Damascus Protocol
TheDamascus Protocolwas a document given toFaisal bin Husseinon 23 May 1915 by the Arab secret societiesal-Fatatandal-'Ahd[1]on his second visit toDamascusduring a mission to consult Turkish officials inConstantinople.
The secret societies declared they would support Faisal's fatherHussein bin Ali's revolt against theOttoman Empire,if the demands in the protocol were submitted to the British. These demands, defining the territory of an independent Arab state to be established in the Middle East that would encompass all of the lands of Ottoman Western Asia south of the37th parallel north,[2]became the basis of the Arab understanding of theHussein–McMahon Correspondence.
Text
[edit]The text was first translated into English byGeorge Antoniusin 1938, based on a copy of the protocol given to him by Faisal:[3]
The recognition by Great Britain of the independence of the Arab countries lying within the following frontiers:
North: The LineMersin-Adanato parallel 37N and thence along the lineBirejek-Urga-Mardin-Midiat-Jazirat (Ibn 'Unear)-Amadiato the Persian frontier;
East: The Persian frontier down to the Persian Gulf;
South: The Indian Ocean (with the exclusion of Aden, whose status was to be maintained).West: The Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea back to Mersin.
The abolition of all exceptional privileges granted to foreigners under the capitulations.
The conclusion of a defensive alliance between Great Britain and the future independent Arab State.
The grant of economic preference to Great Britain.
Background
[edit]
Negotiations with Kitchener
[edit]On 5 February 1914 thesharif's sonAbdullahmetHerbert Kitchener,British Governor General of Egypt and the Sudan, in Cairo and asked him whether Hussein could rely on British support in the event of Turkish moves against theHejaz.At this point Kitchener could offer no encouragement, but two months later Abdullah met with Kitchener's Oriental Secretary,Sir Ronald Storrs,and was given the assurance that Great Britain would guarantee the status quo in Arabia against "wanton Turkish aggression".[4]
British reluctance to oppose the Turks evaporated following the onset of war in August 1914. Kitchener, then Secretary of State for War, sent a message to Abdullah asking whether the Arabs would support Great Britain if Turkey joined the war on the side ofGermany.Abdullah responded that the Sharif would support Britain in return for British support against the Turks.[4]
By the time of Kitchener's reply in October the Turks had joined the Germans,
Kitchener now stated that if the Amir and the 'Arab Nation' supported Britain in the war, the British would recognise and support the independence of the Amirate and of the Arabs and, further, would guarantee Arabia against external aggression. And then Kitchener gratuitously and on his own authority added a phrase that would generate controversy inLondonand theMiddle Eastfor years to come. 'It may be,' he concluded, 'that an Arab of the true race will assume theCaliphateatMeccaorMedinaand so good may come by the help of God out of all the evil that is now occurring'.[5]
In his reply Hussein did not mention the Caliphate but said that he could not immediately break with the Turks because of his position inIslam.
Turkish declaration ofjihad
[edit]On 11 November 1914 the Turks declared ajihadagainst theEntente(Allies of World War I) and urged the Arab leaderHusayn bin Ali,Sharif of Mecca,to support the call and to contribute troops to their forces.[5]
According to Schneer, in January 1915, Hussein was approached by Fauzi al-Bakri (brother ofNasib al-Bakri,both members ofal-Fatatand whose father was an old friend of Hussein)[6]with the aim of persuading the Sharif to become leader of a revolt against the Ottomans.[7]At the same time Hussein's eldest sonAli bin Husseinuncovered a Turkish plot to depose the Sharif in favour ofAli Haidar,[5]head of the dispossessed Motallib branch of the Sharifian family.[8]Hussein ordered his sonFaisalto confront theGrand VizierinConstantinoplewith evidence of the plot, but also to stop inDamascusto explore the viability of a revolt with the leaders of the secret societies, which he did on 26 March 1915. After a month of talks Faisal was unconvinced of the strength of the Arab movement and concluded that a revolt would not succeed without the assistance of one of theGreat Powers.On reaching Constantinople in April and receiving the news that an Arab declaration ofjihadwas viewed as essential by the Turks Faisal became equally concerned about his family's position in theHejaz.[5]
On his return journey Faisal visited Damascus to resume talks with al-Fatat and al-'Ahd and joined their revolutionary movement. It was during this visit that Faisal was presented with the document that became known as the 'Damascus Protocol'. The document declared that the Arabs would revolt in alliance withGreat Britainin return for recognition of Arab independence in an area running from the37th parallel northon the southern border ofTurkey,bounded in the east byPersiaand thePersian Gulf,in the west by theMediterranean Seaand in the south by theArabian Sea.[9]
Meeting at Ta'if
[edit]Following deliberations atTa'ifbetween Hussein and his sons in June 1915, during which Faisal counselled caution, Ali argued against rebellion and Abdullah advocated action, the Sharif set a tentative date for armed revolt for June 1916 and commenced negotiations with the British High Commissioner in Egypt,Sir Henry McMahonvia theHussein-McMahon Correspondence.[9]
Notes
[edit]- ^Herzog, 1975, p. 213.
- ^Ismael, 1991, p. 65.
- ^Antonius, George(1938).The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement.H. Hamilton. p.157.
- ^abParis, 2003, p. 22.
- ^abcdParis, 2003, p. 23.
- ^Isaiah Friedman (17 April 2018).Palestine: A Twice-Promised Land?.Taylor & Francis. pp. 311–.ISBN978-1-351-29006-7.
- ^Jonathan Schneer(1 August 2011).The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.A&C Black. pp. 51–.ISBN978-1-4088-0970-9.
- ^British Imperial Connexions to the Arab National Movement, 1912-1914,accessed 8 April 2007.
- ^abParis, 2003, p. 24.
References
[edit]- Fromkin, David(1990).A Peace To End All Peace.Avon Books, New York.ISBN0-8050-6884-8
- Herzog, Jacob David (1975).A People That Dwells Alone: Speeches and Writings of Yaacov Herzog.Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
- Ismael, Tareq Y. (1991).Politics and Government in the Middle East and North Africa.University of Florida Press.ISBN0-8130-1043-8
- Paris, Timothy J. (2003).Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule, 1920-1925: The Sherifian Solution.London: Routledge.ISBN0-7146-5451-5
