Alexei Kosygin

"Kosygin" redirects here. For other uses, seeKosygin (disambiguation).

In this name that followsEastern Slavic naming customs,thepatronymicisNikolayevichand thefamily nameisKosygin.

Alexei Kosygin
Алексей Косыгин
Kosygin in 1972
8thPremier of the Soviet Union
In office 15 October 1964 – 23 October 1980
President	Anastas Mikoyan Nikolai Podgorny Leonid Brezhnev
Deputy	First Deputy Premiers Dmitriy Ustinov Kirill Mazurov Dmitry Polyansky Nikolai Tikhonov
Leader	Leonid Brezhnev
Preceded by	Nikita Khrushchev
Succeeded by	Nikolai Tikhonov
First Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union
In office 4 May 1960 – 15 October 1964
Premier	Nikita Khrushchev
Preceded by	Frol Kozlov
Succeeded by	Dmitriy Ustinov
Additional positions Chairman of theState Planning Committee In office 20 March 1959 – 4 May 1960 Premier Nikita Khrushchev Preceded by Joseph Kuzmin Succeeded by Vladimir Novikov PremierofRussian SFSR In office 23 June 1943 – 23 March 1946 Premier Joseph Stalin Preceded by Ivan Khokhlov Succeeded by Mikhail Rodionov Full member of the18th,22nd,23rd,24th,&25th CPSUPolitburo In office 4 May 1960 – 21 October 1980 In office 4 September 1948 – 16 October 1952 Candidate member of the18th,19th,&20thCPSUPolitburo In office 29 June 1957 – 4 May 1960 In office 16 October 1952 – 5 March 1953 In office 18 March 1946 – 4 September 1948
Personal details
Born	21 February [O.S.8 February] 1904 Saint Petersburg,Russian Empire
Died	18 December 1980(1980-12-18)(aged 76) Moscow,Russian SFSR,Soviet Union
Resting place	Kremlin Wall Necropolis,Moscow
Citizenship	Soviet
Nationality	Russian
Political party	Communist Party of the Soviet Union(1927–1980)
Spouse	Klavdia Andreyevna (died 1967)
Residence	House on the Embankment
Profession	Teacher, civil servant
Awards
Military service
Allegiance	Russian SFSR
Branch/service	Red Army
Years of service	1919–1921
Rank	Conscript
Commands	Red Army
Battles/wars	Russian Civil War

Alexei Nikolayevich Kosygin(Russian:Алексе́й Никола́евич Косы́гин,IPA:[ɐlʲɪkˈsʲejnʲɪkɐˈla(j)ɪvʲɪtɕkɐˈsɨɡʲɪn];21 February [O.S.8 February] 1904 – 18 December 1980)was aSovietstatesman during theCold War.He served as thePremier of the Soviet Unionfrom 1964 to 1980 and was one of the most influential Soviet policymakers in the mid-1960s along with General SecretaryLeonid Brezhnev.

Kosygin was born in the city ofSaint Petersburgin 1904 to a Russian working-class family. He was conscripted into the labour army during theRussian Civil War,and after the Red Army's demobilization in 1921, he worked inSiberiaas an industrial manager. Kosygin returned to Leningrad in the early 1930s and worked his way up the Soviet hierarchy. During theGreat Patriotic War(World War II), Kosygin was tasked by theState Defence Committeewith moving Soviet industry out of territories soon to be overrun by the German Army. He served asMinister of Financefor a year before becomingMinister of Light Industry(later, Minister of Light Industry and Food). Stalin removed Kosygin from thePolitburoone year before his own death in 1953, intentionally weakening Kosygin's position within the Soviet hierarchy.

Stalin died in 1953, and on 20 March 1959, Kosygin was appointed to the position of chairman of theState Planning Committee(Gosplan), a post he would hold for little more than a year. Kosygin next becameFirst Deputy chairmanof the Council of Ministers. WhenNikita Khrushchevwas removed from power in 1964, Kosygin andLeonid Brezhnevsucceeded him as Premier andFirst Secretary,respectively. Thereafter, as a member of thecollective leadership,Kosygin formed an unofficialTriumvirate(also known by its Russian nameTroika) alongside Brezhnev andNikolai Podgorny,theChairmanof thePresidium of the Supreme Soviet,that governed the Soviet Union in Khrushchev's place.

During the initial years following Khrushchev's ouster, Kosygin initially emerged as the leading figure in Soviet politics.In addition to managing the Soviet Union's economy, he assumed a preeminent role in its foreign policy by leading arms control talks with the US and overseeing relations with Western countries in general. However, the onset of thePrague Springin 1968 sparked a severe backlash against his policies, enabling Leonid Brezhnev to decisively eclipse him as the dominant force within the Politburo. While he and Brezhnev disliked one another, he remained in office until being forced to retire on 23 October 1980, due to bad health. He died two months later on 18 December 1980.

Early life

Kosygin was born into aRussianworking-class family consisting of his father and mother (Nikolai Ilyich and Matrona Alexandrovna) and his siblings. The family lived inSaint Petersburg.Kosygin wasbaptized(7 March 1904) one month after his birth.He lost his mother in infancy and was brought up by his father.

He and his father sympathized with theRevolutionand Alexei was conscripted into alabour armyon theBolshevikside at the age of 14 during theRussian Civil Warof 1917–1922. After demobilization from theRed Armyin 1921, Kosygin attended the Leningrad Co-operative Technical Schooland found work in the system of consumerco-operativesinNovosibirsk,Siberia.When asked why he worked in the co-operative sector of the economy, Kosygin replied, quoting a slogan ofVladimir Lenin:"Co-operation – the path to socialism!"Kosygin stayed there for six years untilRobert Eikhepersonally advised him to quit, shortly before the repressions hit the Soviet consumer co-operation movement.

Early career

Pre-war period

He applied for a membership in theCommunist Party of the Soviet Unionin 1927and returned to Leningrad in 1930 to study at theLeningrad Textile Institute;he graduated in 1935.After finishing his studies, Kosygin worked as a foreman and later a manager in a textile mill director. He rose rapidly during theGreat Purge,overseen in Leningrad by the provincial communist party boss,Andrei Zhdanov.He was appointed director of the October Textile Factory in 1937, head of the Industry and Transport department of the Leningrad provincial communist party in July 1938, and in October 1938,Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Leningrad City Soviets of Working People's Deputies,i.e. 'mayor' of Leningrad City. In 1939, he was appointedPeople's Commissarfor Textile and Industry and earned a seat on theCentral Committee(CC). In 1940 Kosygin became aDeputy Chairmanof theCouncil of People's Commissars.

Wartime

Kosygin was appointed by theState Defence Committeeto manage critically important missions during theGreat Patriotic War(World War II).

As deputy chairman of the Council of Evacuation,he had the task of evacuating industry from territories about to be overrun by the Axis. Under his command 1523 factories were evacuated eastwards, as well as huge volumes of raw materials, ready-made goods and equipment. Kosygin managed clearing of congestions on the railroads in order to maintain their stable operation.

During theLeningrad Blockadehe was sent to his hometown to manage the construction ofan ice road and a pipelineacross the Lake Ladoga.This allowed to evacuate some half-million people from the besieged and starving city, and to supply fuel to its factories and power plants.He was also responsible for the procurement of locally available firewood.

In 1943 Alexey Kosygin was promoted toChairmanof theCouncil of People's Commissars(government) of theRussian SFSR.In 1944 he was appointed to head the Currency Board of the Soviet Union.

Afterwar period

Kosygin became a candidate member of thePolitburoin 1946. During theSoviet famine of 1946–47He headed the foodstuff relief missions to the most suffering regions.He was appointed USSR Minister for Finance in February 1948, and a full member of the Politburo on 4 September 1948, putting him among the dozen or so most ranking officials in the USSR.

Kosygin's administrative skillsled Stalin to take the younger man under his wing. Stalin shared information with Kosygin, such as how much money the families ofVyacheslav Molotov,Anastas Mikoyan,andLazar Kaganovichpossessed, spent and paid their staff. (A Politburo member earned a modest salary by Soviet standardsbut enjoyed unlimited access toconsumer goods.) Stalin sent Kosygin to each hometo put their houses into "proper order".

Temporary fall

Kosygin's patron, Zhdanov, died suddenly in August 1948. Soon afterwards, Zhdanov's old rivalsLavrentiy BeriaandGeorgy Malenkovpersuaded Stalin to let them remove members of the decapitated Zhdanov faction, of whom the three most prominent wereNikolai Voznesensky,then Chairman of theState Planning Committeeand aFirst Deputy Premier,Alexey Kuznetsov,the party secretary with oversight over the security, and Kosygin. During the brutal purge that followed, known as theLeningrad affair,Voznesensky, Kuznetsov and many others were arrested and shot. Kosygin was relegated to the post of USSR Minister for Light Industry,while nominally retaining his membership of the Politburo until 1952.

TheHouse on the Embankmentwas a building completed in 1931 to house the government elite; Kosygin lived there.

Nikita Khrushchevwrote in his memoirs:

Beria and Malenkov were doing everything they could to wreck this troika of Kuznetsov, Voznesensky and Kosygin... Many people perished in Leningrad. So did many people who had been transferred from Leningrad to work in other regions. As for Kosygin, his life was hanging by a thread... Men who had been arrested and condemned in Leningrad made ridiculous accusations against him... I simply can't explain how he was saved from being eliminated along with the others. Kosygin, as they say, must have drawn a lucky lottery ticket.

Kosygin told his son-in-law Mikhail Gvishiani, anNKVDofficer, of the accusations leveled against Voznesensky because of his possession of firearms. Gvishiani and Kosygin threw all their weapons into a lake and searched both their own houses for any listening devices. They found one at Kosygin's house, but it might have been installed to spy on MarshalGeorgy Zhukov,who had lived there before him. According to his memoirs, Kosygin never left his home without reminding his wife what to do if he did not return from work. After living two years in constant fear, the family reached the conclusionthat Stalin would not harm them.

Khrushchev era

In September 1953, six months after Stalin's death, Kosygin was appointed USSR Minister for Industrial Goods, and in December he was reinstated as a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, under Malenkov, Stalin's immediate successor, but lost that position in December 1956, during Khrushchev's ascendancy, when he was appointed Deputy Chairman of the State Economic Commission. When the power struggle between Khrushchev and the so-called 'Anti-Party Group' came to a head in 1957, Kosygin backed Khrushchev because, as he said later, if Malenkov and his allies had won "blood would have flowed again",but the French journalistMichel Tatu,a close observer who was based in Moscow at the time, concluded that "Kosygin did not owe anything to Khrushchev" and that out of the post-1957 leadership "was visibly the least willing to praise the First Secretary", and that Khrushchev was "somewhat reluctant" to promote Kosygin.

However, despite Khrushchev's reluctance, Kosygin's career made a steady recovery. In June 1957, he was again appointed a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers (for the third time), and a candidate member of the PresidiumCentral Committee(the renamedPolitburo). In March 1959, he was made Chairman ofGosplan,and on 4 May 1960, he was promoted First deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and a full member of the Presidium.

As First Deputy Premier Kosygin travelled abroad, mostly on trade missions, to countries such asNorth Korea,India,ArgentinaandItaly.Since 1959 Kosygin headed Soviet mission to the ComEcon. Later, in the aftermath of theCuban Missile Crisis,Kosygin was the Soviet spokesman for improved relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.According to Michel Tatu, in 1960–62, Kosygin was one of the 'big four', with Khrushchev,Frol KozlovandLeonid Brezhnev,who would be present in the Kremlin to greet visiting leaders of East European communist parties, implying, but in November 1962, after Khrushchev complained about the management of Gosplan, and opposed Kosygin's plans for economic reform, he was removed from the inner leadership.

Premiership

Further information:History of the Soviet Union (1964–1982)

See also:Kosygin's First,Second,Third,Fourth,andFifth Government

Struggle for power with Brezhnev

Kosygin at the Glassboro Summit Conference, 23 June 1967

Further information:Collective leadership

When Khrushchev was removed from power in October 1964,Kosygin replaced him as Premier in acollective leadershipthat includedLeonid Brezhnevasgeneral secretaryandNikolai Podgornywho ultimately becameChairmanof thePresidium.Overall, the new Politburo adopted a more conservative outlook than that under Khrushchev's rule.

Kosygin, Podgorny andAndrei Kirilenkowere the most reformist members, Brezhnev andArvīds Pelšebelonged to the moderate faction whileMikhail Suslovretained his leadership of the party'sStalinistwing.

In October 1964, at a ceremony in honour ofSoviet cosmonauts,Brezhnev called for the strengthening of the Party apparatus. This speech was only the beginning of a large campaign directed against Kosygin. Several newspapers, such asPravdaandKommunist,criticized the work of the Council of Ministers, and indirectly Kosygin, its chairman, for planning the economy in an unrealistic fashion, and used the highly aggressive rhetoric previously used to condemn Khrushchev against Kosygin.

Brezhnev was able to criticize Kosygin by contrasting him withVladimir Lenin,who - Brezhnev claimed - had been more interested in improving the conditions ofSoviet agriculturethan improving the quality oflight industrial goods.Kosygin's support for producing more consumer goods was also criticized by Brezhnev, and his supporters, most notablyKonstantin Chernenko,for being a return to quasiFirst Worldpolicies. At the23rd Party Congress,Kosygin's position was weakened when Brezhnev's supporters were able to increase expenditure on defense and agriculture.However, Brezhnev did not have a majority in the Politburo, and could count on only four votes.In the Politburo, Kosygin could count onKiril Mazurov's vote, and when Kosygin and Podgorny were not bickering with each other, they actually had a majority in the Politburo over Brezhnev. Unfortunately for Kosygin this was not often the case, and Kosygin and Podgorny were constantly disagreeing on policy.

Early during Kosygin's tenure, the Brezhnev–Kosygin attempt to create stability was failing on various fronts. From 1969 to 1970, discontent within the Soviet leadership had grown to such an extent that some started to doubt both former and current Soviet policies. Examples include the handling of thePrague Springand the laterSoviet invasion of Czechoslovakia(which Kosygin initially resisted),the decline inagriculture production,theSino–Soviet border conflict(he advocated restraint),theVietnam War,and theSoviet–American talkson the limitation of strategic missiles. Two summit conferences between the US and the USSR were held: the Warsaw Pact Summit Conference and the Moscow Summit Conference; both failed to gain support for Soviet policies.

By 1970, these differences had not been resolved, and Brezhnev postponed the24th Party Congressand theNinth Five-Year Plan(1971–1975). The delay in resolving these issues led to rumors circulating in Soviet society that Kosygin, or even Brezhnev, would lose their posts to Podgorny. By March 1971, it became apparent that Brezhnev was the leader of the country, with Kosygin as the spokesman of the five-year plan and Podgorny's position within the collective leadership strengthened.

Foreign policy

Kosygin with Egypt PresidentGamal Abdel Nasserat a visit to Cairo, May 1966

Early on in his tenure, Kosygin challenged Brezhnev's right asgeneral secretaryto represent the country abroad, a function Kosygin believed should fall into the hands of thehead of government,as was common in non-communist countries. This was actually implemented for a short period,which ledHenry A. Kissingerto believe that Kosygin was theleader of the Soviet Union.Kosygin, who had been the chief negotiator with theFirst Worldduring the 1960s, was hardly to be seen outside theSecond Worldafter Brezhnev consolidated his position within the Politburo,but also due to Foreign MinisterAndrei Gromyko's dislike of Kosygin meddling into his own ministerial affairs.

Kosygin with US PresidentLyndon B. Johnsonat the 1967Glassboro Summit Conference

TheSix-Day Warin the Middle East had the effect of increasing Soviet–American cooperation; to improve relations even further, theUnited States Governmentinvited Kosygin to a summit withLyndon B. Johnson,the President of the United States, following his speech to the United Nations.At the summit, which became known as theGlassboro Summit Conference,Johnson and Kosygin failed to reach agreement on limiting anti-ballistic missile systems, but the summit's friendly and even open atmosphere was referred to as the "Spirit of Glassboro".Relations between the two countries improved further when the1970 Moscow Treatywas signed on 12 August 1970 by Kosygin and Gromyko andWilly BrandtandWalter Scheelwho representedWest Germany.In 1971, Kosygin gave anextensive interviewto the American delegation that includedDavid Rockefeller,presenting his views on US-Soviet relations, environmental protection, arms control and other issues.

Alexei Kosygin (left) andAhmed Hassan al-Bakrsigning the Iraqi–Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Co-Operation in 1972

Kosygin developed a close friendly relationship with the President ofFinlandUrho Kekkonen,which helped the USSR to maintain active mutual trade with Finland and to keep it away fromCold Warconfrontation.

In 1972, Kosygin signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the government ofIraq,building on strong Soviet ties to theIraqi Arab Socialist Ba'ath Partyand previous close relations with Iraqi leaderAbd al-Karim Qasim.

Kosygin protectedJános Kádár's economic reforms and his position as leader of theHungarian People's Republicfrom intervention by the Soviet leadership.Polish leaderWładysław Gomułka,who was removed from all of his posts in 1970, was succeeded byEdward Gierekwho tried to revitalize the economy of thePeople's Republic of Polandby borrowing money from theFirst World.The Soviet leadership approved both countries' respective economic experiments, since it was trying to reduce its large Eastern Bloc subsidy programme in the form of cheap oil and gas exports.During the discussions within the Soviet leadership of a possibleSoviet invasion of CzechoslovakiaKosygin reminded leaders of the consequences of the Soviet suppression of the1956 Hungarian revolution.Kosygin's stance became more aggressive later on when he understood that the reforms in Czechoslovakia could be turned against his1965 Soviet economic reform.

We should tell Taraki and Amin to change their tactics. They still continue to execute those people who disagree with them. They are killing nearly all of theParchamleaders, not only the highest rank, but of the middle rank, too.

— Kosygin speaking at a Politburo session.

Kosygin acted as a mediator betweenIndiaandPakistanin 1966, and got both nations to sign theTashkent Declaration.Kosygin became the chief spokesman on the issue of arms control. In retrospect, many of Kosygin's colleagues felt he carried out his work "stoically", but lacked "enthusiasm", and therefore never developed a real taste forinternational politics.

TheSino–Soviet splitchagrined Kosygin a great deal, and for a while he refused to accept its irrevocability; he briefly visited Beijing in 1969 due to increased tension between the USSR andMaoist China.Kosygin said, in a close-knit circle, that "We are communists and they are communists. It is hard to believe we will not be able to reach an agreement if we met face to face".His view on China changed however, and according toHarold Wilson,formerPrime Minister of the United Kingdom,Kosygin viewed China as an "organized military dictatorship" whose intended goal was to enslave "Vietnamand the whole of Asia ".

During an official visit by an Afghan delegation, Kosygin andAndrei Kirilenkocriticized Afghan leadersNur Muhammad TarakiandHafizullah AminforStalinist-like repressionist behaviour. He promised to send more economic and military aid, but rejected any proposal regarding a possible Soviet intervention, as an intervention inAfghanistanwould strain the USSR's foreign relations with the First World according to Kosygin, most notably West Germany.However, in a closed meeting, without Kosygin, who strongly opposed any kind of military intervention, the Politburo unanimously supported a Soviet intervention.

Economic policy

Five-Year Plans

Further information:Five-year plans of the Soviet Union

TheEighth Five-Year Plan(1966–1970) is considered to be one of the most successful periods for the Soviet economy and the most successful when it comes to consumer production (seeThe "Kosygin" reform).It became known as the "golden era".The23rd Party Congressand theNinth Five-Year Plan(1971–1975) had been postponed by Brezhnev due to a power struggle within the Soviet leadership.At the 23rd Party Congress Kosygin promised that the Ninth Five-Year Plan would increase the supply of food, clothing and other household appliances up to 50 percent.The plan envisaged a massive increase in the Sovietstandard of living,with Kosygin proclaiming a growth of 40 percent for the population's cash income in his speech to the congress.

TheTenth Five-Year Plan(1976–1981) was referred to by Kosygin as the "plan of quality".Brezhnev rejected Kosygin's bid for producing moreconsumer goodsduring the Tenth Five-Year Plan. As a result, the total volume of consumer goods in industrial production only stood at 26 percent. Kosygin's son-in-law notes that Kosygin was furious with the decision, and proclaimed increased defence expenditure would become the Soviet Union's "complete ruin".The plan was less ambitious than its predecessors, with targets of national industrial growth no higher than what the rest of the world had already achieved.Soviet agriculturewould receive a share investment of 34 percent, a share much larger than its proportional contribution to the Soviet economy, as it accounted for only 3 percent of the Soviet GDP.

The "Kosygin" reform

Main article:1965 Soviet economic reform

Like Khrushchev, Kosygin tried to reform thecommand economywithin a socialist framework. In 1965 Kosygin initiated aneconomic reformwidely referred to as the "Kosygin reform". Kosygin sought to make Soviet industry more efficient by including some market measures common in the First World such asprofit makingfor instance; he also tried to increase quantity of production, increaseincentivesfor managers and workers, and freeing managers fromcentralizedstatebureaucracy.The reform had been proposed to Khrushchev in 1964, who evidently liked it and took some preliminary steps to implement it. Brezhnev allowed the reform to proceed because the Soviet economy was entering a period of low growth.In its testing phase, the reform was applied to 336 enterprises inlight industry.

The reform was influenced by the works of Soviet economistEvsei Liberman.Kosygin overestimated the ability of the Soviet administrative machine to develop the economy, which led to "corrections" to some of Liberman's more controversial beliefs aboutdecentralization.According to critics, Kosygin's changes to Liberman's original vision caused the reform to fail.

A propaganda poster promoting the reform. The poster reads:We're forging the keys of happiness.

Kosygin believed that decentralization,semi-public companies,and cooperatives were keys to catching up to the First World's contemporary level of economic growth. His reform sought a gradual change from a "state-administered economy" to an economy in which "the state restricts itself to guiding enterprises".The reform was implemented, but showed several malfunctions and inconsistencies early on.

Results

The salary for Soviet citizens increased abruptly by almost 2.5 times during the plan. Real wages in 1980 amounted to 232.7 rubles, compared to 166.3 rubles before the1965 Soviet economic reformand the Eighth Five-Year Plan. The first period, 1960–1964, was characterized by low growth, while the second period, 1965–1981, had a stronger growth rate. The second period vividly demonstrated the success of the Kosygin reform, with the average annual growth in retail turnover being 11.2 billion rubles, 1.8 times higher than in the first period and 1.2 times higher than the third period (1981–1985). Consumption of goods and daily demand also increased. The consumption of home appliances greatly increased. Refrigerators increased from a low of 109,000 in 1964 to 440,000 units by 1973; consumption declined during the reversal of the reform. Car production increased, and would continue to do so until the late 1980s. The Soviet leadership, under pressure, sought to provide more attractive goods for Soviet consumers.

The removal of Khrushchev in 1964 signalled the end of his "housing revolution".Housing construction declined between 1960 and 1964 to an average of 1.63 million square metres. Following this sudden decrease, housing construction increased sharply between 1965 and 1966, but dropped again, and then steadily grew (the average annual growth rate was 4.26 million square metres). This came largely at the expense of businesses. While the housing shortage was never fully resolved, and still remains a problem in present-day Russia, the reform overcame the negative trend and renewed the growth of housing construction.

Cancellation and aftermath

Growing hostility towards reform, the initial poor results, and Kosygin's reformist stance, led to a popular backlash against him. Kosygin lost most of the privileges he had enjoyed before the reform, but Brezhnev was never able to remove him from the office of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, despite his weakened position.In the aftermath of his failed reform, Kosygin spent the rest of his life improving the economic administration through the modification of targets; he implemented various programmes to improve food security and ensure the futureintensification of production.There is no proof to back up the claim that the reform itself contributed to the high growth seen in the late-1960s, or that its cancellation had anything to do with the stagnating growth of the economy which began in the 1970s.

1973 and 1979 reforms

Main articles:1973 Soviet economic reformand1979 Soviet economic reform

Kosygin initiated anothereconomic reform in 1973with the intentions of weakening thecentral Ministriesand giving more powers to the regional authorities in republican and local-levels. The reform's failure to meet Kosygin's goal led to its cancellation. However, the reform succeeded in creatingassociations,an organization representing various enterprises.The last significant reform undertaken by the pre-perestroikaleadership was initiated byKosygin's fifth governmentin a joint decision of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers. The "Improving planning and reinforcing the effects of the economic mechanism on raising the effectiveness in production and improving the quality of work", more commonly known as the1979 reform.The reform, in contrast to the 1965 reform, was intended to increase the central government's economic involvement by enhancing the duties and responsibilities of the ministries. Due to Kosygin's resignation in 1980, and because ofNikolai Tikhonov's conservative approach to economics, very little of the reform was actually implemented.

Later life and resignation

Kosygin (right) shaking hands with Romanian communist leaderNicolae Ceaușescuin 1974

By the early to mid-1970s Brezhnev had established a strong enough power base to effectively become leader. According to historian Ilya Zemtsov, the author ofChernenko: The Last Bolshevik: The Soviet Union on the Eve of Perestroika,Kosygin "began to lose power" with the24th Party Congressin 1971 which for the first time publicized the formula 'the Politburo led by Brezhnev' ". Along with weakening Kosygin's position, Brezhnev moved to strengthen the Party's hold on the Government apparatus, weakening Kosygin's position further.Historian Robert Wesson, the author ofLenin's Legacy: The Story of the CPSU,notes that Kosygin's economic report to the25th Party Congress"pointed even more clearly to the end of struggle" between Brezhnev and Kosygin.Kosygin was further pushed aside when Brezhnev published his memoirs, which stated that Brezhnev, not Kosygin, was in charge of all major economic decisions.To make matters worse for Kosygin, Brezhnev blocked any future talks on economic reform within the party and government apparatus, and information regarding the reform of 1965 was suppressed.

Brezhnev consolidated his own position over the Government Apparatus by strengthening Podgorny's position asChairmanof thePresidium of the Supreme Soviet,literally head of state, by giving the office some of the functions of the Premier. The1977 Soviet Constitutionstrengthened Podgorny's control of the Council of Ministers, by giving the post of head of state some executive powers. In fact, because of the 1977 Soviet Constitution, the Council of Ministers became subordinate to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.When Podgorny was replaced as head of state in 1977 by Brezhnev, Kosygin's role in day-to-day management of government activities was lessened drastically, through Brezhnev's new-found post.Rumours started circulating within the top circles, and on the streets, that Kosygin would retire due to bad health.

Brezhnev's consolidation of power weakened Kosygin's influence and prestige within the Politburo. Kosygin's position was gradually weakened during the 1970s and he was frequently hospitalized.On several occasionsKiril Mazurov,theFirst Deputy chairmanof theCouncil of Ministers,had to act on his behalf.Kosygin suffered his first heart attack in 1976. After this incident, it is said that Kosygin changed from having a vibrant personality to being tired and fed up; he, according to people close to him, seemed to have lost the will to continue his work. He twice filed a letter of resignation between 1976 and 1980, but was turned down on both occasions.During Kosygin's sick leave, Brezhnev appointedNikolai Tikhonovto the post of First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Tikhonov, as with Brezhnev, was a conservative, and through his post as First Deputy chairman Tikhonov was able to reduce Kosygin to a standby role. At aCentral Committeeplenum in June 1980, the Soviet economic development plan was outlined by Tikhonov, not Kosygin. The powers of the Premier diminished to the point where Kosygin was forced to discuss all decisions made by the Council of Ministers with Brezhnev.

Death

Kremlin Wall Necropolis– grave of Kosygin

Kosygin was hospitalized in October 1980; during his stay he wrote a brief letter of resignation; the following day he was deprived of all government protection, communication, and luxury goods he had earned during his political life. When Kosygin died on 18 December 1980 in Moscow, none of his Politburo colleagues, former aides, or security guards visited him. At the end of his life, Kosygin feared the complete failure of theEleventh Five-Year Plan(1981–1985), saying that the sitting leadership was reluctant to reform the stagnant Soviet economy. His funeral was postponed for three days, as Kosygin died on the eve of Brezhnev's birthday, and the day of Stalin's.Kosygin waspraised by Brezhnevas an individual who "laboured selflessly for the good of the Soviet state".Astate funeralwas conducted and Kosygin was honoured by his peers; Brezhnev,Yuri Andropov,and Tikhonov laid an urn containing his ashes at theKremlin Wall Necropolis.

Personality

Compared to other Soviet officials, Kosygin stood out as a pragmatic and relatively independent leader. In a description given by an anonymous high-rankingGRUofficial, Kosygin is described as "a lonely and somewhat tragic figure" who "understood our faults and shortcomings of our situation in general and those in our Middle East policy in particular, but, being a highly restrained man, he preferred to be cautious." An anonymous former co-worker of Kosygin said "He always had an opinion of his own, and defended it. He was a very alert man, and performed brilliantly during negotiations. He was able to cope quickly with the material that was totally new to him. I have never seen people of that calibre afterwards."

Canadian Prime MinisterPierre Trudeausaid Kosygin was like "Khrushchev without the rough edges, a fatherly man who was the forerunner ofMikhail Gorbachev".He noted that Kosygin was willing to discuss issues so long as the Soviet position was not tackled head-on.FormerUnited States Secretary of StateHenry A. Kissingersaid that Kosygin was devoted, nearly fanatically, to his work. Kosygin was viewed by Western diplomats as a pragmatist "with a glacial exterior who was orthodox if not rigid".Andrei Sakharov,aSoviet dissident,believed Kosygin to be "the most intelligent and toughest man in the Politburo".SingaporePrime MinisterLee Kuan Yewremembered Kosygin as "very quiet-spoken, but very determined, mind of great ability and application".US economistDavid Rockefellerdescribed Kosygin as a talented manager doing miracles in ruling the clumsy Soviet economy.

Legacy

Historical assessments

Kosygin would prove to be a very competent administrator, with the Sovietstandard of livingrising considerably due to his moderately reformist policy.Kosygin's moderate1965 reform,as withNikita Khrushchev'sthaw,radicalized the Soviet reform movement. WhileLeonid Brezhnevwas content to maintain the centralized structure of the Sovietplanned economy,Kosygin attempted to revitalize the ailing economic system by decentralising management. FollowingBrezhnev's deathin 1982, the reform movement was split betweenYuri Andropov's path of discipline and control and Gorbachev'sliberalizationof all aspects of public life.

Chernenko: The Last Bolshevik: The Soviet Union on the Eve of Perestroikaauthor Ilya Zemtsov describes Kosygin as "determined and intelligent, an outstanding administrator" and claims he distinguished himself from the other members of the Soviet leadership with his "extraordinary capacity for work".Historians Moshe Lewin and Gregory Elliott, the authors ofThe Soviet Century,describe him as a "phenomenal administrator"."His strength", David Law writes, was "his exceptional capability as an administrator". According to Law Kosygin proved himself to be a "competent politician" also.HistoriansEvan Mawdsleyand Stephen White claim that Brezhnev was unable to remove Kosygin because his removal would mean the loss of his last "capable administrator".In their book,The Unknown Stalin,Roy MedvedevandZhores Medvedevcalled Kosygin an "outstanding organizer", and the "newVoznesensky".HistorianArchie Brown,the authorThe Rise & Fall of Communism,believes the1965 Soviet economic reformto have been too "modest", and claimed that Kosygin "was too much a product of theSoviet ministerial system,as it evolved under Stalin, to become a radical economic reformer ". However, Brown does believe that Kosygin was" an able administrator ".Gvishiani, a Russian historian, concluded that "Kosygin survived both Stalin and Khrushchev, but did not manage to survive Brezhnev."

Kosygin was viewed with sympathy by the Soviet people, and is still presently viewed as an important figure in both Russian and Soviet history.Because of Kosygin's popularity among the Soviet people, Brezhnev developed a "strong jealousy" for Kosygin, according toNikolai Egorychev.Mikhail Smirtyukov,the formerExecutive Officerof theCouncil of Ministers,recalled that Kosygin refused to go drinking with Brezhnev, a move which annoyed Brezhnev gravely.Nikolai Ryzhkov,the lastChairmanof the Council of Ministers, in a speech to theSupreme Soviet of the Soviet Unionin 1987 referred to the "sad experiences of the 1965 reform", and claimed that everything went from bad to worse following the reform's cancellation.

Honours

During his lifetime, Kosygin received seven Orders and two Awards from the Soviet state.He was awarded twoHero of Socialist Labour (USSR);one being on his 60th birthday by thePresidium of the Supreme Sovietin 1964, on this occasion he was also awarded anOrder of Leninand aHammer and SickleGold Medal. On 20 February 1974, to commemorate his 70th birthday, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet awarded him another Order of Lenin and his second Hammer and Sickle Gold Medal. In total, Kosygin was awarded sixOrders of Leninby the Soviet state, and oneOrder of the October Revolutionand oneOrder of the Red Banner of Labour.During astate visittoPeruin the 1970s with Leonid Brezhnev and Andrei Gromyko, all three were awarded theGrand Cross of the Order of the Sunby PresidentFrancisco Morales Bermúdez.TheMoscow State Textile Universitywas named in his honour in 1981, in 1982 a bust to honour Kosygin was placed inLeningrad,present day Saint Petersburg. In 2006 theRussian Governmentrenamed a street after him.

Foreign honours

• Bangladesh Liberation War Honour(Bangladesh Muktijuddho Sanmanona)

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External links

• Media related toAlexei Kosyginat Wikimedia Commons