Isoroku Yamamoto

"Admiral Yamamoto" redirects here. For the Japanese admiral who served as prime minister in 1913–1914 and 1923–1924, seeYamamoto Gonnohyōe.

The native form of thispersonal nameisYamamoto Isoroku.This article usesWestern name orderwhen mentioning individuals.

Isoroku Yamamoto(Sơn bổn 56,Yamamoto Isoroku,April 4, 1884 – April 18, 1943)was aMarshal Admiralof theImperial Japanese Navy(IJN) and thecommander-in-chiefof theCombined FleetduringWorld War II.He commanded the fleet from 1939 until his death in 1943, overseeing the start of thePacific Warin 1941 and Japan's initial successes and defeats before his plane was shot down by U.S. fighter aircraft over New Guinea.

Isoroku Yamamoto Senior Third Rank
Admiral Yamamoto,c. 1940
Native name	Sơn bổn 56
Born	(1884-04-04)April 4, 1884 Nagaoka, Niigata,Empire of Japan
Died	April 18, 1943(1943-04-18)(aged 59) nearPanguna,Bougainville, Territory of New Guinea
Buried	Tama Cemetery,Tokyo
Allegiance	Empire of Japan
Service/ branch	Japanese Navy
Years of service	1904–1943
Rank	Marshal Admiral(posthumous)
Commands	Isuzu,Akagi,1st Carrier Division,Naval Aviation Bureau,1st Fleet,Combined Fleet,1st Battleship Division
Battles / wars	Russo-Japanese War Battle of Tsushima(WIA) World War II Pacific War Attack on Pearl Harbor Operation MI New Guinea campaign Operation I-Go Solomon Islands campaign Guadalcanal campaign Operation Ke Operation I-Go Operation Vengeance†
Awards	Grand Cordon of the Supreme Order of the Chrysanthemum(posthumous) Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords
Alma mater	Imperial Japanese Naval Academy Harvard University
Spouse(s)	Reiko Mihashi ​ (m.1918)​
Other work	Vice-Minister of the Navy

Yamamoto graduated from theImperial Naval Academyin 1904 and served in theRusso-Japanese War,where he lost two fingers at theBattle of Tsushima.He later studied atHarvard Universityin the United States and was appointednaval attachéto the Japanese embassy in Washington. His experiences convinced him that naval power depended on access to oil and industrial capacity, and that Japan thus had little hope to defeat the U.S. in a war. He was one of the first naval leaders to conclude thatnaval aviationandaircraft carrierswould play a decisive role in any future conflict. In 1936, Yamamoto was appointed navy vice minister, and opposed Japan's alliance with Germany in theTripartite Pactof 1940. In 1939, he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet, and was tasked with creating a strategy for war with the U.S.; Yamamoto favored a surprise attack, which he carried out at the start of the war with anattack on Pearl Harborin December 1941.

In the early months of the war, the Japanese fleet scored a series of decisive naval victories. These gains were halted at theBattle of Midwayin June 1942, in which four Japanese carriers were sunk. Yamamoto committed to the defense of theSolomon Islandsin theGuadalcanal campaign,but was unable to prevent their capture. In April 1943, Yamamoto was killed after American code breakers intercepted his flight plans, enabling theUnited States Army Air Forcestoshoot down his aircraft.

Family background

Yamamoto was born asIsoroku Takano(Cao dã 56,Takano Isoroku)inNagaoka,Niigata.His father, Sadayoshi Takano ( cao dã trinh cát ), had been an intermediate-ranksamuraiof theNagaoka Domain."Isoroku"is a Japanese term meaning" 56 "; the name referred to his father's age at Isoroku's birth.

In 1916, Isoroku was adopted into theYamamoto family(another family of former Nagaoka samurai) and took the Yamamoto name. It was a common practice for samurai families lacking sons to adopt suitable young men in this fashion to carry on the family name, the rank and the income that went with it. Isoroku married Reiko Mihashi in 1918; they had two sons and two daughters.

Early career

Yamamoto (left) with his lifelong friendTeikichi Horias young officers of the Japanese Navy, 1915-1919

Yamamoto graduated from theImperial Japanese Naval Academyin 1904, ranking 11th in his class.He then subsequently served on thearmored cruiserNisshinduring theRusso-Japanese War.He was wounded at theBattle of Tsushima,losing his index and middle fingers on his left hand, as the cruiser was hit repeatedly by the Russian battle line. He returned to theNaval Staff Collegein 1914, emerging as alieutenant commanderin 1916. In December 1919, he was promoted to commander.

1920s and 1930s

Captain Isoroku Yamamoto, 30 Jan 1928

Yamamoto was part of the Japanese Navy establishment, who were rivals of the more aggressiveArmyestablishment, especially the officers of theKwantung Army.He promoted a policy of a strong fleet to project force throughgunboat diplomacy,rather than a fleet used primarily for the transport of invasion land forces, as some of his political opponents in the Army wanted.This stance led him to oppose theinvasion of China.He also opposed war against the United States, partly because of his studies atHarvard University(1919–1921)and his two postings as anaval attachéin Washington, D.C.,where he learned to speak fluentEnglish.Yamamoto traveled extensively in the United States during his tour of duty there, where he studied American customs and business practices.

He was promoted to captain in 1923. On February 13, 1924, Captain Yamamoto was part of the Japanese delegation visiting the United StatesNaval War College.Later that year, he changed his specialty fromgunnerytonaval aviation.His first command was the cruiserIsuzuin 1928, followed by theaircraft carrierAkagi.

Yamamoto as anaval attachéto the United States, with the Secretary of the NavyCurtis D. Wilbur,CaptainKiyoshi Hasegawa,and AdmiralEdward Walter Eberle,1926

He participated in theLondon Naval Conference 1930as a rear admiral and theLondon Naval Conference 1935as a vice admiral, as the growing military influence on the government at the time deemed that a career military specialist needed to accompany the diplomats to the arms limitations talks. Yamamoto was a strong proponent of naval aviation and served as head of the Aeronautics Department, before accepting a post as commander of theFirst Carrier Division.Yamamoto opposed theJapanese invasion of northeast Chinain 1931, the subsequentfull-scale land war with Chinain 1937, and theTripartite PactwithNazi GermanyandFascist Italyin 1940. As Deputy Navy Minister, he apologized to United States AmbassadorJoseph C. Grewfor thebombing of the gunboat USSPanayin December 1937. These issues made him a target of assassination threats by pro-war militarists.

Mitsumasa Yonai and Yamamoto as Minister and Deputy Minister of the Navy, 1930s

Isoroku Yamamoto as Vice-Minister of the Navy, August 1939

Throughout 1938, many young army and naval officers began to speak publicly against Yamamoto and certain other Japanese admirals, such asMitsumasa YonaiandShigeyoshi Inoue,for their strong opposition to a tripartite pact with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, which the admirals saw as inimical to "Japan's natural interests".Yamamoto received a steady stream of hate mail and death threats from Japanese nationalists. His reaction to the prospect of death by assassination was passive and accepting. The admiral wrote:

To die for Emperor and Nation is the highest hope of a military man. After a brave hard fight the blossoms are scattered on the fighting field. But if a person wants to take a life instead, still the fighting man will go to eternity for Emperor and country. One man's life or death is a matter of no importance. All that matters is the Empire. AsConfuciussaid, "They may crush cinnabar, yet they do not take away its color; one may burn a fragrant herb, yet it will not destroy the scent." They may destroy my body, yet they will not take away my will.

The Japanese Army, annoyed at Yamamoto's unflinching opposition to a Rome-Berlin-Tokyo treaty, dispatched military police to "guard" him, a ruse by the Army to keep an eye on him.He was later reassigned from thenaval ministryto sea as thecommander-in-chiefof theCombined Fleeton August 30, 1939. This was done as one of the last acts of acting Navy MinisterMitsumasa Yonai,under BaronHiranuma Kiichirō's short-lived administration. It was done partly to make it harder for assassins to target Yamamoto. Yonai was certain that if Yamamoto remained ashore, he would be killed before the year [1939] ended.

1940–1941

British AmbassadorRobert Craigieand Yamamoto at a party hosted by Yamamoto, 1939

Yamamoto on board the battleshipNagatoin 1940

Yamamoto was promoted to admiral on November 15, 1940. This was in spite of the fact that whenHideki Tojowas appointed prime minister on October 18, 1941, many political observers thought that Yamamoto's career was essentially over.Tojo had been Yamamoto's old opponent from the time when the latter served as Japan's deputy naval minister and Tojo was the prime mover behind Japan's takeover ofManchuria.It was believed that Yamamoto would be appointed to command theYokosuka Naval Base,"a nice safe demotion with a big house and no power at all".However, after a brief stint in the post, a new Japanese cabinet was announced, and Yamamoto found himself returned to his position of power despite his open conflict with Tojo and other members of the Army's oligarchy who favored war with the European powers and the United States.

Two of the main reasons for Yamamoto's political survival were his immense popularity within the fleet, where he commanded the respect of his men and officers, and his close relations with the imperial family.He also had the acceptance of Japan's naval hierarchy:

There was no officer more competent to lead the Combined Fleet to victory than Admiral Yamamoto. His daring plan for thePearl Harbor attackhad passed through the crucible of the Japanese naval establishment, and after many expressed misgivings, his fellow admirals had realized that Yamamoto spoke no more than the truth when he said that Japan's hope for victory in this [upcoming] war was limited by time and oil. Every sensible officer of the navy was well aware of the perennial oil problems. Also, it had to be recognized that if the enemy could seriously disturb Japanese merchant shipping, then the fleet would be endangered even more.

Consequently, Yamamoto stayed in his post. With Tojo now in charge of Japan's highest political office, it became clear the Army would lead the Navy into a war about which Yamamoto had serious reservations. He wrote to an ultranationalist:

Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it would not be enough that we takeGuamand thePhilippines,nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. To make victory certain, we would have to march intoWashingtonand dictate the terms of peace in theWhite House.I wonder if our politicians [who speak so lightly of a Japanese-American war] have confidence as to the final outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices.

This quote was spread by the militarists, minus the last sentence, so it was interpreted in America as a boast that Japan would conquer the entire continental United States.The omitted sentence showed Yamamoto's counsel of caution towards a war that could cost Japan dearly. Nevertheless, Yamamoto accepted the reality of impending war and planned for a quick victory by destroying theUnited States Pacific FleetatPearl Harborin apreventive strike,while simultaneously thrusting into the oil- and rubber-rich areas of Southeast Asia, especially theDutch East Indies,Borneo, and Malaya. In naval matters, Yamamoto opposed the building of thebattleshipsYamatoandMusashias an unwise investment of resources.

Yamamoto was responsible for a number of innovations inJapanese naval aviation.Although remembered for his association with aircraft carriers, Yamamoto did more to influence the development of land-based naval aviation, particularly theMitsubishi G3MandG4Mmedium bombers.His demand for great range and the ability to carry atorpedowas intended to conform to Japanese conceptions of bleeding the American fleet as it advanced across the Pacific. The planes did achieve long range, but long-range fighter escorts were not available. These planes were lightly constructed and when fully fueled, they were especially vulnerable to enemy fire. This earned the G4M the sardonic nickname the "flying cigarette lighter". Yamamoto would eventually die in one of these aircraft.

The range of the G3M and G4M contributed to a demand for great range in a fighter aircraft. This partly drove the requirements for theA6M Zero,which was as noteworthy for its range as for its maneuverability. Both qualities were again purchased at the expense of light construction and flammability that later contributed to the A6M's high casualty rates as the war progressed.

As Japan moved toward war during 1940, Yamamoto gradually moved toward strategic as well as tactical innovation, again with mixed results. Prompted by talented young officers such asLieutenant CommanderMinoru Genda,Yamamoto approved the reorganization of Japanese carrier forces into theFirst Air Fleet,a consolidated striking force that gathered Japan's six largest carriers into one unit. This innovation gave great striking capacity, but also concentrated the vulnerable carriers into a compact target. Yamamoto also oversaw the organization of a similar large land-based organization in the 11th Air Fleet, which would later use the G3M and G4M to neutralize American air forces in thePhilippinesand sink theBritishForce Z.

Yamamoto (first row, 8th right) and his staff on the deck ofAkagi,December 25, 1941

In January 1941, Yamamoto went even further and proposed a radical revision of Japanese naval strategy. For two decades, in keeping with thedoctrineof CaptainAlfred T. Mahan,theNaval General Staffhad planned in terms of Japanese light surface forces,submarines,and land-based air units whittling down the American fleet as it advanced across the Pacific until the Japanese Navy engaged it in a climacticKantai Kessen( "decisive battle" ) in the northernPhilippine Sea(between theRyukyu Islandsand theMarianas), with battleships fighting in traditionalbattle lines.

Correctly pointing out this plan had never worked even in Japanese war games, and painfully aware of American strategic advantages in military production capacity, Yamamoto proposed instead to seek parity with the Americans by first reducing their forces with a preventive strike, then following up with a "decisive battle" fought offensively, rather than defensively. Yamamoto hoped, but probably did not believe,that if the Americans could be dealt terrific blows early in the war, they might be willing to negotiate an end to the conflict. The Naval General Staff proved reluctant to go along, and Yamamoto was eventually driven to capitalize on his popularity in the fleet by threatening to resign to get his way. AdmiralOsami Naganoand the Naval General Staff eventually caved in to this pressure, but only insofar as approving the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Japanese attack plan at Pearl Harbor, Japan, 1941

In January 1941 Yamamoto began developing a plan to attack the American base in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, which the Japanese continued to refine during the next months. On November 5, 1941, Yamamoto in his "Top Secret Operation Order no. 1" issued to the Combined Fleet, the Empire of Japan must drive out Britain and America from Greater East Asia and hasten the settlement of China, whereas, in the event that Britain and America were driven out from the Philippines and Dutch East Indies, an independent, self-supporting economic entity will be firmly established—mirroring the principle of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in another personification.

Two days later, he set the date for the intended surprise attack in Pearl Harbor and that would be on December 7 for one simple reason: it was a Sunday, the day that American military personnel would be least alert to an attack.

The First Air Fleet commenced preparations for the Pearl Harbor raid, solving a number of technical problems along the way, including how to launch torpedoes in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor and how to craft armor-piercing bombs by machining down battleship gun projectiles.

Attack on Pearl Harbor

Main articles:Events leading to the attack on Pearl HarborandAttack on Pearl Harbor

The United States and Japan were officially at peace when the First Air Fleet of six carriers attacked on December 7, 1941. Three hundred and fifty threeaircraft were launched against Pearl Harbor and other locations within Honolulu in two waves. The attack was a success according to the parameters of the mission, which sought to sink at least four American battleships and prevent the United States from interfering in Japan's southward advance for at least six months. Three American aircraft carriers were also considered a choice target, but these were at sea at the time.

In the end, four American battleships were sunk, four were damaged, and eleven othercruisers,destroyers,and auxiliaries were sunk or seriously damaged, 188 American aircraft were destroyed and 159 others damaged, and 2,403 people were killed and 1,178 others wounded. The Japanese lost 64 servicemen and only 29 aircraft,with 74 others damaged by anti-aircraft fire from the ground. The damaged aircraft were disproportionatelydiveandtorpedo bombers,seriously reducing the ability to exploit the first two waves' success, so the commander of the First Air Fleet, Naval Vice AdmiralChuichi Nagumo,withdrew. Yamamoto later lamented Nagumo's failure to seize the initiative to seek out and destroy the American carriers or further bombard various strategically important facilities onOahu,such as Pearl Harbor's oil tanks.

Nagumo had absolutely no idea where the American carriers were, and remaining on station while his forces looked for them ran the risk of his own forces being found first and attacked while his aircraft were absent searching. In any case, insufficient daylight remained after recovering the aircraft from the first two waves for the carriers to launch and recover a third before dark, and Nagumo's escorting destroyers lacked the fuel capacity to loiter long. Much has been made of Yamamoto's hindsight, but in keeping with Japanese military tradition to not criticize the commander on the spot,he did not punish Nagumo for his withdrawal. On the strategic, moral, and political level, the attack was a disaster for Japan, rousing Americans' thirst for revenge due to what is famously called a "sneak attack". The shock of the attack, coming in an unexpected place with devastating results and without adeclaration of war,galvanized the American public's determination to avenge the attack. When asked by Prime MinisterFumimaro Konoein mid-1941 about the outcome of a possible war with the United States, Yamamoto made a well-known and prophetic statement: If ordered to fight, he said, "I shall run wild considerably for the first six months or a year, but I have utterly no confidence for the second and third years."His prediction would be validated, as Japan easily conquered territories and islands in Asia and the Pacific for the first six months of the war, before suffering a major defeat at theBattle of Midwayon June 4–7, 1942, which ultimately tilted the balance of power in the Pacific toward the United States.

December 1941 – May 1942

Yamamoto as Admiral, 1942

Yamamoto on deck, 1942

Admiral Yamamoto on the Japanese airbase of Rabaul on New Britain

With the American fleet largely neutralized at Pearl Harbor, Yamamoto's Combined Fleet turned to the task of executing the larger Japanese war plan devised by theImperial Japanese Armyand Navy General Staff. TheFirst Air Fleetmade a circuit of the Pacific, striking American, Australian, Dutch, and British installations fromWake Islandto Australia toCeylonin the Indian Ocean. The 11th Air Fleet caught the United StatesFifth Air Forceon the ground in the Philippines hours after Pearl Harbor, and then sank the British Force Z's battleshipHMSPrince of WalesandbattlecruiserHMSRepulseat sea.

Under Yamamoto's able subordinates, Vice AdmiralsJisaburō Ozawa,Nobutake Kondō,andIbō Takahashi,the Japanese swept the inadequate remaining American, British, Dutch and Australian naval assets from the Dutch East Indies in a series of amphibious landings and surface naval battles culminating in theBattle of the Java Seaon February 27, 1942. Along with the occupation of the Dutch East Indies came thefall of Singaporeon February 15, and the eventual reduction of the remaining American-Filipino defensive positions in thePhilippineson theBataan peninsulaon April 9 andCorregidor Islandon May 6. The Japanese had secured their oil- and rubber-rich "southern resources area".

By late March, having achieved their initial aims with surprising speed and little loss, albeit against enemies ill-prepared to resist them, the Japanese paused to consider their next moves. Yamamoto and a few Japanese military leaders and officials waited, hoping that the United States orGreat Britainwould negotiate an armistice or a peace treaty to end the war. But when the British, as well as the Americans, expressed no interest in negotiating, Japanese thoughts turned to securing their newly seized territory and acquiring more with an eye to driving one or more of their enemies out of the war.

Competing plans were developed at this stage, including thrusts to the west againstBritish India,southagainst Australia,and east against the United States. Yamamoto was involved in this debate, supporting different plans at different times with varying degrees of enthusiasm and for varying purposes, includinghorse-tradingfor support of his own objectives.

Plans included ideas as ambitious as invading India or Australia, or seizing Hawaii. These grandiose ventures were inevitably set aside, as the Army could not spare enough troops from China for the first two, which would require a minimum of 250,000 men, nor shipping to support the latter two (transports were allocated separately to the Navy and Army, and jealously guarded).Instead, the Imperial General Staff supported an army thrust intoBurmain hopes of linking up withIndian nationalistsrevolting against British rule, and attacks inNew Guineaand theSolomon Islandsdesigned to imperil Australia's lines of communication with the United States. Yamamoto argued for a decisive offensive strike in the east to finish off the American fleet, but the more conservative Naval General Staff officers were unwilling to risk it.

On April 18, in the midst of these debates, theDoolittle Raidstruck Tokyo and surrounding areas, demonstrating the threat posed by American aircraft carriers, and giving Yamamoto an event he could exploit to get his way, and further debate over military strategy came to a quick end. The Naval General Staff agreed to Yamamoto's Midway Island (MI) Operation, subsequent to the first phase of the operations against Australia's link with America, and concurrent with its plan to invade theAleutian Islands.

Yamamoto rushed planning for the Midway and Aleutians missions, while dispatching a force under Vice AdmiralTakeo Takagi,including theFifth Carrier Division(the large new carriersShōkakuandZuikaku), to support the effort to seize the islands ofTulagiandGuadalcanalfor seaplane and airplane bases, and the town ofPort Moresbyon Papua New Guinea's south coast facing Australia.

ThePort Moresby (MO) Operationproved an unwelcome setback. Although Tulagi and Guadalcanal were taken, the Port Moresby invasion fleet was compelled to turn back when Takagi clashed with an American carrier task force in theBattle of the Coral Seain early May. Although the Japanese sank the carrierUSSLe xing tonand damaged theUSSYorktown,the Americans damaged the carrierShōkakuso badly that she required dockyard repairs, and the Japanese lost the light carrierShoho.Just as importantly, Japanese operational mishaps and American fighters and anti-aircraft fire devastated the dive bomber and torpedo plane formations of bothShōkaku's andZuikaku's air groups. These losses sidelinedZuikakuwhile she awaited replacement aircraft and aircrews, and saw to tactical integration and training. These two ships would be sorely missed a month later at Midway.

Battle of Midway, June 1942

Main article:Battle of Midway

Yamamoto's plan for Midway Island was an extension of his efforts to knock the American Pacific Fleet out of action long enough for Japan to fortify its defensive perimeter in the Pacific island chains. Yamamoto felt it necessary to seek an early, decisive offensive battle.

This plan was long believed to have been to draw American attention—and possibly carrier forces—north from Pearl Harbor by sending his Fifth Fleet (one carrier, one light carrier, four battleships, eight cruisers, 25 destroyers, and four transports) against the Aleutians,raiding Dutch HarboronUnalaska Islandand invading the more distant islands ofKiskaandAttu.

While Fifth Fleet attacked the Aleutians, First Mobile Force (four carriers, two battleships, three cruisers, and 12 destroyers) would attack Midway and destroy its air force. Once this was neutralized, Second Fleet (one light carrier, two battleships, 10 cruisers, 21 destroyers, and 11 transports) would land 5,000 troops to seize theatollfrom theUnited States Marines.

The seizure of Midway was expected to draw the American carriers west into a trap where the First Mobile Force would engage and destroy them. Afterwards, First Fleet (one light carrier, three battleships, one light cruiser and nine destroyers), in conjunction with elements of Second Fleet, would mop up remaining US surface forces and complete the destruction of the American Pacific Fleet.

To guard against failure, Yamamoto initiated two security measures. The first was an aerial reconnaissance mission (Operation K) over Pearl Harbor to ascertain if the American carriers were there. The second was a picket line of submarines to detect the movement of enemy carriers toward Midway in time for First Mobile Force, First Fleet, and Second Fleet to combine against it. In the event, the first measure was aborted and the second delayed until after the American carriers had already sortied.

The plan was a compromise and hastily prepared, apparently so it could be launched in time for the anniversary of theBattle of Tsushima,but appeared well thought out, well organized, and finely timed when viewed from a Japanese viewpoint. Against four fleet carriers, two light carriers, seven battleships, 14 cruisers and 42 destroyers likely to be in the area of the main battle, the United States could field only three carriers, eight cruisers, and 15 destroyers. The disparity appeared crushing. Only in numbers of carrier decks, available aircraft, and submarines was there near parity between the two sides. Despite various mishaps developed in the execution, it appeared that—barring something unforeseen—Yamamoto held all the cards.

Unknown to Yamamoto, the Americans had learned of Japanese plans thanks to thecode breaking of Japanese naval code D(known to the US asJN-25).As a result, AdmiralChester Nimitz,the Pacific Fleet commander, was able to place his outnumbered forces in a position to conduct their own ambush. By Nimitz's calculation, his three available carrier decks, plus Midway, gave him rough parity with Nagumo's First Mobile Force.

Following a nuisance raid by Japaneseflying boatsin May,Nimitz dispatched aminesweeperto guard the intended refueling point for Operation K nearFrench Frigate Shoals,causing the reconnaissance mission to be aborted and leaving Yamamoto ignorant of whether the Pacific Fleet carriers were still at Pearl Harbor. It remains unclear why Yamamoto permitted the earlier attack, and why his submarines did not sortie sooner, as reconnaissance was essential to success at Midway. Nimitz also dispatched his carriers toward Midway early, and they passed the Japanese submarinesen routeto their picket line positions. Nimitz's carriers positioned themselves to ambush theKidō Butai(striking force) when it struck Midway. A token cruiser and destroyer force was sent toward the Aleutians, but otherwise Nimitz ignored them. On June 4, 1942, days before Yamamoto expected them to interfere in the Midway operation, American carrier-based aircraft destroyed the four carriers of theKidō Butai,catching the Japanese carriers at especially vulnerable times.

With his air power destroyed and his forces not yet concentrated for a fleet battle, Yamamoto maneuvered his remaining forces, still strong on paper, to trap the American forces. He was unable to do so because his initial dispositions had placed his surface combatants too far from Midway,and because AdmiralRaymond Spruanceprudently withdrew to the east to further defend Midway Island, believing (based on a mistakensubmarine report) the Japanese still intended to invade.Not knowing several battleships, including the powerfulYamato,were in the Japaneseorder of battle,he did not comprehend the severe risk of a night surface battle, in which his carriers and cruisers would be at a disadvantage.However, his move to the east avoided that possibility. Correctly perceiving he had lost and could not bring surface forces into action, Yamamoto withdrew. The defeat marked the high tide of Japanese expansion.

Yamamoto's plan has been the subject of much criticism. Some historians state it violated the principle of concentration of force and was overly complex. Others point to similarly complex Allied operations, such asOperation MB8,that were successful, and note the extent to which the American intelligencecoupderailed the operation before it began. Had Yamamoto's dispositions not denied Nagumo adequate pre-attack reconnaissance assets, both the American cryptanalytic success and the unexpected appearance of the American carriers could have been irrelevant.

Actions after Midway

The Battle of Midway checked Japanese momentum, but the Japanese Navy was still a powerful force, capable of regaining the initiative. It planned to resume the thrust withOperation FS,aimed at eventually takingFijiandSamoato cut the American lifeline to Australia.

Yamamoto remained as commander-in-chief, retained at least partly to avoid diminishing the morale of the Combined Fleet. However, he hadlost faceas a result of the Midway defeat, and the Naval General Staff were disinclined to indulge in further gambles. This reduced Yamamoto to pursuing the classic defensive "decisive battle strategy" he had attempted to avoid.

Yamamoto committed Combined Fleet units to a series of small attrition actions across the south and central Pacific that stung the Americans, but in return suffered losses he could ill afford. Three major efforts to beat theAmericans moving on Guadalcanalprecipitated a pair of carrier battles that Yamamoto commanded personally: the Battles of theEastern SolomonsandSanta Cruz Islandsin September and October, respectively, and finally apair of wild surface engagementsin November, all timed to coincide with Japanese Army pushes. The effort was wasted when the Army could not hold up its end of the operation. Yamamoto's naval forces won a few victories and inflicted considerable losses and damage to the American fleet in several battles around Guadalcanal which included the Battles ofSavo Island,Cape Esperance,andTassafaronga,but he could never draw the United States into a decisive fleet action. As a result, Japanese naval strength declined.

Death

Main article:Operation Vengeance

Admiral Yamamoto, a few hours before his death, saluting Japanese naval pilots atRabaul,April 18, 1943

Prime MinisterHideki Tojobowing to a portrait of Yamamoto, following the return of his ashes to Japan, May 1943

Yamamoto's state funeral, 5 June 1943

Yamamoto's ashes are carried from thebattleship Musashiat Kisarazu, Japan on May 23, 1943.

To boost morale following the defeat at Guadalcanal, Yamamoto decided to make an inspection tour throughout theSouth Pacific.It was during this tour that U.S. officials commenced an operation to kill him. On April 14, 1943, the United States naval intelligence effort, codenamed "Magic",intercepted and decrypted a message containing specifics of Yamamoto's tour, including arrival and departure times and locations, as well as the number and types of aircraft that would transport and accompany him on the journey. Yamamoto, the itinerary revealed, would be flying fromRabaultoBalalae Airfield,on an island nearBougainvillein theSolomon Islands,on the morning of April 18, 1943.

PresidentFranklin D. Rooseveltmay have authorizedSecretary of the NavyFrank Knoxto "get Yamamoto", but no official record of such an order exists,and sources disagree whether he did so.Knox essentially let AdmiralChester W. Nimitzmake the decision.Nimitz first consulted AdmiralWilliam Halsey Jr.,Commander, South Pacific, and then authorized the mission on April 17 to intercept and shoot down Yamamoto's flighten route.A squadron ofUnited States Army Air ForcesLockheed P-38 Lightningaircraft were assigned the task as only they possessed sufficient range. Select pilots from three units were informed that they were intercepting an "important high officer", with no specific name given.

On the morning of April 18, despite urging by local commanders to cancel the trip for fear of ambush, Yamamoto's twoMitsubishi G4Mbombers, used as fast transport aircraft without bombs, left Rabaul as scheduled for the 315 mi (507 km) trip. Sixteen P-38s intercepted the flight over Bougainville, and a dogfight ensued between them and the six escortingMitsubishi A6M Zeroes.First LieutenantRex T. Barberengaged the first of the two Japanese transports, which turned out to be T1-323, the one Yamamoto was travelling in. He fired on the aircraft until it began to spew smoke from its left engine. Barber turned away to attack the other transport as Yamamoto's aircraft crashed into the jungle.

Yamamoto's body, along with the crash site, was found the next day in the jungle of theisland of Bougainvilleby a Japanese search-and-rescue party, led by army engineer Lieutenant Tsuyoshi Hamasuna. According to Hamasuna, Yamamoto had been thrown clear of the plane's wreckage, his white-gloved hand grasping the hilt of hiskatana,still upright in his seat under a tree. Hamasuna said Yamamoto was instantly recognizable, head dipped down as if deep in thought. Apost-mortemdisclosed that Yamamoto had received two.50-caliberbullet wounds, one to the back of his left shoulder and another to the left side of his lower jaw that exited above his right eye. The Japanese navy doctor examining the body determined that the head wound had killed Yamamoto. The more violent details of Yamamoto's death were hidden from the Japanese public. The medical report was changed "on orders from above", according to biographer Hiroyuki Agawa.

Yamamoto's death was a major blow to Japanese military morale.His staff cremated his remains atBuin, Papua New Guinea,and his ashes were returned to Tokyo aboard the battleshipMusashi,his last flagship. He was given a fullstate funeralon June 5, 1943,where he received, posthumously, the title ofMarshal Admiraland was awarded theOrder of the Chrysanthemum(1st Class). He was also awardedNazi Germany'sKnight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords.Some of his ashes were buried in the publicTama Cemetery,Tokyo ( nhiều ma linh viên ) and the remainder at his ancestral burial grounds at the temple of Chuko-ji inNagaoka City.He was succeeded as commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet by AdmiralMineichi Koga.

Yamamoto's grave atTama Cemeteryin 2017

Personal life

Yamamoto practicedcalligraphy.He and his wife, Reiko, had four children: two sons and two daughters. Yamamoto was an avid gambler, enjoyingGo,shogi,billiards,bridge,mahjong,poker,and other games that tested his wits and sharpened his mind. He frequently made jokes about moving toMonacoand starting his owncasino.

He enjoyed the company ofgeisha,and his wife Reiko revealed to the Japanese public in 1954 that Yamamoto was closer to his favoritegeishaKawai Chiyoko than to her, which stirred some controversy.His funeral procession passed by Kawai's quarters on the way to the cemetery.Yamamoto was close friends withTeikichi Hori,a Navy admiral and Yamamoto's classmate from theImperial Japanese Naval Academywho was purged from the Navy for supporting theWashington Naval Treaty.Before and during the war Yamamoto frequently corresponded with Hori, these personal letters would become the subject of theNHKdocumentaryThe Truth of Yamamoto.

The claim that Yamamoto was aCatholicis likely due to confusion with retired Admiral Shinjiro Stefano Yamamoto, who was a decade older than Isoroku, and died in 1942.

Decorations

• Grand Cordon of theOrder of the Chrysanthemum(posthumous appointment, 18 April 1943)
• Grand Cordon of theOrder of the Rising Sun(29 April 1940; Fourth Class: 1 November 1920)
  • (with theOrder of the Paulownia Flowers)
• Grand Cordon of theOrder of the Sacred Treasure(23 March 1939; Second Class: 31 October 1931; Fifth Class: 27 November 1911)
• Order of the Golden Kite(1st class: 18 April 1943 (posthumous); Second Class: 4 April 1942)
• Grand Cross of theOrder of the German Eagle(Nazi Germany,9 February 1940)
• Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords(Nazi Germany,27 May 1943 (posthumous))

Dates of rank

• Midshipman – November 14, 1904
• Ensign – August 31, 1905
• Sublieutenant – September 28, 1907
• Lieutenant – October 11, 1909
• Lieutenant Commander – December 13, 1915
• Commander – December 1, 1919
• Captain – December 1, 1923
• Rear Admiral – November 30, 1929
• Vice Admiral – November 15, 1934
• Admiral – November 15, 1940
• Marshal-Admiral– April 18, 1943 (posthumous)

In film and fiction

Yamamoto was portrayed byDenjirō ŌkōchiinToho's 1953 filmEagle of the Pacific.

The 1960 filmThe Gallant Hoursdepicts the battle of wits between Vice-AdmiralWilliam Halsey, Jr.and Yamamoto from the start of theGuadalcanal Campaignin August 1942 toYamamoto's deathin April 1943. The film, however, portrays Yamamoto's death as occurring in November 1942, the day after the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, and the P-38 aircraft that killed him as coming from Guadalcanal.

In 1960'sStorm Over the PacificfromToho Studios,Yamamoto is portrayed bySusumu Fujita.

InDaiei Studios's 1969 filmAa, kaigun(later released in the United States asGateway to Glory), Yamamoto was portrayed byShōgo Shimada.

Yamamoto is portrayed by Japanese actorSō Yamamurain the 1970 movieTora! Tora! Tora!;he states after the attack on Pearl Harbor:

I fear that all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve.

— attributed to YamamotoinTora! Tora! Tora!(1970), in reference to the attack on Pearl Harbor. There is no evidence that Yamamoto said this in reality.

Professional wrestler Harold Watanabe adopted thevillainousJapanese gimmick ofTojo Yamamotoin reference to both Yamamoto andHideki Tojo.

Award-winning Japanese actorToshiro Mifune(star ofThe Seven Samurai) portrayed Yamamoto in three films:

• Rengō Kantai Shirei Chōkan: Yamamoto Isoroku(1968, later released in Canada and the United States asAdmiral Yamamoto),
• Gekido no showashi 'Gunbatsu'(1970, lit. "Turning Point of Showa History: The Militarists" ),and
• Midway(1976, where all of the Japanese scenes had English dialogue).

A fictionalized version of Yamamoto's death was portrayed in theBaa Baa Black Sheepepisode "The Hawk Flies on Sunday", though only photos of Yamamoto were shown. In this episode, set much later in the war than in real life, the Black Sheep, a Marine Corsair squadron, joins an army squadron of P-51 Mustangs. The Marines intercepted fighter cover while the army shot down Yamamoto.

InShūe Matsubayashi's 1981 filmRengō kantai(lit. "Combined Fleet", later released in the United States asThe Imperial Navy), Yamamoto was portrayed byKeiju Kobayashi.

In the 1993OVAseriesKonpeki no Kantai(lit.Deep Blue Fleet), right after his plane is shot down, Yamamoto suddenly wakes up as his younger self, Isoroku Takano, after theBattle of Tsushimain 1905. His memory from the original timeline intact, Yamamoto uses his knowledge of the future to help Japan become a stronger military power, eventually launching acoup d'étatagainstHideki Tōjō's government. In the subsequentPacific War,Japan's technologically advanced navy decisively defeats the United States, and grants all of the former European and American colonies in Asia full independence. Yamamoto convinces Japan to join forces with the United States and Britain to defeat Nazi Germany. The series was criticized outside Japan as a whitewash of Imperial Japan's intentions towards its neighbors, and distancing itself from the wartime alliance with Nazi Germany.

InNeal Stephenson's 1999 bookCryptonomicon,Yamamoto's final moments are depicted, with him realizing thatJapan's naval codeshave been broken and that he must inform headquarters.

In the 2001 filmPearl Harbor,Yamamoto was portrayed by Japanese-born American actorMako Iwamatsu.LikeTora! Tora! Tora!,Yamamoto also saysthe sleeping giant quote.

In the 2004animeseriesZipang,Yamamoto, voiced byBunmei Tobayama,works to develop the uneasy partnership with the crew of theJMSDFMirai,which has been transported back through time to 1942.

In theAxis of Timetrilogy by authorJohn Birmingham,after a naval task force from the year 2021 is accidentally transported back through time to 1942, Yamamoto assumes a leadership role in the dramatic alteration of Japan's war strategy.

InThe West Wingepisode "We Killed Yamamoto",the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff uses the killing of Yamamoto to advocate for an assassination.

InDouglas Niles' 2007 bookMacArthur's War: A Novel of the Invasion of Japan(written withMichael Dobson), which focuses on GeneralDouglas MacArthurand an alternate history of thePacific War(following a considerably different outcome of theBattle of Midway), Yamamoto is portrayed sympathetically, with much of the action in the Japanese government seen through his eyes, though he could not change the major decisions of Japan in World War II.

InToei's 2011 war filmRengō Kantai Shirei Chōkan: Yamamoto Isoroku(Blu-Ray titles:- English "The Admiral"; German "Der Admiral" ), Yamamoto was portrayed byKōji Yakusho.The film portrays his career from Pearl Harbor to his death in Operation Vengeance.

InRobert Conroy's 2011 bookRising Sun,Yamamoto directs the IJN to launch a series of attacks on theAmerican West Coast,in the hope the United States can be convinced to sue for peace and securing Japan's place as a world power; but cannot escape his lingering fear the war will ultimately doom Japan.

In the 2019 motion pictureMidway,Yamamoto is portrayed byEtsushi Toyokawa.As withTora! Tora! Tora!andPearl Harbor,thesleeping giant quoteis included once again.

Sources

• Agawa, Hiroyuki; Bester, John (trans.).The Reluctant Admiral.New York: Kodansha, 1979.ISBN978-4-7700-2539-5.A definitive biography of Yamamoto in English. This book explains much of the political structure and events within Japan that led to the war.
• Coetzee, Daniel; Eysturlid, Lee W. (2013).Philosophers of War: The Evolution of History's Greatest Military Thinkers [2 Volumes]: The Evolution of History's Greatest Military Thinkers.ABC-CLIO.ISBN9780313070334.- Total pages: 994
• Davis, Donald A.Lightning Strike: The Secret Mission to Kill Admiral Yamamoto and Avenge Pearl Harbor.New York: St. Martin's Press, 2005.ISBN978-0-312-30906-0.
• Dull, Paul S.A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945.Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1978.ISBN978-0-87021-097-6.
• Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie.Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887–1941.Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1997.ISBN978-0-87021-192-8.
• Glines, Carroll V.Attack on Yamamoto(1st edition). New York: Crown, 1990.ISBN978-0-517-57728-8.Glines documents both the mission to shoot down Yamamoto and the subsequent controversies with thorough research, including personal interviews with all surviving participants and researchers who examined the crash site.
• Lundstrom, John B.The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway.Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1984.ISBN978-0-87021-189-8.
• Miller, Edward S.War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945.Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1991.ISBN978-0-87021-759-3.
• Peattie,Mark R.Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941.Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2002.ISBN978-1-55750-432-6.
• Prados, John.Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II.Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2001.ISBN978-1-55750-431-9.
• Prange, Gordon.At Dawn We Slept.New York: Penguin Books, 1982.ISBN978-0-14-006455-1.
• Ugaki, Matome; Chihaya, Masataka (trans.).Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki, 1941–45.Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991.ISBN978-0-8229-5462-0.Provides a high-level view of the war from the Japanese side, from the diaries of Yamamoto's Chief of Staff, AdmiralMatome Ugaki.Provides evidence of the intentions of the imperial military establishment to seize Hawaii and to operate against Britain'sRoyal Navyin the Indian Ocean. Translated by Masataka Chihaya, this edition contains extensive clarifying notes from the U.S. editors derived from U.S. military histories.
• Parillo, Mark (2006)."The United States in the Pacific".In Higham, Robin; Harris, Stephen (eds.).Why Air Forces Fail: the Anatomy of Defeat.The University Press of Kentucky.ISBN978-0-8131-2374-5.
• Ryfle, Steve; Godziszewski, Ed (2017).Ishiro Honda: A Life in Film, from Godzilla to Kurosawa.Wesleyan University Press.ISBN9780819570871.

External links

• Yamamoto biographyfromSpartacus Educational
• "Isoroku Yamamoto"Encyclopædia Britannica
• Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Japanese NavyArchivedMarch 1, 2005, at theWayback MachineUS Naval Historical Center
• Pacific Wrecks. Place where Yamamoto Type 1 bomber crash
• The Great Pacific War
• The Assassination of Yamamoto in 1943(in Japanese)
• CombinedFleet, Isoroku Yamamoto
• Newspaper clippings about Isoroku Yamamotoin the20th Century Press Archivesof theZBW