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Foreign policy of the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration

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Dwight D. Eisenhower
World War II
34th President of the United States
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Dwight D. Eisenhower's signature
Seal of the President of the United States

TheUnited States foreign policyof theDwight D. Eisenhower administration,from 1953 to 1961, focused on theCold Warwith theSoviet Unionand its satellites. The United States built up a stockpile ofnuclear weaponsandnuclear deliverysystems to deter military threats and save money while cutting back on expensive Army combat units. Amajor uprisingbroke out inHungaryin 1956; the Eisenhower administration did not become directly involved, but condemned the military invasion by theSoviet Union.Eisenhower sought to reach a nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union, but following the1960 U-2 incidentthe Kremlin canceled a scheduled summit in Paris.

As he promised, Eisenhower quickly ended the fighting inKorea,leaving it divided North and South. The U.S. has kept major forces there ever since to deter North Korea. In 1954, he played a key role in the Senate's defeat of theBricker Amendment,which would have limited the president's treaty making power and ability to enter into executive agreements with foreign leaders. The Eisenhower administration used propaganda and covert action extensively, and theCentral Intelligence Agencysupported two military coups: the1953 Iranian coup d'étatand the1954 Guatemalan coup d'état.The administration did not approve the partition ofVietnamat the1954 Geneva Conference,and directed economic and military aid and advice toSouth Vietnam.Washington led the establishment of theSoutheast Asia Treaty Organizationas an alliance of anti-Communist states inSoutheast Asia.It ended two crises withChinaoverTaiwan.

In 1956, Egyptian PresidentGamal Abdel Nassernationalized theSuez Canal,sparking theSuez Crisis,in which a coalition of France, Britain, and Israel took control of the canal. Concerned about the economic and political impacts of the invasion, Eisenhower had warned the three against any such action. When they invaded anyway he used heavy financial and diplomatic pressures to force a withdrawal. In the aftermath of the crisis, Eisenhower announced theEisenhower Doctrine,under which any country in the Middle East could request American economic assistance or aid from American military forces.

TheCuban Revolutionbroke out during Eisenhower's second term, resulting in the replacement of pro-U.S. military dictatorFulgencio BatistawithFidel Castro.In response to the revolution, the Eisenhower administration broke ties with Cuba and Eisenhower approved a CIA operation to carry out a campaign ofterrorist attacksandsabotage,kill civilians, and cause economic damage. The CIA also trained and commanded pilots to bomb civilian airfields. The CIA began preparations for an invasion of Cuba by Cuban expatriates, ultimately resulting in the failedBay of Pigs Invasionafter Eisenhower left office.

Cold War[edit]

Further information:Cold War
A map of the geopolitical situation in 1953
Eisenhower's 1957 foreign policy team
Richard Nixon
Richard Nixon
Allen W. Dulles
Allen W. Dulles
John Foster Dulles
John Foster Dulles
Charles Erwin Wilson
Charles Erwin Wilson

Eisenhower's 1952 candidacy was motivated in large part by his opposition to Taft's isolationist views; he did not share Taft's concerns regarding U.S. involvement incollective securityand international trade, the latter of which was embodied by the 1947General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.[1]After Eisenhower secured the 1952 nomination, he and Taft agreed that Taft would handle domestic issues in his role as Senate GOP leader and Eisenhower would control foreign policy.[2]

The Cold War dominated international politics in the 1950s. As both the United States and the Soviet Union possessed nuclear weapons, any conflict presented the risk of escalation into nuclear warfare.[3]Eisenhower continued the basic Truman administration policy ofcontainmentof Soviet expansion and the strengthening of the economies of Western Europe. Eisenhower's overall Cold War policy was described by NSC174, which held that therollbackof Soviet influence was a long-term goal, but that the United States would not provoke war with the Soviet Union.[4]He planned for the full mobilization of the country to counter Soviet power, and emphasized making a "public effort to explain to the American people why such a militaristic mobilization of their society was needed."[5]

AfterJoseph Stalindied in March 1953,Georgy Malenkovtook leadership of the Soviet Union. Malenkov proposed a "peaceful coexistence" with the West, and British Prime MinisterWinston Churchillproposed a summit of the world leaders. Fearing that the summit would delay the rearmament ofWest Germany,and skeptical of Malenkov's intentions and ability to stay in power, the Eisenhower administration nixed the summit idea. In April 1953, Eisenhower delivered his "Chance for Peace speech",in which he called for an armistice in Korea, free elections to re-unify Germany, the" full independence "of Eastern European nations, andUnited Nationscontrol of atomic energy.[6]Though well received in the West, the Soviet leadership viewed Eisenhower's speech as little more than propaganda. In 1954, a more confrontational leader,Nikita Khrushchev,took charge in the Soviet Union. Eisenhower became increasingly skeptical of the possibility of cooperation with the Soviet Union after it refused to support hisAtoms for Peaceproposal, which called for the creation of theInternational Atomic Energy Agencyand the creation ofnuclear powerplants.[7]

National security policy[edit]

Main article:New Look (policy)
Eisenhower and members of his Cabinet inspect the YB-52 prototype of theB-52,c.1954

Eisenhower unveiled theNew Look,his firstnational securitypolicy, on October 30, 1953. It reflected his concern for balancing the Cold War military commitments of the United States with the nation's financial resources. The policy emphasized reliance onstrategicnuclear weapons,rather than much more expensive conventional military power. His goal was to deter both conventional and nuclear military threats.[8]The U.S. military developed a strategy of nuclear deterrence based upon thetriadof land-basedintercontinental ballistic missiles(ICBMs),strategic bombers,andsubmarine-launched ballistic missiles(SLBMs).[9]Throughout his presidency, Eisenhower insisted on having plans toretaliate,fight, and win a nuclear war against the Soviets, although he hoped he would never feel forced to use such weapons.[10]

As the ground war in Korea ended, Eisenhower sharply reduced the reliance on expensive Army divisions. Historian Saki Dockrill argues that his long-term strategy was to promote the collective security of NATO and other American allies, strengthen the Third World against Soviet pressures, avoid another Korea, and produce a climate that would slowly and steadily weaken Soviet power and influence. Dockrill points to Eisenhower's use of multiple assets against the Soviet Union:

Eisenhower knew that the United States had many other assets that could be translated into influence over the Soviet bloc—its democratic values and institutions, its rich and competitive capitalist economy, its intelligence technology and skills in obtaining information as to the enemy's capabilities and intentions, its psychological warfare and covert operations capabilities, its negotiating skills, and its economic and military assistance to the Third World.[11]

End of the Korean War[edit]

Further information:Korean Armistice Agreement

During his campaign, Eisenhower said he would go to Korea to end the Korean War, which had broken out in 1950 afterNorth KoreainvadedSouth Korea.The U.S. had joined the war to prevent the fall of South Korea, later expanding the mission to include victory over the Communist regime in North Korea.[12]The intervention of Chinese forces in late 1950 led to a protracted stalemate around the 38th parallel with continuous casualties.[13] ` Truman had begun peace talks in mid-1951, but the issue of North Korean and Chinese prisoners remained a sticking point. Over 40,000 prisoners from the two countries refused repatriation, but North Korea and China nonetheless demanded their return.[14]Upon taking office, Eisenhower demanded a solution, warning China that he would use nuclear weapons if the war continued.[15]China came to terms, and an armistice was signed on July 27, 1953, as theKorean Armistice Agreement.Historian Edward C. Keefer said that in accepting the American demands that POWs could refuse to return to their home country, "China and North Korea still swallowed the bitter pill, probably forced down in part by the atomic ultimatum."[16]Historian and government advisorMcGeorge Bundystated that while the threat to use nuclear weapons was not empty, neither did it ever reach the point of trying to obtain consent to their use from U.S. allies.[17]

The armistice led to decades of uneasy peace between North Korea and South Korea. The United States and South Korea signed adefensive treatyin October 1953, and the U.S. continue to the present day to station thousands of soldiers in South Korea.[18]

Covert actions[edit]

Eisenhower, while accepting the doctrine of containment, sought to counter the Soviet Union through more active means as detailed in the State-Defense reportNSC 68.[19]The Eisenhower administration and theCentral Intelligence Agencyusedcovert actionto interfere with suspected communist governments abroad. An early use of covert action was against the electedPrime Minister of Iran,Mohammed Mosaddeq,resulting in the1953 Iranian coup d'état.The CIA also instigated the1954 Guatemalan coup d'étatby the local military that overthrew presidentJacobo Arbenz Guzmán,whom U.S. officials viewed as too friendly toward the Soviet Union. Critics have produced conspiracy theories about the causal factors, but according to historian Stephen M. Streeter, CIA documents show theUnited Fruit Company(UFCO) played no major role in Eisenhower's decision, that the Eisenhower administration did not need to be forced into the action by any lobby groups, and that Soviet influence in Guatemala was minimal.

Eisenhower's covert operations were not limited to the Western Hemisphere. He also broke new ground in Africa when he ordered the assassination ofPatrice Lumumba,the firstPrime Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congofollowing Lumumba's visit to the United States requesting assistance against Belgian violence and resistance to Congolese independence. This was the first time the United States had ordered the assassination of a foreign leader.[20]

Streeter identifies three major interpretive perspectives, "Realist", "Revisionist", and "Postrevisionist":

Realists, who concern themselves primarily with power politics, have generally blamed the Cold War on an aggressive, expansionist Soviet empire. Because realists believe that Arbenz was a Soviet puppet, they view his overthrow as the necessary rollback of communism in the Western Hemisphere. Revisionists, who place the majority of the blame for the Cold War on the United States, emphasize how Washington sought to expand overseas markets and promote foreign investment, especially in the Third World. Revisionists allege that because the State Department came to the rescue of the UFCO, the U.S. intervention in Guatemala represents a prime example of economic imperialism. Postrevisionists, a difficult group to define precisely, incorporate both strategic and economic factors in their interpretation of the Cold War. They tend to agree with revisionists on the issue of Soviet responsibility, but they are much more concerned with explaining the cultural and ideological influences that warped Washington's perception of the Communist threat. According to postrevisionists, the Eisenhower administration officials turned against Arbenz because they failed to grasp that he represented a nationalist rather than a communist.[21][22][23]

Defeating the Bricker Amendment[edit]

In January 1953, Republican SenatorJohn W. Brickerof Ohio re-introduced theBricker Amendment,which would limit the president's treaty making power and ability to enter into executive agreements with foreign nations. Conservatives feared that the United Nations would become a world government, and that the steady stream of post-World War II-era international treaties and executive agreements were undermining the nation's sovereignty.[24][25]Believing that the amendment would weaken the president and make it much harder to exercise leadership on the global stage,[26]Eisenhower worked with the Democrats led by Senate Minority LeaderLyndon B. Johnsonto defeat Bricker's proposal.[27]Although the amendment started out with 56 Senate co-sponsors, it went down to defeat in 1954 on 42–50 vote. Later in 1954, a watered-down version of the amendment missed the required two-thirds majority in the Senate by one vote.[28]This episode proved to be the last hurrah for the isolationist Republicans, as younger conservatives increasingly turned to an internationalism based on aggressive anti-communism, typified by SenatorBarry Goldwater.[29]

Europe[edit]

Eisenhower sought troop reductions in Europe by sharing of defense responsibilities with NATO allies.[30]Europeans, however, never quite trusted the idea of nuclear deterrence and were reluctant to shift away from NATO into a proposedEuropean Defence Community(EDC).[31]LikeTruman,Eisenhower believed that the rearmament of West Germany was vital to NATO's strategic interests. The administration backed anarrangement,devised by Churchill and British Foreign MinisterAnthony Eden,in which West Germany was rearmed and became a fully sovereign member of NATO in return for promises not to establish atomic, biological, or chemical weapons programs. European leaders also created theWestern European Unionto coordinate European defense. In response to the integration of West Germany into NATO, Eastern bloc leaders established theWarsaw Pact.Austria, which had beenjointly-occupiedby the Soviet Union and the Western powers, regained its sovereignty with the 1955Austrian State Treaty.As part of the arrangement that ended the occupation, Austriadeclared its neutralityafter gaining independence.[32]

The Eisenhower administration placed a high priority on undermining Soviet influence on Eastern Europe, and escalated a propaganda war under the leadership ofCharles Douglas Jackson.The United States dropped over 300,000 propaganda leaflets in Eastern Europe between 1951 and 1956, andRadio Free Europesent broadcasts throughout the region. A1953 uprising in East Germanybriefly stoked the administration's hopes of a decline in Soviet influence, but the USSR quickly crushed the insurrection. In 1956, amajor uprisingbroke out inHungary.After Hungarian leaderImre Nagypromised the establishment of a multiparty democracy and withdrawal from theWarsaw Pact,Soviet leaderNikita Khrushchevdispatched 60,000 soldiers intoHungaryto crush the rebellion. TheUnited Statesstrongly condemned the military response and Eisenhower "sent an appeal" to then Soviet premierNikolai Bulganincalling on the withdrawal of Soviet forces. The perceived mild move disappointed many Hungarian revolutionaries.[33][34]After the revolution, the US shifted from encouraging revolt to seeking cultural and economic ties as a means of undermining Communist regimes.[35]Among the administration'scultural diplomacyinitiatives were continuous goodwill tours by the "soldier-musician ambassadors" of theSeventh Army Symphony Orchestra.[36][37][38]

Spain and Italy[edit]

In 1953, Eisenhower opened relations withSpainunder dictatorFrancisco Franco.Liberals, remembering their bitter defeat by Franco in 1939, demanded Spain be isolated. However Spain had a strategic geography and a strong anti-communist position. Therefore Eisenhower built a trade and military alliance with the Spanish through thePact of Madrid.These relations brought an end to Spain's isolation, which in turn led to a Spanish economic boom known as theSpanish miracle.[39]

One of Eisenhower's most visible diplomatic appointments wasClare Boothe Luce,who served as the ambassador to Italy from 1953 to 1956. She was a famous playwright, prominent American Catholic, and the wife ofHenry Luce,the dynamic publisher of the highly influentialTimeandLifemagazines. Her mission was to give a favorable impression of the United States to the Italians and help defeat communism in that country. Luce's frontal attack on communist power, while often counterproductive, was also balanced by her discerning use of diplomacy, which deeply influenced the interplay between Italy's domestic and foreign policies. She promoted American popular culture and critically evaluated its effects. She often met with political and cultural leaders who demanded autonomy and mildly criticized American culture.[40][41]

East Asia and Southeast Asia[edit]

WithRepublic of China PresidentChiang Kai-shek,Eisenhower waved toTaiwanese peopleduring his visit toTaipei,Taiwanin June 1960.

After the end of World War II, the CommunistViệt Minhlaunched an insurrection against the French colony calledState of Vietnam.[42]Seeking to bolster France as a NATO ally and prevent the fall of Vietnam to Communism, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations played a major role in financing French military operations in Vietnam.[43]In 1954, the French requested the United States to intervene in theBattle of Dien Bien Phu,which would prove to be the climactic battle of theFirst Indochina War.Seeking to rally public support for the intervention, Eisenhower articulated thedomino theory,which held that the fall of Vietnam could lead to the fall of other countries. As France refused to commit to granting independence to Vietnam, Congress refused to approve of an intervention in Vietnam, and the French were defeated at Dien Bien Phu. At the 1954Geneva Conference,Dulles convinced Chinese and Soviet leaders to pressure Viet Minh leaders to accept the partition of Vietnam; the country was divided into a Communist northern half (under the leadership ofHo Chi Minh) and a non-Communist southern half (under the leadership ofNgo Dinh Diem).[42]Despite some doubts about the strength of Diem's government, the Eisenhower administration directed aid to South Vietnam in hopes of creating a bulwark against further Communist expansion.[44]With Eisenhower's approval, Diem refused to hold elections to re-unify Vietnam; those elections had been scheduled for 1956 as part of the agreement at the Geneva Conference.[45]

Eisenhower's commitment in South Vietnam was part of a broader program to contain China and the Soviet Union in East Asia. In 1954, the United States and seven other countries created theSoutheast Asia Treaty Organization(SEATO), a defensive alliance dedicated to preventing the spread of Communism inSoutheast Asia.In 1954, China began shelling tiny islands off the coast ofMainland Chinawhich were controlled by theRepublic of China(ROC). The shelling nearly escalated to nuclear war as Eisenhower considered using nuclear weapons to prevent the invasion of Taiwan, the main island controlled by the ROC. Thecrisisended when China ended the shelling and both sides agreed to diplomatic talks; asecond crisisin 1958 would end in a similar fashion. During the first crisis, the United States and the ROC signed theSino-American Mutual Defense Treaty,which committed the United States to the defense of Taiwan.[46]The CIA also supporteddissidentsin the1959 Tibetan uprising,but China crushed the uprising.[47]

Middle East[edit]

Further information:United States foreign policy in the Middle East
Eisenhower meeting with Egyptian PresidentGamal Abdel Nasserduring Nasser's visit to United Nations in New York, September 1960

The Middle East became increasingly important to foreign policy during the 1950s. After the 1953 Iranian coup, the U.S. supplanted Britain as the most influential ally of Iran. Eisenhower encouraged the creation of theBaghdad Pact,a military alliance consisting of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan. It had little impact.[48]As it did in several other regions, the Eisenhower administration sought to establish stable, friendly, anti-Communist regimes in theArab World.The U.S. attempted to mediate theIsraeli–Palestinian conflict,but Israel's unwillingness to give up its gains from the1948 Arab–Israeli Warand Arab hostility towards Israel prevented any agreement.[49]

Suez crisis[edit]

Main article:Suez Crisis
President Eisenhower press conference about the Suez crisis, August 9, 1956

In 1952, a revolution led byGamal Abdel Nasserhadoverthrownthe pro-British Egyptian government. After taking power in 1954, Nasser played the Soviet Union and the United States against each other, seeking aid from both sides. Eisenhower sought to bring Nasser into the American sphere of influence through economic aid, but Nasser'sArab nationalismand opposition to Israel served as a source of friction between the United States and Egypt. One of Nasser's main goals was the construction of theAswan Dam,which would provide immense hydroelectric power and help irrigate much of Egypt. Eisenhower attempted to use American aid for the financing of the construction of the dam as leverage for other areas of foreign policy, but aid negotiations collapsed. In July 1956, just a week after the collapse of the aid negotiations, Nasser nationalized the British-runSuez Canal,sparking theSuez Crisis.[50]

The British strongly protested the nationalization, and formed a plan with France and Israel to capture the canal.[51]Eisenhower opposed military intervention, and he repeatedly and explicitly warned British Prime Minister Anthony Eden that the U.S. would not tolerate an invasion.[52]Though opposed to the nationalization of the canal, Eisenhower feared that a military intervention would disrupt global trade and alienate Middle Eastern countries from the West.[53]Israel attacked Egypt in October 1956, quickly seizing control of theSinai Peninsula.France and Britain launched air and naval attacks after Nasser refused to renounce Egypt's nationalization of the canal. Nasser responded by sinking dozens of ships, preventing operation of the canal. Angered by the attacks, which risked sending Arab states into the arms of the Soviet Union, the Eisenhower administration proposed a cease fire and used economic pressure to force France and Britain to withdraw.[54]The incident marked the end of British and French dominance in the Middle East and opened the way for greater American involvement in the region.[55]In early 1958, Eisenhower used the threat of economic sanctions to coerce Israel into withdrawing from the Sinai Peninsula, and the Suez Canal resumed operations under the control of Egypt.[56]

Eisenhower Doctrine[edit]

Further information:United States foreign policy in the Middle East

In response to the power vacuum in the Middle East following the Suez Crisis, the Eisenhower administration developed a new policy designed to stabilize the region against Soviet threats or internal turmoil. Given the collapse of British prestige and the rise of Soviet interest in the region, the president informed Congress on January 5, 1957, that it was essential for the U.S. to accept new responsibilities for the security of the Middle East. Under the policy, known as theEisenhower Doctrine,any Middle Eastern country could request American economic assistance or aid from U.S. military forces if it was being threatened by armed aggression. Though Eisenhower found it difficult to convince leading Arab states or Israel to endorse the doctrine, but he applied the new doctrine by dispensing economic aid to shore up the Kingdom ofJordan,encouragingSyria's neighbors to consider military operations against it, and sendingU.S. troops into Lebanonto prevent a radical revolution from sweeping over that country.[57]The troops sent to Lebanon never saw any fighting, but the deployment marked the only time during Eisenhower's presidency when troops were sent abroad into a potential combat situation.[58]

Though U.S. aid helped Lebanon and Jordan avoid revolution, the Eisenhower doctrine enhanced Nasser's prestige as the preeminentArab nationalist.Partly as a result of the bungled U.S. intervention in Syria, Nasser established the short-livedUnited Arab Republic,a political union between Egypt and Syria.[59]The U.S. also lost a sympathetic Middle Eastern government due to the1958 Iraqi coup d'état,which saw KingFaisal Ireplaced by GeneralAbd al-Karim Qasimas the leader of Iraq.[60]

South Asia: India vs. Pakistan[edit]

The 1947partitionofBritish Indiacreated two new independent states, India andPakistan.Indian Prime MinisterJawaharlal Nehrupursued a non-aligned policy in the Cold War, and frequently criticized U.S. policies. Largely out of a desire to build up military strength against the more populous India, Pakistan sought close relations with the United States, joining both the Baghdad Pact and SEATO. This U.S.–Pakistan alliance alienated India from the United States, causing India to move towards the Soviet Union. In the late 1950s, the Eisenhower administration sought closer relations with India, sending aid to stem the 1957 Indian economic crisis. By the end of his administration, relations between the United States and India had moderately improved, but Pakistan remained the main U.S. ally in South Asia.[61]

In terms of rhetoric, Nehru—as both prime minister and foreign minister (1947–1964), promoted a moralistic rhetoric attacking both the Soviet bloc and the U.S. and its bloc. Nehru tried to build a nonaligned movement, paying special attention to the many new nations in the Third World released from European colonial status at this time. Despite rhetoric that criticized both Cold War blocs, India solicited and received foreign assistance from both the Soviet Union and the United States during its Second Five-Year Plan (1956–1961), aimed at developing India's economy.[62]Eisenhower and Dulles themselves used moralistic rhetoric to attack the evils of Communism.[63]To ease the tensions Eisenhower sentJohn Sherman Cooperas ambassador in 1956–1957. Cooper got along very well with Nehru.[64]

In 1959, Eisenhower made a state visit to India. He was so supportive thatThe New York Timesremarked, "It did not seem to matter much whether Nehru had actually requested or been given a guarantee that the US would help India to meet further Chinese Communist aggression. What mattered was the obvious strengthening of Indian–American friendship to a point where no such guarantee was necessary."[65]

Latin America[edit]

Further information:Cuban RevolutionandConsolidation of the Cuban Revolution

For much of his administration, Eisenhower largely continued the policy of his predecessors in Latin America, supporting U.S.-friendly governments regardless of whether they held power through authoritarian means. The Eisenhower administration expanded military aid to Latin America, and usedPan-Americanismas a tool to prevent the spread of Soviet influence. In the late 1950s, several Latin American governments fell, partly due to a recession in the United States.[66]

Cubawas particularly close to the United States, and 300,000 American tourists visited Cuba each year in the late 1950s. The Cubanmilitary dictator,Fulgencio Batista,sought close ties with both the U.S. government and major U.S. companies, and Americanorganized crimealso had a strong presence in Cuba.[67]The US government provided arms, money and its authority to the Batista dictatorship.[68][69]In January 1959, theCuban Revolutionousted Batista. The new government, led byFidel Castro,quickly legalized theCommunist Party of Cuba,sparking U.S. fears that Castro would align with the Soviet Union. When Castro visited the United States in April 1959, Eisenhower refused to meet with him, delegating the task to Nixon.[70]

Eisenhower approved an operation by the CIA in which they recruited operatives in Cuba to carry out an extensive campaign ofterrorist attacksandsabotage,kill civilians, and cause economic damage. The CIA also trained and commanded pilots to bomb civilian airfields.[77]During this period, the United States government sought to promote private enterprise as an instrument for advancing US strategic interests in the developing world.[78]As Castro drew closer to the Soviet Union, the U.S. broke diplomatic relations, launched a near-totalembargo,and began preparations for an invasion of Cuba by Cuban expatriates armed and funded by the CIA.[79]

Eisenhower also launchedOperation Wetbackto stop illegal immigration.

Ballistic missiles and arms control[edit]

First test launch of thePGM-17 ThorfromCape Canaveral Launch Complex 17B,January 25, 1957

The United States had the first atom bombs in 1945; the USSR caught up by the late 1940s, but lagged in long-distance delivery systems. Both sides started building large nuclear stockpiles during the 1950s. During Eisenhower's presidency, the Cold War arms race shifted from nuclear weapons to delivery systems, with the U.S. starting with a large lead in very long-range bombers. The Soviets emphasized building ballistic intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). They fired their first ICBM in August 1957, followed by a highly public launching of theSputnik 1satellite in October 1957. The launch of the Sputnik energized the American missile program, and the U.S. fired its first ICBM in December 1957. The U.S. broughtTitanandAtlasICBMs into service in 1959, and in 1960 builtPolaris submarinescapable of underwater launches.[80][81][82]

In January 1956 theUnited States Air Forcebegan developing theThor,a 1,500 miles (2,400 km)Intermediate-range ballistic missile.The program proceeded quickly, and beginning in 1958 the first of 20Royal Air ForceThor squadrons became operational in theUnited Kingdom.This was the first experiment at sharing strategic nuclear weapons inNATOand led to other placements abroad of American nuclear weapons.[83]Critics at the time, led by Democratic SenatorJohn F. Kennedylevied charges to the effect that there was a "missile gap",that is, the U.S. had fallen militarily behind the Soviets because of their lead in space. Historians now discount those allegations, although they agree that Eisenhower did not effectively respond to his critics.[84]In fact, the Soviet Union did not deploy ICBMs until after Eisenhower left office, and the U.S. retained an overall advantage in nuclear weaponry. Eisenhower was aware of the American advantage in ICBM development because of intelligence gathered byU-2 planes,which had begun flying over the Soviet Union in 1956.[85]

The administration decided the best way to minimize theproliferation of nuclear weaponswas to tightly control knowledge of gas-centrifuge technology, which was essential to turn ordinary uranium and to weapons-grade uranium. American diplomats by 1960 reached agreement with the German, Dutch, and British governments to limit access to the technology. The four-power understanding on gas-centrifuge secrecy would last until 1975, when scientistAbdul Qadeer Khantook the Dutch centrifuge technology toPakistan.[86]

France also sought American help in developing nuclear weapons; Eisenhower rejected the overtures for four reasons. Before 1958, he was troubled by the political instability of theFrench Fourth Republicand worried that it might use nuclear weapons to its colonial wars in Vietnam and Algeria. De Gaulle brought stability to theFifth Republicin 1958, but Eisenhower knew him too well from the war years. De Gaulle wanted to challenge the Anglo-Saxon monopoly on Western weapons. Eisenhower feared his grandiose plans to use the bombs to restore French grandeur would weaken NATO. Furthermore, Eisenhower wanted to discourage the proliferation of nuclear arms anywhere.[87]

U-2 Crisis[edit]

U.S. and Soviet leaders met at the 1955Geneva Summit,the firstsummitsince the 1945Potsdam Conference.No progress was made on major issues; the two sides had major differences on German policy, and the Soviets dismissed Eisenhower's "Open Skies"proposal.[88]Nevertheless, the conference marked the start of a minor thaw in Cold War relations.[89]Khrushchev toured the United States in 1959, and he and Eisenhower conducted high-level talks regarding nuclear disarmament and the status of Berlin. Eisenhower wanted limits on nuclear weapons testing and on-site inspections of nuclear weapons, while Khrushchev sought the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. Both wanted to limit total military spending and preventnuclear proliferation,but Cold War tensions made negotiations difficult.[90]Towards the end of his second term, Eisenhower was determined to reach a nuclear test ban treaty as part of an overall move towardsdétentewith the Soviet Union. Khrushchev had also become increasingly interested in reaching an accord, partly due to the growingSino-Soviet split.[91]By 1960, the major unresolved issue was on-site inspections, as both sides sought nuclear test bans. Hopes for reaching a nuclear agreement at a May 1960 summit in Paris were derailed by thedowning of an American U-2 spy planeover the Soviet Union.[90]

The Eisenhower administration, initially thinking the pilot had died in the crash, authorized the release of a cover story claiming that the plane was a "weather research aircraft" which had unintentionally strayed into Soviet airspace after the pilot had radioed "difficulties with his oxygen equipment" while flying over Turkey.[92]Further, Eisenhower said that his administration had not been spying on the Soviet Union; when the Soviets produced the pilot, CaptainFrancis Gary Powers,the Americans were caught misleading the public, and the incident resulted in international embarrassment for the United States.[93][94]The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a lengthy inquiry into the U-2 incident.[95]During the Paris Summit, Eisenhower accused Khrushchev "of sabotaging this meeting, on which so much of the hopes of the world have rested".[96]Later, Eisenhower stated the summit had been ruined because of that "stupid U-2 business".[95]

International trips[edit]

Countries visited by Eisenhower during his presidency.

Eisenhower made one international trip while president-elect, to South Korea, December 2–5, 1952; he visitedSeouland the Korean combat zone. He also made 16 international trips to 26 nations during his presidency.[97]Between August 1959 and June 1960, he undertook five major tours, travelling to Europe, Southeast Asia, South America, the Middle East, and Southern Asia. On his "Flight to Peace" Goodwill tour, in December 1959, the President visited 11 nations including five in Asia, flying 22,000 miles in 19 days.

Dates Country Locations Details
1 December 2–5, 1952 South Korea Seoul Visit toKorean combat zone.(Visit made as President-elect.)
2 October 19, 1953 Mexico Nueva Ciudad Guerrero Dedication ofFalcon Dam,with PresidentAdolfo Ruiz Cortines.[98]
3 November 13–15, 1953 Canada Ottawa State visit. Met with Governor GeneralVincent Masseyand Prime MinisterLouis St. Laurent.Addressed Parliament.
4 December 4–8, 1953 Bermuda Hamilton Attended theBermuda Conferencewith Prime Minister Winston Churchill and French Prime MinisterJoseph Laniel.
5 July 16–23, 1955 Switzerland Geneva Attended theGeneva Summitwith British Prime MinisterAnthony Eden,French PremierEdgar Faureand Soviet PremierNikolai Bulganin.
6 July 21–23, 1956 Panama Panama City Attended the meeting of the presidents of the American republics.
7 March 20–24, 1957 Bermuda Hamilton Met with Prime MinisterHarold Macmillan.
8 December 14–19, 1957 France Paris Attended theFirst NATO summit.
9 July 8–11, 1958 Canada Ottawa Informal visit. Met with Governor General Vincent Massey and Prime MinisterJohn Diefenbaker.Addressed Parliament.
10 February 19–20, 1959 Mexico Acapulco Informal meeting with PresidentAdolfo López Mateos.
11 June 26, 1959 Canada Montreal Joined QueenElizabeth IIin ceremony opening theSt. Lawrence Seaway.
12 August 26–27, 1959 West Germany Bonn Informal meeting with ChancellorKonrad Adenauerand PresidentTheodor Heuss.
August 27 –
September 2, 1959 		United Kingdom London,
Balmoral,
Chequers 		Informal visit. Met Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and Queen Elizabeth II.
September 2–4, 1959 France Paris Informal meeting with PresidentCharles de Gaulleand Italian Prime MinisterAntonio Segni.AddressedNorth Atlantic Council.
September 4–7, 1959 United Kingdom Culzean Castle Rested before returning to the United States.
13 December 4–6, 1959 Italy Rome Informal visit. Met with PresidentGiovanni Gronchi.
December 6, 1959 Vatican City Apostolic Palace Audience withPope John XXIII.
December 6–7, 1959 Turkey Ankara Informal visit. Met with PresidentCelâl Bayar.
December 7–9, 1959 Pakistan Karachi Informal visit. Met with PresidentAyub Khan.
December 9, 1959 Afghanistan Kabul Informal visit. Met with KingMohammed Zahir Shah.
December 9–14, 1959 India New Delhi,
Agra 		Met with PresidentRajendra Prasadand Prime MinisterJawaharlal Nehru.AddressedParliament.
December 14, 1959 Iran Tehran Met with ShahMohammad Reza Pahlavi.AddressedParliament.
December 14–15, 1959 Greece Athens Official visit. Met with KingPauland Prime MinisterKonstantinos Karamanlis.AddressedParliament.
December 17, 1959 Tunisia Tunis Met with PresidentHabib Bourguiba.
December 18–21, 1959 France Toulon,
Paris 		Conference with President Charles de Gaulle, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.
December 21–22, 1959 Spain Madrid Met with GeneralissimoFrancisco Franco.
December 22, 1959 Morocco Casablanca Met with KingMohammed V.
14 February 23–26, 1960 Brazil Brasília,
Rio de Janeiro,
São Paulo 		Met with PresidentJuscelino Kubitschek.AddressedBrazilian Congress.
February 26–29, 1960 Argentina Buenos Aires,
Mar del Plata,
San Carlos de Bariloche 		Met with PresidentArturo Frondizi.
February 29 –
March 2, 1960 		Chile Santiago Met with PresidentJorge Alessandri.
March 2–3, 1960 Uruguay Montevideo Met with PresidentBenito Nardone.Returned to the U.S. via Buenos Aires and Suriname.
15 May 15–19, 1960 France Paris Conference with President Charles de Gaulle, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and Soviet PremierNikita Khrushchev.
May 19–20, 1960 Portugal Lisbon Official visit. Met with PresidentAmérico Tomás.
16 June 14–16, 1960 Philippines Manila State visit. Met with PresidentCarlos P. Garcia.
June 18–19, 1960 Republic of China(Formosa/Taiwan) Taipei State visit. Met with President Chiang Kai-shek.
June 19–20, 1960 South Korea Seoul Met with Prime MinisterHeo Jeong.Addressed theNational Assembly.
17 October 24, 1960 Mexico Ciudad Acuña Informal visit. Met with President Adolfo López Mateos.
  • South Korea 1952
    South Korea 1952
  • Geneva Summit 1955
    Geneva Summit 1955
  • Bonn, Germany 1959
    Bonn, Germany 1959
  • Turkey 1959
    Turkey 1959
  • Afghanistan 1959
    Afghanistan 1959
  • India 1959
    India 1959
  • Iran 1959
    Iran 1959
  • Spain 1959
    Spain 1959
  • Brazil 1960
    Brazil 1960
  • Argentina 1960
    Argentina 1960
  • Uruguay 1960
    Uruguay 1960
  • Taiwan 1960
    Taiwan 1960

References[edit]

  1. ^Johnson 2018,pp. 447–448.
  2. ^Jean Edward Smith,Eisenhower in War and Peace(2012) p. 531.
  3. ^Herring 2008,pp. 651–652.
  4. ^Herring 2008,p. 665.
  5. ^William I Hitchcock (2018).The Age of Eisenhower: America and the World in the 1950s.Simon and Schuster. p. 109.ISBN9781451698428.
  6. ^"Address" The Chance for Peace "Delivered Before the American Society of Newspaper Editors. | The American Presidency Project".www.presidency.ucsb.edu.RetrievedAugust 7,2023.
  7. ^Wicker,pp. 22–24, 44.
  8. ^Saki Dockrill,Eisenhower's New-Look National Security Policy, 1953–61(1996).
  9. ^Roman, Peter J. (1996).Eisenhower and the Missile Gap.Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Cornell University Press.ISBN978-0801427978.
  10. ^Chernus, Ira(March 17, 2008)."The Real Eisenhower".History News Network.
  11. ^Dockrill, Saki (2000). "Dealing with Soviet Power and Influence: Eisenhower's Management of U.S. National Security".Diplomatic History.24(2): 345–352.doi:10.1111/0145-2096.00218.
  12. ^James I. Matray, "Truman's Plan for Victory: National Self-Determination and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel Decision in Korea".Journal of American History66.2 (1979): 314-333.online
  13. ^Patterson,pp. 208–215, 223–233.
  14. ^Patterson,pp. 232–233.
  15. ^Jackson, Michael Gordon (2005). "Beyond Brinkmanship: Eisenhower, Nuclear War Fighting, and Korea, 1953–1968".Presidential Studies Quarterly.35(1): 52–75.doi:10.1111/j.1741-5705.2004.00235.x.
  16. ^Edward C. Keefer, "President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the End of the Korean War"Diplomatic History(1986) 10#3: 267–289; quote follows footnote 33.
  17. ^Bundy,pp. 238–243.
  18. ^Herring 2008,pp. 660–661.
  19. ^Stephen E. Ambrose (2012).Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment.Random House Digital, Inc. p. 172.ISBN9780307946614.
  20. ^Reid, Stewart."How the U.S. Issued its First Ever Order to Assassinate a Foreign Leader".Politico.RetrievedJanuary 3,2024.
  21. ^Streeter, Stephen M. (2000). "Interpreting the 1954 U.S. Intervention in Guatemala: Realist, Revisionist, and Postrevisionist Perspectives".History Teacher.34(1): 61–74.doi:10.2307/3054375.JSTOR3054375.S2CID141471098.
  22. ^Stephen M. Streeter,Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala, 1954–1961(Ohio University Press, 2000), pp. 7–9, 20.
  23. ^Stephen G. Rabe (1988).Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism.UNC Press Books. pp. 62–5.ISBN9780807842041.
  24. ^Parker, John J. (April 1954)."The American Constitution and the Treaty Making Power".Washington University Law Quarterly.1954(2): 115–131.RetrievedMay 29,2017.
  25. ^Philip A. Grant, "The Bricker Amendment Controversy".Presidential Studies Quarterly15.3 (1985): 572-582.online
  26. ^Ciment, James (2015).Postwar America: An Encyclopedia of Social, Political, Cultural, and Economic History.Routledge. p. 173.ISBN978-1317462354.
  27. ^Herring 2008,p. 657.
  28. ^Tananbaum, Duane A. (1985). "The Bricker Amendment Controversy: Its Origins and Eisenhower's Role".Diplomatic History.9(1): 73–93.doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.1985.tb00523.x.
  29. ^Nolan, Cathal J. (Spring 1992). "The Last Hurrah of Conservative Isolationism: Eisenhower, Congress, and the Bricker Amendment".Presidential Studies Quarterly.22(2): 337–349.JSTOR27550951.
  30. ^Greene, Fred (1958)."The Eisenhower Administration and the Cold War".Current History.35(206): 229–233.ISSN0011-3530.
  31. ^Dockrill, Saki (1994). "Cooperation and suspicion: The United States' alliance diplomacy for the security of Western Europe, 1953–54".Diplomacy & Statecraft.5(1): 138–182.doi:10.1080/09592299408405912.
  32. ^Herring 2008,pp. 668–670.
  33. ^Borhi, László (1999)."Rollback, Liberation, Containment, or Inaction?: U.S. Policy and Eastern Europe in the 1950s".Journal of Cold War Studies.1(3): 67–110.ISSN1520-3972.
  34. ^"OCR of the Document | National Security Archive".nsarchive.gwu.edu.RetrievedAugust 7,2023.
  35. ^Herring 2008,pp. 664–668.
  36. ^Dance for Export: Cultural Diplomacy and the Cold WarNaima Prevots. Wesleyan University Press, CT. 1998 p. 11 Dwight D. Eisenhower requests funds to present the best American cultural achievements abroad on books.google.com
  37. ^7th Army Symphony Chronology – General Palmer authorizes Samuel Adler to found the orchestra in 1952on 7aso.org
  38. ^A Dictionary for the Modern Composer,Emily Freeman Brown, Scarecrow Press, Oxford, 2015, p. 311ISBN9780810884014Seventh Army Symphony Orchestrafounded by Samuel Adler in 1952 onhttps://books.google.com
  39. ^Stanley G. Payne (2011).The Franco Regime, 1936–1975.University of Wisconsin Press. p. 458.ISBN9780299110734.
  40. ^Alessandro Brogi, "Ambassador Clare Boothe Luce and the evolution of psychological warfare in Italy".Cold War History12.2 (2012): 269–294.
  41. ^Mario Del Pero, "The United States and 'psychological warfare' in Italy, 1948–1955".Journal of American History87.4 (2001): 1304–1334.online
  42. ^abHerring 2008,pp. 661–662.
  43. ^Patterson,pp. 292–293.
  44. ^Pach & Richardson,pp. 97–98.
  45. ^Patterson,pp. 296–298.
  46. ^Herring 2008,pp. 663–664, 693.
  47. ^Herring 2008,p. 692.
  48. ^Sohail H. Hashmi,"'Zero Plus Zero Plus Zero': Pakistan, the Baghdad Pact, and the Suez Crisis ".International History Review33.3 (2011): 525-544.
  49. ^Herring 2008,pp. 672–674.
  50. ^Pach & Richardson,pp. 126–128.
  51. ^Herring 2008,pp. 674–675.
  52. ^See Anthony Eden, and Dwight D. Eisenhower,Eden-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1955–1957(University of North Carolina Press, 2006)
  53. ^Pach & Richardson,pp. 129–130.
  54. ^Herring 2008,pp. 675–676.
  55. ^Cole C. Kingseed (1995).Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956.Louisiana State U.P.ISBN9780807140857.
  56. ^Pach & Richardson,p. 163.
  57. ^Hahn, Peter L. (March 2006)."Securing the Middle East: The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957".Presidential Studies Quarterly.36(1): 38–47.doi:10.1111/j.1741-5705.2006.00285.x.
  58. ^Patterson,p. 423.
  59. ^Herring 2008,pp. 678–679.
  60. ^Pach & Richardson,pp. 191–192.
  61. ^Herring 2008,pp. 679–681.
  62. ^Engerman, David (2018).The Price of Aid.Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press.pp. 117–158.ISBN9780674659599.
  63. ^Sarah Ellen Graham, "The Eisenhower Administration and Public Diplomacy in India: An Ambivalent Engagement, 1953–1960".Diplomacy & Statecraft25.2 (2014): 260-284.
  64. ^Douglas A. Franklin, "The Politician as Diplomat: Kentucky's John Sherman Cooper in India, 1955-1956".Register of the Kentucky Historical Society82.1 (1984): 28-59online.
  65. ^"Strategic Counter Nuclear Fuel Supply Visit".The Times of India.January 21, 2009. Archived fromthe originalon May 12, 2013.RetrievedDecember 17,2013.
  66. ^Herring 2008,pp. 683–686.
  67. ^Herring 2008,pp. 686–67.
  68. ^Bolender, Keith (2012).Cuba under Siege: American Policy, the Revolution, and its People.New York:Palgrave Macmillan.pp. x, 14, 18–20, 45–57, 63–64,et passim.doi:10.1057/9781137275554.ISBN978-1-137-27554-7.The economic inequality and social unrest was brought to a head under the brutal Batista dictatorship, supported by American arms, money, and authority. An estimated 20,000 were killed opposing the government from 1955 to his overthrow, with even President John F. Kennedy using this figure in a rare expression of sympathy for revolutionary goals. Kennedy also came closest to recognizing America could not claim ignorance of the harm its neocolonial control was inflicting on the inhabitants...Transformation came swiftly, completely, and often framed in direct conflict with American immoderations. Popular support for radicalization was possible only by aiming it at the social inequalities associated with foreign domination, of which the greater part of the Cuban population, particularly in the rural areas, had tired of finally. The backing of the countryside permitted Castro to act ruthlessly to ensure his revolution would not suffer the same fate as Grau's. Concurrently, America's hostile reaction worked in harmony, if not intentionally, with Castro's political ambitions. He comprehended the turmoil and incongruities of American dominated prerevolution society had to end.
  69. ^Yaffe, Helen (2020).We are Cuba!: How a Revolutionary People have Survived in a Post-Soviet World.New Haven:Yale University Press.pp. 14–22, 176–181.ISBN978-0-300-23003-1.For the Cuban revolutionaries of the 1950s, US imperialism was the principal explanation for the island's structural weaknesses...Thus, the Revolution of 1959 faced two real alternatives: it could renounce all fundamental changes, beyond expelling the dictator Fulgencio Batista, so that it would be acceptable to Washington; or it could pursue the deep structural changes necessary to address the island's socioeconomic ills and dependent development, which would bring hostility from the United States.
  70. ^Wicker,pp. 108–109.
  71. ^Piccone, Ted; Miller, Ashley (December 19, 2016).Cuba, the U.S., and the concept of sovereignty: Toward a common vocabulary?(Report). Washington:Brookings Institution.Archivedfrom the original on July 7, 2017.President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved a plan to train Cuban exiles to commit violent acts of terrorism within Cuba against civilians, and the CIA trained and commanded pilots to bomb civilian airfields...U.S. government officials justified some of the terrorist attacks on Cuban soil on the grounds of coercive regime change
  72. ^Yaffe, Helen (2020).We are Cuba!: How a Revolutionary People have Survived in a Post-Soviet World.New Haven:Yale University Press.pp. 67, 176–181.ISBN978-0300230031.What have Cuba's revolutionary people survived? For six decades, the Caribbean island has withstood manifold and unrelenting aggression from the world's dominant economic and political power: overt and covert military actions; sabotage and terrorism by US authorities and allied exiles...The CIA recruited operatives inside Cuba to carry out terrorism and sabotage, killing civilians and causing economic damage.
  73. ^Domínguez López, Ernesto; Yaffe, Helen (November 2, 2017)."The deep, historical roots of Cuban anti-imperialism"(PDF).Third World Quarterly.38(11). Abingdon:Taylor & Francis:2517–2535.doi:10.1080/01436597.2017.1374171.S2CID149249232.In international terms, Cuba's Revolution dented the US sphere of influence, weakening the US position as a global power. These were the structural geopolitical motivations for opposing Cuba's hard-won independence. The Bay of Pigs (Playa Giron) invasion and multiple military invasion plans, programmes of terrorism, sabotage and subversion were part of Washington's reaction.
  74. ^Alzugaray, Carlos;Quainton, Anthony(July–December 2011)."Cuban-U.S. Relations: The Terrorism Dimension"(PDF).Pensamiento Propio.16(34). Buenos Aires: Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales: 71–84.ISSN1016-9628.Archived(PDF)from the original on April 10, 2018.It is now evident from publicly available documents that several U.S. plans to overthrow the Cuban government included the use of terrorist tactics. The March 1960 project that President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved...involved the training of Cuban exiles to commit violent acts inside Cuban territory against civilian targets. Prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA trained and commanded pilots who bombed civilian airfields and areas inhabited by peaceful citizens, causing numerous deaths. Terrorists who were supported and/or directed by the U.S. government carried out similar attacks as part of Operation Mongoose in 1962
  75. ^Franklin, Jane(2016).Cuba and the U.S. empire: a chronological history.New York:New York University Press.pp. 45–63, 388–392,et passim.ISBN9781583676059.RetrievedFebruary 2,2020.
  76. ^Bolender, Keith (2012).Cuba under siege: American policy, the revolution, and its people.New York:Palgrave Macmillan.pp. x, 14, 18–20, 53–57, 63–64,et passim.doi:10.1057/9781137275554.ISBN978-1-137-27554-7.A major component became the development of a more traditional military response, President Eisenhower approving the CIA document drafted byJ.C. King,officer in charge of Latin America in the Western Hemisphere Division. The proposal was one part of the all-encompassing strategy being laid under the April 1960 State Department punishment guidelines...The development of a siege mentality was accelerated from early 1960...with the introduction of one of the most violent aspects of American policy — terrorism...the acts included bombings of sugarcane fields, sabotage against commercial and industrial sites, as well as the strafing of Havana residential targets. One such raid in October 1959 resulted in the death of several civilians, followed by other light aircraft dropping incendiary bombs
  77. ^[71][72][73][74][75][76]
  78. ^Kapstein, Ethan B. (December 2020)."Private Enterprise, International Development, and the Cold War".Journal of Cold War Studies.22(4). Cambridge, MA:MIT Press:113–145.doi:10.1162/jcws_a_00967.
  79. ^Herring 2008,pp. 688–689.
  80. ^P.M.H. Bell,The World since 1845: It international history(2001) p. 156
  81. ^William L. Hitchcock,The Age of Eisenhower(2018), pp 169-75, 380-406.
  82. ^Yanek Mieczkowski,Eisenhower's Sputnik moment: The race for space and world prestige(Cornell University Press, 2013).
  83. ^Melissen, Jan (June 1992). "The Thor saga: Anglo‐American nuclear relations, US IRBM development and deployment in Britain, 1955–1959".Journal of Strategic Studies.15(2): 172–207.doi:10.1080/01402399208437480.ISSN0140-2390.
  84. ^Peter J. Roman,Eisenhower and the Missile Gap(1996)
  85. ^Patterson,pp. 419–420.
  86. ^Burr, William (2015). "The 'Labors of Atlas, Sisyphus, or Hercules'? US Gas-Centrifuge Policy and Diplomacy, 1954–60".International History Review.37(3): 431–457.doi:10.1080/07075332.2014.918557.S2CID153862436.
  87. ^Keith W. Baum, "Two's Company, Three's a Crowd: The Eisenhower Administration, France, and Nuclear Weapons".Presidential Studies Quarterly20#2 (1990): 315–328.in JSTOR
  88. ^Herring 2008,p. 670.
  89. ^Patterson,pp. 303–304.
  90. ^abHerring 2008,pp. 696–698.
  91. ^Pach & Richardson,pp. 214–215.
  92. ^Fontaine, André (1968).History of the Cold War: From the Korean War to the present.History of the Cold War. Vol. 2. Translated by Bruce, R. Pantheon Books. p. 338.
  93. ^Frum, David(2000).How We Got Here: The '70s.New York, New York: Basic Books. p.27.ISBN978-0-465-04195-4.
  94. ^Walsh, Kenneth T. (June 6, 2008)."Presidential Lies and Deceptions".U.S. News & World Report.
  95. ^abBogle, Lori Lynn, ed. (2001).The Cold War.Routledge. p. 104.ISBN978-0815337218.
  96. ^"1960 Year In Review: The Paris Summit Falls Apart".UPI.1960.RetrievedApril 30,2017.
  97. ^"Travels of President Dwight D. Eisenhower".U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian.
  98. ^International Boundary and Water Commission; Falcon DamArchivedApril 8, 2010, at theWayback Machine

Works cited[edit]

Further reading[edit]

See also:Bibliography of Dwight D. EisenhowerandJohn Foster Dulles § Further reading

Biographies[edit]

  • Ambrose, Stephen E.Eisenhower: Soldier and President(2003). A revision and condensation of his earlier two-volume Eisenhower biography.
  • Gellman, Irwin F.The President and the Apprentice: Eisenhower and Nixon, 1952–1961(2015).
  • Graff, Henry F., ed.The Presidents: A Reference History(3rd ed. 2002)
  • Krieg, Joann P. ed.Dwight D. Eisenhower, Soldier, President, Statesman(1987). 24 essays by scholars.
  • Mayer, Michael S.The Eisenhower Years(2009), 1024pp; short biographies by experts of 500 prominent figures, with some primary sources.
  • Newton, Jim,Eisenhower: The White House Years(Random House, 2011)online,popular history
  • Nichols, David A.Eisenhower 1956: The President's Year of Crisis--Suez and the Brink of War(2012).

Reference books[edit]

  • Congressional Quarterly.Congress and the Nation 1945–1964(1965), Highly detailed and factual coverage of Administration and foreign policy 1784 pages
  • Kaufman, Burton I. and Diane Kaufman.Historical Dictionary of the Eisenhower Era(2009), 320pp
  • Olson, James S.Historical Dictionary of the 1950s(2000)
  • Schoenebaum, Eleanora, ed.Political Profiles the Eisenhower Years(1977); 757pp; short political biographies of 501 major players in politics in the 1950s.

Scholarly studies[edit]

  • Andrew, Christopher.For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush(1995), pp. 199–256.online
  • Barrett, Roby C.The Greater Middle East And The Cold War: U.S. Foreign Policy Under Eisenhower and Kennedy(2007)online
  • Borhi, László. "Rollback, Liberation, Containment, or Inaction? U.S. Policy and Eastern Europe in the 1950s".Journal of Cold War Studies1.3 (1999): 67-110.online
  • Bose, Meenekshi.Shaping and Signaling Presidential Policy: The National Security Decision Making of Eisenhower and Kennedy(Texas A&M University Press, 1998).
  • Bowie, Robert R. and Richard H. Immerman, eds.Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy(1998)online
  • Brands, Henry W.Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy(Columbia University Press, 1988).
  • Broadwater; Jeff.Eisenhower & the Anti-Communist Crusade(University of North Carolina Press, 1992).
  • Burrows, William E.This New Ocean: The Story of the First Space Age.New York: Random House, 1998. 282pp
  • Bury, Helen.Eisenhower and the Cold War Arms Race: 'Open Skies' and the Military-Industrial Complex(2014).
  • Challener, Richard D. "The Moralist as Pragmatist: John Foster Dulles as Cold War Strategist". inThe Diplomats, 1939-1979(Princeton University Press, 2019) pp. 135–166.online
  • Chernus, Ira.Apocalypse Management: Eisenhower and the Discourse of National Insecurity.(Stanford University Press, 2008).
  • Divine, Robert A.Eisenhower and the Cold War(1981)
  • Divine, Robert A.Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections, 1952-1960(1974)online
  • Divine, Robert A.The Sputnik Challenge(1993)online
  • Divine, Robert A.American Foreign Policy Since 1945(1969)online
  • Dockrill, Saki.Eisenhower's New-Look National Security Policy, 1953–61(1996)excerpt
  • Falk, Stanley L. "The National Security Council under Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy".Political Science Quarterly79.3 (1964): 403–434.online
  • Filipink Jr., Richard M.Dwight Eisenhower and American Foreign Policy During the 1960s: An American Lion in Winter(Lexington Books, 2015 160pp)
  • Hitchcock, William I.The Age of Eisenhower: America and the World in the 1950(2018). The major scholarly synthesis; 645pp;online review symposium
  • Holbo, Paul S. and Robert W. Sellen, eds.The Eisenhower Era: The Age of Consensus(1974), 196pp; 20 short excerpts from primary and secondary sourcesonline
  • Immerman, Richard H. "John Foster Dulles".Dictionary of American Biography(1980)online
  • Jackson, Michael Gordon (2005). "Beyond Brinkmanship: Eisenhower, Nuclear War Fighting, and Korea, 1953‐1968".Presidential Studies Quarterly.35(1): 52–75.doi:10.1111/j.1741-5705.2004.00235.x.
  • Kaufman, Burton Ira.Trade and Aid: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy, 1953–1961(1982).online
  • Medhurst, Martin J.Dwight D. Eisenhower: Strategic Communicator(Greenwood Press, 1993).
  • Melanson, Richard A. and David A. Mayers, eds.Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s(1989)online
  • Rabe, Stephen G.Eisenhower and Latin America: The foreign policy of anticommunism(1988)
  • Rosenberg, Victor.Soviet-American Relations, 1953–1960: Diplomacy and Cultural Exchange During the Eisenhower Presidency(2005).
  • Stebbins, Richard P.The United States in World Affairs, 1953(Harper and Council on Foreign Relations. 1954), 430pp; annual for 1953–1960. Detailed coverage and analysis;online review
  • Taubman, William.Khrushchev: The Man and His Era(2012), Pulitzer Prize

Historiography[edit]

  • Broadwater, Jeff. "President Eisenhower and the Historians: Is the General in Retreat?".Canadian Review of American Studies22.1 (1991): 47–60.
  • Burk, Robert. "Eisenhower Revisionism Revisited: Reflections on Eisenhower Scholarship",Historian,Spring 1988, Vol. 50, Issue 2, pp. 196–209
  • Catsam, Derek. "The civil rights movement and the Presidency in the hot years of the Cold War: A historical and historiographical assessment".History Compass6.1 (2008): 314–344.online[dead link]
  • De Santis, Vincent P. "Eisenhower Revisionism",Review of Politics38#2 (1976): 190–208.
  • Hoxie, R. Gordon. "Dwight David Eisenhower: Bicentennial Considerations",Presidential Studies Quarterly20 (1990), 263.
  • Joes, Anthony James. "Eisenhower Revisionism and American Politics", in Joanne P. Krieg, ed.,Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier, President, Statesman(1987), 283–296;online
  • McAuliffe, Mary S. "Eisenhower, the President",Journal of American History68 (1981), pp. 625–32JSTOR1901942
  • McMahon, Robert J. "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists",Political Science Quarterly(1986) 101#3 pp. 453–73JSTOR2151625
  • Matray, James I (2011). "Korea's war at 60: A survey of the literature".Cold War History.11(1): 99–129.doi:10.1080/14682745.2011.545603.S2CID153921372.
  • Melanson, Richard A. and David Mayers, eds.Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s(1987)
  • Pach, Chester J. ed.A Companion to Dwight D. Eisenhower(2017), new essays by experts; stress on historiography.
  • Rabe, Stephen G. "Eisenhower Revisionism: A Decade of Scholarship",Diplomatic History(1993) 17#1 pp 97–115.
  • Schlesinger Jr., Arthur. "The Ike Age Revisited",Reviews in American History(1983) 11#1 pp. 1–11JSTOR2701865
  • Streeter, Stephen M. "Interpreting the 1954 U.S. Intervention In Guatemala: Realist, Revisionist, and Postrevisionist Perspectives",History Teacher(2000) 34#1 pp 61–74.JSTOR3054375onlineArchivedFebruary 19, 2019, at theWayback Machine

Primary sources[edit]

  • Adams, Sherman.Firsthand Report: The Story of the Eisenhower Administration.1961. by Ike's chief of staff
  • Eisenhower, Dwight D.Mandate for Change, 1953–1956,Doubleday and Co., 1963; his memoir
  • Eisenhower, Dwight D.The White House Years: Waging Peace 1956–1961,Doubleday and Co., 1965; his memoir
  • Papers of Dwight D. EisenhowerThe 21 volume Johns Hopkins print edition of Eisenhower's papers includes:The Presidency: The Middle Way(vols. 14–17) andThe Presidency: Keeping the Peace(vols. 18–21), his private letters and papersonline at subscribing libraries
  • Eisenhower, Dwight D.Public Papers,covers 1953 through end of term in 1961. based on White House press releasesonline
  • James Campbell Hagerty (1983).Ferrell, Robert H.(ed.).The Diary of James C. Hagerty: Eisenhower in Mid-Course, 1954–1955.Indiana University Press.ISBN9780253116253.
  • Hughes, Emmet John.The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years.1963. Ike's speechwriter
  • Nixon, Richard M.The Memoirs of Richard Nixon1978.
  • Documentary History of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidency(13 vol. University Publications of America, 1996)online table of contents
  • Stebbins, Richard P. ed.Documents on America Foreign Relations 1953(Harper and Council on Foreign Relations. 1954); 550 pp; annual for 1953–1960. All major public documents;online review
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