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Use–mention distinction

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Inanalytic philosophy,[1]a fundamental distinction is made between the use of a term and the mere mention of it.[2][3]Many philosophical works have been "vitiated by a failure to distinguish use and mention".[2]The distinction can sometimes be pedantic, especially in simple cases where it is obvious.[2][4]

The distinction between use and mention can be illustrated with the word "cheese":[2][3]

  1. Cheese is derived from milk.
  2. "Cheese" is derived from theOld Englishwordċēse.

The first sentence is a statement about the substance called "cheese": itusesthe word "cheese" to refer to that substance. The second is a statement about the word "cheese" as asignifier:itmentionsthe word without using it to refer to anything other than itself.

Overview

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In written language,mentionedwords or phrases often appear between single or doublequotation marksor initalics.In philosophy, single quotation marks are typically used, while in other fields (such as linguistics) italics are more common.[5]Some style authorities, such asStrunk and White,emphasize that mentioned words or phrases should be visually distinct. On the other hand,usedwords or phrases do not carry typographic markings.[6]

The phenomenon of a term having differentreferencesin various contexts was referred to assuppositio(substitution) by medieval logicians.[7]A substitution describes how a term is substituted in a sentence based on its referent. For nouns, a term can be used in different ways:

  • With aconcrete and real referent:[a]"That is mypig."(personal supposition)
  • With aconcrete but unreal referent:"Santa Claus's pig is very big." (personal supposition)
  • With ageneric referent:"Anypigbreathes air. "(simple supposition)
  • Metaphorically: "Your grandfather is apig."(improper supposition)
  • As apure term:"Pighas only three letters. "(material supposition)

The use–mention distinction is particularly significant inanalytic philosophy.[8]Confusing use with mention can lead to misleading or incorrect statements, such as category errors.

Self-referentialstatements also engage the use–mention distinction and are often central to logical paradoxes, such asQuine's paradox.In mathematics, this concept appears inGödel's incompleteness theorem,where thediagonal lemmaplays a crucial role.

Commentary

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Stanisław Leśniewskiextensively employed this distinction, noting the fallacies that can result from confusing it inRussellandWhitehead'sPrincipia Mathematica.[9]

Donald Davidsonargued that quotation cannot always be treated as mere mention, giving examples where quotations carry both use and mention functions.[10]

Douglas Hofstadterexplains the distinction between use and mention as follows:[11]

When a word is used toreferto something, it is beingused.When a word isquoted,the focus is on its surface aspects, such as typography or phonetics, and it is beingmentioned.

Issues arise when a mention itself is mentioned. Notating this with italics or repeated quotation marks can lead to ambiguity.[12]

Some analytic philosophers have said the distinction "may seem rather pedantic".[2]

In a1977 response toanalytic philosopherJohn Searle,Jacques Derridamentioned the distinction as "rather laborious and problematical".[4]

See also

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Notes

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  1. ^This use of the wordconcreteis explained atAbstract and concrete.

References

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  1. ^Wheeler (2005) p. 568
  2. ^abcdeDevitt and Sterelny (1999) pp. 40–1
  3. ^abW.V. Quine(1940) p. 24
  4. ^abDerrida, Jacques (1977).Limited Inc.Northwestern University Press. p. 79.ISBN9780810107885.
  5. ^For example,Butcher's Copy-Editing: The Cambridge Handbook for Editors, Copy-editors and Proofreaders,4th edition, by Judith Butcher, Caroline Drake, and Maureen Leach. Cambridge University Press, 2006.Butcher'srecommends against the practice, butThe Chicago Manual of Style,section 7.58 (15th edition, 2003), indicates that philosophers use single quotes for a similar distinction, though it is not explained in these terms.
  6. ^Wilson, Shomir (2011)."A Computational Theory of the Use-Mention Distinction in Natural Language".PhD Dissertation, University of Maryland.Retrieved16 February2013.
  7. ^See Read, Stephen (2006).Medieval Theories: Properties of Terms.InStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  8. ^"Quotation".The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.16 July 2005.Retrieved5 October2009.
  9. ^Simons, Peter(2006). "Leśniewski, Stanisław". In Borchert, Donald M (ed.).Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition(e-book ed.). Thomson Gale. p.292.ISBN0-02-866072-2.
  10. ^Davidson, Donald (March 1979). "Quotation".Theory and Decision.11(1): 27–40.doi:10.1007/BF00126690.ISSN0040-5833.S2CID261211103.
  11. ^Hofstadter, Douglas R. (1985).Metamagical Themas.p.9.
  12. ^Boolos, George(1999).Logic, Logic, and Logic.p. 398.In this 1995 paper, Boolos discussed ambiguities in using quotation marks as part of aformal language,and proposed a way of distinguishing levels of mentioning using a finite number of marks.

Sources

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Further reading

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