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Marco Polo Bridge incident

Coordinates:39°50′57″N116°12′47″E/ 39.84917°N 116.21306°E/39.84917; 116.21306
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Marco Polo Bridge incident
Part of theSecond Sino-Japanese War

Aerial photo of theMarco Polo Bridge(right).Wanping Fortressis on the opposite side of the river.
Date(1937-07-07)(1937-07-09)July 7–9, 1937
(2 days)
Location39°50′57″N116°12′47″E/ 39.84917°N 116.21306°E/39.84917; 116.21306
Result See§ Aftermath
Belligerents
China

Japan

Commanders and leaders
Kanichiro Tashiro
Units involved
29th Army Japanese China Garrison Army
Strength
100 troops at the bridge[2]
900 in reinforcement
5,600[3]
Casualties and losses
96 killed[2] 660 killed
Chinese name
Traditional ChineseLư câu kiều sự biến
Simplified ChineseLư câu kiều sự biến
Literal meaningLugou Bridge incident
Hanyu PinyinLúgōuqiáo Shìbiàn
Alternative Chinese name
Traditional ChineseThất thất sự biến
Simplified ChineseThất thất sự biến
Literal meaningJuly 7 incident
Hanyu PinyinQīqī Shìbiàn
Japanese name
KanjiLư câu kiều sự kiện
Revised HepburnRokōkyō Jiken
Marco Polo Bridge incident is located in Beijing
Marco Polo Bridge incident
Location within Beijing

TheMarco Polo Bridge incident,also known as theLugou Bridge incident[a]or theJuly 7 incident,[b]was a battle during July 1937 in the district of Beijing between the 29th Army of theNational Revolutionary Armyof theRepublic of Chinaand theImperial Japanese Army.

Since theJapanese invasion of Manchuriain 1931, there had been many small incidents along the rail line connectingBeijingwith the port ofTianjin,but all had subsided. In this incident, a Japanese soldier was temporarily absent from his unit oppositeWanping,and his commander demanded the right to search the town for him. When this request was refused, units on both sides were alerted and the Chinese Army fired on the Japanese Army. However, the missing Japanese soldier had already returned to his lines. The Marco Polo Bridge incident is generally regarded as the start of theSecond Sino-Japanese War.[4]

Introduction

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In English, the battle is usually known as the "Marco Polo Bridge incident".[5]TheMarco Polo Bridgeis an eleven-arch granite bridge, an architecturally significant structure first erected under theJin dynastyand later restored during the reign of theKangxi Emperorof theQing dynastyin 1698. It gained its Western name from its appearance inIl Milione,Marco Polo's record of his travels.[6]

It is also known as the "Lukouchiao",[7]"Lugouqiao",[8]or'Lugou Bridge incident'from the local name of the bridge, derived from a former name of theYongding River.[9]This is the common name for the event in Japanese (Lô câu kiều sự kiện,Rokōkyō Jiken) and is an alternate name for it in Chinese and Korean (노구교사건,Nogugyo Sageon). The same name is also expressed or translated as the "Battle of Lugou Bridge",[10]"Lugouqiao",[11]or "Lukouchiao".[12]

Background

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Tensions between theEmpire of Japanand theRepublic of Chinahad been heightened since theJapanese invasion of Manchuriain 1931 and their subsequent creation of a client state,Manchukuo,withPuyi,the deposedQing dynastyemperor, as its chief of state. After the invasion, Japanese forces extended their control further into northern China, seeking to obtain raw materials and industrial capacity. A commission of inquiry from theLeague of Nationspublished theLytton Reportwhich was critical of the Japanese, resulting in Japan quitting the League.[13]

TheKuomintang(KMT) government of China refused to recognize Manchukuo but did agree to theTanggu Trucewith Japan in 1933. Subsequently, there were various "incidents", or armed clashes of a limited nature, followed by a return to uneasy peace. The significance of the Marco Polo Bridge incident is that, following it, tensions did not subside again; instead, there was an escalation, with larger forces committed by both sides and fighting spreading to other parts of China. With hindsight, this small incident can, therefore, be regarded as the start of a major conflict.[14]

By the terms of theBoxer Protocolof 7 September 1901, China had granted nations with legations in Beijing the right to station guards at twelve specific points along railways connecting Beijing with Tianjin. This was to ensure open communications between the capital and the port. By a supplementary agreement on 15 July 1902, these forces were allowed to conduct maneuvers without informing the authorities of other nations in China.[15]

GeneralissimoChiang Kai-shek,Allied Commander-in-Chief in the China theater between 1942 and 1945

By July 1937, Japan had expanded its forces in China to an estimated 7,000 to 15,000 men, mostly along the railways. This number of men, and the amount of concomitant matériel, was several times the size of the detachments deployed by the European powers, and greatly in excess of the limits set by theBoxer Protocol.[15]By this time, the Imperial Japanese Army had already surrounded Beijing and Tianjin.

Incident

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On the night of 7 July, the Japanese units stationed atFengtaicrossed the border to conduct military exercises. Japanese and Chinese forces outside the town ofWanping—a walled town 16.4 km (10.2 mi) southwest of Beijing—exchanged fire at approximately 23:00. The exact cause of this incident remains unknown. When a Japanese soldier, Private Shimura Kikujiro, failed to return to his post, Chinese regimental commanderJi Xingwen(219th Regiment, 37th Division, 29th Army) received a message from the Japanese demanding permission to enter Wanping to search for the missing soldier; the Chinese refused. Private Shimura later returned to his unit; he claimed to have sought immediate relief in the darkness from a stomach ache and become lost[16][citation needed]); according to Peter Harmsen, he had visited a brothel.[17]By that time both sides were mobilizing, with the Japanese deploying reinforcements to surroundWanping.

Later that night, a unit of Japanese infantry attempted to breach Wanping's walled defenses but were repulsed. An ultimatum by the Japanese was issued two hours later. As a precautionary measure,Qin Dechun,the acting commander of the Chinese 29th Route Army, contacted the commander of the Chinese 37th Division, GeneralFeng Zhi'an,ordering him to place his troops on heightened alert.[citation needed]

Japanese forces bombardingWanping Fortress,1937

At 02:00 on 8 July,Qin Dechun,executive officer and acting commander of the Chinese 29th Route Army, sent Wang Lengzhai, mayor of Wanping, alone to the Japanese camp to conduct negotiations. However, this proved to be fruitless, and the Japanese insisted that they be admitted into the town to investigate the cause of the incident.

At around 04:00, reinforcements of both sides began to arrive. The Chinese also rushed an extra division of troops to the area. At 04:45 Wang Lengzhai had returned to Wanping, and on his way back he witnessed Japanese troops massing around the town. Within five minutes of Wang's return, a shot was heard, and both sides began firing[citation needed],thus marking the commencement of theBattle of Beiping-Tianjin,and, by extension, the full scale commencement of theSecond Sino-Japanese Warat 04:50 on 8 July 1937.

ColonelJi Xingwenled the Chinese defenses with about 100 men, with orders to hold the bridge at all costs. The Chinese were able to hold the bridge with the help of reinforcements, but suffered tremendous losses.[citation needed]At this point, the Japanese military and members of the Japanese Foreign Service began negotiations in Beijing with the Chinese Nationalist government.

A verbal agreement with Chinese General Qin was reached, whereby:[citation needed]

  • An apology would be given by the Chinese to the Japanese.
  • Punishment would be dealt to those responsible.
  • Control of Wanping would be turned over to the Hebei Chinese civilianconstabularyand not to the Chinese 219th Regiment.
  • The Chinese would attempt to better control "communists" in the area.

This was agreed upon, though Japanese Garrison Infantry Brigade commander GeneralMasakazu Kawabeinitially rejected the truce and, against his superiors' orders, continued to shell Wanping for the next three hours, until prevailed upon to cease and to move his forces to the northeast.[citation needed]

Aftermath

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Although a ceasefire had been declared, further efforts to de-escalate the conflict failed, largely due to actions by theChinese Communistsand theJapanese China Garrison Armycommanders.[citation needed]Due to constant Chinese attacks, Japanese Garrison Infantry Brigade commander GeneralMasakazu Kawabeordered Wanping to be shelled on 9 July. The following day, Japanese armored units joined the attack. The Chinese 219th regiment staged an effective resistance, and full scale fighting commenced atLangfangon 25 July.[citation needed]After launching a bitter and bloody attack on the Japanese lines on the 27 July, GeneralSong Zheyuanwas defeated and forced to retreat behind theYongding Riverby the next day.

Battle of Beiping–Tianjin

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On 11 July, in accordance with the Goso conference, theImperial Japanese Army General Staffauthorized the deployment of an infantry division from theChosen Army,two combined brigades from theKwantung Armyand an air regiment composed of 18 squadrons as reinforcements to Northern China. By 20 July, total Japanese military strength in the Beiping-Tianjin area exceeded 180,000 personnel.

The Japanese gave Song and his troops "free passage" before moving in to pacify resistance in areas surrounding Beijing and Tianjin. After 24 days of combat, the Chinese 29th Army was forced to withdraw. The Japanese captured Beiping and theTaku Fortsat Tianjin on 29 and 30 July respectively, thus concluding theBattle of Beiping–Tianjin.However, the Japanese Army had been given orders not to advance further than the Yongding River. In a suddenvolte-face,the Konoe government's foreign minister opened negotiations withChiang Kai-shek's government in Nanjing and stated: "Japan wants Chinese cooperation, not Chinese land." Nevertheless, negotiations failed to move further. On 9 August 1937,a Japanese naval officer was shot in Shanghai,escalating the skirmishes and battles into full scale warfare.[18]

The 29th Army's resistance (and poor equipment) inspired the 1937 "Sword March",which with reworked lyrics became the NRA's standardmarching cadenceand popularized the racial epithetguizito describe the Japanese invaders.[19]

Consequences

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Damage from the Japanese shells on the wall of Wanping Fortress, now marked with a memorial plaque

The heightened tensions of the Marco Polo Bridge incident led directly to full-scale war between the Empire of Japan and the Republic of China, with theBattle of Beiping–Tianjinat the end of July and theBattle of Shanghaiin August.

In 1937, during the Battle of Beiping–Tianjin the government was notified by Muslim GeneralMa Bufangof theMa cliquethat he was prepared to bring the fight to the Japanese in a telegram message.[20]Immediately after the Marco Polo Bridge incident, Ma Bufang arranged for a cavalry division under the Muslim GeneralMa Biaoto be sent east to battle the Japanese. The TurkicSalar peoplemade up the majority of the first cavalry division sent by Ma.

In 1987, the bridge was renovated and thePeople's Anti-Japanese War Museumwas built near the bridge to commemorate the anniversary of the start of the Sino-Japanese War.[21]

Controversies

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There is debate over whether the incident could have been planned like the earlierMukden incident,which served as a pretext for theJapanese invasion of Manchuria.[22]According to Jim Huffman this notion has been "widely rejected" by historians, as the Japanese would likely have been more concerned over the threat posed by the Soviets. Controversial conservative Japanese historianIkuhiko Hatahas suggested that the incident could have been caused by theChinese Communist Party,hoping it would lead to awar of attritionbetween the Japanese army and the Kuomintang.[citation needed]However, he himself still considers this less likely than the "accidental shot" hypothesis, that the first shot was fired by a low-ranking Chinese soldier in "an unplanned moment of fear".

Order of battle

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National Revolutionary Army

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In comparison to their Japanese counterparts, the 29th Route Army, and generally all of the NRA for that matter, was poorly equipped and under-trained. Most soldiers were armed only with a rifle and adao(a single-edgedChinese swordsimilar to amachete). Moreover, the Chinese garrison in the Lugouqiao area was completely outnumbered and outgunned; it consisted only of about 100 soldiers.[2]

Name Military posts Civilian posts
GeneralSong Zheyuan Commander of 29th Army Chairman ofHebeiLegislative Committee
Head of Beijing security forces
GeneralQin Dechun Vice-Commander of 29th Army Mayor of Beijing
GeneralTong Linge Vice-Commander of 29th Army
GeneralLiu Ruming Commander of the 143rd Division Chairman ofChahar
GeneralFeng Zhi'an
( phùng trị an )
Commander of the 37th Division Chairman ofHebei
GeneralZhao Dengyu
( triệu đăng vũ;Wade-Giles:Chao Teng-yu)
Commander of the 132nd Division
GeneralZhang Zizhong
( trương tự trung;Wade-Giles:Chang Tze-chung)
Commander of the 38th Division Mayor ofTianjin
ColonelJi Xingwen
( cát tinh văn )
Commander of the 219th Regiment
under the 110th Brigade of the 37th Division

Imperial Japanese Army

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TheJapanese China Garrison Armywas a combined force of infantry, tanks, mechanized forces, artillery and cavalry, which had been stationed in China since the time of theBoxer Rebellion.Its headquarters and bulk for its forces were in Tianjin, with a major detachment in Beijing to protect the Japanese embassy.

Name Position Location
Lieutenant GeneralKanichiro Tashiro Commander China Garrison Army Tientsin
Major GeneralMasakazu Kawabe Commander China Garrison Infantry Brigade Peking
ColonelRenya Mutaguchi Commander 1st Infantry Regiment Peking
MajorKiyonao Ichiki Commander, 3rd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment W of Marco Polo Bridge, 510 men

See also

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Notes

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  1. ^Traditional Chinese:Lư câu kiều sự biến;simplified Chinese:Lư câu kiều sự biến;pinyin:Lúgōuqiáo shìbiàn
  2. ^Simplified Chinese:Thất thất sự biến;traditional Chinese:Thất thất sự biến;pinyin:Qīqī shìbiàn

References

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Citations

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  1. ^"Qin Dechun".Generals.dk.Retrieved14 May2015.
  2. ^abcWang Yi (2004).Common Knowledge about Chinese History.Hong Kong China Travel Press. p.185.ISBN962-8746-47-2.
  3. ^Japanese War History library (Senshi-sousyo) No. 86 [Sino-incident army operations 1 until 1938 Jan.] p. 138
  4. ^"Articles published during wartime by former Domei News Agency released online in free-to-access archive".The Japan Times Online.2018-11-02.ISSN0447-5763.Archived fromthe originalon 2019-06-04.Retrieved2019-06-04.
  5. ^"Marco Polo Bridge Incident".Marco Polo Bridge Incident | Asian history | Britannica.Encyclopædia Britannica.30 June 2022..
  6. ^Hahn, Emily (2014).The Soong Sisters.Open Road Media. p. 229.ISBN978-1-4976-1953-1.
  7. ^Kataoka, Tetsuya (1974).Resistance and Revolution in China.University of California Press. p. 48.ISBN978-0-520-02553-0..
  8. ^"Lugouqiao Incident",China through a Lens.
  9. ^"Beijing: Its Characteristics of Historical Development and Transformation",Symposium on Chinese Historical Geography,p.8.
  10. ^"Battle of Lugou Bridge",World War 2.
  11. ^Brown, Richard (2013).A Companion to James Joyce.John Wiley & Sons. p. 202.ISBN978-1-444-34293-2..
  12. ^"The Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge) Battle",Colnect.
  13. ^Song, Yuwu, ed. (2009). "Marco Polo Bridge incident 1937".Encyclopedia of Chinese-American Relations.Jefferson, NC: McFarland. pp. 198-.ISBN978-0-786-44593-6.
  14. ^Usui, Katsumi (1981). "On the Duration of the Pacific War".Japan Quarterly.28(4): 479–488.OCLC1754204.
  15. ^abHyperWar: International Military Tribunal for the Far East [Chapter 5]
  16. ^Benjamin, Lai (2018).Chinese Soldier vs Japanese Soldier: China 1937–38.Bloomsbury. p. 66.ISBN978-1-472-82821-7.Retrieved22 October2021.
  17. ^Harmsen, Peter (2013).Shanghai 1937: Stalingrad on the Yangtze.p. 23.
  18. ^Hoyt, Edwin Palmer (2001).Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict.Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 152–.ISBN978-0-815-41118-5.
  19. ^Lei, Bryant."New Songs of the Battlefield": Songs and Memories of the Chinese Cultural Revolution,p. 85.University of Pittsburgh (Pittsburgh), 2004.
  20. ^Central Press (30 Jul 1937)."He Offers Aid to Fight Japan".Herald-Journal.Retrieved2010-11-28.
  21. ^"Marco Polo Bridge to Be Tourist Attraction: Chinese Spruce Up Landmark of War With Japanese".Los Angeles Times.25 October 1987.
  22. ^Huffman, James L. (31 October 2013).Modern Japan: An Encyclopedia of History, Culture, and Nationalism.Routledge. p. 140.ISBN978-1-135-63490-2.

Sources

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  • Dorn, Frank (1974).The Sino-Japanese War, 1937–41: From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor.MacMillan.ISBN0-02-532200-1.
  • Dryburgh, Marjorie (2000).North China and Japanese Expansion 1933–1937: Regional Power and the National Interest.Routledge.ISBN0-700-71274-7.
  • Lu, David J (1961).From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: A Study of Japan's Entry into World War II.Public Affairs Press.ASINB000UV6MFQ.
  • Furuya, Keiji (1981).The Riddle of the Marco Polo Bridge: To Verify the First Shot.Symposium on the History of the Republic of China.ASINB0007BJI7I.
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