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"Jihadist" redirects here. For the Islamic doctrine, seeJihad.

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Jihadismis aneologismwhich is used in reference to "militant Islamic movements that are perceived as existentially threatening to the West" and "rooted inpolitical Islam."[1]Appearing earlier in the Pakistani and Indian media, Western journalists adopted the term in the aftermath of theSeptember 11 attacksof 2001.[2]Since then, it has been applied to variousinsurgentIslamic extremist,militantIslamist,andterroristindividuals and organizations whose ideologies are based on theIslamicnotion ofjihad.[3][4][5][6]It has also been applied to variousIslamic empiresin history, such as theUmayyad Caliphateand theOttoman Empire,who extensively campaigned against non-Muslim nations in the name ofjihad.[7][8]

Contemporary jihadism mostly has its roots in the late 19th- and early 20th-century ideological developments ofIslamic revivalism,which further developed intoQutbismand related Islamist ideologies during the 20th and 21st centuries.[3][9][10]The Jihadist ideologues envisionedJihadas a "revolutionary struggle" against thesecularinternational orderto unite theMuslim Worldunder the "rule of God".[11]The Islamist volunteer organisations which participated in theSoviet–Afghan Warof 1979 to 1989 reinforced the rise of jihadism, which has proliferated during variousarmed conflictsthroughout the 1990s and 2000s.[12][13]

Gilles Kepelhas diagnosed a specificSalafist form of jihadismwithin theSalafi movementof the 1990s.[14]Jihadism with an international,pan-Islamistscope is also known asglobal jihadism.[9][15][16]Studies show that with the rise ofISIL/ISIS/IS/Daesh,many Muslims from Western countries like Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Kosovo, the Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States traveled to join theglobaljihadin Syria and Iraq.[17][18][19][20][21]

Terminology

Main article:Jihad
Jihadist variationof theBlack Standardas used by variousIslamist organisationssince the late 1990s, which consists of theShahadain white script centered on a black background.

The term "jihadism" has been in use since the 1990s, more widely in the aftermath of the9/11 attacks.[22]It was first used by the Indian and Pakistani mass media, and by French academics who used the more exact term "jihadist-Salafist".[Note 1][2][23]Historian David A. Charters defines "jihadism" as "a revolutionary program whose ideology promises radical social change in theMuslim world.. [with] a central role tojihadas an armed political struggle to overthrow ‘‘apostate’’ regimes, to expel theirinfidelallies, and thus to restoreMuslim landsto governance by Islamic principles. "[24]

According to Martin Kramer as of 2003, "jihadism is used to refer to the most violent persons and movements in contemporary Islam, includingal-Qaeda."[2]David Romano has defined his use of the term as referring to "an individual or political movement that primarily focuses its attention, discourse, and activities on the conduct of a violent, uncompromising campaign that they term ajihad".[25]Following Daniel Kimmage, he distinguishes the jihadist discourse of jihad as a global project to remake the world from the resistance discourse of groups likeHezbollah,which is framed as a regional project against a specific enemy.[25]

MostMuslimsdo not use the term, disliking the association of illegitimate violence with a noble religious concept, and instead prefer the use of delegitimising terms like "deviants".[22][Note 2]

The term "jihadist globalism" is also often used in relation to jihadism. Academic Manfred Steger proposes an extension of the term "jihadist globalism" to apply to all extremely violent strains of religiously influenced ideologies that articulate the global imaginary into concrete political agendas and terrorist strategies (these include al-Qaeda,Jemaah Islamiyah,Hamas,and Hezbollah, which he finds "today's most spectacular manifestation of religious globalism" ).[27]

"Jihad Cool"is a term for the re-branding of militant jihadism as fashionable, or"cool",to younger people throughconsumer culture,social media, magazines,[28]rap videos,[29]toys,propaganda videos,[30]and other means.[31][32]It is asubculturemainly applied to individuals in developed nations who are recruited to travel to conflict zones on jihad. For example, jihadi rap videos make participants look "moreMTVthan Mosque ", according toNPR,which was the first to report on the phenomenon in 2010.[31]To justify their acts ofreligious violence,jihadist individuals and networks resort to the nonbinding genre of Islamic legal literature (fatwa) developed by jihadi-Salafist legal authorities, whose legal writings are shared and spread via the Internet.[33]

Maajid Nawaz,founder and chairman of the anti-extremism think tankQuilliam,defines jihadism as a violent subset ofIslamism:"Islamism [is] the desire to impose any version of Islam over any society. Jihadism is the attempt to do so by force."[34]

History

See also:Islamic fundamentalism,Salafi movement,andWahhabism
Further information:International propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism,International propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism by region,andPetro-Islam
Afghan mujahideenpraying in theKunar Province,Afghanistan (1987)

Key influences

Main article:Khawarij
Further information:QutbismandTakfirism

The term “jihadism” has been applied to variousIslamic empiresin history, such as theArabUmayyad Caliphateand theOttoman empire,who extensively campaigned against non-Muslim nations in the name of jihad.[7][8]

Islamic extremismdates back to theearly history of Islamwith the emergence of theKharijitesin the 7th century CE.[35]The original schism betweenKharijites,Sunnīs,andShīʿasamong Muslims was disputed over thepolitical and religious successionto the guidance of the Muslim community (Ummah) after the death of theIslamic prophetMuhammad.[35]From their essentially political position, the Kharijites developed extreme doctrines that set them apart from both mainstream Sunnī and Shīʿa Muslims.[35]Shīʿas believeʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālibis the true successor to Muhammad, while Sunnīs considerAbu Bakrto hold that position. The Kharijites broke away from both the Shīʿas and the Sunnīs during theFirst Fitna(the first Islamic Civil War);[35]they were particularly noted for adopting a radical approach totakfīr(excommunication), whereby they declared both Sunnī and Shīʿa Muslims to be eitherinfidels(kuffār) orfalse Muslims(munāfiḳūn), and therefore deemed themworthy of deathfor their perceivedapostasy(ridda).[35][36][37]

Osama bin LadenandAyman al-Zawahiriofal-Qaedahave promoted the overthrow of secular governments.[38][39][40]

Sayyid Qutb,an Egyptian Islamist ideologue and a prominent leader of theMuslim Brotherhoodin Egypt, was an influential promoter of thePan-Islamistideologyduring the 1960s.[41]When he was executed by theEgyptian governmentunder theregime of Gamal Abdel Nasser,Ayman al-ZawahiriformedEgyptian Islamic Jihad,an organization which seeks to replace the government with an Islamic state that would reflect Qutb's ideas about theIslamic revivalthat he yearned for.[42]TheQutbist ideologyhas been influential among jihadist movements andIslamic terroristswho seek to overthrow secular governments, most notablyOsama bin Ladenand Ayman al-Zawahiri ofal-Qaeda,[38][39][40]as well as theSalafi-jihaditerrorist groupISIL/ISIS/IS/Daesh.[43]Moreover, Qutb's books have been frequently been cited by Osama bin Laden andAnwar al-Awlaki.[44][45][46][47][48][49]

Sayyid Qutb could be said to have founded the actual movement of radical Islam.[6][40][41]Unlike the other Islamic thinkers who have been mentioned above, Qutb was not anapologist.[6]He was a prominent leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and a highly influential Islamist ideologue,[6][40]and the first to articulate these anathemizing principles in his magnum opusFī ẓilāl al-Qurʾān(In the shade of the Qurʾān) and his 1966 manifestoMaʿālim fīl-ṭarīq(Milestones), which lead to his execution by the Egyptian government.[6][50]Other Salafi movements in theMiddle East and North Africaand Salafi movements across theMuslim worldadopted many of his Islamist principles.[6][40]

According to Qutb, the Muslim community (Ummah) has been extinct for several centuries and it has also reverted tojahiliyah(the pre-Islamic age of ignorance) because those who call themselves Muslims have failed to follow thesharialaw.[6][40]In order to restore Islam, bring back its days of glory, and free the Muslims from the clasps of ignorance, Qutb proposed the shunning of modern society, establishing a vanguard which was modeled after the early Muslims, preaching, and bracing oneself forpovertyor even bracing oneself for death in preparation forjihadagainst what he perceived was ajahiligovernment/society, and the overthrow of them.[6][40]Qutbism,the radical Islamist ideology which is derived from the ideas of Qutb,[40]was denounced by many prominent Muslim scholars as well as by other members of the Muslim Brotherhood, likeYusuf al-Qaradawi.

Islamic revivalism and Salafism (1990s to present)

Main articles:Islamic revivalandSalafi jihadism
Ablack flagreportedly used byCaucasian jihadistsin 2002 displays the phraseal-jihadfi sabilillahabove thetakbirand two crossedswords.
Flag ofISIL/ISIS/IS/Daesh

According toRudolph Peters,scholar ofIslamic studiesand thehistory of Islam,contemporary traditionalist Muslims "copy phrases of the classical works onfiqh"in their writings on jihad;Islamic modernists"emphasize the defensive aspect of jihad, regarding it as tantamount tobellum justumin modern international law; and the contemporary fundamentalists (Abul A'la Maududi,Sayyid Qutb,Abdullah Azzam,etc.) view it as a struggle for the expansion of Islam and the realization of Islamic ideals. "[51]

Some of the earlierIslamic scholarsandtheologianswho had profound influence onIslamic fundamentalismand the ideology of contemporary jihadism include the medieval Muslim thinkersIbn Taymiyyah,Ibn Kathir,andMuhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab,alongside the modern Islamist ideologuesMuhammad Rashid Rida,Sayyid Qutb, and Abul A'la Maududi.[5][10][15][52][53]Jihad has been propagated in modern fundamentalism beginning in the late 19th century, an ideology that arose in the context of struggles againstcolonial powersin North Africa at that time, as in theMahdist Warin Sudan, and notably in the mid-20th century byIslamic revivalistauthors such as Sayyid Qutb and Abul Ala Maududi.[54]

The termjihadism(earlierSalafi jihadism) has arisen in the 2000s to refer to the contemporary jihadi movements, the development of which was in retrospect traced to developments ofSalafismpaired with the origins ofal-Qaedain theSoviet–Afghan Warduring the 1990s. Jihadism has been called an "offshoot" of Islamic revivalism of the 1960s and 1970s. The writings of Sayyid Qutb andMohammed Abdul-Salam Faragprovide inspiration. The Soviet–Afghan War (1979–1989) is said to have "amplified the jihadist tendency from a fringe phenomenon to a major force in theMuslim world."[55]It served to produce foot soldiers, leadership and organization.Abdullah Yusuf Azzamprovided propaganda for the Afghan cause. After the war, veteran jihadists returned to their home countries, and from there would disperse to other sites of conflict involving Muslim populations, such as Algeria,Bosnia,andChechnya,creating a "transnational jihadist stream."[56]Some examples are:

ISIL'sterritoryin Iraq and Syria (in grey), at the time of its greatest territorial extent in May 2015.[57]

An explanation for jihadist willingness to kill civilians and self-professed Muslims on the grounds that they were actuallyapostates(takfīr) is the vastly reduced influence of the traditional diverse class ofulama,often highly educated Islamic jurists. In "the vast majority" of Muslim countries during the post-colonial world of the 1950s and 1960s, the private religious endowments (awqāf) that had supported the independence of Islamic scholars and jurists for centuries were taken over by the state. The jurists were made salaried employees and the nationalist rulers naturally encouraged their employees (and their employees' interpretations of Islam) to serve the rulers' interests. Inevitably, the jurists came to be seen by the Muslim public as doing this.[58]

Into this vacuum of religious authority cameaggressive proselytizing,funded by tens of billions of dollars ofpetroleum-export moneyfromSaudi Arabia.[59]The version of Islam being propagated (Saudi doctrine ofWahhabism) billed itself as a return to pristine, simple, straightforward Islam,[60]not oneschoolamong many, and not interpretingIslamic lawhistorically or contextually, but as the one, orthodox "straight path" of Islam.[60]Unlike the traditional teachings of the jurists, who tolerated and even celebrated divergent opinions and schools of thought and kept extremism marginalized, Wahhabism had "extreme hostility" to "any sectarian divisions within Islam".[60]

Shia jihad

The termjihadistis almost exclusively used to describeSunniextremists.[61]One example is Syria, where there have been thousands of foreign Muslim fighters engaged in thecivil war,for example, non-SyrianShiaare often referred to as "militia", and Sunni foreigners as "jihadists" (or "would-be jihadists" ).[Note 3][Note 4]One who does use the term "Shia jihad" is Danny Postel, who complains that "this Shia jihad is largely left out of the dominant narrative."[64][65]Other authors see the ideology of "resistance" (Arabic:muqawama) as more dominant, even among extremist Shia groups. For clarity, they suggest use of the term "muqawamist "instead.[66]

Beliefs

According to Shadi Hamid and Rashid Dar, jihadism is driven by the idea that jihad is an "individual obligation" (fard‘ayn) incumbent upon allMuslims.This is in contrast with the belief of Muslims up until now (and by contemporary non-jihadists) that jihad is a "collective obligation" (fard al-kifaya) carried out according to orders of legitimate representatives of the Muslim community. Jihadist insist all Muslims should participate because (they believe) today's Muslim leaders are illegitimate and do not command the authority to ordain justified violence.[67]

Evolution of jihad

TheHouthiflag, with the top saying "God is the greatest",the next line saying"Death to America",followed by"Death to Israel",followed by"A curse upon the Jews",and the bottom saying"Victory to Islam".

Some observers[3][68][69]have noted the evolution in the rules of jihad—from the original "classical" doctrine to that of 21st-centurySalafi jihadism.[70]According to thelegal historianSadarat Kadri,[68]during the last couple of centuries, incremental changes in Islamic legal doctrine (developed by Islamists who otherwise condemn anybid‘ah(innovation) in religion), have "normalized" what was once "unthinkable".[68]"The very idea that Muslims might blow themselves up for God was unheard of before 1983, and it was not until the early 1990s that anyone anywhere had tried to justify killing innocent Muslims who were not on a battlefield."[68]

The first or the "classical" doctrine of jihad which was developed towards the end of the 8th century, emphasized the "jihad of the sword" (jihad bil-saif) rather than the "jihad of the heart",[71]but it contained many legal restrictions which were developed from interpretations of both theQuranand theHadith,such as detailed rules involving "the initiation, the conduct, the termination" of jihad, the treatment of prisoners, the distribution of booty, etc. Unless there was a sudden attack on the Muslim community, jihad was not a "personal obligation" (fard ‘ayn); instead it was a "collective one" (fard al-kifaya),[72]which had to be discharged "in the way of God" (fi sabil Allah),[73]and it could only be directed by thecaliph,"whose discretion over its conduct was all but absolute."[73](This was designed in part to avoid incidents like theKharijia's jihad against and killing ofCaliph Ali,since they deemed that he was no longer a Muslim).[3]Martyrdomresulting from an attack on the enemy with no concern for your own safety was praiseworthy, but dying by your own hand (as opposed to the enemy's) merited a special place inHell.[74]The category of jihad which is considered to be a collective obligation is sometimes simplified as "offensive jihad" in Western texts.[75]

Scholars likeAbul Ala Maududi,Abdullah Azzam,Ruhollah Khomeini,leaders of al-Qaeda and others, believe that defensive global jihad is a personal obligation, which means that no caliph or Muslim head of state needs to declare it. Killing yourself in the process of killing the enemy is an act ofShuhada(martyrdom) and it brings you a special place inHeaven,not a special place inHell;and the killing of Muslim bystanders (nevermindNon-Muslims), should not impede acts of jihad. Military and intelligent analystSebastian Gorkadescribed the new interpretation of jihad as the "willful targeting of civilians by a non-state actor through unconventional means."[76][69]Al-Qaeda's splinter groups and competitors,Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihadand theIslamic State of Iraq and Syria,are thought to have been heavily influenced[70][77][78][79][80]by a 2004 work on jihad entitledManagement of Savagery(Idarat at-Tawahhush),[70]written by Abu Bakr Naji[70]and intended to provide a strategy to create a new Islamiccaliphateby first destroying "vital economic and strategic targets" and terrifying the enemy with cruelty to break its will.[81]

Islamic theologian Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir has been identified as one of the key theorists andideologuesbehind modern jihadist violence.[70][82][83][84]His theological and legal justifications influencedAbu Musab al-Zarqawi,al-Qaeda member and former leader ofal-Qaeda in Iraq,as well as several other jihadi terrorist groups, includingISILandBoko Haram.[70][82][83][84]Zarqawi used a 579-page manuscript of al-Muhajir's ideas at AQI training camps that were later deployed by ISIL, known in Arabic asFiqh al-Dimaand referred to in English asThe Jurisprudence of JihadorThe Jurisprudence of Blood.[70][82][83][84][85]The book has been described by counter-terrorism scholar Orwa Ajjoub as rationalizing and justifying "suicide operations, the mutilation of corpses, beheading, and the killing of children and non-combatants".[70]The Guardian's journalist Mark Towsend, citing Salah al-Ansari ofQuilliam,notes: "There is a startling lack of study and concern regarding this abhorrent and dangerous text [The Jurisprudence of Blood] in almost all Western and Arab scholarship ".[84]Charlie Winter ofThe Atlanticdescribes it as a "theological playbook used to justify the group's abhorrent acts".[83]He states:

Ranging from ruminations on the merits of beheading, torturing, or burning prisoners to thoughts on assassination, siege warfare, and the use of biological weapons, Muhajir’s intellectual legacy is a crucial component of theliterary corpus of ISIS—and, indeed, whatever comes after it—a way to render practically anything permissible, provided, that is, it can be spun as beneficial to the jihad. [...] According to Muhajir,committing suicide to kill peopleis not only a theologically sound act, but a commendable one, too, something to be cherished and celebrated regardless of its outcome. [...] neither Zarqawi nor his inheritors have looked back, liberally using Muhajir’s work to normalize the use of suicide tactics in the time since, such that they have become the single most important military and terrorist method—defensive or offensive—used by ISIS today. The way that Muhajir theorized it was simple—he offered up a theological fix that allows any who desire it to sidestep the Koranic injunctions against suicide.[83]

Clinical psychologistChris E. Stoutalso discusses the al Muhajir-inspired text in his essay,Terrorism, Political Violence, and Extremism(2017). He assesses that jihadists regard their actions as being "for the greater good"; that they are in a "weakened in the earth" situation that rendersIslamic terrorisma valid means of solution.[85]

Opponents

As part of their commitment to restore anIslamic statethat implementsSharia(Islamic law), Jihadists are opposed to all formssecular governance:be itdemocracy,communism,Ba'athism,nationalismas well as all types of non-Muslim political orders.[86]

Against communism

See also:Soviet invasion in AfghanistanandAfghan Jihad
U.S. PresidentRonald Reaganmeeting withAfghan mujahideenleaders in the Oval Office in 1983

During theSoviet-Afghan warin the 1980s, Muslims across the World were encouraged by theGulf States,Egypt,Pakistan,Morocco,Jordanand various pro-Western Arab nations for ajihadto defeat thecommunistinvaders in Afghanistan. The United States and allies supported Islamist revolutionaries to the defeat the threat posed by "godlesscommunism",supplying theAfghan Mujahidinwith money, equipment and training.[87]Hundreds of thousands ofMujahideenvolunteers were recruited from various countries, including Egypt,Pakistan,andSaudi Arabia.[88]Following theoverthrowal of the communist regimeanddissolution of U.S.S.R,many foreign Jihadists that coalesced under the transnational networks ofAl-Qaedaorganisation began viewing their struggle as part of a "Global Jihad", eventually pitting them towards a collision course with theUnited Statesin the 1990s.[89][90]

Against Ba'athism

See also:Islamic Uprisings in Syria (1976-1982),Iraqi insurgency (2003–2011),andSyrian civil war

Iraq

As early as 1980s, Jihadist leaderUsama Bin Ladendelivered sermons attacking Iraqi dictatorSaddam Hussein,condemning him as an apostate and denouncedBa'athist Iraqas an "atheist regime"that pursued hegemonic ambitions in theGulf region.According to Bin Laden'sIslamistworldview, “Socialistsare infidels wherever they are”. In 2003,United States invadedandoccupied Iraq,after falsely accusingSaddam Hussein of having links to Al-Qaeda.Resentment amongst Sunnis over their marginalisation after thefall of Ba'athist regimeled to the rise of Jihadist resistance which resulted in theAl-Qaeda led insurgencyin Iraq.[91]

De-Ba'athificationpolicy initiated by thenew governmentled to rise in support of Jihadists and remnants ofIraqi Ba'athistsstarted allying with Al-Qaeda in their common fight against the US.[92]Iraq war journalistGeorge Packerwrites inThe Assassins' Gate:

"The Iraq War proved some of theBush administration’s assertions false, and it made others self-fulfilling. One of these was the insistence on an operational link between Iraq and al-Qaeda... after the fall of the regime, the most potent ideological force behind the insurgency was Islam and its hostility to non-Islamic intruders. Some former Baathist officials even stopped drinking and took to prayer. The insurgency was calledmukawama,or resistance, with overtones of religious legitimacy; its fighters becamemujahideen,holy warriors; they proclaimed their mission to bejihad."[93][94]

Syria

Islamic opposition toBa'ath partyrule developed soon after the1963 coupwhich transformed Syria into aone-partysocialist state.Throughout the 1960s, the opposition organized protests across Syrian towns and villages backed by conservative segments of the society supported by theulemahover socio-economic marginalisation and anti-religious policies of theneo-Ba'athelite. The Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood emerged as the biggest faction of the opposition during this period. After a series of internal purges, GeneralHafez al-Assademerged as the uncontested leader of the Ba'ath party and the state in 1970, and established apersonalist dictatorshipcentered around sectarian loyalty toal-Assad family.The increasing visibility ofAlawitedominance and clan favoritism led to rising resentment and eventually resulted in theIslamic uprisings of 1976-1982.The "Islamic Front", a coalition ofIslamistorganizations led by theSyrian Muslim Brotherhoodplayed a major role in the spread of uprisings across all Syrian cities and declaredJihad(holy war) to overthrow theBa'ath regime.Al-Talia(The Fighting Vanguard) led byAdnan Uqlahwas a major Islamist organisation that participated in theJihad.The uprisings were brutally crushed in the1982 Hama massacrewhich resulted in 20,000-40,000 deaths.[95]

During the2011 Syrian Revolution,the Muslim Brotherhood played a key role in the anti-Assad protests alongside the secular opposition and was also influential within theFree Syrian Army.Foreign volunteers began entering Syria in 2012 to topple theAssad regimeand Jihadists made large inroads into regime-held territories in 2013.[96][97]Al-Nusra Frontwas one of the largest Jihadist factions in theSyrian Civil War,and carried out large-scale attacks against the Ba'athist military and government officers during its insurgency between 2012 and 2016.[98]

Against Shīʿa Islamists

See also:Iranian involvement in the Syrian civil warandHezbollah involvement in the Syrian civil war
Further information:Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict

After the outbreak of the2011 Syrian Revolution,the popular rebellion againstAssad regimetransformed into a sectariancivil war;wherein Sunni Islamist factions of the insurgency became pitted against the Iran-backed Shīʿa militias fighting on the side of regime. In Egypt, theMuslim Brotherhoodcalled forjihadagainst the Syrian government and allied Iranian proxies, accusingHezbollahof launching a "sectarian war" by backingBashar al-Assad.[99]Saudi Arabia also supported various Jihadist factions against the Assad regime, viewing the fight as part of itswider proxy conflict with Iran.[100]Sunnī jihadist foreign fighters converged on Syriafrom Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Yemen, Kuwait, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Morocco, as well as from other Arab states, Chechnya, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Western countries.[101]

See also

Notes

  1. ^Gilles Kepel used the variantsjihadist-salafist(p. 220),jihadism-salafism(p. 276),salafist-jihadism(p. 403) in his bookJihad: The Trail of Political Islam(Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2002)
  2. ^Use of "jihadism" has been criticized by at least one academic (Brachman): "'Jihadism' is a clumsy and controversial term. It refers to the peripheral current of extremist Islamic thought whose adherents demand the use of violence in order to oust non-Islamic influence from traditionally Muslim lands en route to establishing true Islamic governance in accordance with Sharia, or God's law. The expression's most significant limitation is that it contains the word Jihad, which is an important religious concept in Islam. For much of the Islamic world, Jihad simply refers to the internal spiritual campaign that one wages with oneself."[26]
  3. ^For example: "The battle has drawn Shiite militias from Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan on the side of Assad, even as Sunni would-be jihadists from around the world have filled the ranks of the many Islamist groups fighting his rule, including the Islamic State extremist group."[62]
  4. ^The Iranian government has drawn from Afghan refugees living in Iran and the number of Afghans fighting in Syria on behalf of the Assad regime has been estimated at "between 10,000 and 12,000".[63]

References

  1. ^Compare:Firestone, Reuven(2012).""Jihadism" as a new religious movement ".InHammer, Olav;Rothstein, Mikael(eds.).The Cambridge Companion to New Religious Movements.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.pp. 263–285.doi:10.1017/CCOL9780521196505.018.ISBN978-0-521-19650-5.LCCN2012015440.S2CID156374198.'Jihadism' is a term that has been constructed in Western languages to describe militant Islamic movements that are perceived as existentially threatening to the West. Western media have tended to refer to Jihadism as a military movement which is rooted inpolitical Islam.[...] 'Jihadism,' like the wordjihadfrom which it is constructed, is a difficult term to precisely define. The meaning of Jihadism is a virtual moving target because it remains a recent neologism and no single, generally accepted meaning has been developed for it.
  2. ^abcMartin Kramer (Spring 2003)."Coming to Terms: Fundamentalists or Islamists?".Middle East Quarterly.X(2): 65–77.Archivedfrom the original on 1 January 2015.Retrieved11 May2011."French academics have put the term into academic circulation as 'jihadist-Salafism.' The qualifier of Salafism—an historical reference to the precursor of these movements—will inevitably be stripped away in popular usage." Jihadist-Salafism "is defined by Gilles Kepel,Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam(Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 219–22; and Guilain Deneoux, "The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam,"Middle East Policy,June 2002, pp. 69–71. "
  3. ^abcdPoljarevic, Emin (2021). "Theology of Violence-oriented Takfirism as a Political Theory: The Case of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)". InCusack, Carole M.;Upal, M. Afzal(eds.).Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements.Brill Handbooks on Contemporary Religion. Vol. 21.LeidenandBoston:Brill Publishers.pp. 485–512.doi:10.1163/9789004435544_026.ISBN978-90-04-43554-4.ISSN1874-6691.
  4. ^DeLong-Bas, Natana J.(22 February 2018) [10 May 2017]."Jihad".Oxford Bibliographies – Islamic Studies.Oxford:Oxford University Press.doi:10.1093/obo/9780195390155-0045.Archivedfrom the original on 29 June 2016.Retrieved25 October2021.
  5. ^abBadara, Mohamed; Nagata, Masaki (November 2017)."Modern Extremist Groups and the Division of the World: A Critique from an Islamic Perspective".Arab Law Quarterly.31(4).Leiden:Brill Publishers:305–335.doi:10.1163/15730255-12314024.ISSN1573-0255.
  6. ^abcdefghCook, David(2015) [2005]."Radical Islam and Contemporary Jihad Theory".Understanding Jihad(2nd ed.).Berkeley:University of California Press.pp. 93–127.ISBN9780520287327.JSTOR10.1525/j.ctv1xxt55.10.LCCN2015010201.
  7. ^abThe End of the Jihad State.
  8. ^abMohanty, Nirode (15 September 2018).Jihadism: Past and Present - Nirode Mohanty - Google Books.ISBN9781498575973.Retrieved1 October2022.
  9. ^abAydınlı, Ersel (2018) [2016]."The Jihadists after 9/11".Violent Non-State Actors: From Anarchists to Jihadists.Routledge Studies on Challenges, Crises, and Dissent in World Politics (1st ed.).LondonandNew York:Routledge.pp. 110–149.ISBN978-1-315-56139-4.LCCN2015050373.
  10. ^abJalal, Ayesha(2009). "Islam Subverted? Jihad as Terrorism".Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia.Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press.pp. 239–301.doi:10.4159/9780674039070-007.ISBN9780674039070.S2CID152941120.
  11. ^A. Charters, David (6 February 2007)."Something Old, Something New…? Al Qaeda, Jihadism, and Fascism".Terrorism and Political Violence.19.Routledge: 65–93.doi:10.1080/09546550601054832.ISSN0954-6553– via tandfonline.
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