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1938 Yellow River flood

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Flooded area (1938)

The1938 Yellow River flood(simplified Chinese:Hoa viên khẩu quyết đê sự kiện;traditional Chinese:Hoa viên khẩu quyết đê sự kiện;pinyin:Huāyuánkǒu Juédī Shìjiàn;lit.'Huayuankou Dam Burst Incident') was a man-madefloodfrom June 1938 to January 1947 created by theChinese National Army'sintentional destruction ofdikes(levees) on theYellow RiverinHuayuankou,Henan Province.The first wave of floods hitZhongmu Countyon 13 June 1938.

The flood acted as ascorched-earthdefensive line in theSecond Sino-Japanese War.[1][2][3]There were three long-term strategic intents. Firstly, the flood in Henan safeguarded theShaanxisection of theLonghai railway,the major northwest traffic where the Soviet Union sent their military supplies to the Chinese National Army from August 1937 to March 1941.[4][5]Secondly, the inundated land and railway made it difficult for the Japanese Army to mobilize into Shaanxi, thereby preventing them fromentering the Sichuan basin,where the wartime capital ofChongqingand the southwesternhome frontwas located.[6]Thirdly, the floods in Henan and Anhui crushed the tracks and bridges of theBeijing–Wuhan Railway,Tianjin–Pukou Railwayand Longhai Railway, thereby preventing the Japanese Army from mobilizing their machines and troops across the theaters of North China, Central China and Northwest China.[7]The short term strategic intent was to stop the quick mobilization of Japanese Army from North China into theBattle of Wuhan.[7][8][9][10]

The flood achieved the above strategic intent; in particular, the JapaneseOperation 5never capturedShaanxi,SichuanorChongqing.However, the flood came at enormous human cost, economic damages and environmental impact; in the immediate aftermath, 30,000 to 89,000 civiliansdrownedinHenan,AnhuiandJiangsuprovinces,[11][12][13]while a total of 400,000 to 500,000 civilians died from drowning, famine and plague.[14][15]The Yellow River was diverted to a new course over swathes of farmland until the repair of the dykes in January 1947. Five million civilians lived on such inundated land until 1947.[15]Inspired by the strategic outcome, dykes elsewhere in China, especially along theYangtze,were later destroyed by the Chinese and the Japanese.[1]

Destruction of dykes[edit]

Soldiers of theNational Revolutionary Armyfighting in the flooded area of the Yellow River

The military history of China has seen several instances of deliberate human destruction of dykes. It was attested in225BC,219,918, 923,1128,1232,1234,1642and1926.[16]In 1935,Alexander von Falkenhausenwas commissioned by the Chinese to write a report on the strategic planning of the upcoming Sino-Japanese War. Falkenhausen's report[17][16]recommended the use of a Yellow River flood and was adopted into the annual National Defense Strategy of 1937.[18][16]

Many of the officers in theChinese National Armywere familiar to the use of flood as the warlordWu Peifuused it against them in the 1926Northern Expedition.[16]The suggestion of the use of flood was floated among various officers throughout May 1938.[19]On 1 June 1938 in a military meeting, the Commander-in-chiefChiang Kai-sheksanctioned to open up thedikes(levees) on theYellow Rivernear Zhengzhou.[19]After the Chinese were defeated in theBattle of Xuzhou,theZhengzhou junctionof theBeijing–Wuhan Railwaywas within reach by the Japanese. The goal of the operation was to stop the advancing Japanese troops by following a strategy of "using water as a substitute for soldiers" ( dĩ thủy đại binh,pinyin:Yǐshuǐ dàibīng). The ChineseNational Armyimplemented the flood plan. The original plan was to useexplosivesto destroy thedike(levee) of Zhaokou, but due to difficulties at that location, the dike ofHuayuankou,on the Yellow River's south bank, was destroyed on June 5 and June 7 via tunneling,[20]with waters flooding into Henan,Anhui,andJiangsu.The floods covered and destroyed thousands ofsquare kilometersof farmland, and shifted the course of the Yellow River hundreds of kilometers to the south.[21]

Attempts to seal the breach and return the river to its former course were made in 1946 by the KMT with assistance fromUNRRA.Work began in March and was completed in June, but the dams were again destroyed by large summer flows.[22]Subsequent repairs succeeded and were eventually completed in March 1947.

Effect on the war[edit]

Long term[edit]

The flood had three long-term strategic intents.

Firstly, the flood in Henan safeguarded theShaanxisection of theLonghai railway,the major northwest traffic where the Soviet Union sent their military supplies to the Chinese National Army from August 1937 to March 1941.[4][5]Once the German arms export to the Chinese National Army stopped in April 1938, the Soviet Union became the biggest arms exporter to China until the United States joined.[4]

Secondly, the inundated land across Henan and the flooded tracks of theBeijing–Wuhan Railwaymade it difficult for the Japanese Army to mobilize into Shaanxi. Throughout Chinese military history, Shaanxi is always the major path to Sichuan (known as "Shudao"in historiography) and theJapanese plan to enter the Sichuan basinwas no different. Securing Sichuan is important since it was where the wartime capital ofChongqingand the southwesternhome frontlocated.[4]

Thirdly, the floods in Henan and Anhui crushed the tracks and bridges of theBeijing–Wuhan Railway,Tianjin–Pukou Railwayand Longhai Railway. This prevented the Japanese Army from quick mobilizing their machines and troops across the theaters of North China, Central China and Northwest China.[7]

The flood achieved the above strategic intent along with casualties and damages. Believing that the civilians would help them, theChinese Communiststurned the flooded area into a recruiting ground, directing survivors' anger towards a common enemy to bring them into their ranks. By the 1940s the area had evolved into a major guerrilla base known as theYuwansu Base Area.[23]

Short term[edit]

The Chinese National Army took the opportunities to encircle the swamped Japanese army. The14thdivision was swamped in Zhongmu County and could only reassemble on 23 June. The isolated16thwas crushed by the Chinese National Army inWeishi Countyon 24 June and could only reassemble on 7 July.[8]

Most of the flooded towns and transport lines had already been captured by the Japanese; after the flood, the Japanese could not consolidate their control over the area. In fact, large parts of it became guerrilla areas.[23]

The flood bought time for theBattle of Wuhan.[24][9]The flood stopped the Japanese Army from capturing theZhengzhou junctionof theBeijing–Wuhan Railway.[8]Unintentionally, the flood also destroyed theBengburailway bridge of theTianjin–Pukou Railway.[24]The Japanese thus could not use either railway to send its troops and supplies.[24]

Damages[edit]

After the flooding, the Yellow River was diverted from its earlier course at Huayuankou, and flowed into theJialu RiverinZhongmu County.The new course led the Yellow River into theShaying Riverat the city of Zhoujiakou (nowZhoukou), eventually joining theHuai River.Water overflowed from these smaller rivers, causing widespread destruction in the basin. According to a postwar report, floods inundated 32 percent of land and 45 percent of villages in 20 affected counties.[25]

Besides the massive death toll, the flooded areas were affected for years to come. The flooded countryside was more or less abandoned and all the crops destroyed. Upon the recession of the waters, much of the ground was uncultivable as much of the soil was covered insilt.Many of the public structures and housing were also destroyed, leaving any survivors destitute. The irrigation channels were also ruined, further adding to the toll on the farmlands.[23] The destruction also had a long-term psychological effect on the Chinese population.

The Nationalist government were slow to provide disaster relief.[26]: 40 

Casualties[edit]

Japanese troops guarding Chinese refugees displaced by war and the Yellow River Flood, China Jun-Jul 1938

The immediatedrowningdeaths were estimated to range from 30,000 (Kuo Tai-chun, 2015)[11][12]to 89,000 (China Academy of Sciences, 1995).[13]Estimates of total deaths resulting from floods, famine and plague varied wildly. Two professional sources put it to between 400,000 and 500,000, according to Wang Zhibin (1986)[14]and Bi Chunfu (1995),[15]an editor at theYellow River Conservancy Commissionof the Ministry of Water Resources and a researcher atSecond Historical Archives of Chinarespectively. A much higher estimate of 893,303 total deaths given by the Nationalist government's relief statistics in 1948[27]was discredited for its unspecified methodology of body counting and its questionable approximation of the missing figure of Anhui province.[28][29]The Nationalist government's relief statistics were even higher than two early communist estimates in the 1950s, which put the total deaths to 470,000 and 500,000 respectively.[28]However, subsequent communist sources generally upheld the 893,303 figure to portray the Nationalist government as inhumane.[28]

The figures of inundated land were exploited by Nationalist propaganda. Initially, the Nationalist government falsely claimed that the flood was caused by Japaneseaerial bombing,hence the Nationalist initially claimed 12 million peasants living on inundated land to boostanti-Japanese public sentiment.[28][29]Bi Chunfu (1995) estimated that five million peasants were living on the inundated land.[15]Bi's figure was echoed by two early communist estimates in the 1950s, which estimated 6.1 million and 5 million respectively.[28]

See also[edit]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to1938 Yellow River flood.

References[edit]

  1. ^abDi Wu, "The cult of geography: Chinese riverine defence during the Battle of Wuhan, 1937-1938".War in History.Volume: 29 issue: 1, page(s): 185-204.https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0968344520961548
  2. ^Dutch, Steven I. (November 2009). "The Largest Act of Environmental Warfare in History".Environmental & Engineering Geoscience.15(4): 287–297.Bibcode:2009EEGeo..15..287D.doi:10.2113/gseegeosci.15.4.287.
  3. ^Muscolino, Micah S. (2014). The Ecology of War in China: Henan Province, the Yellow River, and Beyond, 1938–1950. Cambridge University Press.
  4. ^abcdCừ trường căn (2003).Công tội thiên thu —— hoa viên khẩu sự kiện nghiên cứu.East China Normal University(PhD). pp. 37, 38, 72.
  5. ^abTrương long kiệt (2019)."Toàn diện kháng chiến thời kỳ tô liên đối quốc cộng lưỡng đảng viện trợ bỉ giác nghiên cứu".Thâm quyến xã hội khoa học(4).
  6. ^Cừ trường căn (2003).Công tội thiên thu —— hoa viên khẩu sự kiện nghiên cứu.East China Normal University(PhD). pp. 38, 41, 73.
  7. ^abcCừ trường căn (2003).Công tội thiên thu —— hoa viên khẩu sự kiện nghiên cứu.East China Normal University(PhD). pp. 23–24, 72–73.
  8. ^abcPhòng vệ sảnh phòng vệ nghiên tu sở chiến sử thất (1976).Chi na sự 変 lục quân tác chiến ＜2＞ chiêu hòa thập tứ niên cửu nguyệt まで.Triều vân tân văn xã. pp. 77–78, 125 – via ebook on Japan National Institute for Defense Studies.
  9. ^abPhó ứng xuyên; hồng tiểu hạ (2015). "Đệ thập chương trọng tham từ châu hội chiến". In quách đại quân (ed.).Trọng tham kháng chiến sử ( nhất ): Tòng kháng nhật đại chiến lược đích hình thành đáo võ hán hội chiến 1931-1938.Taipei: Liên kinh. p. 437-440, 447-449.
  10. ^Eastman, Lloyd E. (1986). "Nationalist China during the Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945". In Twitchett, Denis; Fairbank, John (eds.).The Cambridge History of China, Volume 13: Republican China 1912-1949, part 2.Cambridge University Press. p. 555.
  11. ^abChu lôi (2015-10-27)."Tư liêu giải mật: Hoàng hà hoa viên khẩu quyết đê trở địch nam hạ".World Journal.Whitestone, NY. Archived fromthe originalon 2018-08-18 – via United Daily News.
  12. ^abLý di vân (2015-09-30)."Trọng tham kháng chiến sử hoàng hà quyết đê hữu hiệu ngự địch".Vượng báo.Taipei: China Times Group.
  13. ^abThang kỳ thành; lý tú vân; Institute of Geographic Sciences, China Academy of Sciences (1995). "Thủy quyển trung đích tự nhiên tai hại". In vương kính phong (ed.).Trung quốc tự nhiên tai hại khu hoa —— tai hại khu hoa, ảnh hưởng bình giới, giảm tai đối sách.Beijing: Trung quốc khoa học kỹ thuật xuất bản xã. p. 41.
  14. ^abVương chất bân (1986). "Phiếm khu diện tích cập thụ tai nhân khẩu khảo". In trịnh châu thị chính hiệp văn sử tư liêu ủy viên hội (ed.).Trịnh châu văn sử tư liêu đệ 2 tập.pp. 92–96.Also cited inDương quốc thuận (2003). "Đệ thập chương bán phong kiến bán thực dân địa chế độ hạ đích hoàng hà". In hoàng hà thủy lợi ủy viên hội (ed.).Hoàng hà thủy lợi sử thuật yếu ( tân bài bổn ).Hoàng hà thủy lợi xuất bản xã. p. 407.
  15. ^abcdTất xuân phú (1995).Kháng chiến giang hà quật khẩu bí sử.Taipei: Văn hải học thuật tư tưởng nghiên cứu phát triển văn giáo cơ kim hội. p. 60.Also cited inLary, Diana (1 April 2001). "Drowned Earth: The Strategic Breaching of the Yellow River Dyke, 1938".War in History.8(2): 202, 205–206.doi:10.1177/096834450100800204.S2CID159547176.
  16. ^abcdCừ trường căn (2003).Công tội thiên thu —— hoa viên khẩu sự kiện nghiên cứu.East China Normal University(PhD). pp. 28–30, 33–34.
  17. ^Falkenhausen, Alexander von (1935-08-20).Tổng cố vấn pháp khẳng hào sâm quan ô ứng phó thời cục đối sách chi kiến nghị..Reprinted in:Thích hậu kiệt, ed. (1991). "Đức quốc tổng cố vấn pháp khẳng hào sâm quan vu trung quốc kháng nhật chiến bị chi lưỡng phân kiến nghị thư".Dân quốc đương án(2). Nanjing: Second Historical Archives of China.
  18. ^Dân quốc nhị thập lục niên độ quốc phòng tác chiến kế hoa.March 1937..Reprinted in:Mã chấn độc, ed. (1987). "Quốc dân đảng chính phủ 1937 niên độ quốc phòng tác chiến kế hoa ( giáp án )".Dân quốc đương án(4). Nanjing: Second Historical Archives of China.
  19. ^abCừ trường căn (2003).Công tội thiên thu —— hoa viên khẩu sự kiện nghiên cứu.East China Normal University(PhD). pp. 36–41.
  20. ^"Yellow River flood, 1938-47 | DisasterHistory.org".www.disasterhistory.org.Retrieved2017-10-09.
  21. ^Taylor, Jay (2009).The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-Shek and the Struggle for Modern China.Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. pp.154–155.ISBN9780674033382.
  22. ^Institution of Water Engineers (1947).Water and Water Engineering.Fuel & Metallurgical Journals Limited. p. 312.
  23. ^abcLary, Diana (1 April 2001). "Drowned Earth: The Strategic Breaching of the Yellow River Dyke, 1938".War in History.8(2): 191–207.doi:10.1177/096834450100800204.S2CID159547176.1082337951.
  24. ^abcCừ trường căn (2003).Công tội thiên thu —— hoa viên khẩu sự kiện nghiên cứu.East China Normal University(PhD). pp. 23–24, 28, 37–38, 72–73, 188–196.
  25. ^Muscolino, Micah S. (2014). The Ecology of War in China: Henan Province, the Yellow River, and Beyond, 1938–1950, pp. 29-31. Cambridge University Press.
  26. ^Marquis, Christopher;Qiao, Kunyuan (2022).Mao and Markets: The Communist Roots of Chinese Enterprise.New Haven:Yale University Press.doi:10.2307/j.ctv3006z6k.ISBN978-0-300-26883-6.JSTORj.ctv3006z6k.OCLC1348572572.S2CID253067190.
  27. ^Hàn khải đồng; nam chung vạn (1948).Hoàng phiếm khu đích tổn hại dữ thiện hậu cứu tế.Shanghai: Hành chính viện thiện hậu cứu tế tổng thự biên toản ủy viên hội. pp. 21–23 – via Taiwan eBook Database, National Central Library.Also cited inTừ hữu lễ; chu lan lan (2005)."Lược luận hoa viên khẩu quyết đê dữ phiếm khu sinh thái hoàn cảnh đích ác hóa"(PDF).Kháng nhật chiến tranh nghiên cứu.Archived fromthe original(PDF)on 2023-04-24.Retrieved2023-04-24.
  28. ^abcdeLary, Diana (1 April 2001). "Drowned Earth: The Strategic Breaching of the Yellow River Dyke, 1938".War in History.8(2): 202, 205–206.doi:10.1177/096834450100800204.S2CID159547176.
  29. ^abVu hãn, ed. (2013-03-11)."Tưởng giới thạch hoa viên khẩu quyết đê yêm tử đa thiếu bách tính?".Đằng tấn lịch sử · kim nhật thoại đề.Archived fromthe originalon 2013-12-02.
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