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Alvor Agreement

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Alvor Agreement
TypeGrant of independence
Drafted25 April 1974 – 14 January 1975
Signed15 January 1975
LocationAlvor,Portugal
Effective11 November 1975
Parties
LanguagePortuguese
Part ofa serieson the
History ofAngola
Precolonial historyto 1575
Colonization1575–1641
Dutch occupation1641–1648
Colonial history1648–1951
Portuguese province1951–1961
War of Independence1961–1974
Sovereign socialist state1975–1992
Civil War1975–2002
Post-war Angola’s
See also
Years in Angola

TheAlvor Agreement,signed on 15 January 1975 inAlvor,Portugal, grantedAngolaindependence from Portugal on 11 November and formally ended the 13-year-longAngolan War of Independence.

The agreement was signed by the Portuguese government, thePeople's Movement for the Liberation of Angola(MPLA), theNational Liberation Front of Angola(FNLA),National Union for the Total Independence of Angola(UNITA), and it established a transitional government composed of representatives of those four parties. It was not signed by theFront for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda(FLEC) or theEastern Revoltas the other parties excluded them from negotiations. The transitional government soon fell apart, with each of the nationalist factions, distrustful of the others and unwilling to share power, attempting to take control of the country by force. This initiated theAngolan Civil War.[1][2]The name of the agreement comes from the village ofAlvor,in the southern Portuguese region ofAlgarve,where it was signed.

Negotiations

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Leftist military officers overthrew theCaetano governmentin Portugal in theCarnation Revolutionon 25 April 1974. The MPLA, FNLA and UNITA all negotiated peace agreements with the transitional Portuguese government and began to fight one another for control of the Angolan capital,Luanda,and for the rest the country.Holden Roberto,Agostinho Neto,andJonas Savimbimet inBukavu,Zaire,in July and agreed to negotiate with the Portuguese as one political entity. They met again inMombasa,Kenya,on 5 January 1975, agreed to stop fighting one another, and outlined a joint negotiating position on a new constitution. They met for a third time inAlvor,Portugal from January 10–15 and signed what became known as the Alvor Agreement.[1]

Terms

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Angola

The parties agreed to hold elections for theNational Assembly of Angolain October 1975. From 31 January 1975 to independence, a transitional government consisting of the Portuguese High Commissioner AdmiralRosa Coutinhoand a Prime Ministerial Council (PMC) would rule. The PMC consisted of three representatives, one from each Angolan party to the agreement, with a rotating premiership among the representatives. Every PMC decision required two-thirds support. The twelve ministries were divided among the Angolan parties and the Portuguese government, three for each. The author Witney Wright Schneidman criticised that provision inEngaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal's Colonial Empirefor ensuring a "virtual paralysis in executive authority". The Bureau of Intelligence and Research cautioned that an excessive desire to preserve the balance of power in the agreement restricted the transitional Angolan government's ability to function.[1][2][3]

The Portuguese government's main goal in negotiations was to prevent the mass emigration of white Angolans. Paradoxically, the agreement allowed only the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA to nominate candidates to the first assembly elections, deliberately disenfranchisingBakongoin the east of the country, the Cabindese (the inhabitants ofCabinda,an exclave north of the rest of Angola, many of whom wished independence separate from Angola), and whites. The Portuguese reasoned that white Angolans would have to join the nationalist movements, and the movements would have to moderate their platforms to expand their political bases.[3]

The agreement called for the integration of the militant wings of the Angolan parties into a new military, theAngolan Defense Forces.The ADF would have 48,000 active personnel, made up of 24,000 local Black soldiers of the Portuguese Army and 8,000 MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA fighters respectively. Each party was to maintain separate barracks and outposts. Every military decision required the unanimous consent of each party's headquarters and the joint military command. The Portuguese forces lacked equipment and commitment to the cause, while Angolan nationalists were antagonistic of each other and lacked training.[1][3]

The treaty, to which FLEC never agreed, describedCabindaas an "integral and inalienable part of Angola". Separatists see the agreement as a violation of Cabindan right toself-determination.[4]By August 1975 MPLA had taken control of Cabinda.[5]

Implementation

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Agostinho Neto,MPLA leader andAngola's first president,meets with Poland's ambassador inLuandain 1978

The agreement did not establish a mechanism to verify the number of fighters from each force. All three parties soon had forces greater in number than the Portuguese did, which endangered the colonial power's ability to keep the peace. Factional fighting resumed and reached new heights as foreign supplies of arms increased. In February, the Cuban government warned theEastern Blocthat the Alvor Agreement would not succeed. By spring, theAfrican National CongressandSWAPOechoed Cuba's warning.[6]Leaders of theOrganization of African Unityorganised a peace conference, moderated by Kenyan PresidentJomo Kenyatta,with the three leaders inNakuru,Kenya,in June. The Angolan leaders issued the Nakuru Declaration on 21 June,[7]agreeing to abide by the provisions of the Alvor Agreement while they acknowledged that a mutual lack of trust had led to violence.[1]

Many analysts have criticised the transitional government in Portugal for the violence that followed the Alvor Agreement in terms of a lack of concern for internal Angolan security and favoritism towards the MPLA. High Commissioner Coutinho, one of the seven leaders of theNational Salvation Junta,openly distributed ex-Portuguese arms and military equipment to MPLA forces.[1][8][3]Edward Mulcahy, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in theUnited States State Department,toldTom Killoran,the US Consul General in Angola, to congratulate the PMC, rather than the FNLA and the UNITA on their own and Coutinho, for Portugal's "untiring and protracted efforts" at a peace agreement.[3][9]US Secretary of StateHenry Kissingerconsidered any government involving the pro-Soviet, communist MPLA, to be unacceptable, but US PresidentGerald Fordoversaw heightened aid to the FNLA.[10]

In July, the MPLA violently forced the FNLA out of Luanda, and the UNITA voluntarily withdrew to its stronghold in the south. There, MPLA forces engaged the UNITA, which declared war. By August, the MPLA had control of 11 of the 15 provincial capitals, includingCabindaand Luanda.South Africaintervened on 23 October, sending 1,500 to 2,000 troops fromNamibiainto southern Angola. FNLA-UNITA-South African forces took five provincial capitals, includingNovo RedondoandBenguela,in three weeks. On 10 November the Portuguese left Angola in accordance with the Alvor Agreement. Cuban-MPLA forces defeated South African-FNLA forces, maintaining control over Luanda. On 11 November, Neto declared the independence of the People's Republic of Angola.[1]The FNLA and the UNITA responded by proclaiming their own government, based inHuambo.[8]By mid-November, the Huambo government had control over southern Angola and began pushing north.[5]

See also

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References

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  1. ^abcdefgRothchild, Donald S. (1997).Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation.Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997. p. 116.ISBN978-0815775935.
  2. ^abTvedten, Inge (1997).Angola: Struggle for Peace and Reconstruction.London. pp.3.ISBN9780813333359.{{cite book}}:CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  3. ^abcdeSchneidman, Witney Wright (2004).Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal's Colonial Empire.Dallas. p. 200.ISBN978-0761828129.{{cite book}}:CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  4. ^Ryan, J. Atticus (1998).Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization Yearbook.The Hague; Cambridge MA. p. 58.OCLC40709448.{{cite book}}:CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  5. ^abPorter, Bruce D (1986).The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars, 1945–1980.Cambridge. pp.149.ISBN978-0521263085.{{cite book}}:CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  6. ^Westad, Odd Arne (2005).The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times.Taylor & Francis. p. 227.ISBN978-1912302796.
  7. ^McDannald, Alexander Hopkins (1976).The Americana Annual: An Encyclopedia of Current Events, 1877–1976.not identified. p.86.ISBN9780717202072.{{cite book}}:CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  8. ^abCrocker, Chester A.; Osler Hampson, Fen; Aall, Pamela R. (2005).Grasping The Nettle: Analyzing Cases Of Intractable Conflict.Washington D.C. p. 213.ISBN978-1929223619.{{cite book}}:CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  9. ^1975, Angola: Mercenaries, Murder and CorruptionArchived9 July 2011 at theWayback MachineCoalition to Oppose the Arms Trade
  10. ^Wright, George (1997).The Destruction of a Nation: United States Policy Towards Angola Since 1945.London. pp.57.ISBN978-0745310299.{{cite book}}:CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
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