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III Corps (Continuation War)

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III Corps
III Armeijakunta
Active1941–1944
DisbandedRe-designated1st Divisionon 5 December 1944
CountryFinland
BranchArmy
TypeCorps
Engagements
Commanders
Notable
commanders		Hjalmar Siilasvuo

TheIII Corps(Finnish:III Armeijakunta, III AK) was acorpsof theFinnish Armyduring theContinuation War,whereFinlandfought alongsideNazi Germanyagainst theSoviet Union.Formed from the peacetime V Corps and subordinated to the GermanArmy High Command Norway,III Corps fought initially in northern Finland on the flank of theGerman XXXVI Corps,participating in the Finno-GermanOperation Arctic Fox.In February 1944, it was moved to theKarelian Isthmusjust prior to the launch of the SovietVyborg–Petrozavodsk offensive.Following theMoscow Armistice,III Corps took overall command of the Finnish forces participating in theLapland War,the removal of German forces from northern Finland.

Mobilization and pre-war plans[edit]

Further information:Continuation War § German and Finnish war plans

While the exact details of the Finno-Germanplanning preceding theContinuation Warremain unclear,[4]it is known that on 25 May 1941 Finnish officers participated in negotiations with the Germans inSalzburgregarding plans for a future war with the Soviet Union.[5]According to the plans proposed by the Germans, the Finns would be in charge of operations in the southeast of Finland and east ofLake Ladoga,with overall command of both Finnish and German troops in the area falling under the Finnishcommander-in-chief,MarshalCarl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim.In turn, the Finns would subordinate the peacetime V Corps to the headquarters of the GermanArmy of Norway.[5]During follow-up negotiations inBerlinon 26 May, the Finnish generalErik Heinrichsstated that theArmy of Norwaycould expect a Finnish contribution of two divisions, but emphasized that the Finnish forces concentrated in theSallaregion would be needed in the south as soon as possible.[6]Forward elements of the German troops began arriving in Finland on 1 June, and further talks followed in Helsinki over the period 3 to 6 June.[7]The participants agreed that the southern border of the Army of Norway's area of operations would be on the lineOulu–Oulujärvi–Lentiira–Belomorsk.[8]

The Finnish mobilization began on 10 June 1941 under the pretext of "additional exercises" (Finnish:ylimääräiset harjoitukset). The Military Districts of Perä-Pohjola and Pohjois-Pohjanmaa called up the3rdand6thDivisions, which concentrated in the area betweenKajaaniandSavukoskiunder the command of the peacetime V Corps. As arranged in the previous month's discussions, the corps, led byMajor GeneralHjalmar Siilasvuo,was formally subordinated to the headquarters of the German Army of Norway on 15 June.[9]On 18 June, the corps was re-designated as III Corps.[10]

In Northern Finland, 1941–1944[edit]

Further information:Operation Arctic Fox
GeneralNikolaus von Falkenhorst(left) with Major GeneralHjalmar Siilasvuo(right) at the start of the Continuation War.
Original plan forOperation Silver Fox

Before the start of the hostilities, the 6th Division was transferred from the III Corps to the German XXXVI Corps.[11]The German plans called for the III Corps, now consisting only of the 3rd Division, to cover the right (southern) flank of the Army of Norway. It was to advance first to theUkhta–Kestengaline and this movement was to be followed by a continued advance to theMurmansk railroadandKem.III Corps would be to the south of theGerman XXXVI Corps,with the unit areas of responsibility defined by the lineKuusamo–Oulanka–Chupa.III Corps thus secured the southern flank ofOperation Silver Fox,targeting the capture ofMurmansk.[12]Siilasvuo divided the remaining forces of the III Corps into two formations. Group F, consisting of the main body of the 3rd Division, attacked east fromSuomussalmi;its initial objective wasVoknavolok,from where it was expected to continue towards Ukhta. Group J, formed around one regiment from the 3rd Division, attacked towardsSohjana[fi],with a follow-on objective of Kestenga.[13]III Corps was ordered to launch its attack on 1 July, at 02:30.[11]

It soon become apparent that III Corps was the only corps-level unit of the Army of Norway making significant progress, and the corps was reinforced with parts ofSS Division Nordon 21 July. On 30 July,Adolf Hitlerapproved a modification to the Germans plans: operations of the two German corps of the Army of Norway were largely halted, and German reinforcements were allocated to support the attack of the III Corps. The main objective of the III Corps was to be the Murmansk railroad in the area ofLoukhi.[14][15]By end of July, SS Division Nord had been subordinated to III Corps in totality. As Siilasvuo did not trust the German officers to lead Finnish forces following their failures in the Salla region, the bulk of the combat strength of SS Division Nord was subordinated to Group J, the Finnish force consisting of a single regiment while the staff of the Division was subordinated into the III Corps HQ. This resulted in tension between the various commanders, as the officers of SS Division Nord viewed the subordination as a humiliation.[16]

By 2 August, Group F had reached the Soviet defensive lines north of Ukhta,[17][18]but failed to take the town due to strong resistance by the Soviet54th Division.Renewed attempts in September fared no better.[19]Group J had taken up positions 8 miles (13 km) east of Kestenga after being pushed back by the Soviet88th Divisionwhich had recently arrived in the area.[19]General Siilasvuo reported toGeneraloberstNikolaus von Falkenhorstthat III Corps was unable to reach Loukhi, with both sides settling for stationary warfare in the sector.[20]On 14 August, Group J was renamedDivision Jand Group F as3rd Division.[21]On the same date, Hitler ordered the attack on Ukhta to be halted, and for Division J, including SS-Division Nord, to go on the defensive.[19]Concurrently with these changes, SS Division Nord was de-subordinated from Division J and was given its own sector alongside Division J's as part of the III Corps's northern group.[21]

By 6 October the situation at the front had improved to a point where von Falkenhorst and Siilasvuo discussed continuing the III Corps's advance towards Loukhi. Due to Hitler's August order, the plan was phrased as III Corp improving its positions.[22][23]To this end, on 16 October, von Falkenhorst approved a plan to capture "a crossing of a railway and a highway 30 kilometres (19 mi) east of Kestenga",[23]indicating the real purpose of the operation was to cut the Murmansk railroad. The Finnish high command was informed about the operation on 25 October, but nobody informed the German high command,Oberkommando der Wehrmacht(OKW).[23]The operation began on 30 October, with III Corps encircling a Soviet regiment in the first two days. On 9 October, the Army of Norway reported to OKW that two regiments of the Soviet 88th Rifle Division had been virtually destroyed,[24]but Finnish intelligence indicated that Soviets were reinforcing the area with the186th Rifle Divisionfrom Murmansk.[25]

Finnish soldiers east of Kestenga in the arctic forest.

On 5 November, Siilasvuo was informed by the Finnish high command that the attack should be halted for political reasons, and that no additional Finnish reinforcements would be forthcoming despite Siilasvuo's wishes. TheUnited States of Americahad given the Finnish government a note demanding the attack be stopped. This had caused FinnishPresidentRisto Rytito express his concern over the operation to Mannerheim. By 11 November, Siilasvuo was actively slowing down the attack by ordering construction of further field fortifications. On the same date, the headquarters of the German Army of Norway received a message from OKW, demanding an explanation for the III Corps's attack. The message also reiterated a previous order for the whole Army of Norway sector to go to a defensive posture. On 17 November, Siilasvuo gave a written order to halt the attack. By December, the fighting in the area had calmed down.[26]

In early 1942, the German forces in northern Finland and Norway were reorganized with the creation of theGerman Lapland Army(soon renamed the 20th Mountain Army) which took over Army of Norway's responsibilities in northern Finland. As part of this reorganization, III Corps was transferred to the Lapland Army. On 4 July, III Corps was formally transferred back to Finnish command, where it was directly subordinated to the Finnish commander-in-chief Mannerheim, with the GermanXVIII Corpstaking responsibility for the Kestenga area the previous day.[27]The area of Ukhta remained a Finnish responsibility until 22 March 1944, when it was handed to the 20th Mountain Army.[28]

Karelian Isthmus, 1944[edit]

Further information:Vyborg–Petrozavodsk offensive
Finnish defensive lines on the Karelian Isthmus

In March 1942, Finnish defenses had been reorganized under three large formations namedKannas Group,Maaselkä GroupandAunus Group.[29]After the end of thesiege of Leningradin January 1944, the Finnish high command prepared for a Soviet offensive. As part of these preparations, the Kannas Group, responsible for the Karelian Isthmus (Finnish:Karjalankannas), was split into two corps-level formations on 4 March. The western side of the isthmus became the responsibility of theIV Corps,with the eastern side of the isthmus being handed to the III Corps, the headquarters of which was moved to the area from northern Finland.[30]Following this reorganization, on 6 July, III Corps consisted of the15th Division,the 19th Brigade and some assets from the18th Divisionthat mostly acted as part of the commander-in-chief's reserve.[31]The 3rd Division, previously part of the III Corps and recently freed from its frontal duties in the Ukhta area, was subordinated directly to the commander-in-chief as reserve.[30]

On 9 June 1944, the SovietVyborg–Petrozavodsk offensivestarted with a preparatory attack against the sector of the IV Corps. The main thrust of the offensive, on the Karelian Isthmus, hit the IV Corps sector on 10 June and quickly breached the Finnish main defensive line.[32]By 11 June, IV Corps had been pushed sufficiently far back that the flank of III Corps was endangered.[33]Even after IV Corps had reached the secondaryVT-lineon 12 June, III Corps was still holding to its part of the original main defensive line. On 13 June, to protect the flank of the corps, the 18th Division was released from the reserve and subordinated to III Corps. Concurrently, preparations were started for a future retreat to the VT-line.[34]By 14 June, the situation of the 15th Division was becoming increasingly untenable, and III Corps was given permission to retreat to the VT-line. The retreat began on the night of 14–15 June, and the bulk of III Corps had reached the secondary defensive line by the end of June 15, with the exception of some forces on the left-most flank on the shore of Lake Ladoga.[35]

The situation on the western Karelian Isthmus continued to deteriorate, and on 16 June Mannerheim ordered the 18th Division to be moved to theVyborgregion to act as his reserve as soon as possible. Given the rapid Soviet advance to the west, the III Corps continued to be in danger of being cut off.[36]In the following days, the corps conducted a series of delaying actions, eventually taking defensive positions alongVuoksi,on theVKT-line.[36][37]By 20 June, III Corps had created a defensive line consisting of two divisions and a brigade.[38]The front stabilized along the Vuoksi for the rest of the war, and Soviet forces failed to break the VKT-line on the III Corps sector despite several attempts.[39]

After the Continuation War[edit]

Main article:Lapland War
The German withdrawal from Finland

A ceasefire was agreed in September 1944 between the Soviet Union and Finland, which led to theMoscow Armistice.One of the terms of the armistice required Finland to ensure the removal of any German forces remaining in Finland. In practice, this meant that unless the German 20th Mountain Army Corps voluntarily retreated from Finland by mid-September, Finnish forces would have to evict them by force.[40]Initially, Germans fell back towards Norway in unofficial cooperation with the Finnish forces. However, following the failure ofOperation Tanne Ost,where the German's attempted captureGoglandfrom Finnish defenders on 14–15 September, as well as a general cessation of any voluntary movement towards Norway, Finno-German cooperation completely broke down.[41][42]

During the resultingLapland War,III Corps was moved to northern Finland where it took overall command of all the Finnish forces participating in the fighting against the Germans. The resulting formation consisted of the3rd,6th,11th,15thdivisions, theArmored Divisionand two brigades. Over the next months, the III Corps slowly pushed the Germans out of Lapland.[43][3]

As the Finnish Army completed its demobilization by early December, as mandated by the Moscow Armistice, the forces under III Corps were reduced from a peak strength of 75,000 to approximately 12,000 men. On 5 December the corps was re-designated 1st Division, which remained under Siilasvuo's command. As the veterans of the Continuation War were demobilized and replaced by fresh conscripts, this latter part of the Lapland War became known in Finland as the "Children's Crusade". The final stages of the war saw the Germans only occupy a minor area of land in theKaresuvantoregion, and the Finnish forces in the area were eventually reduced to a task force consisting of 700 men.[44][45][46]The final German forces left Finland on 27 April 1945, signaling the end to the Lapland War.[47]

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^Leskinen & Juutilainen 2005,p. 131.
  2. ^Leskinen & Juutilainen 2005,p. 789.
  3. ^abLeskinen & Juutilainen 2005,p. 1136.
  4. ^Trotter 2013,stating "Despite exhaustive efforts by Finnish historians, it has so far proven impossible to pinpoint the exact date on which Finland was taken into confidence about Operation Barbarossa".
  5. ^abSotatieteen laitos 1988,p. 172.
  6. ^Sotatieteen laitos 1988,pp. 173–174.
  7. ^Sotatieteen laitos 1988,pp. 175–177.
  8. ^Sotatieteen laitos 1988,p. 175.
  9. ^Sotatieteen laitos 1988,pp. 177–179.
  10. ^Sotatieteen laitos 1988,p. 183.
  11. ^abSotatieteen laitos 1993,p. 19.
  12. ^Sotatieteen laitos 1993,pp. 14–15.
  13. ^Sotatieteen laitos 1993,p. 21.
  14. ^Sotatieteen laitos 1993,pp. 21–22.
  15. ^Sotatieteen laitos 1993,p. 53.
  16. ^Sotatieteen laitos 1993,pp. 53–54.
  17. ^Sotatieteen laitos 1993,p. 68.
  18. ^Ziemke 1959,p. 169.
  19. ^abcZiemke 1959,p. 179.
  20. ^Sotatieteen laitos 1993,p. 22.
  21. ^abSotatieteen laitos 1993,p. 54.
  22. ^Ziemke 1959,p. 180.
  23. ^abcSotatieteen laitos 1993,p. 100.
  24. ^Ziemke 1959,p. 181.
  25. ^Sotatieteen laitos 1993,p. 101.
  26. ^Sotatieteen laitos 1993,pp. 101–102.
  27. ^Sotatieteen laitos 1993,pp. 191–192.
  28. ^Sotatieteen laitos 1993,p. 194.
  29. ^Leskinen & Juutilainen 2005,p. 343.
  30. ^abSotatieteen laitos 1993,p. 179.
  31. ^Sotatieteen laitos 1993,pp. 289–291.
  32. ^Sotatieteen laitos 1993,pp. 292–295.
  33. ^Sotatieteen laitos 1993,p. 313.
  34. ^Sotatieteen laitos 1993,p. 318.
  35. ^Sotatieteen laitos 1993,pp. 343–347.
  36. ^abSotatieteen laitos 1993,pp. 370–374.
  37. ^Sotatieteen laitos 1993,pp. 380–385.
  38. ^Sotatieteen laitos 1993,pp. 406.
  39. ^Nenye et al. 2016,pp. 245–249.
  40. ^Leskinen & Juutilainen 2005,p. 1124.
  41. ^Leskinen & Juutilainen 2005,p. 1129.
  42. ^Ziemke 1959,p. 296.
  43. ^Leskinen & Juutilainen 2005,p. 1131.
  44. ^Hietanen 1992,pp. 196–201.
  45. ^Nenye et al. 2016,pp. 312–316.
  46. ^Uola 2006.
  47. ^Leskinen & Juutilainen 2005,p. 1148.

References[edit]

  • Hietanen, Silvo (1992). "Aseista mottimetsään – armeijan kotiuttaminen syksyllä 1944" [From Arms to Forestry Work – Demobilization of the Army in the Fall of 1944]. In Hietanen, Silvo (ed.).Kansakunta sodassa: 3. Kuilun yli[Nation at War: 3. Over the Chasm] (in Finnish). Helsinki: Valtion painatuskeskus andOpetusministeriö.ISBN951-861-384-2.
  • Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti, eds. (2005).Jatkosodan pikkujättiläinen[The Small Giant of the Continuation War] (in Finnish). Helsinki: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö.ISBN951-0-28690-7.
  • Nenye, Vesa; Munter, Peter; Wirtanen, Toni; Birks, Chris (2016).Finland at War: The Continuation and Lapland Wars 1941–45.Oxford, UK: New York, NY: Bloomsbury Publishing.ISBN978-1-47-281528-6.
  • Sotatieteen laitos, ed. (1988).Jatkosodan historia 1[History of the Continuation War, part 1]. Sotatieteen laitoksen julkaisuja XXV (in Finnish). Vol. 1. Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö.ISBN951-0-15327-3.
  • Sotatieteen laitos, ed. (1993).Jatkosodan historia 4[History of the Continuation War, part 4]. Sotatieteen laitoksen julkaisuja XXV (in Finnish). Vol. 4. Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö.ISBN951-0-15330-3.
  • Trotter, William R.(2013).A Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939–1940.Algonquin Books.ISBN978-1565126923.
  • Uola, Mikko (2006)."Siilasvuo, Hjalmar (1892–1947)".Kansallisbiografia.Studia Biographica (in Finnish). Vol. 4. The Finnish Literature Society.ISSN1799-4349.Retrieved11 November2021.
  • Ziemke, Earl F. (1959).The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940–1945(PDF).United States Government Printing.ISBN0-16-001996-6.Retrieved21 October2021.
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