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Cross-strait relations

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Cross–strait relations
Map indicating locations of China and Taiwan

China

Taiwan
Cross-strait relations
Traditional ChineseHải hiệp lưỡng ngạn quan hệ
Simplified ChineseHải hiệp lưỡng ngạn quan hệ
Territories currently administered by the two governments that formally use the name China: thePRC(in purple) and theROC(in orange). The size of minor islands is exaggerated in this map for ease of identification.

Cross-strait relations(sometimes calledMainland–Taiwan relations,[1]China–Taiwan relationsorTaiwan–China relations[2]) are the political and economic relations betweenmainland China(officially thePeople's Republic of Chinaor PRC) andTaiwan(officially theRepublic of Chinaor ROC) across theTaiwan Strait.

The relationship has been complex and controversial due to the dispute regarding thepolitical status of Taiwanafterthe island's administration was transferred fromJapanto theRepublic of Chinain 1945, and the split between the PRC and ROC in 1949 as a result of theROC's retreat to the islandafter losing theChinese Civil War.The essential questions are whether the two governments are still in a state of civil war overOne China,each holding one of two "regions" or parts of the same country (i.e. "one nation, two states"); whether they can beunifiedunder a "one country, two systems"framework; or whether they are now separate countries (either asTwo Chinas,or as "one China, one Taiwan"). The English expression" cross-strait relations "is considered to be a neutral term that avoids reference to the political status of either side.

After theJapanese surrenderat the end of theSecond World Warin 1945, the administration of Taiwan was transferred from theEmpire of Japan(who hadannexed Taiwan as a spoil of warthrough theFirst Sino-Japanese War) to the Republic of China, who was one of the "Big Four"ofAllied Nations,although questions remain regarding the legal language used in theTreaty of San Francisco.In 1949, with the Chinese Civil War turning decisively in favor of theChinese Communist Party(CCP), theRepublic of China Governmentled by theNationalist Party of China(Kuomintang,or KMT) evacuated to Taiwan and established a provisional capital inTaipei,while still claiming to be the legitimate government of all of China. The CCPproclaimed the establishmentof theCentral People's GovernmentwithBeijingas the capital, and thePeople's Liberation Armysubsequently conquered and quelled all of mainland China, although thedisastrous landing attempt at Kinmen,the unexpected outbreak of theKorean Warand the subsequentAmerican involvementhalted any further plans to invade Taiwan. The two sides then entered decades ofstalemateandde factoceasefirewith sporadic episodes of naval skirmishes and islandshellings,but noarmisticeorpeace treatyhas ever been signed, and debate continues as to whether the civil war has legally ended.[3]

Since then, the relations between the governments in Beijing and Taipei have been characterized by limited contact, tensions, and instability. In the early years, military conflicts continued, while diplomatically both governments competed to be the "legitimate governmentof China ". Since the democratization of Taiwan, the question regarding thepolitical and legal status of Taiwanhas shifted focus to the choice betweenpolitical unification with the mainlandorde jureTaiwanese independence.The PRC remains hostile to any formal declaration of independence and maintains its claim over Taiwan, citing its status as the only internationally recognized government of all of China since theUnited Nations'eviction of the ROCin 1971.

At the same time, non-governmental and semi-governmental exchanges between the two sides have increased. In 2008, negotiations began to restore theThree Links(postal, transportation, trade) between the two sides, which was cut off since 1949. Diplomatic contact between the two sides has generally been limited to Kuomintang officials on Taiwan, who were the main proponents of the1992 Consensus,and cross-strait treaties such asECFAandCSSTAwere signed during KMT administrations. Even duringDemocratic Progressive Partyadministrations, who were supporters of "one country on each side"and considered by many in China to be outrightseparatists,negotiations continue to occur on practical matters through informal channels.[citation needed]However, whenLai Ching-teannounced "Taiwan is already a sovereign, independent country called the Republic of China"inhis inaugural speechon May 20, 2024, the mainland responded by suspending prior treaties and conductinglive-firejoint military exercisesaround the island, raising concerns of large-scalearmed conflicts.

History

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Timeline

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Leaders of the two governments

Chiang Kai-shekYen Chia-kanChiang Ching-kuoLee Teng-huiChen Shui-bianMa Ying-jeouTsai Ing-wenLai Ching-teMao ZedongHua GuofengDeng XiaopingJiang ZeminHu JintaoXi Jinping

Before 1949

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A 1885 map of China, showing Taiwan, which was part ofFujianprovince
A 1912 map of theJapanese Empire,showing Taiwan, which was under Japanese rule from 1895 to 1945

The early history of cross-strait relations involved the exchange of cultures, people, and technology.[4][5][6]However, no Chinese dynasty formally incorporated Taiwan in ancient times.[7]In the 16th and 17th centuries, Taiwan first caught the attention ofPortuguese,thenDutchandSpanishexplorers. After establishing their first settlement in Taiwan in 1624, the Dutch were defeated in 1662 byKoxinga(Zheng Chenggong), aMing dynastyloyalist, who took the island and established the first formallyHan Chineseregime in Taiwan. Koxinga's heirs used Taiwan as a base for launching raids intomainland Chinaagainst theManchuQing dynasty,before being defeated in 1683 by Qing forces. Taiwan was incorporated intoFujianProvince in 1684.

With other powers increasingly eyeing Taiwan for its strategic location and resources in the 19th century, the administration began to implement a modernization drive.[8]In 1887, Fujian-Taiwan Province was declared by Imperial decree. However, the fall of the Qing outpaced the development of Taiwan, and in 1895, following its defeat in theFirst Sino-Japanese War,the Imperial government ceded Taiwan toJapanin perpetuity. Qing loyalists briefly resisted Japanese rule under the banner of the "Republic of Formosa"but were quickly put down by Japanese authorities.[9]

From 1928 to 1942, theChinese Communist Party(CCP) maintained that Taiwan was a separate nation.[10]In a 1937 interview withEdgar Snow,Mao Zedongstated, "we will extend them (the Koreans) our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence. The same thing applies for Taiwan."[11]

Japan ruled Taiwan until 1945. As part of theJapanese Empire,Taiwan was a foreign jurisdiction in relation to the Qing dynasty until 1912, and then to theRepublic of Chinafor the remainder of Japanese rule. In 1945, Japan was defeated inWorld War IIand surrendered its forces in Taiwan to the Allies; the ROC, then ruled by theKuomintang(KMT), took custody of the island. The period of post-war KMT rule over China (1945–1949) was marked by conflict in Taiwan between local residents and the new KMT authority. The Taiwaneserebelled on 28 February 1947,but the uprising was violently suppressed by the KMT. The seeds of the Taiwan independence movement were sown during this period.

China was soon engulfed infull-scale civil war.In 1949, the conflict turned decisively against the KMT in favor of the CCP. On 1 October 1949,CCP ChairmanMao Zedong proclaimed thefounding of the People's Republic of China(PRC) inBeijing.The ROC government retreated to Taiwan, eventually declaringTaipeiits temporary capital in December 1949.[12]

Military stalemate to diplomatic war (1949–1979)

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Kuomintang's retreat

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In June 1949, the ROC declared a "closure"of all Chinese ports, and its navy attempted to intercept all foreign ships. The closure covered area from a point north of the mouth ofMin riverin Fujian Province to the mouth of theLiao Riverin Manchuria.[13]Since China's railroad network was underdeveloped, north–south trade depended heavily on sea lanes. ROC naval activity caused severe hardship for Chinese fishermen.

The two governments continued in a state of war until 1979. In October 1949, the PRC's attempt to take the ROC-controlled island ofKinmenwas thwarted in theBattle of Kuningtou,halting the advance of the PRC'sPeople's Liberation Army(PLA) towards Taiwan.[14] In theBattle of Dengbu Islandon 3 November 1949, the ROC forces repulsed their PRC counterparts but were later forced to retreat after the PRC established air superiority.[15] The ROC government also launched a number of air bombing raids into key coastal cities of China such asShanghai.[16] Other PRC amphibious operations conducted in 1950 were more successful. They led to theCommunist conquest of Hainan Islandin April 1950, along with thecapture of Wanshan Islandsoff theGuangdongcoast (May–August 1950) and ofZhoushan IslandoffZhejiang(May 1950).[17] Additional PRC successes included theBattle of Dongshan Islandon 11 May 1950, as well as theBattle of Nanpeng Islandin September and October of the same year. However, the ROC won theBattle of Nanri Islandin 1952 withUnited Statessupport. In 1953 the communists won theBattle of Nanpeng Archipelago,theBattle of Dalushan Islandsand theDongshan Island Campaign.

After the ROC lost the mainland, a group of approximately 12,000KMT soldiers escaped to Burmaand continued launching guerrilla attacks into southern China during the early 1950s.[18] The ROC paid a salary to the guerrilla leader GeneralLi Miand issued him the nominal title "Governor ofYunnan".Initially the U.S. supported these remnants, and theCentral Intelligence Agencyprovided aid. After the Burmese government appealed to theUnited Nationsin 1953, the U.S. began pressuring the ROC to withdraw its loyalists. By the end of 1954, nearly 6,000 soldiers left Burma, and Li Mi declared his army disbanded. However, thousands of guerrilla fighters remained, and the ROC continued to supply and command them, even secretly supplying reinforcements. In northwestern China during the 1950s and 1960s, theKuomintang Islamic insurgencyled by Muslim Kuomintang army officers continued fighting, refusing to surrender to the PRC.[citation needed]

Korean War and Taiwan Strait Crises

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TheTaiwan Strait

Most observers expected Chiang's government to eventually fall in response to a Communist invasion of Taiwan, and the U.S. initially showed no interest in supporting Chiang's government in its final stand. Things changed radically with the onset of theKorean Warin June 1950. At this point, it became politically impossible in the U.S. to allow a total Communist victory over Chiang, so PresidentHarry S. Trumanordered theU.S. Seventh Fleetinto theTaiwan Straitto prevent the ROC and PRC from attacking each other.[19]The U.S. fleet hindered the Communist invasion of Taiwan, and the PRC decided to send troops to Korea in October 1950.[20]The ROC proposed participation in the Korean War but was rejected.[21]During the Korean War, some captured Communist Chinese soldiers, many of whom were originally KMT soldiers, were repatriated to Taiwan rather than China.[22][23][24]

Though viewed as a military liability by the United States, the ROC viewed its remaining islands inFujianas vital for any future campaign to defeat the PRC and retake China. On 3 September 1954, theFirst Taiwan Strait Crisisbegan when the PLA started shellingKinmenand threatened to take theDachen Islands.[13]On 20 January 1955, the PLA took nearbyYijiangshan Island,with the entire ROC garrison of 720 troops killed or wounded defending the island. On 24 January, theU.S. Congresspassed theFormosa Resolutionauthorizing the President to defend the ROC's offshore islands.[13]The First Taiwan Strait Crisis ended in March 1955 when the PLA ceased its bombardment. The crisis was brought to a close during theBandung conference.[13]At the conference, the PRC articulated itsFive Principles of Peaceful Coexistencewith PremierZhou Enlaipublicly stating, "[T]he Chinese people do not want to have a war with the United States. The Chinese government is willing to sit down to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Far East, and especially the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan area."[25]Two years of negotiations with the U.S. followed, although no agreement was reached on the Taiwan issue.[25]

TheSecond Taiwan Strait Crisisbegan on 23 August 1958 with air and naval engagements between the PRC and the ROC military forces, leading to intense artillery bombardment of Kinmen (by the PRC) andXiamen(by the ROC), and ended in November of the same year.[13]PLA patrol boats blockaded the islands from ROC supply ships. Though the U.S. rejectedChiang Kai-shek's proposal to bomb Chinese artillery batteries, it quickly moved to supply fighter jets and anti-aircraft missiles to the ROC. It also providedamphibious assaultships to land supply, as a sunken ROC naval vessel was blocking the harbor. On 7 September, the U.S. escorted a convoy of ROC supply ships, and the PRC refrained from firing. On 25 October, the PRC announced an "even-day ceasefire" — the PLA would only shell Kinmen on odd-numbered days.

U.S. PresidentDwight D. Eisenhower,riding with PresidentChiang Kai-shek,waves to onlookers during his visit toTaipei,Taiwan in June 1960.
U.S. PresidentRichard Nixonshakes hands with PremierZhou Enlaiduring his visit toBeijing,China in February 1972.

After the 1950s, the "war" became more symbolic than real, represented by on again, off again artillery bombardment towards and from Kinmen. In later years, live shells were replaced with propaganda sheets.[26]The ROC once initiatedProject National Glory,a plan to retake mainland China.[27]The project failed in the 1960s,[28]and the bombardment finally ceased after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the United States.[26]The PRC and the ROC have never signed any agreement or treaty to officially end the war.[29]There were occasional defectors from both sides.[30][31]

Until the 1970s, the ROC had international recognition from most countries.[32]: 228 The PRC government was recognized bySoviet Bloccountries, members of theNon-Aligned Movement,and someWestern nationssuch as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Both governments claimed to be the legitimate government of China, labeling the other as illegitimate. Civil war propaganda permeated the educational curriculum. Each side portrayed people of the other as living in hell-like misery. In official media, each side called the other "bandits". The ROC also suppressed expressions of support for Taiwanese identity or Taiwan independence.[citation needed]

The ROC representedChina at the United Nationsuntil 1971, when the PRC obtained the UN seat.[32]: 228 

Thawing of relations (1979–1998)

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In the 1 January 1979 "New Year's Day Message to Taiwan Compatriots," theStanding Committee of the National People's Congress(NPC) stated that the PRC would "take present realities into account in accomplishing the great cause of reunifying the motherland and respect the status quo on Taiwan and the opinions of people in all walks of life there and adopt reasonable policies and measures in settling the question of reunification so as not to cause the people of Taiwan any losses."[32]: 228 

After the United States formally recognized the PRC and broke its official relations with the ROC in 1979, the PRC under the leadership ofDeng Xiaopingshifted its strategy from liberating Taiwan to peaceful unification.[33][34]The PRC moderated its rhetoric, referring to the "Taiwan authorities" instead of "Chiang's clique" and "peaceful reunification" instead of "liberating Taiwan."[32]: 228 

Deng proposed a model for the incorporation of Taiwan into the PRC which involved a high degree of autonomy within the Chinese state, similar to the model proposed toHong Kongwhich would eventually becomeone country, two systems.Consistent with Deng's one country, two systems approach, NPC Standing Committee ChairYe Jianyingelaborated on peaceful reunification under per his 30 September 1981 "Nine Points Proposal" in which Taiwan would have a high degree of autonomy following reunification.[32]: 228 The Nine Points Proposal also talked of trade, transportation, and postal services as "three links" across the strait and "four exchanges" in the areas of culture, academics, economics, and sports.[32]: 228 

The ROC government underChiang Ching-kuomaintained aThree Noespolicy of no contact, no negotiation and no compromise to deal with the PRC government. However, Chiang was forced to break from this policy during the May 1986hijacking of a China Airlines cargo plane,in which the Taiwanese pilot subdued other members of the crew and flew the plane toGuangzhou.In response, Chiang sent delegates to Hong Kong to discuss with PRC officials the return of the plane and crew, which was seen as a turning point in cross-strait relations.[35][36]

In 1987, Chiang became willing to open up cross-strait economic and cultural contacts.[32]: 229 That year, the ROC government began allowing visits to China. This benefited many, especially old KMT soldiers, who had been separated from their families in China for decades.[37][38]This catalyzed a thawing of relations between the two sides, but problems arising from increased contact necessitated a mechanism for regular negotiations. From the end of 1987 to June 1995, the two sides frequently exchanged envoys to develop formal and informal institutions and agencies for cross-strait relations.[32]: 229 

In 1988,a guidelinewas approved by PRC to encourage ROC investments in the PRC.[39][40]It guaranteed that ROC establishments would not be nationalized, exports would be free from tariffs, and ROC businessmen would be granted multiple visas for easy movement.

In 1990, under the presidency ofLee Teng-hui,theNational Unification Councilwas established in Taiwan.[34]The following year, theGuidelines for National Unificationwere adopted, and theperiod of mobilization for the suppression of Communist rebellionwas terminated. Seeking to negotiate with China on operational issues without affirming the other side's legitimacy, the ROC government created theStraits Exchange Foundation(SEF),[32]: 229 a nominally non-governmental institution directly led by theMainland Affairs Council(MAC), an instrument of theExecutive Yuanin 1991. The PRC established theAssociation for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits(ARATS),[32]: 229 directly led by theTaiwan Affairs Officeof theState Council.This system, described as "white gloves", allowed the two governments to engage with each other on a semi-official basis without compromising their respective sovereignty policies.[41]

On 1 August 1992, the ROC'sNational Unification Councilpassed the "Definition of One China Resolution," stating: "The two sides of the Taiwan Strait uphold the One China principle, but the interpretations of the two sides are different... Our side believes that one China should mean the Republic of China, established in 1912 and existing today, and its sovereignty extends throughout China, but its current governing authority is only over Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matzu. Admittedly, Taiwan is part of China, but the mainland is also a part of China."[32]: 229 

This resolution became the basis for quasi-governmental negotiations between SEF and ARATS from October to November 1992.[32]: 229 Led byKoo Chen-fuandWang Daohan,these talks culminated in the 1993Wang–Koo summit.Both sides agreed to confer ambiguity on questions of sovereignty in order to engage on operational questions affecting both sides.[42]The ambiguity of the1992 Consensusallowed the PRC to emphasize that both sides of the strait upheld the position of one China and allowed the ROC to emphasize that it was the one China to which both the mainland and Taiwan belonged.[32]: 230 This facilitated the improvement of cross-strait relations in the early 1990s.[32]: 230 

Nevertheless, the rhetoric of ROC President Lee Teng-hui began turning further towards Taiwan independence.[43]Prior to the 1990s, the ROC had been a one-party authoritarian state committed to eventual unification with China. However, democratic reforms reshaped attitudes of the general public, which in turn began influencing policy in Taiwan. As a result, the ROC government shifted away from its commitment toOne Chinaand towards a separate political identity for Taiwan.

In January 1995,Jiang Zeminannounced the PRC's "Eight-Point Proposal" discussing a gradual process of cross-strait rapprochement and negotiation leading to eventual reunification.[32]: 231 The Eight-Point Proposal emphasized maintaining the status quo, facilitating economic exchanges and the "three links" (trade, transportation, and postal services), and seeking to deter Taiwan from separating from the mainland.[32]: 231 As long as Taiwan was committed to the One China principle, than the PRC stated that it would consider Taiwan concerns like renouncing the use of force or treating the Taipei government as an equal political entity.[32]: 231 

In 1995, Lee visited the United States and delivered a speech to an invited audience atCornell University.[44]In response to Taiwan's diplomatic moves, the PRC postponed the second Wang–Koo summit indefinitely.[45]The PLA attempted to influence the1996 Taiwanese presidential electionby conducting a missile exercise, leading to theThird Taiwan Strait Crisis.[46][47]Following the crisis and the growing influence of a pro-independence element in Taiwan politics, the PRC increased its focus on modernizing its military to deter Taiwan independence and deter U.S.-involvement.[32]: 231 

Hostile non-contact (1998–2008)

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'UNfor Taiwan' banner atTaipei Railway Station

In 1998, the ARATS and the SEF resumed contact and the second Wang–Koo summit was held inShanghai,China.[48]Jiang also received the Taiwanese representatives inBeijing.While Wang Daohan's return visit to Taiwan was scheduled, Lee Teng-hui described cross-strait relations as "state-to-state or at least special state-to-state relations" in July 1999.[49]Lee'stwo-states theorypostponed Wang's visit indefinitely and the PRC issued a white paper entitled "The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue" in February 2000, before the2000 Taiwanese presidential election.[50]In the white paper, the PRC warned against conduct it would view as separatism and stated that the PRC would consider the use of force if Taiwan sought to indefinitely avoid meaningful talks with the PRC.[32]: 231 

Chen Shui-bianof the pro-independenceDemocratic Progressive Party(DPP) was electedPresident of the ROCin 2000. Before the KMT handed over power to the DPP, chairman of theMainland Affairs CouncilSu Chisuggested a new term 1992 Consensus as a common point that was acceptable to both sides so that Taiwan and China could keep up cross-strait exchanges.[51]Chen expressed some willingness to accept the 1992 Consensus, but backed down after backlash within his own party.[52]In his inaugural speech, Chen Shui-bian pledged to theFour Noes and One Without,in particular, promising to seek neither independence nor unification as well as rejecting the concept of special state-to-state relations expressed by his predecessor, Lee Teng-hui, as well as establishing theThree Mini-Links.Furthermore, he pursued a policy of normalizing economic relations with the PRC.[53]The PRC did not engage Chen's administration, but meanwhile in 2001 Chen lifted the 50-year ban on direct trade and investment with the PRC.[54][55]In November 2001, Chen repudiated "One China" and called for talks without preconditions.[56]On 3 August 2002, Chen defined the cross-strait relations asOne Country on Each Side(namely, that China and Taiwan are two different countries). The PRC subsequently cut off official contact with the ROC government.[57]

Hu JintaobecameGeneral Secretary of the Chinese Communist Partyin late 2002, succeeding Jiang astop leaderof the PRC.[32]: 233 Hu urged Taiwan's DPP administration to resume cross-strait dialogue on the basis of the 1992 Consensus.[32]: 233 The PRC also continued applying diplomatic pressure to other nations to isolate the ROC diplomatically.[58]However, during the 2003 Iraq war, the PRC allowedTaiwanese airlinesuse of China's airspace.[59]

After the re-election of Chen Shui-bian in 2004, Hu's government changed the previous blanket no-contact policy, a holdover from the Jiang Zemin administration. Under the new policy, on the one hand, the PRC government continued a no-contact policy towards Chen Shui-bian. It maintained its military build-up against Taiwan, and pursued a vigorous policy of isolating Taiwan diplomatically.[citation needed]In March 2005, the10th National People's Congresspassed theAnti-Secession Lawauthorizing military force for unification.[60]

Lien Chantouring theSun Yat-sen Mausoleumwith theKuomintang delegation to mainland Chinain 2005

On the other hand, the PRC administration pursued contact with apolitical, or politically non-independence leaning, groups in Taiwan. In hisMay 17 Statementin 2004, Hu Jintao made friendly overtures to Taiwan on resuming negotiations for the "Three Links",reducing misunderstandings, and increasing consultation.[citation needed]However, the Anti-Secession Law was passed in 2005, which was not well received in Taiwan. The CCP increased contacts on a party-to-party basis with the KMT,[61]: 138 then the opposition party in Taiwan, due to their support for the One China principle. The increased contacts culminated in the2005 Pan-Blue visits to China,including a meeting between Hu and then-KMT chairmanLien Chanin April 2005.[62][63]It was the first meeting between the leaders of the two parties since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949.[64][65][66]

Resumption of high level contact (2008–2016)

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Inauguration of Ma Ying-jeou

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In 2008, the KMT won a large majority in thelegislative electionand its candidateMa Ying-jeouwon the followingTaiwanese presidential electionon 22 March.[67]Ma advocated that cross-strait relations should shift from "mutual non-recognition" to "mutual non-denial".[68]He stated that the relations are neither between two Chinas nor two states. It is aspecial relationship.[69]Cross-strait cooperation increased during Ma's tenure.[70]

Both Hu Jintao and his new counterpart, Ma Ying-jeou, considered the 1992 Consensus to be the basis for negotiations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. On 26 March 2008, Hu Jintao held a telephone talk with the U.S. PresidentGeorge W. Bush,in which he explained that the "1992 Consensus" shows that "both sides recognize there is only one China, but agree to differ on its definition".[71][72][73]There followed a series of meetings between the two sides. On 12 April 2008, Hu Jintao held a meeting with ROC's then vice-president electVincent Siewas chairman of theCross-Straits Common Market Foundationduring theBoao Forum for Asia.[74]On 28 May 2008, Hu met with the KMT chairmanWu Po-hsiung,the first meeting between the heads of the CCP and the KMT as ruling parties.[75]During this meeting, Hu and Wu agreed that both sides should recommence semi-official dialogue under the 1992 Consensus.[76][77]

Chiang Pin-kung(left) represented the SEF at theChen–Chiang Summitin October 2011.

Cross-strait high-level talksbetween theARATSand theSEFreopened in June 2008, with the first meeting held in Beijing. On 13 June, President of the ARATS,Chen Yunlin,and President of the SEF,Chiang Pin-kung,signed files agreeing that direct flights between the two sides would begin on 4 July,[78]and that Taiwan would allow entrance of up to 3,000 visitors from China daily.[79]The first direct flights took off on 15 December 2008.[80]On 31 December 2008, Hu stated that both sides of the strait should "make pragmatic explorations in their political relations under the special circumstances where the country has not yet been reunified."[32]: 334 

The financial relationship between the two areas improved on 1 May 2009 in a move described as "a major milestone" byThe Times.[81]The ROC's financial regulator, theFinancial Supervisory Commission,announced that Chinese investors would be permitted to invest in Taiwan's money markets for the first time since 1949. Investors can apply to purchase Taiwan shares that do not exceed one tenth of the value of the firm's total shares. The move came as part of a "step by step" movement designed to relax restrictions on Chinese investment. Taipei economist Liang Chi-yuan commented: "Taiwan's risk factor as a flash point has dropped significantly with its improved ties with Chinese. The Chinese would be hesitant about launching a war as their investment increases here."

From military aspect, a report in 2010 from Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense said that China'scharm offensiveis only accommodating on issues that do not undermine China's claim to Taiwan and that the PRC would invade if Taiwan declared independence, developed weapons of mass destruction, or suffered from civil chaos.[citation needed]President Ma has called repeatedly for the PRC to dismantle the missile batteries targeted on Taiwan's cities, without result.[citation needed]Ma also called on the PRC to embraceSun Yat-sen's call for freedom and democracy.[citation needed]

In June 2013, China offered 31 new measures to improve Taiwan's economic integration with the mainland.[82]

2014 Wang-Zhang Meetingin Taiwan

In October 2013, in a hotel lobby on the sidelines of theAPEC Indonesia 2013meetings,Wang Yu-chi,Minister of the Mainland Affairs Council, spoke briefly withZhang Zhijun,Minister of the Taiwan Affairs Office, each addressing the other by his official title. Both called for the establishment of a regular dialogue mechanism between their two agencies. Zhang also invited Wang to visit China.[83][84]The two ministers metinNanjingon 11 February 2014, in the first official, high-level, government-to-government contact between the two sides since 1949.[85][86][87][88]During the meeting, Wang and Zhang agreed on establishing a direct and regular communication channel. They also agreed on finding a solution for health insurance coverage for Taiwanese students studying in mainland China, on pragmatically establishing SEF and ARATS offices in their respective territories, and on studying the feasibility of allowing visits to detained persons once these offices had been established. Zhang visited Taiwan between 25 and 28 June 2014, becoming the first ministerial-level PRC official to do so.[89]

In 2014, theSunflower Student Movementbroke out. Citizens occupied the TaiwaneseLegislative Yuanfor 23 days, protesting against the government's forcing through theCross-Strait Service Trade Agreement.The protesters felt that the trade pact with China would leave Taiwan vulnerable to political pressure from Beijing.[90]The agreement ended up unratified in the legislature.[91]In September 2014, Xi Jinping adopted a more uncompromising stance than his predecessors as he called for the "one country, two systems" model to be applied to Taiwan.[92]It was noted that the model had not been mentioned by the PRC since 2005, when the Anti-Secession Law was passed.[93]

2015 Ma–Xi meetinginSingapore

On 7 November 2015, Xi and Mamet and shook handsinSingapore,marking the first meeting between leaders of the two sides since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949.[94][95]They met within their capacity as "Leader of Mainland China" and "Leader of Taiwan" respectively and addressed each other as "mister".[32]: 236 No major agreements were reached on the occasion, however, ahotlineconnecting the head of the Mainland Affairs Council and the head of the Taiwan Affairs Office was established at the end of 2015.[96][97]

In January 2016, the opposition DPP won theTaiwanese presidential election.[98]In the transition to a new administration, the ROCJustice MinisterLuo Ying-shayembarked on a 5-day historic visit to mainland China in March, making her the first minister of theGovernment of the Republic of Chinato visit the mainland after the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949.[99]

Deteriorating relations (2016–present)

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Inauguration of Tsai Ing-wen

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Tsai Ing-wensucceededMa Ying-jeouas the ROC President in May 2016.

In the2016 Taiwan general elections,Tsai Ing-wenand the DPP captured landslide victories.[100]Tsai initially pursued a similar strategy as Chen Shui-bian, but after winning the election she received a similarly frosty reception from the PRC.[101][102][103]In her inauguration speech, President Tsai acknowledged that the talks surrounding the 1992 Consensus took place without agreeing that a consensus was reached. She credited the talks with spurring 20 years of dialogue and exchange between the two sides. She hoped that exchanges would continue on the basis of these historical facts, as well as the existence of the Republic of China's constitutional system and the democratic will of the Taiwanese people.[104]In response, Beijing called Tsai's answer an "incomplete test paper" because Tsai did not agree to the content of the 1992 Consensus.[102]On 25 June 2016, Beijing suspended official cross-strait communications,[105]with any remaining cross-strait exchanges thereafter taking place through unofficial channels.[106]

The Tsai administration blocked former President Ma Ying-jeou from visiting Hong Kong,[107][108][109]but eight non-DPP magistrates and mayors from Taiwan visited Beijing in 2016.[110][111][112]Their visit was aimed to reset and restart cross-strait relations after Tsai took office. The eight local leaders reiterated their support ofOne Chinaunder the 1992 Consensus.

In October 2017, Tsai Ing-wen expressed hopes that both sides would restart their cross-strait relations after the19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party,and argued that new practices and guidelines governing mutual interaction should be examined.[113][114]However, Xi Jinping emphasized the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan in his opening speech at the 19th National Congress.[115]At the same time, he offered the chance for open talks and "unobstructed exchanges" with Taiwan as long as the government moved to accept the 1992 Consensus.[115][116]

Beginning in the mid-to-late 2010s, Beijing has significantly restricted the number of Chinese tour groups allowed to visit Taiwan in order to place pressure upon President Tsai Ing-wen.[117]Apart from Taiwan, theHoly SeeandPalauhave also been pressured to recognize the PRC over the ROC.[118]China was also accused of conductinghybrid warfareagainst Taiwan.[119][120]ROC political leaders, including President Tsai and PremierWilliam Lai,as well as international media outlets, have repeatedly accused the PRC of spreadingfake newsvia social media to create divisions in Taiwanese society andinfluence voters.[121][122][123][124]

In a January 2019 speech commemorating the 40th anniversary of the "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan," Xi Jinping called for "peaceful reunification with Taiwan" in accordance with the "One China principle" and the 1992 Consensus.[32]: 240 In Xi's view, the Taiwan issue emerged from China's weakness dating back to the Opium Wars and after World War II, the "two sides of the Taiwan straits fell into a a special state of protracted political confrontation due to the civil war in China and he interferences of foreign forces."[32]: 240–241 

In response, Tsai emphasized that she has never accepted the 1992 Consensus.[125]Tsai made a shift from not publicly accepting the 1992 Consensus to directly rejecting it, stating that there's no need to talk about the 1992 Consensus anymore, because this term has already been defined by Beijing as "one country, two systems."[126]Tsai, who supported the2019–20 Hong Kong protests,pledged that as long as she is Taiwan's president, she will never accept the "one country, two systems."[127]In January 2020, re-elected Tsai Ing-wen argued that Taiwan already was an independent country called the "Republic of China (Taiwan)", further arguing that the mainland Chinese authorities had to recognize that situation.[128]

The Taiwanese public turned further against mainland China, due to fallout from the Hong Kong protests and also due to the PRC's continued determination to keep the ROC out of theWorld Health Organizationduring theCOVID-19 pandemic.[129] The opposition KMT also appeared to distance itself from the Chinese mainland in 2020, stating it would review its unpopular advocacy of closer ties with the PRC. In March 2021, KMT chairmanJohnny Chiangrejected "one country, two systems" as a feasible model for Taiwan, citing Beijing's response to protests in Hong Kong as well as the value that Taiwanese place in political freedoms.[130]

TheHong Kong Economic, Trade and Cultural Officein Taiwan suspended its operation indefinitely in 2021, followed by theMacau Economic and Cultural Office.[131]In October 2021, Tsai stated in herNational Dayspeech that Taiwanese people would not be forced to "bow" down to mainland Chinese pressure, and said that Taiwan would keep bolstering its defenses.[132]The PRC denounced Tsai's speech as "incited confrontation and distorted facts", and added that seeking Taiwanese independence was closing doors to dialogue.[133]Following aban on the importation of pineapples from Taiwanand wax apples in 2021, the Chinese government banned the import ofgrouper fishin June 2022, claiming they had found banned chemicals and excessive levels of other substances.[134][135]

2022 and 2023 military exercises

[edit]
ROC President Tsai Ing-wen with U.S. House SpeakerNancy Pelosion 3 August 2022

On 2 August 2022, U.S. House SpeakerNancy Pelosivisited Taiwan. China perceived her visit as a violation of its sovereign rights on Taiwan, and the PLA announced it would conduct live-fire exercises in six zones surrounding Taiwan from 4 to 7 August.[136][137]The live-fire drills were unprecedented in recent history[137]and took place in zones that surrounded the island's busiestterritorial watersandairspace.[138][139]The military exercises involved the usage of live-fire ammunition, air assets, naval deployments, and ballistic missile launches by the PLA.[140]In response, Taiwan deployed ships and aircraft. No military conflict came of this, although it greatly increased tensions between the two countries. China announced an end to the exercises on 10 August, but also stated that regular "patrols" would be launched in the Taiwan Strait.[141][142]

On 10 August 2022, the PRC's Taiwan Affairs Office and theState Council Information Officejointly published the firstwhite paperabout Taiwan's status since 2000 called "The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era".In it, the PRC urged again for Taiwan to unify under the" one country, two systems "formula. Notably, the white paper did not contain a previous line stating that no troops would be sent to Taiwan after unification. In response, Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council said the white paper was" wishful thinking and disregarding facts ".[143]

Another set of military exercises began on 8 April 2023, after president Tsai visited U.S. SpeakerKevin McCarthyin California.[144][145][146]Beijing called this operation the "Joint Sword". Taiwan reportedly spotted 70 aircraft and 11 ships from China. On the first day of the military exercises, one of the Chinese vessels discharged a shot while sailing nearPingtan Island– the nearest point between China and Taiwan.[147]

Taiwan's prosecutions of Chinese espionage cases spiked in 2023, reaching 16 throughout the year. From 2013 to 2019, theMinistry of Justice Investigation Bureauregistered 44 espionage cases by China.[148]

Semi-official relations

[edit]
Straits Exchange Foundationheadquarter office inTaipei,Taiwan
Shanghai MayorGong ZhengandTaipei MayorChiang Wan-anshaking hands at the 2023Shanghai-Taipei City Forum

Semi-governmental contact is maintained through theStraits Exchange Foundation(SEF) and theAssociation for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits(ARATS). Although formally privately constituted bodies, the SEF and the ARATS are both directly led by the Executive Government of each side: the SEF by the Mainland Affairs Council of the ROC's Executive Yuan, and the ARATS by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC's State Council. The heads of the two bodies are both full-time appointees and do not hold other government positions.

Semi-official representative offices between the two sides are the PRC'sCross-Strait Tourism Exchange Association(CSTEA) in Taiwan, and ROC'sTaiwan Strait Tourism Association(TSTA) in China.[149][150]Both were established in May 2010.[151]However, the duties of these offices are limited only to tourism-related affairs.

The Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party maintained regular dialogue via theKMT–CCP Forumfrom 2006 to 2016.[152][153]This was called a "second rail" in Taiwan and helped to maintain political understanding between the two parties.[154]

TheShanghai-Taipei City Forumis an annual forum between the cities of Shanghai and Taipei. Launched in 2010 by then-Taipei MayorHau Lung-pinto promote city-to-city exchanges, it led to Shanghai's participation in theTaipei International Flora Expositionend of that year.[155]Both Taipei and Shanghai are the first two cities across the Taiwan Strait that carries out exchanges. The forum proceeded even thoughKo Wen-jewas the non-KMT mayor of Taipei from 2014 to 2022.[156][157]

Another mode of contact is through private bodies accredited by the respective governments to negotiate technical and operational aspects of issues between the two sides. Called the "Macaumode ", this avenue of contact was maintained even through the years of the Chen Shui-bian administration.[158]

Transportation

[edit]
AnAir ChinaAirbus A330-300 atTaipei Songshan Airport

The PRC proposedThree Linksto open up postal, transportation and trade links between mainland China and Taiwan. Before 2003, travelers had to make a time-consuming stopover at a third destination, usually Hong Kong or Macau.[159]Cross-strait charterflights duringChinese New Yeartook off in 2003. However, the charter flights still had to land in Hong Kong. The transportation model was improved in 2005 as the flights had to fly over Hong Kong'sflight information regionwithout landing. It was not until 2008 that direct flights and cargo shipments began.[80]As of 2015, 61 mainland Chinese cities are connected with eight airports in Taiwan. The flights operate every day, totaling 890 round-trip flights across the Taiwan Strait per week.[160]

Taiwan residents cannot use theRepublic of China passportto travel to mainland China, and mainland China residents cannot use thePeople's Republic of China passportto travel to Taiwan, as neither the ROC nor the PRC considers this international travel. The PRC government requires Taiwan residents to hold aMainland Travel Permit for Taiwan Residentswhen entering mainland China, whereas the ROC government requires mainland Chinese residents to hold theExit and Entry Permit for the Taiwan Area of the Republic of Chinato enter the Taiwan Area.

Economy

[edit]

China is Taiwan's most important target of outwardforeign direct investment.[161]From 1991 to 2022, more than US$200 billion have been invested in China by Taiwanese companies.[162]Much of Taiwanese-owned manufacturing, particularly in the electronics sector and the apparel sector, occurs in the PRC.[163]: 11 The investments helped the Taiwanese economy but also propelled China's economic rise.[164]

China is also Taiwan's largest trading partner, accounting for over 20 percent of total trade.[165]China and Hong Kong account for over 30 percent of Taiwan's exports. In 2022, Taiwan's trade surplus with mainland China and Hong Kong amounted to $100.4 billion.[166]Electronic components, including semiconductor chips, lead in Taiwan's total exports to China.[167]

Since the governments on both sides of the strait do not recognize the other side's legitimacy, there is a lack of legal protection for cross-strait economic exchanges. TheEconomic Cooperation Framework Agreement(ECFA) was viewed as providing legal protection for investments.[168]In 2014, theSunflower Student Movementeffectively halted theCross-Strait Service Trade Agreement(CSSTA).

Neither China nor Taiwan is comfortable with mutual economic dependence, and each government has been driven to seek alternatives.[169]Since 2016, Taiwan has tried to reduce its economic reliance on mainland China through itsNew Southbound Policy– in 2022 Taiwan's total investments in the countries targeted by the policy outstripped investments in China for the first time.[170]The number of Taiwanese working in China also fell. In 2015, 58 percent of Taiwanese working outside Taiwan worked in mainland China, with a total number of 420,000 people.[171]In 2021, the number fell to 163,000, accounting for 51.1 percent of the 319,000 Taiwanese who worked overseas.[172]

In 2021, China bannedpineappleimports from Taiwan, citing the risk of “harmful creatures” that could affect its own crops. The Taiwanese government characterized the ban as a Chinese campaign to ramp up political pressure on Taiwan. Similar to the Australian barley and wine incident, China was accused of "using ambiguous and opaque trade policies to punish its rivals." As a reaction to the ban, Taiwanese politicians and allies promoted Taiwanese pineapples asfreedom pineapples.[173]

In May 2024, following the inauguration ofLai Ching-te,China suspended preferential tariff arrangements on 134 items under the ECFA.[174]

Cultural exchanges

[edit]

TheNational Palace Museumin Taipei and thePalace Museumin Beijing have collaborated on exhibitions.[175]Scholars and academics frequently visit institutions across the Taiwan Strait.[176]Books published on each side are regularly re-published in the other side. However, restrictions on direct imports,different writing systems,andcensorshipsomewhat impede the exchange of books and ideas.[177][178]Some cultural exchanges are even accused of being associated with China'sunited frontwork.[179][180]

Taiwanese students can apply to universities in the mainland China without taking China's nationwide unified examination, calledGaokao.[181]There are regular programs for school students from each side to visit the other.[182][183]In 2019, there were 30,000 mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students studying in Taiwan.[184]There were also more than 7,000 Taiwanese students studying in Hong Kong that same year.[185]

Religious exchange has become frequent. Frequent interactions occur between worshipers ofMatsu,and also betweenBuddhists.[186][187]Taiwan Buddhist organizationTzu Chiis the first overseas non-governmental organization allowed to operate in China.[188]

Humanitarian actions

[edit]

Both sides have provided humanitarian aid to one another on several occasions.[citation needed]Following the2008 Sichuan earthquake,an expert search and rescue team was sent from Taiwan to help rescue survivors inSichuan.Shipments of aid material were also provided under the coordination of theRed Cross Society of the Republic of Chinaand charities such asTzu Chi.[189]

Following the2023 Jishishan earthquake,Taiwanese President Tsai expressed her condolences and offered humanitarian aid to the PRC.[190]Tsai expressed her condolences in official remarks, as well as in asimplified characterpost on X.[191]

Military

[edit]

China has embarked ona massive military build-up.[192]The U.S. has increased military exchanges with Taiwan,[193][194]and U.S. military vessels passed through the Taiwan Strait at a far greater rate.[195]

Speculation about the odds of war between China and Taiwan is rife. The Deputy Director-General of Taiwan'sNational Security Bureau,Chen Wen-fan, stated in 2020 that Xi Jinping intends to solve the "Taiwan Problem" by 2049.[196]In 2022, U.S. Pacific Command described the situation of cross-straits relations as being dire, as China was amassing the largest build-up of military personnel and assets seen since World War II.[197]Admiral Mike Gilday,Chief of Naval Operations of the U.S. Navy, warned that the American military must be prepared for the possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan before 2024.[198]A poll conducted by theCenter for Strategic and International Studies(CSIS) summarized that China is determined to unify with Taiwan and the potential for a military crisis or conflict in the Taiwan Strait is very real.[199]The poll also showed that China is willing to wait to unify with Taiwan peacefully, but would immediately invade if Taiwan declared independence.

ThePeople's Republic of China's persistent opposition toTaiwan'sde factoautonomy has edged many times on the possibility andthreatof amilitary invasionof the latter territories with the aim of achieving its vision ofChinese unification.Such threat has become increasingly tangible in the course of the 2020s decade, driven by the expressed willingness of mainland political leadership to pursue a military intervention, its parallel build-up of forces and recurrent exercises around Taiwan; as a consequence, Taiwan has also pursued forms of military preparation and international political alignment to discourage and possibly resist such intervention.[200][201]

ThePLA exercises around Taiwan in 2022were widely seem as signalling their willingness to pursue a military scenario and protest theUnited States' support of Taiwan's status quo.[200]

ThePeople's Liberation Army's current capacity of carrying out and winning such a war is a matter of debate, ranging mostly on the analysis whether it has the power to take the self-governing island despite the heavy costs foreseen. The perceived failure of the Russian army in rapidly occupyingUkraine,turning into a protracted conflict with destabilizing repercussions insideRussiaitself, is believed to weigh on PRC decision making.[202][203][204]

International scenario

[edit]

Positions from other countries

[edit]
India
[edit]

India's position before Taiwan's sovereignty and the PRC's military threat is considered key to the regional balance of power, and its policy to the Taiwan question has been evolving along with the military build-up and the growing affirmation of the possibility of invasion. It has been reportedly studying the threat such invasion would entail for the regional stability, economic relations and its own security. The consolidation of Chinese hegemony in theIndo-Pacificand the immediate economic repercussions of the disruption to commodities logistics and electronic technology production are its main concerns in relation to Taiwan's security. Some analysts see India as an approximation to theUnited States of Americaas a visible positioning as well as a growing liability, amounting to the possibility of the country being dragged into the war.[205]

In August 2023, three retired army chiefs from India participated in a security conference in Taiwan, organized the ministry of foreign relations, and additionally held closed doors discussions with Taiwan ministries and its main military think-tank, theInstitute of National Defence and Security Research.In parallel, India's Chief of Defence Staff,General Anil Chauhan,has reportedly initiated a study on the possibility of India being dragged into the war and the path the country should seek.[205]

Public opinion

[edit]

China

[edit]

A survey conducted between 2020 and 2021 showed that 55 percent of the respondents accepted launching a unification war to take back Taiwan entirely while 33 percent of them opposed.[206]22 percent of the respondents accepted the two sides of the Taiwan Strait keeping separate political systems, with unification not necessarily being the end game. Another survey conducted in 2022 showed Chinese respondents were split between those favoring tough policies on Taiwan and those favoring friendly ones.[207]

YoungjingoisticChinese nationalistson the internet, also calledLittle Pink,occasionallybypassedtheGreat Firewallto flood websites with messages andstickersin protest against Taiwan independence.[208][209][210]

Taiwan

[edit]
Results from an identity survey conducted each year since 1992 by the Election Study Center,National Chengchi University.[211]Responses are Taiwanese (green), Chinese (red) or both Taiwanese and Chinese (hatched). Non-responses are shown as grey.

In 2023, a poll conducted by the Election Study Center ofNational Chengchi University(NCCU) showed that the Taiwanese public opted for maintaining some forms of the status quo, instead of choosing Taiwan independence or unification with China as soon as possible.[212][213]Other polls released by theMainland Affairs Council(MAC)[214]and the Focus Survey Research[215]showed similar responses. A poll conducted by the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF) showed the public preferred independence to unification with China.[216][217]

On people's national identity of being either "Taiwanese" or "Chinese," a majority of respondents identify as Taiwanese in either poll of the NCCU[211]or the TPOF.[218]MAC polls have consistently shown support for the future of Taiwan to be decided by the people in Taiwan.[219][220][221]

On President Tsai Ing-wen's cross-strait policy, the first poll conducted by the TPOF in August 2016 showed 51 percent of approval and 40 percent of disapproval.[222]The approval rating dropped below the disapproval rating three month later and hit the lowest of 25 percent in December 2018.[223]However, the approval rating bounced after 2019.[222]In 2020, an annual poll conducted byAcademia Sinicashowed 73 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement that "the Chinese government is a friend of Taiwan's," an increase of 15 percent from the previous year.[224][225]In 2024, an annual survey by Academia Sinica found that 80.6 percent of Taiwan residents believe Taiwan and China do not belong to the same country.[226][227]

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Further reading

[edit]
Books
  • Beckershoff, A. (2023).Social Forces in the Re-Making of Cross-Strait Relations: Hegemony and Social Movements in Taiwan.Routledge.ISBN978-1-032-49800-3
  • Bush, R. & O'Hanlon, M. (2007).A War Like No Other: The Truth About China's Challenge to America.Wiley.ISBN0-471-98677-1
  • Bush, R. (2006).Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait.Brookings Institution Press.ISBN0-8157-1290-1
  • Cardenal, Juan Pablo;Araújo, Heriberto(2011).La silenciosa conquista china(in Spanish). Barcelona: Crítica. pp. 261–272.ISBN9788498922578.
  • Carpenter, T. (2006).America's Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan.Palgrave Macmillan.ISBN1-4039-6841-1
  • Cole, B. (2006).Taiwan's Security: History and Prospects.Routledge.ISBN0-415-36581-3
  • Copper, J. (2006).Playing with Fire: The Looming War with China over Taiwan.Praeger Security International General Interest.ISBN0-275-98888-0
  • Gill, B. (2007).Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy.Brookings Institution Press.ISBN0-8157-3146-9
  • Shirk, S. (2007).China: Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise.Oxford University Press.ISBN0-19-530609-0
  • Tsang, S. (2006).If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics.Routledge.ISBN0-415-40785-0
  • Tucker, N.B. (2005).Dangerous Strait: the U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis.Columbia University Press.ISBN0-231-13564-5
  • Wachman, Alan M.(2007 )Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China's Territorial Integrity.Stanford University Press.ISBN978-0804755542
Articles
[edit]