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Firebombing

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An American aircraft dropsnapalmonViet Congpositions in 1965.
AGermanWorld War IIincendiary bombremnant

Firebombingis abombingtechnique designed to damage a target, generally anurban area,through the use offire,caused byincendiary devices,rather than from the blast effect of large bombs. In popular usage, any act in which an incendiary device is used to initiate a fire is often described as a "firebombing".

Although simple incendiary bombs have been used to destroy buildings since the start of gunpowder warfare,World War Isaw the first use ofstrategic bombingfrom the air to damage the morale and economy of the enemy, such as the GermanZeppelinair raids conducted onLondon.The Chinese wartime capital ofChongqingwasfirebombed by the Imperial Japanesestarting in early 1939 during theSecond Sino-Japanese War.London,Coventry,and many other British cities were firebombed duringthe BlitzbyNazi Germany.Most large German cities were extensively firebombed starting in 1942, andalmost all large Japanese cities were firebombedduring the last six months ofWorld War II.

This technique makes use of smallincendiary bombspossibly delivered by acluster bomb,such as theMolotov bread basket.[1]If a fire catches, it could spread, taking in adjacent buildings that would have been largely unaffected by a high explosive bomb. This is a more effective use of the payload that a bomber could carry.

The use of incendiaries alone does not generally start uncontrollable fires where the targets are roofed with nonflammable materials such as tiles or slates. The use of a mixture of bombers carrying high explosive bombs, such as the Britishblockbuster bombs,which blew out windows and roofs and exposed the interior of buildings to the incendiary bombs, is much more effective. Alternatively, a preliminary bombing with conventional bombs can be followed by subsequent attacks by incendiary carrying bombers.

Tactics

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Firebombing inBraunschweig,Germany, 15 October 1944
Charred remains of Japanese civilians after abombing of Tokyo

Early in World War II many British cities were firebombed. Two particularly notable raids were theCoventry Blitzon 14 November 1940, and theblitz on Londonon the night of 29 December/30 December 1940, which was the most destructive raid on London during the war with much of the destruction caused by fires started by incendiary bombs. During the Coventry Blitz the Germans pioneered several innovations which were to influence all future strategic bomber raids during the war.[2]These were: the use of pathfinder aircraft with electronic aids to navigate, to mark the targets before the main bomber raid; and the use of high explosive bombs andair-minescoupled with thousands of incendiary bombs intended to set the city ablaze. The first wave of follow-up bombers dropped high explosive bombs, the intent of which was to knock out the utilities (the water supply, electricity network and gas mains), and to crater the road — making it difficult for the fire engines to reach fires started by the successive waves of bombers. The follow-up waves dropped a combination of high explosive and incendiary bombs. There were two types of incendiary bombs: those made ofmagnesiumandironpowders, and those made ofpetroleum.The high-explosive bombs and the larger air-mines were not only designed to hamper the Coventry fire brigade, they were also intended to damage roofs, making it easier for the incendiary bombs to fall into buildings and ignite them. AsSir Arthur Harris,commander ofRAF Bomber Command,wrote after the war:

In the early days of bombing our notion, like that of the Germans, was to spread an attack out over the whole night, thereby wearing down the morale of the civilian population. The result was, of course, that an efficient fire brigade could tackle a single load of incendiaries, put them out, and wait in comfort for the next to come along; they might also be able to take shelter when a few high explosives bombs were dropping.... But it was observed that when the Germans did get an effective concentration,... then our fire brigades had a hard time; if a rain of incendiaries is mixed with high explosives bombs there is a temptation for the fireman to keep his head down. The Germans, again and again, missed their chance, as they did during the London blitz that I watched from the roof of the Air Ministry, of setting our cities ablaze by a concentrated attack. Coventry was adequately concentrated in point of space, but all the same, there was little concentration in point of time, and nothing like the fire tornadoes of Hamburg or Dresden ever occurred in this country. But they did do us enough damage to teach us the principle of concentration, the principle of starting so many fires at the same time that no firefighting services, however efficiently and quickly they were reinforced by the fire brigades of other towns could get them under control.

Thetactical innovationof thebomber streamwas developed by the RAF to overwhelm theGermanaerial defensesof theKammhuber Lineduring World War II to increase the RAF's concentration in time over the target. But after the lessons learned during the Blitz, the tactic of dropping a high concentration of bombs over the target in the shortest time possible became standard in the RAF as it was more effective than a longer raid.[3]For example, during the Coventry Blitz on the night of 14/15 November 1940, 515 Luftwaffe bombers, many flying more than onesortieagainst Coventry, delivered their bombs over a period of time lasting more than 10 hours. In contrast, the much more devastating raid onDresdenon the night of 13/14 of February 1945 by two waves of the RAF Bomber Command's main force, involved their bombs being released at 22:14, with all but one of the 254Lancasterbombers releasing their bombs within two minutes, and the last one released at 22:22. The second wave of 529 Lancasters dropped all of their bombs between 01:21 and 01:45. This means that in the first raid, on average, one Lancaster dropped a full load of bombs every half a second and in the second larger raid that involved more than one RAF bomber Group, one every three seconds.

TheUnited States Army Air Forces(USAAF) officially only bombed precision targets over Europe, but for example, when 316B-17 Flying FortressesbombedDresdenin a follow-up raid at around noon on 14 February 1945, because of clouds the later waves bombed usingH2X radarfor targeting.[4]The mix of bombs to be used on the Dresden raid was about 40% incendiaries, much closer to the RAF city-busting mix than thebomb-load usually used by the Americans in precision bombardments.[5]This was quite a common mix when the USAAF anticipated cloudy conditions over the target.[6]

In its attacks on Japan, the USAAF abandoned itsprecision bombingmethod that was used in Europe before and adopted a policy ofsaturation bombing,using incendiaries to burn Japanese-held cities includingWuhan,and the cities of the Japanese home islands.[7]These tactics were used to devastating effect with many urban areas burned out. The first incendiary raid byB-29 Superfortressbombers was againstKobeon 4 February 1945, with 69 B-29s arriving over the city at an altitude of 24,500 to 27,000 ft (7,500 to 8,200 m), dropping 152 tons of incendiaries and 14 tons of fragmentation bombs to destroy about 57.4 acres (23.2 ha). The next mission was another high altitude daylight incendiary raid againstTokyoon 25 February when 172 B-29s destroyed around 643 acres (260 ha) of the snow-covered city, dropping 453.7 tons of mostly incendiaries with some fragmentation bombs.[8]Changing to low-altitude night tactics to concentrate the fire damage while minimizing the effectiveness of fighter and artillery defenses, theOperation Meetinghouseraid[9]carried out by 279 B-29s raided Tokyo again on the night of 9/10 March, dropped 1,665 tons of incendiaries from altitudes of 5,000 to 9,000 ft (1,500 to 2,700 m), mostly using the 500-pound (230 kg) E-46 cluster bomb which released 38M-69 oil-based incendiary bombsat an altitude of 2,500 ft (760 m). A lesser number ofM-47 incendiarieswas dropped: the M-47 was a 100-pound (45 kg) jelled-gasoline and white phosphorus bomb which ignited upon impact. In the first two hours of the raid, 226 of the attacking aircraft or 81% unloaded their bombs to overwhelm the city's fire defenses.[10]The first to arrive dropped bombs in a large X pattern centered in Tokyo's working class district near the docks; later aircraft simply aimed near this flaming X. Approximately 15.8 square miles (4,090 ha) of the city were destroyed and 100,000 people are estimated to have died in the resultingconflagration,more than the immediate deaths of either theatomic bombingsofHiroshimaorNagasaki.[11]After this raid, the USAAF continued with low-altitude incendiary raids against Japan's cities, destroying an average of 40% of the built-up area of 64 of the largest cities.[12]

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See also

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Notes

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  1. ^Langdon Davies, John (June 1940). "The Lessons of Finland".Picture Post.
  2. ^Taylor, Fredrick;Dresden Tuesday 13 February 1945,Pub Bloomsbury (First Pub 2004, Paper Back 2005).ISBN0-7475-7084-1.Page 118
  3. ^abArthur Harris.Bomber Offensive,(First edition Collins 1947), Pen & Sword military classics 2005;ISBN1-84415-210-3.Page 83
  4. ^Davis p.504
  5. ^Taylor p. 366. Taylor compares this 40% mix with theraid on Berlinon 3 February where the ratio was 10% incendiaries
  6. ^Davis pp. 425,504
  7. ^MacKinnon, Stephen R. Peter Harmsen (ed.)."The US Firebombing of Wuhan".China in WW2.Peter Harmsen.Retrieved2021-04-20.
  8. ^Bradley, F.J. (1999).No Strategic Targets Left.Paducah, Kentucky: Turner Publishing. p. 33.ISBN9781563114830.
  9. ^"THE WAR. Search & Explore. Themes & Topics | PBS".Archived fromthe originalon 2007-10-13.
  10. ^Bradley 1999, pp. 34–35.
  11. ^Part I: A Failure of IntelligenceArchived2012-03-02 at theWayback Machine.Freeman Dyson.Technology Review, November 1, 2006,MIT
  12. ^Fagg, John E. (1983). "Aviation Engineers". In Craven, Wesley Frank; Cate, James Lea (eds.).Services Around the World.The Army Air Forces in World War II. Volume VII. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. p. 751.OCLC222565066.

References

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