Expedition to Ostend

Expedition to Ostend
Part of theFrench Revolutionary Wars
Date 18–20 May 1798 Location Ostend,Batavian Republic Result Bruges–Ostend Canalobjectives destroyed British landing force captured
Belligerents
Great Britain	France Batavian Republic
Commanders and leaders
Home Riggs Popham Eyre Coote(POW)	Augustin Kellar
Strength
27 ships 1,400 soldiers	Local garrisons
Casualties and losses
163 killed and wounded 1,134 captured

The Britishexpedition to Ostendtook place on 18 May 1798 during theFrench Revolutionary Wars.The expedition was intended to destroy the gun-boats harboured inOstend,since they were destined to take part in the planned invasion of Britain. It also hoped to destroy the infrastructure of the port including the locks, basin-gates, and sluices of theBruges–Ostend Canal.The expedition was a combinedRoyal NavyandBritish Armyexpedition under the command of CaptainHome Popham(R.N.) and Major-GeneralEyre Coote.The British destroyed their objectives, but bad weather meant that the army contingent was unable to disembark, and after a brief fight were captured by the French.

Background

Planning

In 1798 the French Revolutionary Wars were ongoing and France had for several years been threatening what would be the first of severalplanned invasions of Britain.By the start of the year the majority of the invasion forces brought together for this had been diverted to join theFrench campaign in Egypt and Syria,but enough remained to cause worry.Prime MinisterWilliam Pitt the Youngerand his government, aware of the invasionflotillathat had been built up in France and theBatavian Republic,put out requests for solutions to halt or defend againstNapoleon's plans. These included the scouring of the archives to create a dossier of documents profiling how the English had planned to defend against theSpanish Armada of 1588,which Pitt then used to create theProvisional Cavalryand Army of Reserve.In April a proposal was put forward byGeneralSir Charles Grey,the commander of theBritish Army'sSouthern District,for offensive anti-invasion operations.

In order to avoid attacks by Royal Navy warships in theEnglish Channel,the French were moving their invasion craft fromFlushingtoOstendandDunkirkusing the newly expandedBruges–Ostend Canal.At nearbySas-Slijkenslargesluicegates had been built but left unprotected.Grey put forward the plan on the recommendation ofCaptainHome Riggs Pophamof theRoyal Navy,who suggested that anamphibious landingbe made at Ostend where they could then destroy the canal'sbasingates and the new sluices. This would hamper the operational capability of the canal and interrupt French maritime movement betweenHolland,Flanders,and France, stopping the Dutch part of the invasion flotilla from assembling.

Organisation

The government supported the plan, but theAdmiralty,to whom Popham had to submit his idea, found his request to lead it problematic. While he had military experience of Flanders from his service as astaff officerduring theFlanders campaign,he was only a junior captain in the Royal Navy, aged thirty-six. It was felt that if he was given command of such a large operation over the heads of many more senior officers it would do more harm than good.In order to force the Admiralty's hand in appointing him, Popham spoke to Grey and had him back his appointment; with this support Popham was give charge of the operation. This was the first of several delays that the operation went through.

For the operation Popham was given asquadronof twenty-seven warships, of which five had been converted intotroopships.The Admiralty had initially promised that this force would be prepared and brought together for Popham before the end of April, within ten days of the plan being finalised, but this was not actually completed until four weeks later on 13 May. The landing force for the expedition was provided by the army, and was commanded byMajor-GeneralEyre Coote.The general brought with him around 1,400 troops, which group consisted oflight companiesfrom theFirst,Coldstream,andThird Guards,light andgrenadier companiesfrom the23rdand49th Regiment of Foot,the entirety of the11th Regiment of Foot,and small contingents of theRoyal Artilleryand17th Light Dragoons.A separate group of warships was initially planned to go to Dunkirk to ensure that no enemy ships could escape there to defend Ostend once the attack was underway, but this was later abandoned.

Popham was fully aware that the expedition was dangerous and might fail, and that his part in it was very unpopular with many members of the military. He sent a letter to theFirst Lord of the AdmiraltyLord Spencerrequesting that if he was unsuccessful that Spencer would ensure Popham's subsequent trial would be fair. The force was ready to set sail on 14 May.

Expedition

Landings

Popham only revealed his plans, which had been kept highly secret, to his men once the ships were at sea. Intending to make a quick crossing of the English Channel, the ships were initially halted in this action by a violentgaleoff the coast ofKent,and only reached their destination on 16 May. Popham set out to begin the attack the same night. Five warshipswere assigned to attack the west of Ostend at first light, distracting enemy forces and destroying thebatteriesemplaced there. Five other shipswere to ensure that the mouth of Ostend harbour was kept open for the British, and to attack any shipping they found to the east of the town. Twobomb ketcheswere to respectively anchor to the north-north-west and east of the town to bombard it. The rest of the ships and Coote's soldiers would then be left to the main attack, for which Popham attached anaval brigadeformed with seamen from his largest vessels to bolster it. Another contingent of sailors were assigned to take theminesashore that would destroy the gates. Armedcutterswere organised to go ahead of the force to show them the way in.

While Popham's crews had been trained to arrive at their positions in the dead of night without the use ofsignals,a turn in the weather forced Popham to abandon the first attack. The expedition stayed at sea for another two days before on 18 May a captured ship revealed to Popham and Coote that the invasion craft at Flushing were making haste down the canal for Ostend and Dunkirk. With the weather having improved, it was decided that the attack should immediately go forward. The ships reached their various starting points at 1 a.m. on 19 May, by which time the wind had gotten up again and the sea was becoming rougher. Popham deliberated putting off the attack again, but was stopped in this from intelligence taken from a newly capturedpilot boatthat the nearbygarrisonswere all very small.

Hearing the news, Coote begged Popham for the landings to go ahead, expecting that by the time their mission had been completed the weather would have quietened enough that the troops could reembark safely. Popham put the landings into effect immediately without waiting for the troopships to organise themselves, so that the de-embarkation was done out of the pre-arranged order. Coote's troops began to be landed, unobserved, onsandbanks3 miles (4.8 km) east of Ostend. The presence of British troops was not first reported by the Dutch for several hours, and at 4:15 a.m. the Ostend batteries opened fire on the British ships of the two harbour parties. Popham's bomb ketches then began to return fire, quickly setting fires in the town and damaging ships in the canal basin. Apart from one troopship that had become separated during the night, Coote's soldiers were all landed with their equipment by 5 a.m.

Canal gates destroyed

The weather at sea continued to worsen after this and Coote looked to hurry the attack. At around 6 a.m. the warships assigned to the east side of Ostend harbour were sent towards the shore so that they could givecovering fireto the troops as they made their advance on the sluices.As they began to receive heavy damage, Popham started rotating the ships assigned to attack the Ostend batteries so that the distraction could continue on, but the ships then found that as the water around the batteries had lowered they could not get close enough to attack, leaving the batteries open to take aim at Coote's soldiers. In order to distract the guns while the mines were brought up to destroy the gates a request for surrender was sent to the commander of the Ostend garrison. Major-GeneralHarry Burrardthen succeeded with some of the Guards light infantry, 23rd and 49th grenadiers, and twofield gunsin securing the approaches to the harbour, despite attacks from a multitude ofsharpshooters.

Men were sent to ensure that the garrison could not send fresh defenders across from the town via the harbour ferry route, and defensive positions were taken up around the sluices. Portions of the 11th and 23rd light infantry took control ofBredeneand the coastal road.At 9:30 a.m. the missing troopship,HMSMinerva,arrived at Ostend and while the ship's captain was ashore reporting to CooteLieutenant-ColonelHenry Wardecommandeered some flat-bottomed boats and attempted to bring his fourcompaniesashore. The sea was so rough by this stage that he was persuaded by another ship to give up landing his reinforcements in case they were all killed in the attempt. The operation on shore continued, and at 10:20 a.m. thecanal locksand sluices were blown up by a mixed party of sailors and engineers.

Coote cut off

Coote's force then began to make its way back to the landing beach, finding minimal resistance as it did so and having only five casualties.They reached the beach at around 11 a.m., and Popham looked to re-embark them all by noon. The weather, however, had continued to worsen and it was now impossible to get any men off the beach. Coote found his communication with Popham's ships cut off, and on his own initiative attempted to send some boats of troops off to the ships. These boats quickly filled with water as they made way and the men on board only narrowly avoided being killed. Seeing that further attempts to get to sea were hopeless and expecting that the weather would moderate on the following day, Coote formed a position on the sandbanks, facing inland. There the engineers hastily constructedbreastworksand the availablefield gunsandhowitzerswere brought up in defensive positions.

The force stayed at the ready in their positions through the following day and night, with the weather conditions getting steadily worse. News of the attack had since reached the surrounding settlements, and soldiers had been formed together from the garrisons atGhent,Bruges,and Dunkirk to repulse the British. At around 4 a.m. on 20 May these troops came up with Coote's force on the beach, organised into twocolumnsdirectly opposing the British with other units on the flanks. Popham observed the French attack from his ships but thesea statemeant that he was still unable to do anything to assist Coote. The French force pushed the British flanks in over a period of two hours of fighting, during which time Coote himself was badly injured while trying to rally the 11th. The decision was then made to capitulate, before which the Royal Artillery pushed its guns into the sea to stop them from being captured. Coote's force lost 163 men killed and wounded, with 1,134 men subsequently captured.

Aftermath

When it was clear the Coote had surrendered, Popham weighed anchor and moved out to sea. Plans had been made to follow up the Ostend operation with similar attacks on theScheldtand at Flushing, but these did not take place. Despite the ignominious end to Coote's force, the goal of the operation had been achieved.Lord Buckinghamwrote to theForeign SecretaryLord Grenvillethat he was "extremely happy in the success of your very important and very well digested attempt upon Ostend", calling it a "complete success". Despite the failure to rescue Coote's force, naval historianSir Julian Corbettargues that as the destruction of the canal gates had the impact they had intended, the expedition was "a thoroughly well-designed, and brilliantly-executed enterprise". The Admiralty was blamed for the loss of Coote, with it being suggested that had Popham come up against less opposition to his plan in April then it would have been put into action before the coming of the bad weather and the losses would have been avoided.

Royal Navy force

Ship	Guns	Commander	Notes	Ref.
HMSExpedition	26	CaptainHome Riggs Popham	Nominally of 44 guns. Armeden fluteas atroopship
HMSCirce	28	CaptainRobert Winthrop
HMSVestal	28	CaptainCharles White
HMSAriadne	20	CaptainJames Bradby
HMSChampion	20	CaptainHenry Raper
HMSHebe	14	CommanderWilliam Birchall	Nominally of 38 guns. Armeden fluteas a troopship
HMSMinerva	14	CommanderJohn McKellar	Nominally of 38 guns. Armeden fluteas a troopship
HMSDruid	12	CommanderCharles Apthorpe	Nominally of 32 guns. Armeden fluteas a troopship
HMSHarpy	16	CommanderHenry Bazely
HMSSavage	16	CommanderNorborne Thompson
HMSDart	16	CommanderRichard Raggett	Nominally of 28 guns. Armeden fluteas a troopship
HMSKite	16	CommanderWilliam Brown
HMSTartarus	8	CommanderThomas Hand
HMSHecla	8	CommanderJames Oughton
HMSWolverine	16	CommanderLewis Mortlock
HMSBlazer	12	LieutenantDaniel Burgess
HMSVesuve	4	LieutenantWilliam Elliott
HMSCrash	12	LieutenantBulkeley Macworth Praed
HMSBoxer	12	LieutenantThomas Gilbert
HMSAcute	12	LieutenantJeremiah Seaver
HMSAsp	12	LieutenantJoseph Edmonds
HMSFurnace	12	LieutenantMaurice William Suckling
HMSBiter	12	LieutenantJohn de Vitre
HMSCracker	12	LieutenantThomas Aitkinson
Vigilant	6
Terrier	12	T. Lewen
Lion	10	S. Bevel

References

• Field of Mars: Being an Alphabetical Digestion of the Principal Naval and Military Engagements, in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, Particularly of Great Britain and Her Allies, from the Ninth Century to the Present Period...Vol. 2. G and J Robinson. 1801. p.353–357.
• Intelligence Branch, Quartermaster-General's Department (1884).British Minor Expeditions, 1746–1814.London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
• Manwaring, G. E. (1936).The Flower of England's Garland.London: Philip Allan & Co.
• Stephen, Leslie,ed. (1887)."Coote, Eyre (1762-1824?)".Dictionary of National Biography.Vol. 12. London: Smith, Elder & Co. p. 161–162.

Further reading

• "No. 15017".The London Gazette.19 May 1798. pp. 421–425.