with the generals. In 1931, he visited the US, where he openly proclaimed his belief in the certainty and the benefits of a Nazi government for Germany.[12]Blomberg's first wife Charlotte died on 11 May 1932, leaving him with two sons and three daughters.[13][14]

In 1932, Blomberg served as part of the German delegation to theWorld Disarmament ConferenceinGenevawhere, during his time as the German chief military delegate, he not only continued his pro-Nazi remarks to the press, but used his status as Germany's chief military delegate to communicate his views toPaul von Hindenburg,whose position asPresident of Germanymade him German Supreme Commander in Chief.[12]

In his reports to Hindenburg, Blomberg wrote that his arch-rival Schleicher's attempts to create theWehrstaathad clearly failed, and that Germany needed a new approach to forming theWehrstaat.[15]By late January 1933, it was clear that the Schleicher government could only stay in power by proclaimingmartial lawand by authorizing theReichswehrto crush popular opposition. In doing so, the military would have to kill hundreds, if not thousands of German civilians; any régime established in this way could never expect to build the national consensus necessary to create theWehrstaat.[16]The military had decided that Hitler alone was capable of peacefully creating the national consensus that would allow the creation of theWehrstaat,and thus the military successfully brought pressure on Hindenburg to appoint Hitler asChancellor.[16]

In late January 1933, President Hindenburg—without informing the chancellor, Schleicher, or the army commander, GeneralKurt von Hammerstein—recalled Blomberg from the World Disarmament Conference to return to Berlin.[17]Upon learning of this, Schleicher guessed correctly that the order to recall Blomberg to Berlin meant his own government was doomed.[17]When Blomberg arrived at the railroad station in Berlin on 28 January 1933, he was met by two officers,Adolf-Friedrich KuntzenandOskar von Hindenburg,adjutant and son of President Hindenburg. Kuntzen had orders from Hammerstein for Blomberg to report at once to the Defense Ministry, while Oskar von Hindenburg had orders for Blomberg to report directly to thePalace of the Reich President.[18]

Over and despite Kuntzen's protests, Blomberg chose to go with Hindenburg to meet the president, who swore him in as defense minister.[18]This was done in a manner contrary to the Weimar constitution, under which the president could only swear in a minister after receiving the advice of the chancellor. Hindenburg had not consulted Schleicher about his wish to see Blomberg replace him as defense minister because in late January 1933, there were wild (and untrue) rumors circulating in Berlin that Schleicher was planning to stage aputsch.[19]To counter alleged plans of aputschby Schleicher, Hindenburg wanted to remove Schleicher as defense minister as soon as possible.[19]

Two days later, on 30 January 1933, Hindenburg swore inAdolf Hitleras Chancellor, after telling him that Blomberg was to be his defense minister regardless of his wishes. Hitler for his part welcomed and accepted Blomberg.

Minister of Defense

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In 1933, Blomberg rose to national prominence when he was appointed Minister of Defense in Hitler's government. Blomberg became one of Hitler's most devoted followers and worked feverishly to expand the size and the power of the army. Blomberg was made acolonel generalfor his services in 1933. Although Blomberg and his predecessor,Kurt von Schleicher,loathed each other, their feud was purely personal, not political, and in all essentials, Blomberg and Schleicher had identical views on foreign and defense policies. Their dispute was simply over who was best qualified to carry out the policies, not the policies themselves.[20]

Blomberg was chosen personally by Hindenburg as a man he trusted to safeguard the interests of the Defense Ministry and could be expected to work well with Hitler.[20]Above all, Hindenburg saw Blomberg as a man who would safeguard the German military's traditional "state within the state" status dating back to Prussian times under which the military did not take orders from the civilian government, headed by the chancellor, but co-existed as an equal alongside the civilian government because of its allegiance only to the head of state, not the chancellor, who was the head of government.[20]Until 1918, the head of state had been the emperor, and since 1925, it had been Hindenburg himself.[20]Defending the military "state within the state" and trying to reconcile the military to the Nazis was to be one of Blomberg's major concerns as a defense minister.[20]

Blomberg was an ardent supporter of the Nazi regime and cooperated with it in many capacities, including serving on theAcademy for German Law.[21]On 20 July 1933, Blomberg had a new Army Law passed, which ended the jurisdiction of civil courts over the military and extinguished the theoretical right for the military to elect councils although that right, despite being guaranteed by theWeimar Constitutionin 1919, had never been put into practice.[22]

Blomberg's first act as defense minister was to carry out a purge of the officers associated with his hated archenemy, Schleicher.[12]Blomberg sackedFerdinand von Bredowas chief of theMinisteramtand replaced him with GeneralWalter von Reichenau,Eugen Ottwas dismissed as chief of theWehramtand sent toJapanas amilitary attachéand GeneralWilhelm Adamwas sacked as chief of theTruppenamt(the disguised General Staff) and replaced withLudwig Beck.[23]The British historian SirJohn Wheeler-Bennettwrote about the "ruthless" way that Blomberg set about isolating and undermining the power of the army commander-in-chief, a close associate of Schleicher, GeneralKurt von Hammerstein-Equord,to the point that in February 1934 Hammerstein finally resigned in despair, as his powers had become more nominal than real.[22]With Hammerstein's resignation, the entire Schleicher faction that had dominated the army since 1926 had been removed from their positions within the High Command. Wheeler-Bennett commented that as a military politician Blomberg was every bit as ruthless, as Schleicher had been.[22]The resignation of Hammerstein caused a crisis in military-civil relations when Hitler attempted to appoint as his successor Reichenau, a man who was not acceptable to the majority of theReichswehr.[24]Blomberg supported the attempt to appoint Reichenau, but reflecting the power of the "state within the state", certain Army officers appealed to Hindenburg, which led toWerner von Fritschbeing appointed instead.[24]

Far more serious than dealing with the followers of Schleicher was Blomberg's relations with the SA. He was resolutely opposed to any effort to subject the military to the control of the Nazi Party or that of any of its affiliated organizations such as the SA or the SS, and throughout his time as a minister, he fought fiercely to protect the institutional autonomy of the military.[25]

By the autumn of 1933, Blomberg had come into conflict withErnst Röhm,who made it clear that he wanted to see the SA absorb theReichswehr,a prospect that Blomberg was determined to prevent at all costs. In December 1933, he made clear to Hitler his displeasure about Röhm being appointed to the Cabinet.[25]In February 1934, when Röhm penned a memo about the SA absorbing theReichswehrto become the new military force, Blomberg informed Hitler that the Army would never accept it under any conditions.[26]On 28 February 1934, Hitler ruled theReichswehrwould be the main military force, and the SA was to remain a political organization.[27]Despite the ruling, Röhm continued to press for a greater role for the SA. In March 1934, Blomberg and Röhm began openly fighting each other at cabinet meetings and exchanging insults and threats.[28]As a result of his increasingly-heated feud with Röhm, Blomberg warned Hitler that he must curb the ambitions of the SA, or the Army would do so itself.

To defend the military "state within the state", Blomberg followed a strategy of Nazifying the military more and more in a paradoxical effort to persuade Hitler that it was not necessary to end the traditional "state within the state" to preventGleichschaltungbeing imposed by engaging in what can be called a process of "self-Gleichschaltung".[29]

War minister and OKW commander Werner von Blomberg followed by the three armed forces chiefs inspects a parade in honor of the 40th anniversary of his joining the army.

In February 1934, Blomberg, on his own initiative, had all of the men considered to be Jews serving in theReichswehrgiven an automatic and immediatedishonorable discharge.[30]As a result, 74 soldiers lost their jobs for having "Jewish blood".[30]TheLaw for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service,enacted in April 1933, had excluded Jews who were First World War veterans and did not apply to the military. Thereby, Blomberg's discharge order was his way of circumventing the law and went beyond what even the Nazis then wanted. The German historianWolfram Wettecalled the order "an act of proactive obedience".[31]

The German historianKlaus-Jürgen Müller[de]wrote that Blomberg's anti-Semitic purge in early 1934 was part of his increasingly-savage feud with Röhm, who since the summer of 1933 had been drawing unfavorable comparisons between the "racial purity" of his SA, which had no members with "Jewish" blood, and theReichswehr,which had some.[32]Müller wrote that Blomberg wanted to show Hitler that theReichswehrwas even more loyal and ideologically sound than was the SA and that purgingReichswehrmembers who could be considered Jewish without being ordered to do so was an excellent way to demonstrate loyalty within the Nazi regime.[32]As both the Army and the Navy had longstanding policies of refusing to accept Jews, there were no Jews to purge within the military. Instead, Blomberg used the Nazi racial definition of a Jew in his purge.[32]None of the men given dishonorable discharges themselves practiced Judaism, but they were the sons or grandsons of Jews who had converted to Christianity and thus were considered to be "racially" Jewish.[33]

Blomberg ordered every member of theReichswehrto submit documents to their officers and that anyone who was a "non-Aryan" or refused to submit documents would be dishonorably discharged. As a result, seven officers, eight officer cadets, 13 NCOs and 28 privates from the Army, and three officers, four officer candidates, three NCOs and four sailors from the Navy were dishonorably discharged, together with four civilian employees of the Defense Ministry.[34]With the exception ofErich von Manstein,who complained that Blomberg had ruined the careers of 70 men for something that was not their fault, there were no objections.[35]Again, on his own initiative as part of "self-Gleichschaltung", Blomberg had theReichswehrin May 1934 adopt Nazi symbols into their uniforms.[36]In 1935, Blomberg worked hard to ensure that the Wehrmacht complied with theNuremberg Lawsby preventing any so-calledMischlingfrom serving.[37]

Blomberg had a reputation as something of a lackey to Hitler. As such, he was nicknamed "Rubber Lion" by some of his critics in the army who were less than enthusiastic about Hitler.[1]One of the few notable exceptions was during the run-up to theNight of the Long Knivesfrom 30 June to 2 July 1934.[38]In early June, Hindenburg decided that unless Hitler did something to end the growing political tension in Germany, he would declare martial law and turn over control of the government to the army. Blomberg, who had been known to oppose the growing power of theSA,was chosen to inform Hitler of that decision on the president's behalf.[38]When Hitler arrived at Hindenburg's estate at Neudeck on 21 June 1934, he was greeted by Blomberg on the steps leading into the estate.[38]Wheeler-Bennett wrote that Hitler was faced with "a von Blomberg no longer the affable 'Rubber Lion' or the adoring 'Hitler-Junge Quex', but embodying all the stern ruthlessness of the Prussian military caste ".[38]

Blomberg bluntly informed Hitler that Hindenburg was highly displeased with the recent developments and was seriously considering dismissing Hitler as chancellor if he did not rein in the SA at once.[39]When Hitler met Hindenburg, the latter insisted for Blomberg to attend the meeting as a sign of his confidence in the Defense Minister. The meeting lasted half-an-hour, and Hindenburg repeated the threat to dismiss Hitler.[40]

Blomberg was aware of least in general of the purge that Hitler began planning after the Neudeck meeting.[41]The conversations between Blomberg and Hitler in late June 1934 were generally not recorded, which makes it difficult to determine how much Blomberg knew, but he was definitely aware of what Hitler had decided to do. On 25 June 1934, the military was placed in a state of alert, and on 28 June, Röhm was expelled from the League of German Officers.[41]The decision to expel Röhm was part of Blomberg's effort to maintain the "honor" of the German military. Röhm being executed as a traitor from the League would besmirch the honor of the reputation of the League in general. The same thinking later led to those officers involved in theputschattempt of 20 July 1944to be dishonorably discharged before they were tried for treason as a way of upholding military "honor."[42]

Wheeler-Bennett wrote that the fact that Blomberg instigated the expulsion of Röhm from the League just two days before Röhm was arrested on charges of high treason proved he knew what was coming.[43]Röhm had been quite open about hishomosexualityever since he had been outed in 1925 after the publication in a newspaper of his love letters to a former boyfriend. Wheeler-Bennett found highly implausible Blomberg's claim that a homosexual would not be allowed to be a member of the League of German Officers.[43]On 29 June 1934, an article by Blomberg appeared in the official newspaper of the Nazi Party, theVölkischer Beobachter,stating that the military was behind Hitler and would support him whatever he did.[43]

In the same year, after Hindenburg's death on 2 August, as part of his "self-Gleichschaltung" strategy, Blomberg personally ordered all soldiers in the army and all sailors in the Navy to pledge theoath of allegiance to Adolf Hitler[44][page needed]not toPeople and Fatherlandbut to the newFührer,which is thought to have limited later opposition to Hitler. The oath was the initiative of Blomberg and theMinisteramtchief GeneralWalther von Reichenau.The entire military took the oath to Hitler, who was most surprised at the offer. Thus, the popular view that Hitler imposed the oath on the military is incorrect.[45]

On the other hand, Hitler had long expected Hindenburg's death and had planned on taking power anyhow and so could he have very well convinced Von Blomberg to implement such an oath long before the actual implementation took place.[46][page needed]

The intention of Blomberg and Reichenau in having the military swear an oath to Hitler was to create a personal special bond between Hitler and the military, which was intended to tie Hitler more tightly towards the military and away from theNazi Party.Blomberg later admitted that he had not thought the full implications of the oath at the time.[45]As part of his defense of the military "state within the state", Blomberg fought against the attempts of the SS to create a military wing.[47]

Heinrich Himmlerrepeatedly insisted that the SS needed a military wing to crush any attempt at a communist revolution before Blomberg conceded in the idea, which eventually become the Waffen-SS.[47]Blomberg's relations with the SS were badly strained in late 1934 to early 1935 when it was discovered that the SS had bugged the offices of theAbwehrchief, AdmiralWilhelm Canaris.That led Blomberg to warn Hitler the military would not tolerate being spied upon. In response to Blomberg's protests, Hitler gave orders that the SS could not spy upon the military, no member of the military could be arrested by the police, and cases of suspected "political unreliability" in the military were to be investigated solely by themilitary police.[48]

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Minister of War

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On 21 May 1935, the Ministry of Defense was renamed the Ministry of War (Reichskriegsministerium); Blomberg also was given the title ofCommander-in-Chiefof the armed forces (Wehrmacht), a title no other German officer had ever held. Hitler remained the Supreme Commander of the military in his capacity as Head of State, the Führer of Germany.[49]On 20 April 1936, the loyal Blomberg became the firstGeneralfeldmarschallappointed by Hitler.[50]On 30 January 1937 to mark the fourth anniversary of the Nazi regime, Hitler personally presented theGolden Party Badgeto the remaining non-Nazi members of the cabinet, including Blomberg, and enrolled him in the Party (membership number 3,805,226).[51]

In December 1936, a crisis was created within the German decision-making machinery when General Wilhelm Faupel, the chief German officer inSpain,started to demand the dispatch of three German divisions to fight in theSpanish Civil Waras the only way for victory. That was strongly opposed by the Foreign Minister BaronKonstantin von Neurath,who wanted to limit the German involvement in Spain.[52]

At a conference held at the Reich Chancellery on 21 December 1936 attended by Hitler,Hermann Göring,Blomberg, Neurath, GeneralWerner von Fritsch,GeneralWalter Warlimontand Faupel, Blomberg argued against Faupel that an all-out German drive for victory in Spain would be too likely to cause a general war before Germany had rearmed properly. He stated that even if otherwise, it would consume money better spent on military modernization. Blomberg prevailed against Faupel.[53]

Unfortunately for Blomberg, his position as the ranking officer of Nazi Germany alienatedHermann Göring,Hitler's second-in-command and Commander-in-Chief of theLuftwaffe,Germany's air force, andHeinrich Himmler,the head of the SS, the security organization of theNazi Party,and concurrently the chief of all police forces of Germany, who conspired to oust him from power. Göring, in particular, had ambitions of becoming Commander-in-Chief himself of the entire military.[54]

Blomberg withJoseph Goebbels,1937

On 5 November 1937, the conference between the Reich's top military–foreign policy leadership and Hitler recorded in the so-calledHossbach Memorandumoccurred. At the conference, Hitler stated that it was the time for war or, more accurately wars, as what Hitler envisioned would be a series of localized wars inCentralandEastern Europein the near future. Hitler argued that because the wars were necessary to provide Germany withLebensraum,autarkyand thearms racewithFranceand theUnited Kingdommade it imperative to act before the Western powers developed an insurmountable lead in the arms race.[55][56]

Of those invited to the conference, objections arose from Foreign MinisterKonstantin von Neurath,Blomberg and the Army Commander-in-Chief, GeneralWerner von Fritsch,that any German aggression in Eastern Europe was bound to trigger a war against France because of the French alliance system in Eastern Europe, the so-calledcordon sanitaire,and if a Franco–German war broke out, Britain was almost certain to intervene rather than risk the prospect of France's defeat. Moreover, it was objected that Hitler's assumption was flawed that Britain and France would just ignore the projected wars because they had started their rearmament later than Germany had.[57]

Accordingly, Fritsch, Blomberg and Neurath advised Hitler to wait until Germany had more time to rearm before pursuing a high-risk strategy of localized wars that was likely to trigger a general war before Germany was ready. None of those present at the conference had any moral objections to Hitler's strategy with which they basically agreed; only the question of timing divided them.[58]

Scandal and downfall

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Main article:Blomberg–Fritsch affair

Göring and Himmler found an opportunity to strike against Blomberg in January 1938, when the 59-year-old general married his second wife, Erna Gruhn (1913–1978, sometimes referred to as "Eva" or "Margarete" ). Blomberg had been a widower since the death of his first wife, Charlotte, in 1932.[59]Gruhn was a 24-year-old typist[60]and secretary, but the Berlin police had a long criminal file on her and her mother, a former prostitute. Among the reports was information that Erna Gruhn had posed for pornographic photos in 1932.[61]

That was reported to the Berlin police chief,Wolf-Heinrich von Helldorf,who went toWilhelm Keitelwith the file on the new Mrs. Blomberg. Helldorff said he was uncertain about what to do. Keitel told Helldorf to take the file to Göring, which he did.[62]

Göring, who had served asbest manto Blomberg at the wedding, used the file to argue Blomberg was unfit to serve as a war minister.[63]Göring then informed Hitler, who had been present at the wedding. Hitler ordered Blomberg to annul the marriage to avoid a scandal and to preserve the integrity of the army. The upcoming wedding of one of Blomberg's daughters, Dorothea, would have been threatened by scandal. She was engaged to Karl-Heinz Keitel, the eldest son ofWilhelm Keitel.Blomberg refused to end his marriage but when Göring threatened to make public the pasts of Erna Gruhn and her mother, Blomberg was forced to resign his posts to prevent that, which he did on 27 January 1938. His daughter was married in May the same year.[64]

Keitel, who would be promoted to the rank of field marshal in 1940, and Blomberg's former right-hand man would be appointed by Hitler as the Chief of the OKW of the Armed Forces.

A few days later, Göring and Himmler accusedGeneraloberstWerner von Fritsch,the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, of being a homosexual. Hitler used these opportunities for a major reorganization of theWehrmacht.Fritsch was later acquitted; together, the events became known as theBlomberg–Fritsch Affair.

Generalfeldmarschallvon Blomberg and his wife went on a honeymoon for a year to the island ofCapri.AdmiralErich Raederdecided that Blomberg needed to commit suicide to atone for his marriage, and dispatched an officer to Italy, who followed the Blombergs around on their honeymoon and persistently and unsuccessfully tried to force Blomberg to commit suicide.[65]The officer at one point even tried to force a gun into Blomberg's hands, but he declined to end his life.[66]SpendingWorld War IIin obscurity, Blomberg was arrested by theAlliesin 1945 and later gave evidence at theNuremberg trials.

Imprisonment and death

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Grave in Bad Wiessee

Blomberg's health declined rapidly while he was in detention atNuremberg.He faced the contempt of his former colleagues and the intention of his young wife to abandon him. It is possible that he manifested symptoms of cancer as early as 1939. On 12 October 1945, he noted in his diary that he weighed slightly over 72 kilograms (159 lb). He was diagnosed withcolorectal canceron 20 February 1946. Resigned to his fate and gripped by depression, he spent the final weeks of his life refusing to eat.[67]

Blomberg died on 13 March 1946.[68]His body was buried without ceremony in anunmarked grave.His remains were later cremated and interred in his residence inBad Wiessee.[69]

References

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  1. ^abKane 2008,p. 82.
  2. ^Schäfer 2006,pp. 25–29.
  3. ^abcPaehler 2009.
  4. ^Wheeler-Bennett 1967,pp. 295–296.
  5. ^Kolb 2005,p. 173.
  6. ^Müller 1987,p. 26.
  7. ^Patch 2006,p. 50.
  8. ^abcPatch 2006,p. 51.
  9. ^Wheeler-Bennett 1967,p. 296.
  10. ^Wheeler-Bennett 1967,pp. 296–297.
  11. ^abcFeuchtwanger 1993,pp. 252–253.
  12. ^abcWheeler-Bennett 1967,p. 297.
  13. ^Görlitz 1989,p. 131.
  14. ^Schäfer 2006,p. 22.
  15. ^Müller 1987,p. 28.
  16. ^abGeyer 1983,p. 122.
  17. ^abWheeler-Bennett 1967,p. 282.
  18. ^abWheeler-Bennett 1967,p. 284.
  19. ^abKershaw 1998,p. 422.
  20. ^abcdeMüller 1987,p. 30.
  21. ^Klee 2007,p. 53.
  22. ^abcWheeler-Bennett 1967,p. 300.
  23. ^Wheeler-Bennett 1967,pp. 298–299.
  24. ^abWheeler-Bennett 1967,p. 301.
  25. ^abWheeler-Bennett 1967,pp. 308–309.
  26. ^Wheeler-Bennett 1967,p. 309.
  27. ^Wheeler-Bennett 1967,p. 311.
  28. ^Wheeler-Bennett 1967,pp. 301–311.
  29. ^Bartov 1999,p. 143.
  30. ^abFörster 1998,p. 268.
  31. ^Wette 2006,p. 70.
  32. ^abcWette 2006,p. 71.
  33. ^Wette 2006,p. 72.
  34. ^Wette 2006,pp. 71–72.
  35. ^Wette 2006,p. 73.
  36. ^Wheeler-Bennett 1967,p. 312.
  37. ^Förster 1998,pp. 268–269.
  38. ^abcdWheeler-Bennett 1967,p. 319.
  39. ^Wheeler-Bennett 1967,pp. 319–320.
  40. ^Wheeler-Bennett 1967,p. 320.
  41. ^abWheeler-Bennett 1967,pp. 320–321.
  42. ^Wheeler-Bennett 1967,pp. 321–322.
  43. ^abcWheeler-Bennett 1967,p. 322.
  44. ^Carruthers 2013,p.[page needed].
  45. ^abKershaw 1998,p. 525.
  46. ^Dupuy 1984,p.[page needed].
  47. ^abWheeler-Bennett 1967,p. 341.
  48. ^Wheeler-Bennett 1967,pp. 341–342.
  49. ^Taylor 1969,p. 93.
  50. ^Taylor 1969,p. 119.
  51. ^"Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume V, pp. 543-544, Document 2879-PS"(PDF).Office of United States Chief of Counsel For Prosecution of Axis Criminality. 1946.Retrieved25 April2021.
  52. ^Weinberg 1970,pp. 296–297.
  53. ^Weinberg 1970,pp. 297–298.
  54. ^Brett-Smith 1976,p. 108.
  55. ^Messerschmidt 1990,pp. 636–637.
  56. ^Carr 1972,pp. 73–78.
  57. ^Weinberg 1970,pp. 39–40.
  58. ^Weinberg 1970,p. 342.
  59. ^Nicholls 2000,p. 29.
  60. ^Kiiker, EIIe (28 March 2018)."Erna / Eva Margarete Gruhn".geni.
  61. ^Glasman 2005,pp. 120–121.
  62. ^Wheeler-Bennett 1967,p. 366.
  63. ^Faber 2008,pp. 46–75.
  64. ^Keitel & Görlitz 1966,pp. 41, 77.
  65. ^Wheeler-Bennett 1967,p. 368.
  66. ^Shirer 1960,p. 314.
  67. ^Schäfer 2006,pp. 200, 206–207.
  68. ^New York Times 1946.
  69. ^Mitcham 2011,pp. 34–35, note 23.

Sources

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  • Brett-Smith, Richard (1976).Hitler's Generals.San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press.ISBN0-89141-044-9.
  • Bartov, Omer(1999). "Soldiers, Nazis and War in the Third Reich". In Leitz, Christian (ed.).The Third Reich: The Essential Readings.London: Blackwell. pp.129–150.
  • Carr, William (1972).Arms, Autarky and Aggression.London, United Kingdom: Edward Arnold.
  • Carruthers, Bob (2013).World War Two from original sources: Handbook on German military forces.Great Britain: Pen & Sword Military.
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  • Geyer, Michael (1983). "Etudes in Political History: Reichswehr, NSDAP and the Seizure of Power". In Stachura, Peter (ed.).The Nazi Machtergreifung.London: Allen & Unwin. pp.101–123.
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  • Schäfer, Kirstin A. (2006).Werner von Blomberg: Hitlers erster Feldmarschall: Eine Biographie(in German). Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh.ISBN978-3506713919.
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  • Wheeler-Bennett, Sir John(2005) [1st ed. 1953, 2nd ed. 1964].The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics 1918–1945(2nd ed.). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
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Military offices
Preceded by
GeneralmajorGeorg Wetzell
 Chief of the German Troop Office
1927– 1929 		Succeeded by
Preceded by
General der InfanterieFriedrich Freiherr von Esebeck
 Commander ofWehrkreis I
1929 – 1933 		Succeeded by
Preceded by
Paul von Hindenburg
as Commander-in-Chief of theReichswehr
 Commander-in-Chiefof theGerman Armed Forces
1935-1938 		Succeeded by
Führer und ReichskanzlerAdolf Hitler
Political offices
Preceded by Minister of Defence
1933-1935 		Succeeded by
Preceded by Minister of War
1935-1938 		Succeeded by
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Werner_von_Blomberg&oldid=1264606314"