War of succession

Not to be confused withwar of secession.

This article is about (princely) wars during succession crises. For princely wars against well-established monarchs, seeprincely rebellion.

AfterCharles II's death,Louis XIV of Franceproclaims his grandsonPhilip of Anjouthe new Spanish king (November 1700), triggering theWar of the Spanish Succession(1701–1714).

Awar of successionis awarprompted by asuccession crisisin which two or more individuals claim theright of successorto adeceasedordeposedmonarch.The rivals are typically supported byfactionswithin theroyal court.Foreign powers sometimesintervene,allyingthemselves with a faction. This may widen the war into one between those powers.

Wars of succession were some of the most prevalent types ofwars by causethroughout human history, but the replacement ofabsolute monarchiesby an international order based ondemocracywithconstitutional monarchiesorrepublicsended almost all such wars by 1900.

Terminology

Descriptions

See also:Princely rebellion § Terminology

In historiography and literature, awar of successionmay also be referred to as asuccession dispute,dynastic struggle,internecineconflict,fratricidalwar,or any combination of these terms. Not all of these are necessarily describing armed conflict, however, and the dispute may be resolved without escalating into open warfare. Wars of succession are also often referred to as acivilwar, when in fact it was a conflict within the royalty, or broader aristocracy, that civilians were dragged into.It depends on the circumstances whether a war of succession is also acivilwar in the sense ofintrastate war(if it is limited to armed conflict inside one state), or it may be aninterstate war(if foreign powers intervene; sometimes called 'international' war), or both.Therefore, names or descriptions of a war may simply depend on one's perspective; for example, Nolan (2008) stated: 'TheWilliamite War of 1689–1691,sometimes known as the Jacobite War, was a war of succession in England and an international war for or against France for most non-Irish participants. But it was a civil war in Ireland.'Similarly, scholars sometimes disagree whether the1657–1661 Mughal dynastic conflict(which consisted of several subconflicts, phases, and factions) should be labelled a 'war of succession' or a '(princely) rebellion'.

Orders of succession

Further information:Order of successionandWar of succession § Prevention and mitigation

There are several different types oforders of succession,some of which may not have been enshrined in law, but only established in local custom or tradition. Across times and places, orders of succession have switched from one system to another.Some prominent examples are:

• None:Every death of a monarch results in a succession crisis that is resolvedad hoc,either diplomatically or by violence. This pattern has been observed in cultures around the world, for example in theBuyid dynasty(934–1062),Đại Cồ Việt(968–1054),Ayutthaya(17th century),andMataram(17th–18th century).
• Heir designationorselection:The reigning monarch had the sole right to personally designate his or her preferred heir while still alive, sometimes far ahead of time (perhaps already giving them important functions and dignities), sometimes only in theirlast willor verbally on theirdeathbed.This pattern has been observed in cultures around the world. For example, fromPeter the Great(1721) to thePauline Laws(1797), theRussian Empirehad this system. It was also common in high medieval Mediterranean Europe to accept heir designation by will.
  • Co-rulershiporabdication/delegation:In many states in cultures around the world, the reigning monarch gave their designated heir already a prominent role in running the realm to prevent a power vacuum upon the monarch's death, and to train the co-ruler in their future duties. TheRomanTetrarchyhad twoAugusti(senior emperors) and twoCaesari(junior emperors, chosen by theAugusti). TheCapetian kingsFrancehad their sons elected 'co-king' by his noblemen to ensure loyalty to the heir. TheHan dynastyset up an Office of the Crown Prince wherein a group of officials trained and served the heir designate long ahead of the succession.In the VietnameseTrần dynasty,the kings '[abdicated] the throne to their chosen adult heirs upon the death of their predecessors, thereafter ruling as 'senior' kings.'
• Equal share within the lineageordividing the inheritance:One son of the monarch would inherit the kingship while other sons (or other male relatives) would be given an equal share / regional control of the territory. This was common practice inFrancia,and prevailed in certain regions in northern and western France such asNormandylong after the French royal dynasty had adopted primogeniture.
• Agnatic seniority,collateral succession,horizontal succession,fraternal successionorbrother–brother succession:When monarch X dies, his oldest brother succeeds him, and then his second-oldest brother and so on, until there are no brothers left; then, the oldest son of monarch X becomes the next monarch, and then monarch X's second-oldest son, and so on. This pattern has been observed in cultures around the world, including in many European states before the 11th century such asPiast dynasty of Poland,and theRurik dynastyof theKievan Rus'and its successor states),African states such as theKanem–Bornu Empirefrom the 14th century onwards,or Asian states such as theKonbaung dynastyof Burma.
• Patrilineal succession,vertical succession,filial successionorfather–son succession:A son of the previous monarch succeeds him. There are several different subtypes of this order of succession, including:
  • Primogeniture:The oldest son of the previous monarch succeeds him; in case there is no son, then his eldest daughter succeeds. This system is virtually unique to Europe,and has only been adopted in very few other states in modern times.
    • Salic law:Only males can inherit the kingship.
    • semi-Salic law:Inheritance may pass through the female line but only at the extinction of all male lines.
    • Absolute primogeniture,gender is irrelevant and the oldest child of the last monarch automatically becomes the next ruler.
  • Ultimogeniture:The youngest son of the previous monarch succeeds him. This system existed in some places in medieval Europe.
  • Non-fixed son:There is no fixed rule which son of the previous monarch should automatically succeed him. Any son may be designated as heir by the living monarch, or be accepted by the relevant aristocrats after asserting himself through diplomacy or violence over his brothers. Examples include theKanem–Bornu Empireuntil the 14th century,andAnglo-Saxon England.
• Elective succession:seeelective monarchy.The royal succession is decided by votes from a relatively small group ofaristocrats(typically a few dozen). It may be decided by an electionvivente rege( "while the king yet lives" ) to secure a more stable transition of power upon the monarch's death, although this was not required, and could still result in a war of succession.

Analysis

Common elements

A war of succession is a type of war concerning struggle for the throne: a conflict about supreme power in amonarchy.Although it is typically associated withhereditary monarchy(either withprimogenitureor some other principle ofhereditary succession), the concept has also been applied toelective monarchies.It may beintrastate war,an interstate war (if foreign powers intervene), or both.

A succession war may arise after (or sometimes even before) a universally recognised ruler over a certain territorypasses away(sometimes without leaving behind any (legal) offspring, or failing to clearly designate an heir), or is declared insane or otherwise incapable to govern, and is deposed. Next, severalpretenders(also known as 'claimants', 'candidates', or 'rivals') step forward, who are either related to the previous ruler (by ancestry or marriage) and therefore claim to have a right to their possessions based on thehereditary principle,or have concluded a treaty to that effect. They will seek allies within thenobilityand/or abroad to support their claims to the throne. After all options for a diplomatic solution –such as a sharing of power, or a financial deal– or a quick elimination (in effect acoup d'état) –e.g. by assassination or arrest– have been exhausted, a military confrontation will follow.Quite often such succession disputes have led to long-lasting wars.Potential candidates were not always limited to members from the royal household; depending on circumstances, aristocrats of other noble families within the realm were eligible to replace the deceased monarch, and could seize the opportunity of a succession crisis to take control of the state and found a newdynasty.

Factors that increased the risk of a succession crisis included lack of legitimate heirs (especially when the (ruling branch of a) dynasty died out), illegitimate children, contested inheritance, and the creation ofcollateral dynastic branches.The last factor in particular had the potential to not only stimulate wars of succession upon a monarch's death, but alsoprincely revoltsbycadetsand cousins while they were still alive.Theminorityof a ruler necessitatedregentsand ministers to run state affairs until they came of age, which made opposition from military and administrative elites to the underage monarch easier, and also increased the risk of widespread political instability and civil conflict.

Some wars of succession are about women'sright to inherit.This does not exist in some countries (a "swordfief",where theSalic lawapplies, for example), but it does in others (a "spindle fief" ).Often a ruler who has no sons, but does have one or more daughters, will try to change thesuccession lawsso that a daughter can succeed him.Such amendments will then be declared invalid by opponents, invoking the localtradition.In Europe, theHoly Roman Emperor(orKing of the Romans) increasingly regularly granted smaller inland fiefs to heirs according to the female lineage since the 13th century.ThePrivilegium Minusof 1156, which established theDuchy of Austria,already allowed women to inherit the state as well.

Prevalence and impact

See also:Casus belli § Categorisation,andReligious war § Prevalence

Land inheritance disputes were frequent inagrarian societies,and the 'increasing subdivision of estates was a common cause of the undermining of territorialaristocracies' in cultures across the world.For example, in the 10th and 11th centuries,Sassanid Persia,various states in India, theSong dynastyof China, andmedieval Europe,all struggled with succession crises.According to British statesmanHenry Brougham(Lord Chancellor1830–34), there were more and longer wars of succession in Europe between1066and theFrench Revolution(1789–99) than all other wars put together. "A war of succession is the most lasting of wars. The hereditary principle keeps it in perpetual life – [whereas] a war ofelectionis always short, and never revives ", he opined, arguing for elective monarchy to solve the problem.According toKalevi Holsti(1991, p. 308, Table 12.2), who catalogued and categorised wars from 1648 to 1989 into 24 categories of 'issues that generated wars', 'dynastic/succession claims' were (one of) the primary cause(s) of 14% of all wars during 1648–1714, 9% during 1715–1814, 3% during 1815–1914, and 0% during 1918–1941 and 1945–1989.Braumoeller (2019) attributed this drastic decrease (and practical extinction) of wars of succession from the 18th century onwards largely to the fact that 'succession no longer serves either to cement territorial holdings legitimized by continuous bloodlines or to create de facto alliances or long-standing allegiances among the Great Powers.'He added that 'an international order based on politicaldemocracymore or less eliminates the incentive for wars of royal succession.'

Wars of succession have throughout history often been the worst-case scenario for absolute monarchies and otherautocracies,as they are commonly known to be at their weakest and most vulnerable when the ruler dies and it is uncertain who will be the successor.Rival claims to ultimate power within such a regime are very prone to spiralling out of control into violence, because such regimes operate according to rule by force, ormight makes right.A succession crisis not only risks dragging the entire population into 'civil' war between factions backing rival pretenders,but the power vacuum it creates also presents oppressed groups within the state with an opportunity to revolt,as well as vassal states outside it to reclaim their independence,and while the state is weakened, it also provides rulers of neighbouring states the chance to invade to further their own interests (with or without their own claim to the throne, or while backing another claimant within the state).In numerous cases, the enormous long-term political and economic instability created by wars of succession caused the fall of the dynasty or the state, or both.

Scholars such as Johannes Kunisch and Johannes Burckhardt (1997) blamed wars of succession inearly modern Europeon notions such as thedivine right of kingsandabsolutism,because they created inherent problems in 'a state system that had known neither effective forms of cooperation nor a clear hierarchy that had neither experienced a formal equality between its members nor clear borders.'Nolan (2008) added about the 1650–1715 period in Europe: 'Complex issues of succession ofBourbonandHabsburgwere the daily stuff of high European politics at all times, and the bane of the lives of the masses of peasants swept away by ebbing and waning tides of peace and the maelstrom of war.'To him, theNine Years' Warand (1688–1697) andWar of the Spanish Succession(1701–1714) were the 'two great, climactic conflicts that submerged local conflicts', so that these decades produced 'a generation of war that swirled around the dynastic ambitions and personal convictions ofLouis XIV.'

Prevention and mitigation

"The most plausible plea which hath ever been offered in favor of hereditary succession is, that it preserves a nation from civil wars; and were this true, it would be weighty; whereas it is the most bare-faced falsity ever imposed on mankind."

–Thomas Paine,Common Sense(1776)

Throughout the centuries and across the planet, various attempts have been made at prevention or mitigation of wars of succession.

• Legally fixing the order of succession(see alsoOrders of successionabove): All over Europe (except in the Kievan Rus'), the introduction ofprimogeniturefrom the 11th to 13th century sought to establish a fixed order of succession,but it proved to be insufficient to prevent numerous succession crises and wars, as demonstrated by their persistence into the 19th century.Kokkonen and Sundell (2017) found that in Europe during 1000–1799, successions following monarchs' natural deaths considerably increased the risk of both intrastate ('civil') as well as interstate wars of succession; they calculated that monarchies practicing primogeniture did experience fewer intrastate wars than elective monarchies, but 'there is no evidence that primogeniture moderated successions' effects on interstate wars.'Luard (1992) and Duchchardt (1997) pointed out that additional diplomatic efforts such as 'offensive and defensive alliances, dynastic marriages and agreements on succession' often failed to prevent them either,although Nolan (2008) countered that theAct of Settlement 1701(alias Act of Succession) did avoid 'another violent succession crisis uponQueen Anne's eventual death.'Modern scholars are still divided on the question whether hereditary succession (as opposed to other methods of appointing leaders) has historically been a net force for political stability, including Kokkonen and Sundell (2014), or instability, such asSteven Pinker (2011),who stated: 'The idea of basing leadership on inheritance is a recipe for endless wars of succession'.Some thinkers of the latter opinion go as far back asThomas Painein his pamphletCommon Sense(1776), in which his argument in favour of theAmerican colonies in revoltagainst theBritish crownbecoming arepublicrather than a monarchy included his claim that hereditary succession more often than not led to civil wars.
• Dividing the inheritance:A common strategy in states such asFranciaand theTimurid Empirewas to share the inheritance amongst male family members by giving them regional control over the realm's territory in order to appease them.One would still be the supreme ruler, while the other heirs would receiveappanagesand could establish cadet branches.Any landholdings and titles of princely branches that died out could be retaken by the dynasty's ruling branch.However, this division of the inheritance also granted many princes a power base from which to challenge the reigning monarch.
• Abdication/delegation in favour of designated heir:Abdicationof a living monarch in favour of one or more heirs was one strategy to attempt to secure a smooth transition of power.For example,Charles V, Holy Roman Emperorabdicated in 1556 and divided his possessions between his sonPhilip II of Spainand his brotherFerdinand I, Holy Roman Emperorbefore dying in 1558, splitting theHouse of Habsburgin a Spanish and an Austrian branch.A related strategy was a partial or gradual abdication in which the ruling monarch already delegated some of their powers to their designated heir before retiring from active politics or dying.An example is howCosimo I de' Medicieffectively retired from governing in the 1560s in favour of his son and designated successorFrancescobefore dying in 1574.
• Eliminating potential opponents beforehand:A common set of strategies to secure one's own succession or accession or that of someone else before a war could break out was to eliminate potential rivals early on in the succession crisis, or before there even was a succession crisis. This could range from assassination to banishment, and from bodily mutilation to imprisonment.Political mutilation in Byzantine culturewas one way in which rivals sought to prevent each other from staging coups d'état or wars of succession to gain theByzantine Emperorship,either before they had the chance, or to punish them after failed attempts and to prevent future attempts. Similar mutilation of competitors for succession were also common elsewhere in Europe, such asWilliam fitz Giroiein 11th-centuryNormandy.In theOttoman Empire,succession practicesagainst potential rival claimants ranged from committing royal fratricide to lifelong imprisonment in theKafes.None of its succession procedures were codified, however.
• Hiding the monarch's death and secretly seizing power:Anad hocstrategy that a candidate or an important player supporting a candidate might have is to try and hide the monarch's death for some time to undertake the necessary actions to secretly seize power and confront any potential rival pretenders with afait accompli.This can only be done effectively if one can control the flow of information about the monarch's death from potential rivals. Even if a war erupts, whoever seizes control over critical government institutions (such as the court and the army) first, and secures the support of domestic and foreign powers at the start, puts their enemy/enemies at a major disadvantage.

Applicability

See also:Religious war § Applicability of religion to war

It can sometimes be difficult to determine whether a war was purely or primarily a war of succession, or that other interests were at play as well that shaped the conflict in an equally or more important manner, suchterritory,economy,religion,and so on.Many wars are not called 'war of succession' because hereditary succession was not the most important element, or despite the fact that it (partially)was.For example, theGreat Northern War(1700–1721) was primarily about territory, butduring 1704–1706, it was focused on the royal succession in Poland.Similarly, wars can also be unjustly branded a 'war of succession' whilst the succession was actually not the most important issue hanging in the balance, such as whenLouis XIVused dubious succession claims as an excuse to declare theWar of Devolution(1667–1668) that he rather sought to fight for territorial gain.Some wars of succession were about multiple simultaneous disputes, such as in the cases of theNine Years' War(about England, the Palatinate, and Cologne) and theWar of the Polish Succession(about Poland and Lorraine).The outbreak of a war can be motivated by a succession dispute, but its focus or scope can shift over its course, and vice versa, particularly if a new succession crisis erupts in the middle of a war that originally began for different reasons (e.g. theRusso-Swedish War (1741–1743)).

Patterns by continent

African patterns

"There was a general rush for arms; fighting began at once and continued until one of the rivals was killed, when all his followers submitted to the victor and became his men. It seldom happened that more than two princes fought for the throne, the others would look on and accept the result of the combat. Sometimes, however, several would claim it, and whatever the number of rivals might be, the fighting would not end until only one of them was left alive."

– John Roscoe (1923) describing wars of succession amongst theBanyoro peoplein the Empire of Kitara

According toCatherine Coquery-Vidrovitch(1988), wars of succession were "so common in the history of African monarchies that it seems almost an institution".Especially in matrilinear societies, there were few succession laws or fixed customs."Dynastic histories are everywhere intersected with wars of succession (the almost exclusive cause of civil wars) and royal genealogies are very hard to reconstruct", with many "unfortunate heirs-presumptive more or less violently prevented from assuming office".

Changing orders of succession

In various African cultures, the order of succession has changed over the course of centuries from one type to another, and especially during a switch, there were several wars of succession before the new system was consolidated. For example, the death of mai Idris I Nigalemi (c. 1370) of theKanem–Bornu Empiretriggered a war of succession, because it was unclear whether collateral (brother to brother) or filial/patrilineal (father to son) succession was to be preferred; patrilineal had been dominant until early 14th-century Kanem–Bornu, but was replaced by collateral by 1400.TheKano Chroniclerecords father–son succession in theKingdom of Kano,but always mentions the name of the ruler's mother, which may point to vestiges of a preceding matrilineal system.TheKingdom of Yatengaswitched from collateral to filial succession in the late 18th century.

Bunyoro

SeveralBunyorowars of succession took place in the East African Empire of Kitara in the 17th and 18th century.The last recorded two occurred around 1851 and 1869.Every death of amukama( "king" ) of Kitara created a power vacuum, during which all legitimate royal candidates were required to negotiate to agree on a single candidate to become the next ruler.In cases of failure, "traditions encouraged them to mobilize their supporters and engage in a brief and decisive political violence to win the vacant seat."Using such political violence was an institutionalised legitimate procedure to end the royal power vacuum, but sometimes the rivals did not manage to defeat each other quickly as custom demanded.Lengthy wars of succession often broke down society with large-scale famines, massacres and refugee crises, endangering the state's continued existence.They also almost always coincided with rebellions in tributary states, indicating that vassals regularly sought to exploit their suzerain's weakness during succession disputes in order to reclaim independence.

Americas patterns

InAndean civilizationssuch as theInca Empire(1438–1533), it was customary for a lord to pass on his reign to the son he perceived to be the most able, not necessarily his oldest son; sometimes he chose a brother instead. After theSpanish colonization of the Americasbegan in 1492, some Andean lords began to assert their eldest-born sons were the only "legitimate" heirs (as was common to European primogeniture customs), while others maintained Andean succession customs involving the co-regency of a younger son of a sitting ruler during the latter's lifetime, each whenever the circumstances favoured either approach.

Asian patterns

Burma

Helen James (2004) stated that in the late 17th-century BurmeseRestored Toungoo dynasty,"the transfer of power upon the death of a monarch was always a problem, for there were many contenders to the throne owing to the practice ofpolygamy.The sons of the major queens frequently contested the succession. "Alaungpaya,founder of the newKonbaung dynasty(1752–1885), intended his successors to be appointed byagnatic seniority(from brother to brother),according to James in an attempt "to avoid the bloodshed that accompanied each transfer of power at the death of a Burmese monarch. It was a vain hope. The directive itself led to bloody succession crises, as some of his sons sought to pass the crown to their sons instead of their brothers, thereby thwarting Alaungpaya's dying wish."His oldest sonNaungdawgyihad to fight atwo-year war of succession(1760–1762) to assert his authority.Hsinbyushin's succession was not challenged, but designating his sonSingu Minas heir rather than a younger brother bred animminent succession disputejust before his death.The next king, Singu, managed to avoid a war of succession by having most of his potential rivals killed or exiled in a timely manner, although Singu's reign was cut short by aprincely rebellionin February 1782, in whichPhaungkaza Maung Maungseized the throne for seven days beforeBodawpayakilled and replaced him.Bodawpaya successfully eliminated all his rivals upon enthronement, and in 1802 ended "twenty-five years of conflict between lineal and collateral succession" in favour of the former, according to Koenig (1990).Nevertheless, two kings were overthrown by their brothers in coups in 1837 and 1853, and in 1866, the crown prince (the king's brother) was assassinated by two of the king's sons.When the last Burmese king,Thibaw Min(r. 1878–1885), began his reign, he had about 80 of his relatives murdered to prevent any challenge to his accession.

China

According toArthur Waldron(2008), "throughouttheir history,Chinese stateshave been overwhelmingly land-based and (...) their wars have chiefly been wars of succession and overland conquest. "In the alleged first dynasty, theXia,as well as the confirmedShang dynasty,both father–son and older brother–younger brother succession appear to have existed, withagnatic primogenituregradually becoming a frequent practice in the late Shang.TheRebellion of the Three Guards(c. 1042–1039 BCE) after the death ofKing Wu of Zhouis perhaps the first war of succession in Chinese recorded history. During the reign ofDuke Zhuang,Zhengwas the most powerfulSpring and Autumn periodstate, but the 701–680 BCEwar of succession following his deathreduced it to one of the weakest.As the authority of the Zhou dynasty declined, the states' power increased (theAge of Hegemons), and whenever the Zhou royal clan was unable to solve a succession crisis by itself, leading states were expected to militarily intervene on behalf of the "legitimate" heir, which occurred frequently in the 7th and 6th centuries.However, as the states grew more powerful and dukes had to delegate control over certain areas to kinsmen as their territories enlarged, they increasingly risked internal dynastic struggles as well.The largest states in particular experienced this problem, namelyQi(e.g. theWar of Qi's successionin 643–642 BCE) andJin;in the latter case, this eventually led to thePartition of Jinin 403 BCE, which ushered in theWarring States period.

After uniting all states into hisQin dynasty,the first Chinese emperor,Qin Shi Huang,failed to establish secure succession rules before his death in 210 BCE, upon which his clan immediately lost control of the government toLi SiandZhao Gao,and his dynasty fell soon after (207 BCE).Winning the subsequentChu–Han Contentionand founding theHan dynasty,Emperor Gaozusought to ensure a stable succession process that would not endanger the dynasty.He strengthened the designated heir's position by creating the office of the Crown Prince, in which a group of officials educated and served the designated heir well in advance until his time to succeed would arrive.This crown prince system prevented a lot of succession disputes during the Han dynasty, and although it frequently malfunctioned in theThree Kingdoms,JinandNorthern and Southern dynastiesperiods, it "matured" during theTangandSong dynasties.Nevertheless, the Han state did suffer dynastic instability several times. When a Han emperor died without officially appointing a successor, his widow, theempress dowager,had the sole right to appoint one of the late emperor's surviving sons or relatives to the position.At such times, or when an infant emperor was placed on the Han throne, aregent,often also the empress dowager or one of her male relatives, would assume the duties of the emperor until he reached his majority. Sometimes the empress dowager's faction—theconsort clan—was overthrown in acoup d'étator a war of succession. For example,Empress Lü Zhiwas thede factoruler of the court during the reigns of the child emperorsQianshao(r.188–184 BCE) andHoushao(r.184–180 BCE),but her faction was overthrown during theLü Clan Disturbanceupon her death in 180 BCE, andLiu Hengwas named emperor instead.

At theend of the Han dynastyin the 190s, the imperial Liu family lost effective control over the state; prominent members of the nobility becamewarlordstrying to establish their own dynasties. Instead of governors being appointed by the emperor, they tried to secure the succession of their own clansmen, making it a hereditary office that led to several succession crises. The Yuan clan, once a prominent candidate to replace the imperial Liu family,descended into a fratricidal waruponYuan Shao's death (202–205).The August 208 death ofLiu Biaocaused a succession dispute between his sonsLiu CongandLiu Qi,but a quick invasion byCao Caoforced Cong to surrender without a fight while Qi fled.Cao Pi's deposition of the last Han emperorXianand foundation of theWei dynastyin 220 causedLiu Bei,a scion of the imperial family, to proclaim himself the legitimate emperor and found theShu Handynasty in 221, followed bySun Quan'sEastern Wuin 229; this three-way claim to the imperial throne started theThree Kingdomsperiod.The death ofSun Quan's heirresulted in asuccession struggle between Sun He and Sun Ba(241–250); Quan deposed He, forced Ba to commit suicide, and appointed 5-year-oldSun Liangas successor.Liang became emperor aged 7 in 252, but this boy-ruler was deposed in 258.

Japan

TheYamato statedid not have clear rules on succession (such asprimogeniture), and the death of a monarch frequently resulted in a crisis with multiple claimants from several powerful clans vying for the throne.The religion-basedSoga–Mononobe conflict(552–587) between the pro-ShintoMononobe clanand the pro-BuddhistSoga clansometimes resulted in wars of succession, particularly in 585–587.To prevent further challenges to his power due to succession crises and to enforce the adoption of Buddhism, clan leaderSoga no UmakohadEmperor Sushunassassinated in 592, and instead installedSuikoas empress (the first woman on the imperial throne in Japanese history) withPrince Shōtokuas regent, while holding the reins of power behind the scenes.This configuration led to a stable reign of empress Suiko until 628, 'a remarkably long span for that period.'However, when she died and Shōtoku's sonPrince Yamashiroclaimed the throne, he was rejected by the Soga clan in favour ofEmperor Jomei.After the latter died in 641 and was succeeded by his wife,Empress Kōgyoku,Yamashiro once again claimed the throne, but he and his family were killed (possibly by suicide) when soldiers ofSoga no Irukaattacked.The latter was subsequently murdered in the 645Isshi IncidentbyPrince Naka-no-Ōe,who installed puppetEmperor Kōtokubefore taking the throne himself asEmperor Tenjiin 654.Tenji's death in 672 caused theJinshin War;as there were still no rules for succession, any close kin of the deceased emperor regardless of gender could claim equal rights to the crown.

Fitnas in early Islamic states

Further information:Succession to Muhammad

ThehistoricalFitnasand similar conflicts inearly Islamwere essentially wars of succession, resulting not (primarily) from religious disputes, but from a lack of agreement in early Islamic political thought on how to politically organise the early Muslim community.In particular, there was no consensus on the exercise of power and how leaders should be appointed.This lack of constitutional theory has been attributed byAli Abdel Raziq(1888–1966) to the idea that the prophetMuhammadhad been primarily concerned with religious regulations, and had not given priority to founding a political system, never left a known successor (=caliph), nor established standard rules by which future leaders were to be appointed.After his death in 632, this compelled theCompanionsto findad hocsolutions to the leadership question, causingsuccession disputesthat resulted in theFitnas,most notably theFirst Fitna(656–661), theSecond Fitna(680–692), theThird Fitna(744–747), theFourth Fitna(809–827), and theFitna of al-Andalus(1009–1031).Eventually, the disputes led to the major schism betweenSunni Muslims,who held that the leader should in some way be elected from within theQuraysh,andShia Muslims,who held that the leader must be a direct biological descendant of Muhammad throughAli,and that each leader personally designated his own successor.TheUmayyad Caliphate(661–750) followed neither school of thought, because its founderMu'awiya Iwas neither a descendant of Muhammad, nor a Companion elected as caliph; instead, the Umayyad basis of power was military success and wealth acquired from conquest.Therefore, many early Muslims perceived this dynasty to lack legitimacy, and this 'arguably biggest problem' contributed to its downfall during theThird Fitna(744–747) and the closely connectedAbbasid Revolution(747–750).

Islamic dynasties

Other wars of succession in later Islamic polities in Asia (mostly Perso-Arabic, Turkic, and Mongolic monarchies) that haven't been namedfitnashave also occurred, such as during theAbbasid Caliphate,where a peaceful transition of power upon the caliph's death was the exception rather than the rule.According toJustin Marozzi(2015), the 775 succession ofAl-MansurbyAl-Mahdi"was, by the standards of the future, blood-soaked successions of the Abbasid caliphate, a model of order and decorum."During the period of Abbasid fragmentation into autonomous dynasties (c. 850–1050), this was still a common problem according to Antony Black (2011): "Most dynasties were disabled by succession struggles; it was difficult to establish a constitutional rule for succession in the face of Islamic law and tribal custom, which divided a patrimony equally among all sons. (...) To gain the succession within a clan dynasty, you needed, once again, to demonstrate thatGodwas on your side. This meant acquiring support through a combination of military success and good repute. "Eric J. Hanne (2007) reached a similar conclusion about theBuyid dynastyin particular: "As the Buyids had traditionally divided up their lands among brothers, uncles, and cousins, the familial confederacy, a frail situation at best, only worked when one had a strong personal figure such as'Adud al-Dawla(d. 372/983), whose suzerainty was accepted only after prolonged internecine warfare. "Wars of succession could sometimes cause more instability to the realm than whatever stability the most capable of rulers could achieve in times of peace.CitingIbn Khaldun,Black argued that this was one major factor why virtually all Islamic dynasties (with the notable exception of theOttoman Empire) lasted only about 100 to 200 years before falling apart due to succession crises.

According toRashid al-Din Hamadani'sJami' al-tawarikh(c. 1316), theIlkhanatewas plagued with succession struggles, misrule and corruption from its founding byHulagu Khanin the 1260s until the accession ofGhazanin 1295, the first Ilkhan to convert to Islam, and to make efforts to base the Ilkhanate's legitimacy on that religion. However, because Ghazan was Rashid'spatron,this account of the early Ilkhanate's instability may have been exaggerated in order to glorify Ghazan and legitimise his reign.

Indian subcontinent

In our quarter of the globe, the succession to the crown is settled in favour of the eldest by wise and fixed laws; but in Hindústan the right of governing is usually disputed by all the sons of the deceased monarch, each of whom is reduced to the cruel alternative of sacrificing his brothers that he himself may reign, or of suffering his own life to be forfeited for the security and stability of the dominion of another.

–François Bernier,Travels in the Mughal Empire(1670)

See also:Princely rebellion § Mughal Empire

In theMughal Empire(1526–1857), there was no tradition of primogeniture.Instead it was customary for sons to overthrow their father, and for brothers to war to the death among themselves.17th-century French travellerFrançois Bernier,who spent about 12 years in India (1658–1670; partially overlapping with the Mughal war of succession of 1657–1661), praisedAurangzebas "a great King" with "a versatile and rare genius", but was critical of the "unjust and cruel" means by which he and other Mughal emperors rose to power through war rather than the European method of succession "in favour of the eldest son by wise and fixed laws" that Bernier himself was familiar with.Judith E. Walsh (2006) stated that wars of succession were "the one problem the Mughals never solved", and that after Aurangzeb's death in 1707, repetitive "succession struggles brought Mughal power more or less to an end"On the other hand, scholars such as Faruqui (2002) have posited that studies which argue Mughal succession struggles weakened the empire may be influenced by "a long held bias in Western European writings favoring the institution of primogeniture over all other modes of forms of succession."Instead, Faruqui sought to "demonstrate how, far from weakening the empire, intra-dynastic collaboration and strife was a crucial site for the production and reproduction of Mughal power."

Malay Archipelago

Wars of succession after the death ofHayam Wuruk,such as theRegreg War(1404–1406), are commonly recognised to have weakened theJavaneseempire ofMajapahitin the 15th century, and to have been one of the leading causes of its eventual downfall in 1527.TheSamudera Pasai Sultanatein northernSumatraexperienced a throne struggle in 1412–1415, in which theMing Chinesefourth treasure voyageof admiralZheng Heintervened.Starting with the death ofSultan Agung of Mataramin 1645, every time the sultan ofMataramdied, a war of succession broke out, and these recurrent conflicts crippled the state.From theTrunajaya rebellion(1674–1681) onwards, theDutch East India Company(VOC) began to exploit the dynastic crises to expand its economic, political and territorial control over Java by supporting their preferred candidate for the throne with superior firepower, in return for extensive concessions upon victory.TheJavanese Wars of Succession(1703–1755) enabled the company to weaken and eventually split Mataram into smaller states that it could easily control.An early 19th-century British writer observed: "In Malay States, aWar of Successionalmost invariably follows the decease of theRajah,and with their other feudal contentions are the bane of them all — oppressing the inhabitants, checking industry, and obstructing commerce. "He recommended that theBritish governmenttake certain measures to prevent these wars from happening in the interest of both natives and foreigners, but argued that the English should not become "conquerors and oppressors" to the Malays, "as the Dutch are in alltheir possessionsthroughout the Archipelago ".The British would establish "indirect rule"over the Malay States and turned the sultans essentially into their agents.In 1819, the British would exploit theJohor Sultanate's succession crisisto partition its territory with the Dutch, keeping mainland Johor, including Singapore, for themselves and ceding theRiau-Lingga Sultanateto the Netherlands.WhileBruneiremained an absolute monarchy, thekings of independent Malaysiahave assumed more ceremonial roles of identity within a constitutional framework.

Ottoman Empire

Further information:Ottoman dynasty § Succession practices

TheOttoman Empirewas an Islamic dynasty originating inAsia Minor,which gradually expanded intoSoutheastern Europeand madeConstantinopleits capital uponconquering it in 1453;it developed unique succession practices which "departed sharply from the usual inheritance practices for almost all of its history."Three customs can be distinguished: survival of the fittest, fratricide, and rule of the eldest.From the 14th through the late 16th centuries, the Ottomans practiced open succession – something historianDonald Quataerthas described as "survival of the fittest,noteldest,son. "Following common Central Asian tradition, during their father's lifetime, all adult sons of the reigning sultan were given provincial governorships in order to gain experience in administration, accompanied and mentored by their retinues and tutors.Upon the death of their father, the reigning sultan, these sons would fight amongst themselves for the succession until one emerged triumphant.The first son to reach the capital and seize control of the court would usually become the new ruler.The first such instance was the brief Ottoman war of succession of 1362 after the death of sultanOrhan,between şehzade (prince)Murad I,şehzade Ibrahim Bey (1316–1362; governor ofEskişehir) andşehzade Halil.Murad won and executed his half-brothers Ibrahim and Halil, the first recorded instance ofOttoman royal fratricide.In 1451,Mehmed IIbecame the first Ottoman prince who, upon, seizing the capital, executed all his brothers before any war of succession could even break out.Although at the time, Islamic and Christian societies alike would condemn such a move as an immoral and sinful act of murder, Mehmed and subsequent would-be sultans would justify it as the prerogative of the ruler to commit (peace-time) fratricide in order to ensure the order and stability of the realm.Ottoman royal fratricide would continue until 1648, and only happen once more in 1808.In 1617, the Ottoman dynasty would adopt a system of succession calledekberiyet,by which the oldest surviving male relative of the deceased sultan (often an uncle or brother) would assume the throne.This was combined with thekafes( "gilded cage" ) system in 1622, which put all male members of the royal family underhouse arrestwithin the palace grounds, to ensure a pool of potential successors under the control of the reigning sultan.Theekberiyet–kafespractices would prevail until the end of the Ottoman Empire and theabolition of the Ottoman sultanatein 1922.

Vietnam

About theHoa Lư-based earlyVietnamesekingdom ofĐại Cồ Việt(968–1054),Nicholas Tarling(1992) noted: "the Hoa-lu kings ruled chiefly by threat of violence, and the death of each one was followed by a war of succession."By contrast, rulers of the laterTrần dynasty(1225–1400) had adopted the practice of "[abdicating] the throne to their chosen adult heirs upon the death of their predecessors, thereafter ruling as 'senior' kings."Tarling added that "the Tran kings made decisions in consultation with their uncles, brothers, and cousins, thereby fostering solidarity within the royal clan", and that the dynasty began to collapse when these rules were no longer observed.When the childless kingTrần Dụ Tôngfailed to designate an heir, his death in 1369 marked the beginning of two decades of succession-based warfare, until prime ministerHồ Quý Lyseized power and restored order in 1390, and abolished the Tran dynasty in favour of his own in 1400.

Siam/Thailand

With the exception ofNaresuan's succession byEkathotsarotin 1605, "the method of royal succession atAyutthayathroughout the seventeenth century was battle. "Although European visitors to Thailand at the time tried to discern any rules in the Siamese order of succession, noting that in practice the dead king's younger brother often succeeded him, this custom appears not to have been legally enshrined anywhere.The ruling king did often bestow the title ofuparaja('viceroy') upon his preferred successor, but in reality, it was an "elimination process": any male member of the royal clan (usually the late king's brothers and sons) could claim the throne of Ayutthaya for himself, and win by defeating all his rivals.Moreover, groupings of nobles, foreign merchants, and foreign mercenaries actively rallied behind their preferred candidates in hopes of benefiting from each war's outcome.

European patterns

Causes

"WhereasCharles the Second, king of Spain,of most glorious memory, being not long sincedead without issue,hisSacred Imperial Majestyhas claimed the succession in the kingdoms and provinces of the deceased king, as lawfully belonging tohis august family;butthe most Christian King,aiming at the same succession forhis grandson the duke of Anjou,and pretending a right did accrue to him by a certain will of the deceased king, has usurped the possession of the entire inheritance, orSpanish monarchy,for the aforementioned duke of Anjou, and invaded by his arms the provinces of theSpanish Low Countries,and theDutchy of Milan... "

–Emperor Leopold Iproclaims his position on theWar of the Spanish Successionin theTreaty of The Hague (1701)

The origins of wars of succession in Europe lie infeudalorabsolutistsystems of government, in which the decisions on war and peace could be made by a singlesovereignwithout the population's consent. The politics of the respective rulers was mainly driven by dynastic interests. German historianJohannes Kunisch(1937–2015) ascertained: "The all-driving power was the dynasties' law of the prestige of power, the expansion of power, and the desire to maintain themselves."Moreover, the legal and political coherence of the various provinces of a "state territory" often consisted merely in nothing more than having a common ruler (apersonal union). Early government systems were therefore based on dynasties, the extinction of which immediately brought on a state crisis. The composition of the governmental institutions of the various provinces and territories also eased their partitioning in case of a conflict, just like the status of claims on individual parts of the country by foreign monarchs.

Early medieval Europe was rife with conflicts over property or property rights.R. I. Moore(2000) characterised the situation as "apparently endless and pointless internecine conflict which raged at every level of aristocratic society from the tenth century onwards. It continued everywhere in Latin Europe (though taking a somewhat different form to the east of theRhine) throughout the eleventh century, and did not subside in most regions until well into the twelfth. "Usually, a designated or prospective heir to a property (typically but not always the owner's oldest son) would face off demands by uncles and brothers, aunts and sisters (often represented by their husbands) and their children to grant them a fair share in the inheritance.Moore stated: "Title to landed property would always remain a source of endless and bitter contention, governed by infinitely various and complicated combinations of differing legal traditions and local customs and conditions."

Justifications

To wage a war, a justification is needed (Jus ad bellum). These arguments may be put forward in adeclaration of war,to indicate that one is justly taking up arms. As the Dutch lawyerHugo Grotius(1583–1645) noted, these must make clear that one is unable to pursue their rightful claims in any other way.The claims to legal titles from the dynastic sphere were a strong reason for war, because international relations primarily consisted of inheritance and marriage policies until the end of theAncien Régime.These were often so intertwined that it had to lead to conflict. Treaties that led to hereditary linkages,pawningand transfers made various relations more complicated, and could be utilised for claims as well. That claims were made at all is due to the permanent struggle for competition and prestige between the respective ruling houses. On top of that came the urge of contemporary princes to achieve "glory"for themselves.

Prince-bishoprics

Main article:Diocesan feud

In some cases, wars of succession in Europe could also be centred around the reign inprince-bishoprics.Although these were formallyelective monarchieswithout hereditary succession, the election of the prince-bishop could be strongly intertwined with the dynastic interests of the noble families involved, each of whom would put forward their own candidates. In case of disagreement over the election result, waging war was a possible way of settling the conflict. In theHoly Roman Empire,such wars were known asdiocesan feuds.

Primogeniture and international law

After numerous familial conflicts, the principle of maleprimogenitureoriginated inWestern Europein the 11th century, spreading to the rest of Europe (with the exception ofKievan Rus'and subsequentRus' principalities) in the 12th and 13th century; it has never been widely adopted outside Europe.This restricted the number of potential heirs to the oldest son of the reigning monarch, thereby facilitating undivided inheritance and a great reduction of potential sources of property conflict.Another major effect of the near-universal introduction of male primogeniture was the strengthening ofpatrilineality,and the structural undermining and destruction of thewomen's property rights,be they mothers, wives or daughters.For example, women in northern Italy, who had the ancient right to inherit atercia,one third of their husband's estate, lost it in the 12th century (Genoa:1143).

However, it did not prevent the outbreak of wars of succession altogether. A true deluge of succession wars occurred in Europe between theThirty Years' War(1618–1648) and theCoalition Wars(1792–1815).According to German historian Heinz Duchhardt (1943) the outbreak of wars of succession in theearly modern periodwas stimulated on the one hand by the uncertainty about the degree to which regulations and agreements on hereditary succession were to be considered a respectable part of emerginginternational law.On the other hand, there was also a lack of effective means to provide them recognition and validation.Jeroen Duindam (2021) noted that, 'when the internal challenges to dynastic supremacy had abated' in 17th- and 18th-century Europe, the royal courts forged more and more marriages alliances with the ruling houses of other sovereign states, which 'helps to explain the prevalence of international wars of succession' in that period.

Wars of succession in Europe gradually came to an end in the 19th century, when absolute monarchies were replaced by an international order based ondemocracy,featuringconstitutional monarchiesorrepublics.

List of wars of succession

Main articles:List of wars of successionandList of wars of succession in Europe

In popular culture

• Wars of Succession,a 2018strategy video gamedeveloped byAGEodabout theWar of the Spanish Succession(1701–1714) and theGreat Northern War(1700–1721), most of which focused aroundthe succession of Poland.
• Age of Empires IV,a 2021strategy video gamedeveloped byRelic Entertainment,features a campaign that includesWilliam the Conqueror'sNorman Conquest(1066–1075) as well as theRebellion of 1088,a war of succession between William's sons upon his death.

In fiction

• InJ.R.R. Tolkien's fantasy world ofMiddle-earth(developed 1937–1973), several wars of succession take place, such as:
  • The Wars with Angmar (T.A.861–1975), after King Eärendur of Arnor died in T.A. 861 and the kingdom was split between his three quarreling sons, founding the rival realms of Arthedain, Cardolan and Rhudaur. When the lines of Eärendur died out in Cardolan and Rhudaur, King Argeleb I of Arthedain intended to reunite Arnor in T.A. 1349 and was recognised by Cardolan, but then theWitch-king of Angmarintervened, annexed Rhudaur, ravaged Cardolan and besieged Arthedain's capital city of Fornost. In T.A. 1973–1975, Arthedain was finally destroyed; even though allied Men from Gondor and Elves from Lindon subsequently succeeded in defeating Angmar in the Battle of Fornost and driving out the Witch-king, the Kingdom of Arnor would never be restored until the dawn of theFourth AgebyAragorn.
• The Succession Wars(1980), a wargame set in the BattleTech universe
• The Successions, civil wars over themonarchy of AndorinThe Wheel of Time(1990–2013)
• The books inGeorge R.R. Martin'sA Song of Ice and Fireseries (1996–) and its TV adaptation,Game of Thronesfeature theWar of the Five Kings,based around five individuals declaring themselves king, three of whom compete over theIron Throne (A Song of Ice and Fire)after the death of KingRobert Baratheon.Another is theTargaryenwar of succession, better known as the Dance of the Dragons; this particular conflict is the focal point of theHouse of the Dragonseries.
• The Elder Scrolls,a high fantasy video game series, features many succession disputes and wars. For example, inThe Elder Scrolls Online(launched in 2014), a war of succession that happened almost a decade earlier over the kingdom of Eastern Skyrim is reignited. After their sister Queen Nurnhilde died in battle 10 years ago, the twin brothers Jorunn and Fildgor together drove out the invading Akaviri, but then fought over the throne afterwards. According to Jorunn, they 'disagreed on who should succeed our sister. I believed in diplomacy and wisdom. Fildgor believed in rule by force. I couldn't let him take the throne. (...) I was forced to exile Fildgor. He never forgave me for that.' Jorunn requests the player to militarily support his legitimacy as the discontent Fildgor returns in another attempt to seize the kingship.
• Tui T. Sutherland'sseries of children's’ novels,Wings of Fire,books 1-5 main conflict is about a dragon queen being killed with none of her daughters knowing who to pick, starting a war of succession, Aptly called The War Of SandWing Succession. With the main characters prophesied to end the war.

See also

• Carlism
• Conservative
• Legitimist
• Loyalism
• Ottoman dynasty § Succession practices(including royal fratricide)
• Political mutilation in Byzantine culture
• Reactionary
• Restoration (disambiguation)
• Royalism

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