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Huaiyin–Huai'an campaign

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Not to be confused withBattle of Huaiyin-Huai'an.
Huaiyin–Huai'ancampaign
Part ofChinese Civil War
DateAugust 26, 1945 – September 22, 1945
Location
Jiangsu,China
Result Communistvictory
Belligerents
Flag of the National Revolutionary Army
Flag of the National Revolutionary Army
National Revolutionary Army
PLA
PLA
Chinese Red Army
Commanders and leaders
Flag of the National Revolutionary ArmyPan Ganchen
Flag of the National Revolutionary ArmyWu Shuquan		 PLAHuang Kecheng
Strength
14,000 11,000
Casualties and losses
1,000+
12,678 captured alive		 200+

TheHuaiyin–Huai'ancampaign ( lưỡng hoài chiến dịch ) was a campaign consisted of several battles fought between thenationalistsand thecommunistsduring theChinese Civil Warin the immediate post-World War IIera, and resulted in communists taking the city ofHuaiyinand the city ofHuai'an.Sometimes this campaign is separated into two by the communists asHuaiyincampaign( hoài âm chiến dịch ) andHuai'ancampaign( hoài an chiến dịch ) respectively.

Prelude[edit]

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end ofWorld War IIbetween the communists and thenationalistsinChina,this conflict also rooted from the fact thatChiang Kai-shekhad realized that hisnationalistregime simply had neither the sufficient troops nor enough transportation assets to deploy his troops into the Japanese-occupied regions ofChina.Unwilling to let the communists who had already dominated most of the rural regions inChinato further expand their territories by accepting the Japanese surrender and thus would consequently control the Japanese occupied regions,Chiang Kai-shekordered the Japanese and their turncoat Chinese puppet regime not to surrender to the communists and kept their fighting capabilities to "maintain order" in the Japanese occupied regions, fighting off the communists as necessary, until the final arrivals and completion of the deployment of thenationalisttroops. As a result, most members of the Japanese puppet regimes and their military forces rejoined thenationalists.

However, these formernationaliststurned Japanese puppet regime forces were not fromChiang Kai-shek's own clique, but instead, they were mainly consisted of troops ofwarlordswho were only nominally under theChiang Kai-shek's beforeWorld War II,since they werenationalistsin name only and mostly maintained their independence. Thesewarlordswere only interested in keeping their own power and defected to the Japanese side when Japanese invaders offered to let them keep their power in exchange for their collaborations. AfterWorld War II,these forces of former Japanese puppet regimes once again returned to thenationalistcamp for the same reason they defected to the Japanese invaders. Obviously, it was difficult for Chiang to immediately get rid of these warlords for good as soon as they surrendered to Chiang and rejoinednationalists,because such move would alienate other factions within thenationalistranks, and these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords could still help thenationaliststo gain more territories by holding on to what was under their control until Chiang completed the deployment of his own troops to take over.Chiang Kai-shek's objective was to simultaneously solve the warlord problem that had plaguedChinafor so long and the problem of the extermination ofcommunismtogether, which proved to be an extremely fatal mistake for him and hisnationalistregime later on, as shown in this conflict.

Nationalist strategy[edit]

In accordance with his strategy to simultaneously solve the warlord problem that had plaguedChinafor so long and the problem of the extermination ofcommunismtogether,Chiang Kai-shekand his followers had hoped that these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords who rejoined thenationalistswould be able to hold on to the regions long enough for Chiang to deploy his own troops by holding off communists. If the communists were victorious in such conflicts, however, the result would still benefit to Chiang and China because the power of these warlords would be reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, and the warlord problem plagued China for so long could thus be greatly reduced, while at the same time, communists would be weakened by the fights and Chiang's own troops would have easier time to take control.

For the formernationalistturned Japanese puppet regime forces, thesewarlordsand their troops had no problem of followingChiang Kai-shek's orders, and they were eager to prove themselves. Thesewarlordsand their troops were well aware that due to the collaboration with the Japanese invaders during theSecond Sino-Japanese War,they were well hated by the general population inChina,including thosenationalistswho refused to surrender to the enemy and fought the enemy until the eventual victory. Therefore, in the impending demilitarization afterWorld War II,they would certainly be disarmed and discharged, which would probably be the best outcome and the power of these warlord would be reduced or even eliminated as a result.Chiang Kai-shek's ordering them not surrendering to the communists and fighting off the communists was a savior for them because by carrying out such orders, thesewarlordsand their troops could legitimize themselves and thus retain their power by fighting the communists who were targeted as rebels byChiang Kai-shekand hisnationalistregime.

Communist strategy[edit]

Thecommuniststrategy was much simpler than that of thenationalistsbecause there was not any huge division within thecommunistrank like that of thenationalist.The communists already earned considerable popular support by being the only Chinese force left in the region fighting the Japanese invaders and their puppet regime after thenationalistwithdrew, and after successfully establishingcommunistbases in the rural regions where better life was provided to the general populace in comparison to that of Japanese occupied regions, the general Chinese populace agreed that the communists were well deserved to represent theChinato accept the invaders' surrender in the region and takeover the regions occupied by the invaders.

Order of battle[edit]

First stage[edit]

Thecommunist10thbrigadeof the 3rdDivisionof theNew Fourth Armybegun its push towardHuaiyinon August 26, 1945, from regions of Gaoliang Ravine (Gaoliang Jian, cao lương giản ) and Jiang's Dam (Jiang Ba, tưởng bá ), while fivecommunistlocal regiments coordinated their attacks from other directions: thecommunistSheyang ( xạ dương ) Independent regiment, Huaiyin Garrison regiment and Lianshui ( liên thủy ) Garrison regiment attacked Huaiyin from the east and north, whileHuai'anwas attacked by thecommunistHuai'anIndependent regiment and the Eastern Lianshui ( liên đông ) Independent regiment. After fierce battles that lasted four days from August 27, 1945 – August 31, 1945, allnationalistpositions outside the city wall had fallen into the enemy hands and the city of Huaiyin was surrounded.

After besieging the city, the enemy force did not immediately attack, but instead, made preparations by building fire support stations and digging trenches that extended all the way to the foot of the city wall. The fire support stations were built by creating hills higher than the city wall with earth so that they would also serve as reconnaissance platforms and everything inside the city was under the attacking enemy's surveillance.

Second stage[edit]

After thenationalistdefenders refused to surrender, the final assault on the city begun in the afternoon on September 6, 1945, at 2:00 PM. Taking the advantage of the trenches, the attacking enemy succeeded in approaching the foot of the city wall and set explosives to blow up a section of the city wall near the eastern gate. Thenationalistwas unable to stop the enemy from rushing in from the collapsed section and after one and half hour fierce battle, the entirenationalistgarrison ofHuaiyinconsisted of the 28thDivisionand the Huaiyin SecurityRegimenttotaling more than 8,600 men were annihilated by the enemy. Pan Ganchen ( phan càn thần ), the commander of thenationalist28thDivisionwas among the 300+nationalistdefenders killed, and another 8,328 was captured alive, included thechief-of-staffof thenationalist28thDivision,Liu Shaoshen ( lưu thiệu khôn ). The enemy also succeeded in capturing 7artillerypieces, 88machine guns,and 6,592repeating riflesfrom thenationalist.The last resistance ended at 5:30 AM next day on September 7, 1945.

After the fall of Huaiyin, thecommunist10thbrigadeof the 3rdDivisionof theNew Fourth Armyturned its attention toHuai'an,besieged the city on September 13, 1945. Two days later, on September 15, 1945, the commander of thecommunist3rdDivisionof theNew Fourth Army,Huang Kecheng ( hoàng khắc thành ) personally led the 7thbrigadeand the 8thbrigadeof thecommunist3rdDivisionof theNew Fourth ArmytoHuai'an,replacing the 10thbrigadeof thecommunist3rdDivisionof theNew Fourth Armyin preparation to attack the city with the help of localcommunistmilitia.Realizing their desperate situation, the defenders attempted to breakout on the dusk on September 21, 1945, but was beaten back by the enemy.

The assault onHuai'anbegun in the morning of September 22, 1945 at 8:00 am. Under the cover of heavy artillery support frommortarsandinfantry support gunswhich included capturedJapanese Type 11,the attacking force succeeded in breaching the defense of the city, and the 12-metre-high (39 ft) city wall proved to be incapable of stopping the enemy, which was breached within 5 minutes. By 10:00 am, most of the defending force was annihilated. However, the remaining defense of a group of more than 200 ardentnationalistsled by thenationalistbrigadecommander Wu Shuquan ( ngô sấu tuyền ) and the civilian commissioner Li Yunpei( lý vân bái ) was much stronger than anticipated and it took attackers 5 hours to wipe out this last group of defenders and mop up the rest who went into hiding. The three-brigadestrongnationalistdefending force ofHuai'anwas completely annihilated by the attacking enemy with more than 300 killed, including the commander Wu Shuquan ( ngô sấu tuyền ), and another 4,350 men captured alive, while 5artillerypieces, 52 light mortars, 50machine gunsand 3,738repeating riflesalso fell into the hands of the enemy. Along with the previous loss ofHuaiyinand positions outside the two cities, the defenders lost nearly 14,000 troops, nearly the entire force.

Outcome[edit]

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end ofWorld War IIbetween the communists and thenationalistsinChina,this conflict also showed thatChiang Kai-shek's attempt to simultaneously solve the warlord problem that had plaguedChinafor so long and the problem of the extermination ofcommunismtogether proved to be a fatal mistake. Although the result of the campaign turned out exactly likeChiang Kai-shekand his subordinates had predicted, and consequently the power of thewarlordsin this region was indeed reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, so that the warlord problem plaguedChinafor so long was thus reduced for this particular region, andChiang Kai-shek's secondary objective was achieved here, any positive gains obtained by thenationalistswere negated by the politic fallout. The reason was that this success of achieving the secondary objective came at a huge cost innationalists' loss of popular support in this region formerly dominated by the Japanese, because the local population had already blamed nationalists for losing the regions to the Japanese invaders, while reassigning these former Japanese puppet regime forces as thenationalistforces to fight the communists, the only Chinese force left in the regions, only further alienated the local populace and strengthened the popular resentment toChiang Kai-shekand hisnationalistregime.

In contrast, thecommunistvictory of taking the two cities resulted in the linking up of the previous four separatecommunistbases in centralJiangsu,northernJiangsu,north ofHuai Riverand south ofHuai River.The political fallout ofChiang Kai-shek's fatal mistake of attempting to simultaneously solve the warlord problem that had plaguedChinafor so long and the problem of the extermination ofcommunismtogether also greatly helped the communists in gaining popular support in the region.

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  • Zhu, Zongzhen and Wang, Chaoguang,Liberation War History,1st Edition, Social Scientific Literary Publishing House inBeijing,2000,ISBN7-80149-207-2(set)
  • Zhang, Ping,History of the Liberation War,1st Edition, Chinese Youth Publishing House inBeijing,1987,ISBN7-5006-0081-X(pbk.)
  • Jie, Lifu,Records of the Liberation War: The Decisive Battle of Two Kinds of Fates,1st Edition,HebeiPeople's Publishing House inShijiazhuang,1990,ISBN7-202-00733-9(set)
  • Literary and Historical Research Committee of theAnhuiCommittee of theChinese People's Political Consultative Conference,Liberation War,1st Edition,AnhuiPeople's Publishing House inHefei,1987,ISBN7-212-00007-8
  • Li, Zuomin,Heroic Division and Iron Horse: Records of the Liberation War,1st Edition,Chinese CommunistParty History Publishing House inBeijing,2004,ISBN7-80199-029-3
  • Wang, Xingsheng, and Zhang, Jingshan,Chinese Liberation War,1st Edition,People's Liberation ArmyLiterature and Art Publishing House inBeijing,2001,ISBN7-5033-1351-X(set)
  • Huang, Youlan,History of the Chinese People's Liberation War,1st Edition, Archives Publishing House inBeijing,1992,ISBN7-80019-338-1
  • Liu Wusheng,FromYan'antoBeijing:A Collection of Military Records and Research Publications of Important Campaigns in the Liberation War,1st Edition, Central Literary Publishing House inBeijing,1993,ISBN7-5073-0074-9
  • Tang, Yilu and Bi, Jianzhong,History of ChinesePeople's Liberation Armyin Chinese Liberation War,1st Edition, Military Scientific Publishing House inBeijing,1993 – 1997,ISBN7-80021-719-1(Volum 1), 7800219615 (Volum 2), 7800219631 (Volum 3), 7801370937 (Volum 4), and 7801370953 (Volum 5)

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