Jump to content

Vaisheshika

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Part ofa serieson
Hindu philosophy
Orthodox
Heterodox
Sub-schools
Smartist
Vaishnavite
Shaivite
Neo-Vedanta
Teachers(Acharyas)
Nyaya
Mīmāṃsā
Advaita(Mayavada)
Vishishtadvaita
Dvaita(Tattvavada)
Shuddhadvaita
Achintya Bheda Abheda
Dvaitadvaita
Mahanubhava
Ekasarana Dharma
Akshar Purushottam Darshan
Neo-Vedanta
Others
Samkhya
Yoga
Vaisheshika
Secular
Major texts
Vedas
Upanishads
Other scriptures
ShastrasandSutras
Secular ethics

Vaisheshika(IAST:Vaiśeṣika;/vaɪˈʃɛʃɪkə/;Sanskrit:वैशेषिक) is one of the six schools ofHindu philosophyfrom ancientIndia.In its early stages, the Vaiśeṣika was an independentphilosophywith its own metaphysics, epistemology, logic, ethics, and soteriology.[1]Over time, the Vaiśeṣika system became similar in its philosophical procedures, ethical conclusions and soteriology to theNyāyaschool of Hinduism, but retained its difference in epistemology and metaphysics.

Theepistemologyof the Vaiśeṣika school of Hinduism, likeBuddhism,accepted only two reliable means to knowledge: direct observation and inference.[2][3]The Vaiśeṣika school and Buddhism both consider their respective scriptures as indisputable and valid means to knowledge, the difference being that the scriptures held to be a valid and reliable source by Vaiśeṣikas were theVedas.

The Vaiśeṣika school is known for its insights innaturalism.[4][5]It is a form ofatomismin natural philosophy.[6]It postulated that all objects in the physical universe are reducible toparamāṇu(atoms), and one's experiences are derived from the interplay of substance (a function of atoms, their number and their spatial arrangements), quality, activity, commonness, particularity and inherence.[7]Everything was composed of atoms, qualities emerged from aggregates of atoms, but the aggregation and nature of these atoms was predetermined by cosmic forces.Ājīvikametaphysicsincluded a theory of atoms which was later adapted in the Vaiśeṣika school.[8]

According to the Vaiśeṣika school, knowledge and liberation were achievable by a complete understanding of the world of experience.[7]

Vaiśeṣikadarshanawas founded byKaṇāda Kashyapaaround the 6th to 2nd century BC.[9][10][11]

Overview[edit]

Although the Vaiśeṣika system developed independently from theNyāya philosophyof Hinduism, the two became similar and are often studied together. In its classical form, however, the Vaiśeṣika school differed from the Nyāya in one crucial respect: where Nyāya accepted four sources of valid knowledge, the Vaiśeṣika accepted only two.[2][3]

Theepistemologyof Vaiśeṣika school of Hinduism accepted only two reliable means to knowledge –perceptionandinference.[2]

Vaisheshika espouses a form ofatomism,that the reality is composed of five substances (examples are earth, water, air, fire, and space). Each of these five are of two types, explains Ganeri:[6]paramāṇuand composite. A paramāṇu is that which is indestructible, indivisible, and has a special kind of dimension, called "small" (aṇu). A composite is that which is divisible into paramāṇu. Whatever human beings perceive is composite, and even the smallest perceptible thing, namely, a fleck of dust, has parts, which are therefore invisible.[6]The Vaiśeṣikas visualized the smallest composite thing as a "triad" (tryaṇuka) with three parts, each part with a "dyad" (dyaṇuka). Vaiśeṣikas believed that a dyad has two parts, each of which is an atom. Size, form, truths and everything that human beings experience as a whole is a function of parmanus, their number and their spatial arrangements.

Paramameans "most distant, remotest, extreme, last" andaṇumeans "atom, very small particle", henceparamāṇuis essentially "the most distant or last small (i.e. smallest) particle".

Vaiśeṣika postulated that what one experiences is derived fromdravya(substance: a function of atoms, their number and their spatial arrangements),guna(quality),karma(activity),samanya(commonness),vishesha(particularity) andsamavaya(inherence, inseparable connectedness of everything).[7][12]

The followers of this philosophy are mostlyShaivas[citation needed].AcharyaHaribhadra Suri,in his work 'Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya' describes the followers of Vaiśeṣika as worshippers of Pashupati orShiva.[13]

Epistemology[edit]

Hinduism identifies sixPramāṇasasepistemicallyreliable means to accurate knowledge and to truths:[14]Pratyakṣa(perception),Anumāna(inference),Śabdaorāgama"(word, testimony of past or present reliable experts),Upamāna(comparison and analogy),Arthāpatti(postulation, derivation from circumstances), andAnupalabdhi(non-perception, negative/cognitive proof).[2][3][15]Of theseVaiśeṣikaepistemology considered onlypratyakṣa(perception) andanumāna(inference) as reliable means of valid knowledge.[16]Yoga accepts the first three of these six as pramāṇa; and the Nyaya school, related to Vaiśeṣika, accepts the first four out of these six.[2]

  • Pratyakṣa(प्रत्यक्ष) means perception. It is of two types: external and internal. External perception is described as that arising from the interaction of five senses and worldly objects, while internal perception is described by this school as that of inner sense, the mind.[17][18]The ancient and medieval texts of Hinduism identify four requirements for correct perception:[19]Indriyarthasannikarsa(direct experience by one's sensory organ(s) with the object, whatever is being studied),Avyapadesya(non-verbal; correct perception is not throughhearsay,according to ancient Indian scholars, where one's sensory organ relies on accepting or rejecting someone else's perception),Avyabhicara(does not wander; correct perception does not change, nor is it the result of deception because one's sensory organ or means of observation is drifting, defective, suspect) andVyavasayatmaka(definite; correct perception excludes judgments of doubt, either because of one's failure to observe all the details, or because one is mi xing inference with observation and observing what one wants to observe, or not observing what one does not want to observe).[19]Some ancient scholars proposed "unusual perception" aspramāṇaand called it internal perception, a proposal contested by other Indian scholars. The internal perception concepts includedpratibha(intuition),samanyalaksanapratyaksa(a form of induction from perceived specifics to a universal), andjnanalaksanapratyaksa(a form of perception of prior processes and previous states of a 'topic of study' by observing its current state).[20]Further, the texts considered and refined rules of accepting uncertain knowledge fromPratyakṣa-pranama,so as to contrastnirnaya(definite judgment, conclusion) fromanadhyavasaya(indefinite judgment).[21]
  • Anumāna(अनुमान) means inference. It is described as reaching a new conclusion and truth from one or more observations and previous truths by applying reason.[22]Observing smoke and inferring fire is an example ofAnumana.[17]In all except one Hindu philosophies,[23]this is a valid and useful means to knowledge. The method of inference is explained by Indian texts as consisting of three parts:pratijna(hypothesis),hetu(a reason), anddrshtanta(examples).[24]The hypothesis must further be broken down into two parts, state the ancient Indian scholars:sadhya(that idea which needs to proven or disproven) andpaksha(the object on which thesadhyais predicated). The inference is conditionally true ifsapaksha(positive examples as evidence) are present, and ifvipaksha(negative examples as counter-evidence) are absent. For rigor, the Indian philosophies also state further epistemic steps. For example, they demandVyapti- the requirement that thehetu(reason) must necessarily and separately account for the inference in "all" cases, in bothsapakshaandvipaksha.[24][25]A conditionally proven hypothesis is called anigamana(conclusion).[26]

Syllogism[edit]

The syllogism of theVaiśeṣikaschool was similar to that of theNyāyaschool of Hinduism, but the names given byPraśastapādato the 5 members of syllogism are different.[27]

Literature[edit]

The earliest systematic exposition of the Vaisheshika is found in theVaiśeṣika SūtraofKaṇāda(orKaṇabhaksha). This treatise is divided into ten books. The two commentaries on theVaiśeṣika Sūtra,RāvaṇabhāṣyaandBhāradvājavṛttiare no more extant.Praśastapāda’sPadārthadharmasaṁgraha(c. 4th century) is the next important work of this school. Though commonly known asbhāṣyaofVaiśeṣika Sūtra,this treatise is basically an independent work on the subject. The next Vaisheshika treatise, Candra’sDaśapadārthaśāstra(648) based onPraśastapāda’s treatise is available only in Chinese translation. The earliest commentary available onPraśastapāda’s treatise isVyomaśiva’sVyomavatī(8th century). The other three commentaries areŚridhara’sNyāyakandalī(991), Udayana’sKiranāvali(10th century) andŚrivatsa’sLīlāvatī(11th century).Śivāditya’sSaptapadārthīwhich also belongs to the same period, presents theNyāyaand theVaiśeṣikaprinciples as a part of one whole.Śaṁkara Miśra’sUpaskāraonVaiśeṣika Sūtrais also an important work.[28]

The Categories orPadārtha[edit]

According to the Vaisheshika school, all things that exist, that can be cognized and named arepadārthas (literal meaning: the meaning of a word), the objects of experience. All objects of experience can be classified into six categories,dravya(substance),guṇa(quality),karma(activity),sāmānya(generality),viśeṣa(particularity) andsamavāya(inherence). LaterVaiśeṣikas (Śrīdharaand Udayana andŚivāditya) added one more categoryabhava(non-existence). The first three categories are defined asartha(which can perceived) and they have real objective existence. The last three categories are defined asbudhyapekṣam(product of intellectual discrimination) and they are logical categories.[29]

  1. Dravya(substance): There are nine substances. They are,pṛthvī(earth),ap(water),tejas(fire),vāyu(air),ākaśa(ether),kāla(time),dik(space),ātman(self or soul) andmanas(mind). The first five are calledbhūtas, the substances having some specific qualities so that they could be perceived by one or the other external senses.[30]
  2. Guṇa(quality): TheVaiśeṣika Sūtramentions 17guṇas (qualities), to whichPraśastapādaadded another 7. While a substance is capable of existing independently by itself, aguṇa(quality) cannot exist so. The original 17guṇas (qualities) are,rūpa(colour),rasa(taste),gandha(smell),sparśa(touch),saṁkhyā(number),parimāṇa(size/dimension/quantity),pṛthaktva(individuality),saṁyoga(conjunction/accompaniments),vibhāga(disjunction),paratva(priority),aparatva(posteriority),buddhi(knowledge),sukha(pleasure),duḥkha(pain),icchā(desire),dveṣa(aversion) andprayatna(effort). To thesePraśastapādaaddedgurutva(heaviness),dravatva(fluidity),sneha(viscosity),dharma(merit),adharma(demerit),śabda(sound) andsaṁskāra(faculty).[31]
  3. Karma(activity): Thekarmas (activities) likeguṇas (qualities) have no separate existence, they belong to the substances. But while a quality is a permanent feature of a substance, an activity is a transient one.Ākāśa(ether),kāla(time),dik(space) andātman(self), though substances, are devoid ofkarma(activity).[32]
  4. Sāmānya(generality): Since there are plurality of substances, there will be relations among them. When a property is found common to many substances, it is calledsāmānya.[33]
  5. Viśeṣa(particularity): By means ofviśeṣa,we are able to perceive substances as different from one another. As the ultimate atoms are innumerable so are theviśeṣas.[34]
  6. Samavāya(inherence):Kaṇādadefinedsamavāyaas the relation between the cause and the effect.Praśastapādadefined it as the relationship existing between the substances that are inseparable, standing to one another in the relation of the container and the contained. The relation ofsamavāyais not perceivable but only inferable from the inseparable connection of the substances.[35]
  7. Abhava(non-existence)

Atomism[edit]

According to theVaiśeṣikaschool, aparamanu(atom) is an indestructible particle of matter. The atom is indivisible because it is a state at which no measurement can be attributed. They used invariance arguments to determine properties of the atoms. It also stated thatanucan have two states—absolute rest and a state of motion.[36]

They postulated four different kinds of atoms: two with mass, and two without.[5]Each substance is supposed to consist of all four kinds of atoms. Atoms can be combined intotryaṇukas (triads) anddvyaṇuka(dyad)before they aggregate into bodies of a kind that can be perceived.[37][38]Eachparamāṇu(atom) possesses its own distinctviśeṣa(individuality)[39]

The measure of the partless atoms is known asparimaṇḍala parimāṇa.It is eternal and it cannot generate the measure of any other substance. Its measure is its own absolutely.[40]

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^Amita Chatterjee (2011), Nyāya-vaiśeṣika Philosophy, The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy,doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195328998.003.0012
  2. ^abcdeDPS Bhawuk (2011), Spirituality and Indian Psychology (Editor: Anthony Marsella), Springer,ISBN978-1-4419-8109-7,page 172
  3. ^abc
    • Eliot Deutsch (2000), in Philosophy of Religion: Indian Philosophy Vol 4 (Editor: Roy Perrett), Routledge,ISBN978-0815336112,pages 245-248;
    • John A. Grimes, A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English, State University of New York Press,ISBN978-0791430675,page 238
  4. ^Dale Riepe (1996), Naturalistic Tradition in Indian Thought,ISBN978-8120812932,pages 227-246
  5. ^abKak, S. 'Matter and Mind: The Vaisheshika Sutra of Kanada' (2016), Mount Meru Publishing, Mississauga, Ontario,ISBN978-1-988207-13-1.
  6. ^abcAnalytical philosophy in early modern IndiaArchived18 March 2019 at theWayback MachineJ Ganeri, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  7. ^abcOliver Leaman,Key Concepts in Eastern Philosophy.Routledge,ISBN978-0415173629,1999, page 269.
  8. ^Basham 1951,pp. 262–270.
  9. ^Jeaneane D. Fowler 2002,pp. 98–99.
  10. ^Oliver Leaman (1999),Key Concepts in Eastern Philosophy.Routledge,ISBN978-0415173629,page 269
  11. ^J Ganeri (2012), The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance, Oxford University Press,ISBN978-0199652365
  12. ^M Hiriyanna (1993), Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Motilal Banarsidass,ISBN978-8120810860,pages 228-237
  13. ^"Shad Darshan Samucchaya, by Acharya Haribhadra Suri".
  14. ^P Bilimoria (1993), Pramāṇa epistemology: Some recent developments, in Asian philosophy - Volume 7 (Editor: G Floistad), Springer,ISBN978-94-010-5107-1,pages 137-154
  15. ^Gavin Flood,An Introduction to Hinduism, Cambridge University Press,ISBN978-0521438780,page 225
  16. ^Chattopadhyaya 1986,p. 170
  17. ^abMM Kamal (1998), The Epistemology of the Carvaka Philosophy, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 46(2): 13-16
  18. ^B Matilal (1992), Perception: An Essay in Indian Theories of Knowledge, Oxford University Press,ISBN978-0198239765
  19. ^abKarl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995 by Motilal Banarsidass,ISBN81-208-0309-4,pages 160-168
  20. ^Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995 by Motilal Banarsidass,ISBN81-208-0309-4,pages 168-169
  21. ^Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995 by Motilal Banarsidass,ISBN81-208-0309-4,pages 170-172
  22. ^W Halbfass (1991), Tradition and Reflection, State University of New York Press,ISBN0-7914-0362-9,page 26-27
  23. ^Carvaka school is the exception
  24. ^abJames Lochtefeld, "Anumana" in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Vol. 1: A-M, Rosen Publishing.ISBN0-8239-2287-1,page 46-47
  25. ^Karl Potter (2002), Presuppositions of India's Philosophies, Motilal Banarsidass,ISBN81-208-0779-0
  26. ^Monier Williams (1893), Indian Wisdom - Religious, Philosophical and Ethical Doctrines of the Hindus, Luzac & Co, London, page 61
  27. ^Radhakrishnan 2006,p. 75ff
  28. ^Radhakrishnan 2006,pp. 180–81
  29. ^Radhakrishnan 2006,pp. 183–86
  30. ^Chattopadhyaya 1986,p. 169
  31. ^Radhakrishnan 2006,p. 204
  32. ^Radhakrishnan 2006,pp. 208–09
  33. ^Radhakrishnan 2006,p. 209
  34. ^Radhakrishnan 2006,p. 215
  35. ^Radhakrishnan 2006,pp. 216–19
  36. ^Roopa Narayan."Space, Time and Anu in Vaisheshika"(PDF).Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, USA.Retrieved29 May2013.
  37. ^Berryman, Sylvia (2022), Zalta, Edward N.; Nodelman, Uri (eds.),"Ancient Atomism",The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy(Winter 2022 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University,retrieved6 October2023
  38. ^Chattopadhyaya 1986,pp. 169–70
  39. ^Radhakrishnan 2006,p. 202
  40. ^Dasgupta 1975,p. 314

References[edit]

  • Chattopadhyaya, D. (1986),Indian Philosophy: A Popular Introduction,People’s Publishing House, New Delhi,ISBN81-7007-023-6.
  • Dasgupta, Surendranath (1975),A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I,Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi,ISBN978-81-208-0412-8.
  • Radhakrishnan, S. (2006),Indian Philosophy, Vol. II,Oxford University Press, New Delhi,ISBN0-19-563820-4.

Further reading[edit]

External links[edit]

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Vaisheshika&oldid=1217690235"