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Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States

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Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States
Argued October 5, 1964
Decided December 14, 1964
Full case nameHeart of Atlanta Motel, Incorporated v. United States, et al.
Citations379U.S.241(more)
85 S. Ct. 348; 13L. Ed. 2d258; 1964U.S. LEXIS2187; 1 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 9712
Case history
PriorJudgment for defendant, 231F. Supp.393(N.D. Ga.1964); probable jurisdiction noted,379U.S.803 (1964).
SubsequentNone
Holding
Congress did not unconstitutionally exceed its powers under theCommerce Clauseby enacting Title II of the1964 Civil Rights Act,which prohibitedracial discriminationinpublic accommodations.Northern District of Georgiaaffirmed.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Earl Warren
Associate Justices
Hugo Black·William O. Douglas
Tom C. Clark·John M. Harlan II
William J. Brennan Jr.·Potter Stewart
Byron White·Arthur Goldberg
Case opinions
MajorityClark, joined by Warren, Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, White, Goldberg
ConcurrenceBlack
ConcurrenceDouglas
ConcurrenceGoldberg
Laws applied
U.S. Const. art. I
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,379 U.S. 241 (1964), was alandmark decisionof theSupreme Court of the United Statesholding that theCommerce Clausegave theU.S. Congresspower to force private businesses to abide byTitle II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,which prohibitsdiscriminationon the basis ofrace,religion,ornational origininpublic accommodations.[1]

Background[edit]

This important case represented an immediate challenge to theCivil Rights Act of 1964,the landmark piece ofcivil rightslegislation which represented the first comprehensive act by Congress on civil rights and race relations since theCivil Rights Act of 1875.In the 100 years preceding 1964,African Americansin the United States had been subjected toracial segregation,a system of racial separation which, while in name providing for "separate but equal"treatment of both white andAfrican Americans,in fact provided inferior accommodation, services, and treatment for African Americans.

During the mid-20th century, partly as a result of cases such asPowell v. Alabama,287 U.S. 45 (1932);Smith v. Allwright,321 U.S. 649 (1944);Shelley v. Kraemer,334 U.S. 1 (1948);Sweatt v. Painter,339 U.S. 629 (1950);McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,339 U.S. 637 (1950);NAACP v. Alabama,357 U.S. 449 (1958);Boynton v. Virginia,364 U.S. 454 (1960); and, most notably,Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,347 U.S. 483 (1954), public opinion began to turn against segregation. Despite the outcomes of these cases, segregation remained in full effect into the 1960s in parts of thesouthern United States,where the Heart of Atlanta Motel was located.

Court case[edit]

Petitioner's argument[edit]

The Heart of Atlanta Motel was a large, 216-room motel that opened on September 5, 1956 inAtlanta,Georgia.[2]In direct violation of the terms of theCivil Rights Act of 1964,which bannedracial discriminationin public places, largely based on Congress's control ofinterstate commerce,the motel refused to rent rooms to African-American patrons. The owner, Moreton Rolleston, filed suit in federal court, arguing that the requirements of the Act exceeded the authority theCommerce Clausegranted to Congress over interstate commerce. Rolleston specifically argued againstTitle II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or national origin in places of public accommodation.[3]Hotels and motels are included as types of public accommodation in the Act, and so are restaurants that serve food substantially to those who participate in interstate travel.[4]In further arguing against the validity of the Act's basis on the Commerce Clause, he stated that people themselves are not commerce; rather, people engage in commerce. Therefore, a hotel or motel does not necessarily engage in interstate commerce because the profit comes from persons rather than goods. Rolleston also asserted that racial discrimination by an individual is not prohibited by theFourteenth Amendmentor the Constitution, claiming that discrimination is a private wrong that individuals are allowed to commit.[4]

In addition, Rolleston maintained that it violated hisFifth Amendmentrights to choose customers and operate his business as he wished and resulted in unjust deprivation of his property withoutdue processoflawand just compensation. Finally, he contended that Congress had placed him in a position ofinvoluntary servitudeby forcing him to rent available rooms to African Americans, thereby violating hisThirteenth Amendmentrights. Rolleston noted that in 1944 theFifth Circuit Court of Appealsfor the United States held that even if acts committed in involuntary servitude are compensated, it still violates the Thirteenth Amendment.[4]

Rolleston maintained throughout his argument that the Constitution should be interpreted as it was at the time of its creation and as theFramersoriginally intendedit. He concluded his opening argument by stating that the Supreme Court did not need to exist if the Commerce Clause allowed for Congress to enact any regulations it pleases.[4]

Respondent's argument[edit]

In response,Archibald Cox,theSolicitor General for the United States,countered that the restrictions requiring adequate accommodation for African Americans were unquestionably related to interstate travel and that Congress, under the Constitution's Commerce Clause, certainly had the power to address such a matter in law. Cox stated that racial discrimination in inns and restaurants “constitute[s] a source of burden or obstruction to interstate commerce.”[4]He brought up multiple examples in which protests over racial discrimination, some in regards to public accommodations and some with broader scopes, intensely affected the economy of certain areas. One of the prime examples wasBirmingham, Alabamain the spring of 1963, during which department and downtown store sales dropped dramatically in the area and the amount of business failure rivaled the rates of theGreat Depression.[4]Cox also mentioned that areas that do not practice equal opportunity are often overlooked by companies that seek commercial and industrial expansion due to the possibility of demonstrations. He usedLittle Rock, Arkansasto exemplify this point, as business expansion fell by over 50 million dollars in the two years it experienced high racial tensions.[4]

Cox also highlighted how discrimination by hotels and motels hinders interstate travel by limiting the availability of accommodations for travelers. He described the impediment discrimination imposes with a hypothetical road trip:[4]

On a motor trip betweenWashington D.C.andMiami, Florida,the average distance that was found between accommodations of reasonable quality open to Negroes was 141 miles. And when we think of the frequency by such we go by other hotels and motels open to everyone, the significance of a three or four-hour drive between the hope of accommodation is very significant indeed. — Archibald Cox

He further argued that theFifth Amendmentdoes not forbid reasonable regulation of interstate commerce and that such incidental damage did not constitute the "taking" of property without just compensation or due process of law. He emphasized that the courts have consistently sustained cases that strengthen anti-discrimination measures.[4]Lastly, he asserted that the Thirteenth Amendment applies primarily toslaveryand the removal of widespread disabilities associated with it and so it undoubtedly would not place issues of racial discrimination in public accommodations beyond the reach offederalandstatelaw:[4]

But surely it would turn the world quite upside down for anyone to seriously suggest that the Thirteenth Amendment was intended to prohibit either Congress or the state governments from guaranteeing Negroes equality of treatment in places of public accommodation. — Archibald Cox

Ruling[edit]

TheUnited States District Court for the Northern District of Georgiaruled in favor of the United States and issued a permanentinjunctionrequiring the Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. to refrain from using racial discrimination when providing services or goods to guests or the general public on its premises.[5]The case was combined with the case of the future Governor of GeorgiaLester Maddox,regarding his Pickrick restaurant and his refusal to serve African Americans.[6]

The opinion of the court, announced on December 14, 1964, was delivered by JusticeTom C. Clark,with concurring opinions by JusticeArthur Goldberg,JusticeHugo Black,and JusticeWilliam O. Douglas.

The U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress acted well within its authority under the Commerce Clause in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, thereby upholding the act's Title II in question. While it might have been possible for Congress to pursue other methods for abolishing racial discrimination, the way in which Congress did so, according to the Court, was perfectly valid. It found no merit in the arguments pursuant to theThirteenth Amendment,finding it difficult to conceive that such an amendment might be applicable in restraining civil rights legislation. Having observed that 75% of the Heart of Atlanta Motel's clientele came from out-of-state and that it was strategically located near Interstates 75 and 85 as well as two majorGeorgiahighways, the Court found that the business clearly affected interstate commerce. Accordingly, it upheld the permanent injunction issued by the district court and required the Heart of Atlanta Motel to receive business from the clientele of all ethnicities.

Case legacy[edit]

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United Stateshas been cited in at least 690 other case decisions since its ruling, including multiple other Supreme Court cases.[7]A notable example includes the 1997 caseCamps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,in which a summer camp inMainethat mainly serviced out-of-state residents fought against a state tax exemption statute that favored organizations that serviced state residents.[8]The courts compared out-of-state campers staying at a summer camp to out-of-state residents occupying a hotel, deeming the camp a participant in interstate commerce.[9]Another example is the 1966 caseUnited States v. Guest,in which the courts ruled, due to the conspiratorial murder of Lt. Col.Lemuel Pennwhile he was traveling home, that forcefully depriving someone's right to travel is unconstitutional.[10]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States.,379U.S.241(1964).
  2. ^"Heart of Atlanta Motel".todayingeorgiahistory.org/.RetrievedApril 14,2020.[permanent dead link]
  3. ^"Department of Justice".www.justice.gov.August 6, 2015. Archived fromthe originalon April 13, 2016.RetrievedMarch 17,2020.
  4. ^abcdefghij"Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States".Oyez.RetrievedMarch 16,2020.
  5. ^Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,231 F. Supp. 393(N.D. Ga.1964).
  6. ^Heart of Atlanta/Pickrick trial.Civil Rights Digital Library. Retrieved 2014-05-23
  7. ^"Document: Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241".Nexis Uni.December 14, 1964.RetrievedApril 16,2020.
  8. ^"Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison".Oyez.RetrievedApril 16,2020.
  9. ^"Document: Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564".Nexis Uni.May 19, 1997.RetrievedApril 16,2020.
  10. ^"United States v. Guest".Oyez.RetrievedApril 16,2020.

External links[edit]