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Chinese Century

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"Chinese hegemony" redirects here. For the historical hegemons of ancient China, seeFive Hegemons.
Map of China

TheChinese Century(simplified Chinese:Trung quốc thế kỷ;traditional Chinese:Trung quốc thế kỷ;pinyin:Zhōngguó shìjì) is aneologismsuggesting that the 21st century may begeoeconomicallyorgeopoliticallydominated by thePeople's Republic of China,[1]similar to how the "American Century"refers to the 20th century and the"British Centuries"to the 18th and 19th,[2]same in the 17-18th centuries dominated byFranceand the 15-16th centuries dominated bySpain.[3][4]The phrase is used particularly in association with the prediction that theeconomy of Chinamay overtake theeconomy of the United Statesto be the largest in the world.[5]A similar term isChina's riseorrise of China(simplified Chinese:Trung quốc quật khởi;traditional Chinese:Trung quốc quật khởi;pinyin:Zhōngguó juéqǐ).[6][7]

China created theBelt and Road Initiative,which according to analysts has been ageostrategiceffort to take a larger role in global affairs and challengesAmerican postwar hegemony.[8][9][10]It has also been argued that China co-founded theAsian Infrastructure Investment BankandNew Development Bankto compete with theWorld Bankand theInternational Monetary Fundindevelopment finance.[11][12]In 2015, China launched theMade in China 2025strategic plan to further develop its manufacturing sector. There have been debates on the effectiveness and practicality of these programs in promoting China's global status.

China's emergence as a global economic power is tied to its large working population.[13]However, the population in China is aging faster than almost any other country in history.[13][14]Current demographic trends could hinder economic growth, create challenging social problems, and limit China's capabilities to act as a new global hegemon.[13][15][16][17]China's primarily debt-driven economic growth also creates concerns for substantial credit default risks and a potential financial crisis.

According toThe Economist,on a purchasing-power-parity(PPP)basis, the Chinese economy became the world's largest in 2013.[18]On aforeign exchangerate basis, some estimates in 2020 and early 2021 said that China could overtake the U.S. in 2028,[19]or 2026 if theChinese currencyfurther strengthened.[20]As of July 2021,Bloomberg L.P.analysts estimated that China may either overtake the U.S. to become the world's biggest economy in the 2030s or never be able to reach such a goal.[21]Some scholars believe that China's rise has peaked and that an impending stagnation or decline may follow.[22][23][24]

Debates and factors[edit]

GDP(current US$, not adjusted forpurchasing power parity) - United States, China (in trillions of US$, 1960–2019)
Nominal GDP per capita (not adjusted for purchasing power parity) - United States, China (1960–2019)
See also:Belt and Road Initiative,Made in China 2025,andRegional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

China's economywasestimatedto be the largest in the 16th, 17th and early 18th century.[25]Joseph Stiglitzsaid the "Chinese Century" had begun in 2014.[26]The Economisthas argued that "the Chinese Century is well under way", citing China's GDP since 2013, if calculated on apurchasing-power-paritybasis.[27]

From 2013, China created theBelt and Road Initiative,with future investments of almost $1 trillion[28]which according to analysts has been ageostrategicpush for taking a larger role in global affairs.[8][9]It has also been argued that China co-founded theAsian Infrastructure Investment BankandNew Development Bankto compete with theWorld Bankand theInternational Monetary Fundindevelopment finance.[11][12]In 2015, China launched theMade in China 2025strategic plan to further develop the manufacturing sector, with the aim of upgrading the manufacturing capabilities of Chinese industries and growing from labor-intensive workshops into a more technology-intensive powerhouse.

In November 2020, China signed theRegional Comprehensive Economic Partnershipas afree trade agreement[29][30][31]in counter to theTrans-Pacific Partnership.[32][33][34]The deal has been considered by some commentators as a "huge victory" for China,[35][36]although it has been shown that it would add just 0.08% to China's 2030 GDP withoutIndia's participation.[37][38]

Ryan Hass, a senior fellow in foreign policy at theBrookings Institution,said that much of the narrative of China "inexorably rising and on the verge of overtaking a faltering United States" was promoted by China's state-affiliated media outlets, adding, "Authoritarian systems excel at showcasing their strengths and concealing their weaknesses."[39]Political scientistMatthew Kroenigsaid, "the plans often cited as evidence of China's farsighted vision, the Belt and Road Initiative and Made in China 2025, were announced by Xi only in 2013 and 2015, respectively. Both are way too recent to be celebrated as brilliant examples of successful, long-term strategic planning."[40]

According toBarry Naughton,a professor and China expert at theUniversity of California, San Diego,the average income in China was CN¥42,359 for urban households and CN¥16,021 for rural households in 2019. Even at thepurchasing power parityconversion rate, the average urban income was just overUS$10,000and the average rural income was just underUS$4,000in China. Naughton questioned whether it is sensible for amiddle income countryof this kind to be taking "such a disproportionate part of the risky expenditure involved in pioneering new technologies". He commented that while it does not make sense from a purely economic perspective, Chinese policymakers have "other considerations" when implementing their industrial policy such as Made in China 2025.[41]

Depending on different assumptions of scenarios, it has been estimated that China would either overtake the U.S. to become the world's biggest economy in the 2030s or never be able to do so.[21]

International relations[edit]

Top five countries by military expenditure in 2020.
According to theStockholm International Peace Research Institute.[42]

In 2011,Michael Beckley,then a research fellow at theHarvard Kennedy School,released his journalChina's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endurewhich rejects that theU.S. is in declinerelative to China or that the hegemonic burdens the U.S. bears to sustain a globalized system contributes to its decline. Beckley argues the U.S. power is durable, and "unipolarity"andglobalizationare the main reasons. He says, "The United States derives competitive advantages from its preponderant position, and globalization allows it to exploit these advantages, attracting economic activity and manipulating the international system to its benefit."[43]

Beckley believes that if the United States was in terminal decline, it would adoptneomercantilisteconomic policies and disengage from military commitments inAsia."If however, the United States is not in decline, and if globalization and hegemony are the main reasons why, then the United States should do the opposite: it should contain China’s growth by maintaining a liberal international economic policy, and it should subdue China’s ambitions by sustaining a robust political and military presence in Asia."[43]Beckley believes that the United States benefits from being an extanthegemon—the U.S. did not overturn the international order to its benefit in 1990, but rather, the existing order collapsed around it.

Scholars that are skeptical of the U.S.'s ability to maintain a leading position includeRobert Pape,who has calculated that "one of the largest relative declines in modern history" stems from "the spread of technology to the rest of the world".[44]Similarly,Fareed Zakariawrites, "The unipolar order of the last two decades is waning not because of Iraq but because of the broader diffusion of power across the world."[45] Paul KipchumbainAfrica in China's 21st Century: In Search of a Strategypredicts a deadlycold warbetween the U.S. and China in the 21st century, and, if that cold war does not occur, he predicts China will supplant the U.S. in all aspects of global hegemony.[46]

AcademicRosemary Footwrites that the rise of China has led to some renegotiations of the U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, but inconsistency between China's stated ambitions and policy actions has prompted various forms of resistance which leaves U.S. hegemony only partially challenged.[47]Meanwhile,C. Raja Mohanobserves that "many of China’s neighbors are steadily drifting toward either neutrality betweenBeijingandWashingtonor simply acceptance of being dominated by their giant neighbor. "However, he also notes thatAustralia,India,andJapanhave readily challenged Beijing.[48]Richard Heyderian proposes that "America’s edge over China is its broad and surprisingly durable network of regional alliances, particularly with middle powers Japan, Australia and, increasingly, India, which share common, though not identical, concerns over China’s rising assertiveness."[49]

In the midst of global concerns that China's economic influence included political leverage,Chinese leaderXi Jinpingstated "No matter how far China develops, it will never seek hegemony".[50]At several international summits, one being theWorld Economic Forumin January 2021, Chinese leader Xi Jinping stated a preference for multilateralism and international cooperation.[51]However, political scientistStephen Waltcontrasts the public message with China's intimidation of neighboring countries. Stephen Walt suggests that the U.S. "should take Xi up on his stated preference for multilateral engagement and use America’s vastly larger array of allies and partners to pursue favorable outcomes within various multilateral forums." Though encouraging the possibility of mutually beneficial cooperation, he argues that "competition between the two largest powers is to a considerable extent hardwired into the emerging structure of the international system."[51]According to former Singaporean Prime MinisterLee Kuan Yew,China will "[initially] want to share this century as co-equals with the U.S.", but have "the intention to be the greatest power in the world" eventually.[49]

Writing in theAsia Europe Journal,Lei Yu and Sophia Sui suggest that theChina-Russia strategic partnership"shows China’s strategic intention of enhancing its 'hard' power in order to elevate its status at the systemic (global) level."[52]

In 2018,Xiangming Chenwrote that China was potentially creating aNew Great Game,shifted togeoeconomiccompetition compared with the originalGreat Game.Chen stated that China would play the role of the British Empire (and Russia the role of the 19th century Russian Empire) in the analogy as the "dominant power players vs. the weaker independent Central Asian states". Additionally, he suggested that ultimately the Belt and Road Initiative could turn the "China-Central Asia nexus into a vassal relationship characterized by cross-border investment by China for border security and political stability."[53]

Rapid aging and demographic challenges[edit]

Historical estimates of population, combined with the projected population to 2100 based on the UN's medium variant scenario for the top 3 countries with the largest current population: China, India, and the U.S.
World Bank projections of China's working-age population through 2050
See also:Aging of China

China's emergence as a global economic power is tied to its large, working population.[13]However, the population in China is aging faster than almost any other country in history.[13][14]In 2050, the proportion of Chinese over retirement age will become 39 percent of the total population according to projections. China is rapidly aging at an earlier stage of its development than other countries.[13]Current demographic trends could hinder economic growth, create challenging social problems, and limit China's capabilities to act as a new global hegemony.[13][15][16][17]

Brendan O'Reilly, a guest expert at Geopolitical Intelligence Services, wrote, "A dark scenario of demographic decline sparking a negative feedback loop of economic crisis, political instability, emigration and further decreased fertility is very real for China".[54][55]Nicholas Eberstadt,an economist and demographic expert at theAmerican Enterprise Institute,said that current demographic trends will overwhelm China's economy and geopolitics, making its rise much more uncertain. He said, "The age of heroic economic growth is over."[56]

Ryan Hass at the Brookings said that China's "working-age population is already shrinking; by 2050, China will go from having eight workers per retiree now to two workers per retiree. Moreover, it has already squeezed out most of the large productivity gains that come with a population becoming more educated and urban and adopting technologies to make manufacturing more efficient."[39]

According to American economistScott Rozelleand researcher Natalie Hell, "China looks a lot more like 1980s Mexico or Turkey than 1980s Taiwan or South Korea. No country has ever made it to high-income status with high school attainment rates below 50 percent. With China's high school attainment rate of 30 percent, the country could be in grave trouble." They warn that China risks falling into themiddle income trapdue to therural urban dividein education andstructural unemployment.[57][58]Economists Martin Chorzempa and Tianlei Huang of thePeterson Instituteagree with this assessment, adding that "China has overlooked rural development much too long", and must invest in the educational and health resources of its rural communities to solve an ongoinghuman capitalcrisis.[58]

Economic growth and debt[edit]

China's share of global export (1990–2019)

The People's Republic of China was the only major economy that reported growth in 2020, during theCOVID-19 pandemic.[59]The economy of China expanded by 2.3% while the U.S. economy and theeurozoneare expected to have shrunk by 3.6% and 7.4% respectively. China's share of the global GDP rose to 16.8%, while the U.S. economy accounted for 22.2% of global GDP in 2020.[60]By the end of 2024, however, the Chinese economy is expected to be smaller than what was previously projected, while the U.S. economy is expected to be larger, according to the International Monetary Fund's 2021 report on the global economic outlook.[61]

China's increased lending has been primarily driven by its desire to increase economic growth as fast as possible. The performance of local government officials has for decades been evaluated almost entirely on their ability to produce economic growth. Amanda Lee reports in theSouth China Morning Postthat "as China’s growth has slowed, there are growing concerns that many of these debts are at risk of default, which could trigger a systemic crisis in China’s state-dominated financial system".[62]

Diana Choylevaof Enodo Economics predicts that China's debt ratio will soon surpass that of Japan at the peak of its crisis.[63]Choyleva argues "For evidence that Beijing realizes it is drowning in debt and needs a lifebuoy, look no further than the government's own actions. It is finally injecting a degree of pricing discipline into the corporate bond market and it is actively encouraging foreign investors to help finance the reduction of a huge pile of bad debt."[63]

China'sdebt-to-GDP ratioincreased from 178% in the first quarter of 2010 to 275% in the first quarter of 2020.[63]China's debt-to-GDP ratio approached 335% in the second and third quarters of 2020.[62]Ryan Hass at the Brookings said, "China is running out of productive places to invest in infrastructure, and rising debt levels will further complicate its growth path."[39]

The PRC government regularly revises its GDP figures, often toward the end of the year. Because local governments face political pressure to meet pre-set growth targets, many doubt the accuracy of the statistics.[64]According to Chang-Tai Hsieh, an economist at theUniversity of Chicago Booth School of Businessand research associate at theNational Bureau of Economic Research,Michael Zheng Song, an economics professor at theChinese University of Hong Kong,and coauthors, China's economic growth may have been overstated by 1.7 percent each year between 2008 and 2016, meaning that the government may have been overstating the size of the Chinese economy by 12-16 percent in 2016.[65][66]

According to American strategist and historianEdward Luttwak,China will not be burdened by huge economic or population problems, but will fail strategically because "the emperor makes all the decisions and he doesn't have anybody to correct him." He said that geopolitically, China "gained one year in the race" in 2020 by using the measures of atotalitariangovernment, but this has brought the "China threat" to the fore, pushing other governments to respond.[67]

Sociologist Ho-Fung Hung stated that, although China's extensive lending during the COVID-19 pandemic allowed a quick rebound after the initial lockdown, it contributed to the already deep indebtedness of many of China's corporations, slowing the economy by 2021 and depressing long-term performance. Hung also pointed out that in 2008, although it was claimed mainly in propaganda that theChinese yuancould overtake the US dollar as a reserve currency, after a decade the yuan has since stalled and decreased in international usage, ranking below the British pound sterling, let alone the dollar.[68]

Chinese decline[edit]

Some scholars argue that China's rise will be over by the 2020s. According to foreign policy experts Michael Beckley andHal Brands,China, as arevisionist power,has little time to change the status quo of the world in its favor due to "severe resource scarcity", "demographic collapse", and "losing access to the welcoming world that enabled its advance", adding that "peak China" has already come.[22]

According to Andrew Erickson of theU.S. Naval War Collegeand Gabriel Collins of theBaker Institute,China's power is peaking, creating "a decade of danger from a system that increasingly realizes it only has a short time to fulfill some of its most critical, long-held goals".[23]David Von Drehle,a columnist forThe Washington Post,wrote that it would be more difficult for the West to manage China's decline than its rise.[69]

According to John Mueller at theCato Institute,a "descent or at least prolonged stagnation might come about, rather than a continued rise" for China. He listed the environment, corruption, ethnic and religious tensions, Chinese hostility toward foreign businesses, among others, as contributing factors to China's impending decline.[24]

According toYi Fuxian,a demography and health researcher at theUniversity of Wisconsin-Madison,the Chinese Century is "already over".[70]

See also[edit]

China specific
Counter China
General

References[edit]

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Further reading[edit]

Library resourcesabout
Chinese Century
  • Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World.Cosimo. March 2010. p. 7.ISBN9781605207711.
  • Brown, Kerry (2017)China's World: The Global Aspiration of the Next Superpower.I. B. Tauris, LimitedISBN9781784538095.
  • Brahm, Laurence J. (2001)China's Century: The Awakening of the Next Economic Powerhouse.WileyISBN9780471479017.
  • Fishman, Ted (2006)China, Inc.: How the Rise of the Next Superpower Challenges America and the World.ScribnerISBN9780743257350.
  • Jacques, Martin (2012)When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order.Penguin BooksISBN9780143118008.
  • Hung, Ho-fung (2015).The China Boom: Why China Will Not Rule the World.Columbia University Press.ISBN978-0-231-54022-3.
  • Overholt, William (1994)The Rise of China: How Economic Reform is Creating a New Superpower.W. W. Norton & CompanyISBN9780393312454.
  • Peerenboom, Randall (2008)China Modernizes: Threat to the West or Model for the Rest?.Oxford University PressISBN9780199226122.
  • Pillsbury, Michael (2016)The Hundred-Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower.St. Martin's GriffinISBN9781250081346.
  • Schell, Orville (2014)Wealth and Power: China's Long March to the Twenty-first Century.Random House Trade PaperbacksISBN9780812976250.
  • Shenkar, Oded (2004)The Chinese Century: The Rising Chinese Economy and Its Impact on the Global Economy, the Balance of Power, and Your Job.FT PressISBN9780131467484.
  • Shambaugh, David (2014)China Goes Global: The Partial Power.Oxford University PressISBN9780199361038.
  • Womack, Brantly (2010)China's Rise in Historical Perspective.Rowman & Littlefield PublishersISBN9780742567221.
  • Yueh, Linda (2013)China's Growth: The Making of an Economic Superpower.Oxford University PressISBN9780199205783.
  • Dahlman, Carl J; Aubert, Jean-Eric. (2001)China and the Knowledge Economy: Seizing the 21st Century.WBI Development Studies. World Bank Publications.
  • Hell, Natalie; Rozelle, Scott. (2020)Invisible China: How the Urban-Rural Divide Threatens China’s Rise.University of Chicago PressISBN9780226739526.
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