Anti-tank warfare

Anti-tank warfareoriginated duringWorld War Ifrom the desire to develop technology andtacticsto destroytanks.After theAlliesdeployed the first tanks in 1916, theGerman Empireintroduced the first anti-tank weapons.^[1]The first developed anti-tank weapon was a scaled-up bolt-action rifle, theMauser 1918 T-Gewehr,that fired a 13.2 mm cartridge with a solid bullet that could penetrate the thin armor used by tanks at that time and destroy the engine or ricochet inside, killing occupants.^[2]Because tanks represent an enemy's strongforce projectionon land, military strategists have incorporated anti-tank warfare into the doctrine of nearly every combat service since. The most predominant anti-tank weapons at the start ofWorld War IIin 1939 included thetank-mounted gun,anti-tank gunsandanti-tank grenadesused by theinfantry,andground-attack aircraft.

Anti-tank warfare evolved rapidly duringWorld War II,leading to infantry-portable weapons such as theBazooka,anti-tankcombat engineering,specialized anti-tank aircraft and self-propelled anti-tank guns (tank destroyers). Both the SovietRed Armyand theGerman Armydeveloped methods of combating tank-led offensives, including deployment of static anti-tank weapons embedded in in-depth defensive positions, protected by anti-tank obstacles andminefields,and supported by mobile anti-tankreservesand by ground-attack aircraft.

Through theCold Warof 1947-1991, the United States,Soviet Unionand other countries contemplated the possibility of nuclear warfare. While previous technology had developed to protect the crews of armored vehicles from projectiles and from explosive damage, now the danger ofradiationarose. In theNATOcountries, little if any development took place on defining adoctrineof how to use armed forces without the use oftactical nuclear weapons.In theSoviet sphere of influencethe legacy doctrine ofoperational maneuverwastheoretically examinedto understand how a tank-led force could be used even with the threat of limited use of nuclear weapons on prospective European battlefields. TheWarsaw Pactarrived at the solution ofmaneuver warfarewhile massively increasing the number of anti-tank weapons. To achieve this, Soviet military theorists such asVasily Sokolovsky(1897–1968) realized that anti-tank weapons had to assume an offensive role rather than the traditionally defensive role used in theGreat Patriotic War(1941–1945), becoming more mobile. This led to the development of improvedguided anti-tank missiles,though similar design work progressed in Western Europe and the United States.

Both sides in the Cold War also recognized the utility of light anti-tank weapons, and this led to further development of man-portable weapons for use by infantry squads, while heavier missiles were mounted on dedicatedmissile tank-destroyers,including dedicatedanti-tank helicopters,and even heavier guided anti-tankmissiles launched from aircraft.Designers also developed new varieties of artillery munitions in the form oftop-attack shells,and shells that were used to saturate areas withanti-armor bomblets.Helicopters could be used as well to rapidly deliver scattered anti-tank mines.

Since the end of the Cold War in 1992, new threats to tanks and other armored vehicles have included remotely detonatedimprovised explosive devices(IEDs) used inasymmetric warfareand weapon systems like theRPG-29andFGM-148 Javelin,which can defeatreactive armoror shell armor. Both those weapon systems use atandem warheadwhere the first stage of the warhead activates the reactive armor, and the second stage defeats the shell armor by means of ahigh-explosive anti-tank(HEAT)shaped charge.

During theUkraine warof 2014-,dronesandloitering munitionshave attacked and destroyed tanks.

Tank threat[edit]

Anti-tank warfare evolved as a countermeasure to the threat of the tank's appearance on the battlefields of theWestern Frontof the First World War. The tank had been developed to negate the Germansystem of trenches,and allow a return tomaneuver against enemy's flanksand toattack the rearwithcavalry.

The use of the tank was mainly based on the assumption that, once they were able to eliminate the German trench lines with their machine gun andinfantry support gunpositions, the Allied infantry would follow and secure the breach, and the cavalry would exploit the breach in the trench lines by attacking into the depth of German-held territory, eventually capturing thefield artillerypositions and interdicting logistics and reserves being brought up from the rear areas. Naval crews^{[citation needed]}initially used to operate the installed naval guns and machine guns were replaced with Army personnel who were more aware of theinfantry tacticswith which the tanks were intended to cooperate. However, there was no means of communication between the tank's crew and the accompanying infantry, or between the tanks participating in combat. Radios were not yet portable or robust enough to be mounted in a tank, although Morse Code transmitters were installed in some Mark IVs at Cambrai as messaging vehicles.^[3]Attaching a field telephone to the rear would become a practice only during the next war. With greater use of tanks by both sides it was realized that the accompanying infantry could be forced to ground byambushfire, thus separating them from the tanks, which would continue to advance, eventually finding themselves exposed toclose-assaultsby German infantry andsappers.

The early tanks were mechanically rudimentary. The 6-to-12-millimetre (0.24 to 0.47 in) thick armor generally prevented penetration bysmall armsfire andshell fragments.However, even a near miss from field artillery or an impact from a mortar could easily disable or destroy the tank: if thefuel tankwas ruptured, it could incinerate the tank's crew. A large caliber gun was recognized as a tactical necessity to attack machine gun positions and defeat any infantry field pieces found in the trench lines which could easily disabletank trackwith the HE ammunition. This was achieved by mounting a 57 mmQF 6 pounder Hotchkisslight naval gun in the hullbarbettes.Hull and track engineering was largely dictated by theterrain—the need to cross wide trenches—although the relationship betweenground pressureandsoil-vehicle mechanicswas not resolved until the Second World War.Turretswere later introduced on medium and light tanks to react to ambushes during the advance.^{[citation needed]}

First World War[edit]

The tank, when it appeared on the Western Front in September 1916, was a surprise to German troops, but not theGerman General Staff.The French Army Staff was highly critical of the British Army'searly fieldingof the Mark I vehicles in small numbers because the French trials showed the armored vehicles to be highly unreliable. They judged that large numbers had to be employed to sustain an offensive despite losses to mechanical failure or vehicles foundering in intractableno man's landterrain. These losses, coupled with those from enemy artillery fire, later amounted to as high as 70% of the starters during some operations. Deploying small numbers of tanks would therefore cause the Allies to lose theelement of surprise,allowing Germans to develop countermeasures.

Anti-tank weapons[edit]

Because the German Army was the only force in need of anti-tank weapons, they were first to develop a viable technology to combat the armored vehicle. These technologies took threeammunitionapproaches: use of grenades by infantrymen, including theGeballte Ladung( "Bundled Charge" ) of several stick grenades bound together bypioneers;early attempts at the small-caliberanti-tank rifleslike the bolt-action 13 mmMauser 1918 T-Gewehr;3.7 cm TaK Rheinmetall in starrer Räder-lafette 1916anti-tank gunon a light carriage which could destroy a tank^[4]using large-caliberarmor-piercingammunition issued in 1917 to special commands; and the existing 77 mm field guns (such as the7.7 cm FK 16) of the infantry division's artillery regiment were also eventually issued with special armor-piercing (AP) ammunition.

Anti-tank tactics[edit]

With the appearance of Allied tanks, the German Army were quick to introduce new anti-tank defense detachments within the pioneer battalions of the infantry divisions. These were initially issued 13 mm caliber long barrel rifles firing solid shot. However, these suffered from fouling after 2–3 rounds and had a recoil that was unsustainable by the mechanism or the rifleman. Stick grenades were used to destroy the tracks by individual pioneers, however this required accompanying machine-gunners to first separate the supporting Allied infantry line from the tanks, which proved difficult. Another tactic was to lure the tank beyond the German trench-line, re-establishing it just as the Allied infantry approached. The tank would then be engaged by the divisional 7.7 cm guns brought forward, that would try to disable the tracks with ordinary HE shells (and later AP ammunition). If the crews of the disabled tanks refused to surrender, they were engaged with flamethrowers, or a mortar would be fired on the stricken vehicle until a direct hit was achieved on the top surface, usually resulting in an internal fire. Finally, anti-tank obstacles were prepared on the likely approaches by deepening and widening existing ground cratering, the precursors of theanti-tank trench.Finally in early 1917 the 3.7 cmTaKfromRheinmetallwas rushed to the frontline, and proved effective in destroying the tanks despite limited elevation and traverse.

Development between the world wars[edit]

Lack of consensus on the design and use of the tank after the First World War also influenced the development of its anti-tank countermeasures. However, because Germany was restricted by theTreaty of Versaillesin its military capability, and there were no other challenges to France and Britain, very little development took place in anti-tank warfare until the 1930s.

TheInterwar periodwas dominated by the strategic thinking withfortifiedborders at its core. These included obstacles consisting of natural features such asditches,streamsandurban areas,or constructed obstacles such as anti-tank ditches,minefields,dragon's teeth,or log barriers. The pinnacle of this strategic thinking was considered to be theMaginot Linewhich replaced infantry-filled trenches with artillery-filledbunkers,includingcasemateshousing 37 or 47 mm anti-tank guns, and steel turrets armed with a pair of machine guns and a 25 mm anti-tank gun, although Germany was forbidden to produce tanks. The construction was partially based on the Allied experience with theHindenburg Linewhich was breached with tank support during thebattles of CambraiandSt. Quentin Canal,although German Command was more impressed by the surprise achieved by the Canadian troops at theBattle of the Canal du Nord.This came to influence their planning in 1940.

The Maginot line defenses– up to 25 km (16 mi) deep from the forward positions to the rear line – were intended to prevent a surprise attack and delay any attack while the French Army was mobilized. With the relative numerical inferiority between the France and Germany,^{[definition needed]}it was a more effective use of manpower. Within the line, passive anti-tank obstacles were supported by anti-infantry and anti-tank bunkers. After Belgium declared neutrality in 1936, France began work on extending the line along the Belgian border.

Improved artillery was seen as the quickest solution to anti-tank defense, and one of the earliest post-war anti-tank gun designs was the25 mm Hotchkissmodel from France. It was intended to replace anAtelier de Puteaux 37 mmweapon designed in 1916 to destroy machine gun positions.Rheinmetallcommenced design of a 37 mm anti-tank gun in 1924 and the first guns were produced in 1928 as 3.7 cm Pak L/45,^[5]later adopted in Wehrmacht service as3.7 cm Pak 36.It made an appearance during theSpanish Civil War,as did theBofors 37 mmdeveloped in Sweden, and used by many early Second World War combatants. The British Army accepted for service the (40 mm)Ordnance QF 2 pounder,which was developed as atank gun.The SovietRed Armyafter theRussian Civil Waralso begun a search for an anti-tank gun with a French Hotchkiss 37 mm L.33 tank gun, but soon upgraded this to a higher velocity L.45 Model 1935 while also making a licensed copy of the German3.7 cm PaK 36.However, the Red Army was almost immediately taught a lesson about anti-tank warfare when a tankbattalionsent to aid the Spanish Republicans in theSpanish Civil Warwas almost entirely destroyed in anengagement.

At this time, the predominant ammunition used against tanks was thearmor-piercing kinetic energyshell that defeated armor by directpressure,spiking or punching through it. During the late 1930sshaped chargeammunition was experimented with that usedchemical energyfor armor penetration. The shaped charge concept is officially known as the "Munroe Effect" and was discovered by accident decades earlier by Professor Charles E. Munroe at the U.S. Torpedo Station, Providence, RI. Professor Munroe was detonating different manufactured blocks of explosives on a sheet of armor plating and observed the blocks having the manufacturing letters recessed (vs. raised) cut an imprint of the manufacturing letters into the armor plate—the birth of the shaped-charged explosive which focuses the blast energy caused by an indentation on the surface area of an explosive.^[6]Although shaped charges are somewhat more difficult to manufacture, the advantage is that the projectile does not require as high velocity as typical kinetic energy shells, yet on impact it creates a high-velocityjet of metal flowing like a liquid due to the immense pressure (though x-ray diffraction has shown the metal stays solid^[7]) whichhydrodynamicallypenetrates the armor and kills occupants inside.^[8]The depth of the penetration, though proportional to the length of the jet and thesquare rootof itsdensity,is also dependent on the strength of the armor. With the development of this new ammunition begun more advanced research intosteel manufacturing,and development ofspaced armorthat caused "jet waver" by detonating prematurely or at the wrong angle to the surface of the main armor.

The only significant attempt to experiment in the use of tanks in the late 1920s was that of the British Army'sExperimental Mechanized Forcethat influenced future development of tanks, armored troops and entire armies of both its future enemies and allies in the next war.

In Spain, the anti-tank defense of the Nationalists was organized by theWehrmachtofficers, and the anti-tank guns were incorporated into a system of obstacles that were constructed with the intent to stop an attack by tanks by slowing it down, separating them from supporting infantry (advancing on foot) with machine-gun and mortar fire, and forcing tanks to conduct deliberate head-on assaults with engineer support, or seek a less-defended area to attack.Minefieldslaid with purpose-designedmineswere used for the first time, destroying tank tracks, and forcingcombat engineerstoclearthem on foot. Delay meant that Nationalist field artillery could engage thelightly armored Soviet tanks.This meant a change in Republican operational and eventually strategic planning, and a more protracted combat operations, with more casualties at a greater cost.

The only change to the German anti-tank tactics of the First World War was that now an effective anti-tank weapon was available to support the defending infantry. However, the Soviet tanks armed with 45 mm guns easily destroyed the German light tanks.

Ironically, in the early 1930s until the Spanish War, German officers were conducting secret testing of a new way of employing tanks, infantry and artilleryoffensivelyin the Soviet Union with the cooperation of the Red Army. In Germany, these developments eventually culminated in tactics that later came to be known asBlitzkrieg,while in the Soviet Union they formed the core of thedeep battleoperational doctrine. The successful test of the latter was during theBattles of Khalkhin Golalthough the Red Army foundered on theMannerheim Linein 1940, largely due to thepurge in the Officer Corps,claiming many of thesenior proponentsof the new doctrine. Anti-tank artillery would be included in mobile tank-led Wehrmacht and Red Army units due to the possibility of encountering enemy tanks in ameeting engagement.

The new doctrines of using the tank, were divided into infantry and cavalryschools of thought.The former regarded the tank as a mobile artillery system to be used for infantry support. This suggested that the infantry needed to be armed with integral anti-tank weapons. The latter advocated use of tanks in the traditional cavalry way of high-tempo attacks intended to outflank the enemy infantry and sever its communication lines. This approach suggested that the tank was the best anti-tank system, and only limited anti-tank troops were required to accompany them. For this reason the late 30stank configurationscame in a great diversity, ranging from lighttankettesandcavalry tanksto multi-turretedheavy tanksresembling bunkers, all of which had to be considered in training by the anti-tank artillery troops. The development of these doctrines was the most significant influence on the rapid development in anti-tank technology and tactics in the Second World War.

Second World War[edit]

Two aspects of how the Second World War commenced helped to delay development of anti-tank warfare: resignation and surprise. After Poland was attacked, its allies in the West were resigned to its defeat by a numerically superior Wehrmacht. The little information that was brought out about the conduct of combat during that campaign did nothing to convince either France, Britain or the USSR of the need for improved anti-tank technology and tactics. The reliance on the Maginot Line, and the subsequent surprise of the German offensive left no time to develop existing abilities and tactics in the West. The British were preparing the stop lines and theanti-tank islandsto slow enemy progress and restrict the route of an attack. The Red Army however was fortunate in having several excellent designs for anti-tank warfare that were either in final stages of development for production, or had been rejected earlier as unnecessary and could now be rushed into production. The relative ease with which the older models of Red Army's tank fleet were destroyed by German anti-tank weapons, using tactics already seen in Spain, once and for all focused Stavka attention on anti-tank warfare as Soviet armies were repeatedly encircled by panzer-led strategic pincer maneuvers. Of the major iconic Soviet weapons of the Second World War, two were made exclusively for anti-tank warfare, theT-34and theIlyushin Il-2Shturmovik.The former was one of the most manufactured tanks in history, and the latter, itself dubbed the 'flying tank', was one of the most manufactured aircraft. The war also saw the creation and almost immediate abandonment of the self-propelled tank destroyer which would be replaced post war by the anti tank guided missile.

Aircraft[edit]

As tanks were rarely used in conflicts between the two World Wars, no specific aircraft or tactics were developed to combat them from the air. One solution adopted by almost all European air forces was to use bomb loads for conventional bombers that were composed from small bombs allowing a higher density during bombing. This created a greater chance of causing a direct impact on the thinner top armor of the tank while also having the ability to damage track and wheels through proximity detonation.

The first aircraft able to engage tanks was theJunkers Ju 87"Stuka" usingdive bombingto place the bomb close to the target. Some French and German fighters fitted with 20 mm cannon were also able to engage thinner top armor surfaces of the tanks early in the war. The Stuka was also given cannons for anti-armor role though it was obsolete by 1942, and was joined by theHenschel Hs 129that mounted a podded 30 mm (1.2 in)MK 101 cannonbeneath its fuselage, while the Red Army Air Force fielded the SovietIlyushin Il-2armed with a pair of 23 mm cannons and unguided rockets, but armored to enable the pilots to approach German tanks at very low altitude, ignoring small arms, machine-gun and even small anti-aircraft cannon fire that usually provided tanks with protection against the bombers. Il-2s could also carry large numbers of 2.5 kg shaped-charge anti-tankPTABbombs.

To give it more firepower against tanks, the RAF mounted two underwing pod-mounted 40 mmVickers Scannon on theHawker Hurricane(as theMk. IID), which saw service in North Africa in 1942 and theHawker Typhoonwas given HE rockets though these were more effective against other ground vehicles. From March 1943 the Red Army Air Force produced the more agileYakovlev Yak-9T (37 mm cannon) and K (45 mm cannon) bomber interceptor also used for ground attack, with one example of either gun inmotornaya pushkamounts attached to the engine's gear reduction unit, that had either one of them firing through a hollow-center propeller shaft.

FollowingOperation Overlordin 1944, the military version of the slow-flyingPiper J-3 Cubhigh-wing light civilian monoplane, the L-4 Grasshopper, usually used for liaison and artillery-spotting, began to be used in a light anti-armor role by a few U.S. Army artillery spotter units over France; these aircraft were field-outfitted with either two or fourbazookarocket launchers attached to thelift struts,^[9]against German armored fighting vehicles. During the summer of 1944, U.S. Army MajorCharles Carpentermanaged to successfully take on an anti-armor role with his rocket-armed Piper L-4. His L-4, namedRosie the Rocketeer,armed with six bazookas, had a notable anti-armor success during an engagement during theBattle of Arracourton September 20, 1944, knocking out at least four German armored vehicles,^[10]as a pioneering example of taking on heavy enemy armor from a lightweight slow-flying aircraft.^[11]

Field artillery[edit]

Field artillery were often the first ground combat arm to engage detected concentration of troops which included tanks through artillery airborne observers, either in assembly areas (for refueling and rearming), during approach marches to the combat zone, or as the tank unit was forming up for the attack. Conventional artillery shells were very effective against the tank's thinner top armor if fired in appropriate density while the tanks were concentrated, enabling direct hits by a sufficiently powerful shell. Even a non-penetrating shell could still disable a tank through dynamic shock, internal armor shattering or simply overturning the tank. More importantly the tanks could be disabled due to damage to tracks and wheels, and their supporting vehicles and personnel could be damaged and killed, reducing unit's ability to fight in the longer term. Because tanks were usually accompanied by infantry mounted on trucks orhalf-trackedvehicles that lacked overhead armor, field artillery that fired a mix of ground and air-burst ammunition was likely to inflict heavy casualties on the infantry as well. Field guns, such as theOrdnance QF 25 pounder,were provided with armor-piercing shot for direct engagement of enemy tanks.

Anti-tank guns[edit]

Anti-tank guns are guns designed to destroy armored vehicles from defensive positions. In order to penetrate vehicle armor, they fire smaller caliber shells from longer-barreled guns to achieve higher muzzle velocity than field artillery weapons, many of which arehowitzers.The higher velocity, flatter trajectoryballisticsprovide terminalkinetic energyto penetrate the moving/static target's armor at a given range and contact's angle. Any field artillerycannonwith barrel length 15 to 25 times longer than itscaliberwas able also to fire anti-tank ammunition, such as the SovietA-19.

Prior toWorld War II,few anti-tank guns had (or needed) calibers larger than 50 mm. Examples of guns in this class include theGerman 37 mm,US 37 mm(the largest gun able to be towed by the1⁄4-ton, 4×4 'jeep'),French 25 mmand47 mmguns,British QF 2-pounder (40 mm),Italian 47 mmandSoviet 45 mm.All of these light weapons could penetrate the thin armor found on most pre-war and early war tanks.

At the start ofWorld War II,many of these weapons were still being used operationally, along with a newer generation of light guns that closely resembled their WWI counterparts. After the well-armoured SovietT-34medium andKVheavy tanks were encountered, these guns were recognized as ineffective againstsloped armor,with the German lightweight 37 mm gun quickly nicknamed the "tank door knocker" (German:Panzeranklopfgerät), for revealing its presence without penetrating the armor.

Germany introduced more powerful anti-tank guns, some which had been in the early stages of development prior to the war. By late 1942, the Germans had an excellent50-mm high-velocity design,while they faced theQF 6-pounderintroduced in theNorth African Campaignby the British Army, and later adopted by theUS Army.By 1943 Wehrmacht was forced to adopt still larger calibers on theEastern Front,the75 mmand the famous88 mmguns. The Red Army used a variety of 45 mm,57 mm,and100 mmguns, and deployed general-purpose 76.2 mm and 122-mm guns in the anti-tank role. By the time of theInvasion of Normandy,the British had the 3 in (76 mm) calibreQF 17 pounder,which design had begun before the 6 pounder entered service, in general use which proved to be a highly effective anti-tank gun and was also used on the Sherman Firefly tank, theArcher self-propelled gun,and on the17-pdr SP Achilles

Tank destroyers[edit]

As towed anti-tank cannon guns grew in size and weight, they became less mobile and more cumbersome to maneuver, and required ever larger gun crews, who often had to wrestle the gun into position while under heavy artillery and/or tank fire. As the war progressed, this disadvantage often resulted in the loss or destruction of both the antitank gun and its trained crew. This gave impetus to the development of the self-propelled, lightly armored "tank destroyer"(TD). The tank destroyer was usually based on the hull of existing tank designs, using either a gun integrated into the hull or a fully rotating turret much like that of a conventional tank. These self-propelled (SP) AT guns were first employed as infantry support weapons in place of towed antitank guns. Later, due to a shortage of tanks, TDs sometimes replaced the former in offensive armored operations.^{[citation needed]}

Early German-designed tank destroyers, such as theMarder I,employed existing light French or Czech design tank chassis, installing an AT gun as part of an armored, turret-less superstructure. This method reduced both weight and conversion costs. The Soviet Union later adopted this style of self-propelled anti-tank gun or tank destroyer. This type of tank destroyer had the advantage of a reduced silhouette, allowing the crew to more frequently fire fromdefilade ambushpositions. Such designs were easier and faster to manufacture and offered good crew protection, though the lack of a turret limited the gun's traverse to a few degrees. This meant that, if the TD became immobilized due to engine failure or track damage, it could not rotate its gun to counter opposing tanks, making it an easy target. This vulnerability was later exploited by opposing tank forces. Late in the war, it was not unusual to find even the largest and most powerful tank destroyer abandoned on the field after a battle, having been immobilized by one high-explosive shell to the track or front drive sprocket.^{[citation needed]}

US Army pre-war infantry support doctrines emphasized the use of tank destroyers with open-top fully rotating turrets, featuring less armor than the standardM4 Shermantanks, but with more powerful cannon. A 76 mm long-barrel tank cannon was fitted to the Sherman-basedM10 GMCand all-new designM18designs, with the M18 being the fastest-moving American AFV of any type in World War II.^[12]Late in 1944, the Sherman-originM36appeared, equipped with a 90 mm cannon. With rotating turrets and good combat maneuverability, American TD designs generally worked well, although their light armor was no match for enemy tank cannon fire during one on one confrontations. Another disadvantage proved to be the open, unprotected turret, and casualties from artillery fire soon led to the introduction of folding armor turret covers. Near the war's end, a change in official doctrine caused both the self-propelled tank destroyer and the towed antitank gun to fall from favor in U.S. service, increasingly replaced by conventional tanks or infantry level antitank weapons. Despite this change, the M36 tank destroyer continued in service, and was used in combat as late as theKorean War.^{[citation needed]}

The third, and likely most effective kind of tank destroyer was the unturreted,casemate-style tank destroyer, known by theJagdpanzerterm in German service, orSamokhodnaya Ustanovkain Soviet service for their own designs. These generally featured a heavy gun mounted on an older or then-current tank chassis, with the gun pointing forward with a limited degree of traverse. Casemate tank destroyers often had the same amount of armour as the tanks they were based on. The removal of the turret allowed for greater room to mount a larger gun with a larger breech and leave room for crew. Many casemate tank destroyers either originated as, or were dual-purpose vehicles with the duty of a self-propelled gun, which share many (but usually not all) of the same features and layout. Some examples are the GermanSturmgeschütz III– the most-produced German armored fighting vehicle of WW II — and the Soviets'SU-100,itself based on theT-34 tank's hull and drivetrain.

Infantry[edit]

Rifles[edit]

Anti-tank rifles were introduced in some armies before the Second World War to provide infantry with a stand-off weapon when confronted with a tank assault. The intention was to preserve the morale of the infantry by providing a weapon that could actually defeat a tank.Anti-tank rifleswere developed in several countries during the 1930s. By the beginning of WW2, anti-tank rifle teams could knock out most tanks from a distance of about 500 m, and do so with a weapon that was man-portable and easily concealed. Although the AT rifle performance was negated by the increased armor of medium and heavy tanks by 1942, they remained viable against lighter-armored and unarmored vehicles, and against field fortification embrasures.

Notable examples include the FinnishLahti L-39(which was also used as a sniper rifle during theContinuation War), the automatic JapaneseType 97 20 mm anti-tank rifle,the GermanPanzerbüchse 38,Panzerbüchse 39,the Polishwz.35and theSoviet14.5 mmPTRDandPTRS-41.

By 1943, most armies judged anti-tank rifles to lack combat effectiveness due to the diminished ability to penetrate the thicker armor of new tanks – the British Army had abandoned them by 1942 and the Wehrmacht by 1943, while the US Army never adopted the weapon, although the USMC usedBoys anti-tank riflesin the Pacific Theater. However, theanti-tank rifleremained in Soviet use during the conflict due to the importance it occupied in its doctrine of anti-tank in-depth defense, first demonstrated during the defense of Moscow and again during the Kursk battles. This became particularly true later in the war when the Red Army assumed an almost constant offensive, and anti-tank in-depth defensive deployments were used for protecting flanks of the operational breakthroughs against German tactical counterattacks. By firing on the lighter armored infantry and support vehicles (e.g.artillery tractors) the anti-tank rifle units helped to separate the supporting infantry (panzergrenadiers) and artillery of the German tanks and so forced the tanks to halt at short distances from the concealed anti-tank guns leaving them exposed to fire from larger, longer ranged anti-tank guns. PTRS-41 semi-automatic anti-tank rifles were also used for sniping since an additional tracer round enabled rapid fire adjustment by the gunner. Although optical sniper scopes were tried with the PTRS-41, the weapons proved too inaccurate at sniping distances (800 m or more), and the recoil too much for effective use of the scopes.

Rockets and shaped charges[edit]

The development of light, man-portable, anti-tank weapons increased during the Second World War. Most were based on theMunroe effectwhich led to the development of thehigh-explosive shaped charge.These weapons were calledhigh-explosive anti-tank(HEAT). The destructive effect relies fully on the kinetic energy of the explosion rather than the ballistic speed of the round on the damage inflicted to the armor. The effect was also concentrated and could penetrate more armor for a given amount of explosives. The first HEAT rounds were rifle grenades, but better delivery systems were soon introduced: the BritishPIATwas propelled in a manner similar to thespigot mortarwith a blackpowder charge contained in the tailfin assembly, the USBazookaand the GermanPanzerschreckused rockets, and the GermanPanzerfaustwas a smallrecoilless gun.The HEAT warhead was retroactively used to give more power to smaller calibre weapons such as in the conversion of the otherwise limited German 37 mm PaK guns to fire a large shell, calledStielgranate 41,that fitted over the barrel rather than down in it, to a greater range than thePanzerschreckcould manage.

TheHungarian 44M "Buzogányvető"was a successful unguided rocket used extensively in theSiege of Budapest.

PARS 3 LRwith HEAT warhead of theGerman Army.

After the war, research on infantry anti-tank weapons continued, with most designers focused on two primary goals: first an anti-tank weapon that could defeat more heavily armored postwar tanks and fighting vehicles, and second a weapon lightweight and portable enough for infantry use.

Mines and other explosives[edit]

Though unsophisticated, thesatchel chargewas an effective anti-tank weapon during World War II; the blast could sever the tracks of a tank, damage internal components or injure the crew.
Hawkins mine
TheWehrmachtemployed theGoliath tracked mine,an unmanned demolition vehicle.
TheSoviet Unionemployedanti-tank dogsduring World War II, with very limited success; as a counterpart to the German Goliath theTeletankwas used as a remote-controlled unmanned tank.
The Japanese forces employed suicide attacks with pole-mounted anti-tank mines dubbedlunge minesduring late World War II.^[13]In Vietnam, similar mines were calledbom ba càngdue to the three contact points at the head of each mine.

Grenades[edit]

Regularfragmentation grenadeswere ineffective against tanks, so many kinds of anti-tank grenades were developed. These ranged fromhollow chargedesigns (e.g., the BritishNo. 68 AT Grenade), to ones that simply contained a lot of explosive (the BritishNo. 73 Grenade). To increase their effectiveness, some grenades were designed so that they adhered to the tank either through an adhesive (sticky bomb) or with a magnet. The Germans used a magnetic grenade, theHafthohlladungto ensure that theshaped chargewould fire at the optimal 90° angle to the armor.

There was also a special type of grenade called theNebelhandgranatenorBlendkörper( "smoke hand grenades" ), which was supposed to be smashed over an air vent and fill the tank with smoke, widely used by both sides inWorld War II.Molotov cocktailsalso saw much use, especially in theWinter War,early tanks (such as theT-26) being very vulnerable to them, but later tanks required a well-thrown bottle directly over the engine compartment to have any effect at all.

On the whole, thrown anti-tank weapons suffered from a variety of drawbacks. In addition to the inherently short range, they required careful aim to be effective, and those that relied on explosive force were often so powerful that the user had to take cover immediately.

Additionally, with hand-thrown grenades, the requirement for the attacker to get close to the tank made the attacker exceptionally vulnerable to counter-attack from the tank (typically by machine gun), or from infantry – mounted or dismounted troops – accompanying the tank. However, if the attacker were very low to the ground, and in very close proximity to the tank – for instance 30 feet (9.1 meters) or less – it might be impossible for the tank crew to see the attacker.^[14]

Tactics[edit]

Anti-tank tactics developed rapidly during the war but along different paths in different armies based on the threats they faced and the technologies they were able to produce. Very little development took place in UK because weapons available in 1940 were judged adequate for engaging Italian and German tanks during most of theNorth African Campaign.Its experience therefore failed to influence the US Army's anti-tank doctrine prior to 1944. From 1941, German anti-tank tactics developed rapidly as a result of being surprised by the previously unknown Soviet tank designs, forcing introduction of new technologies and new tactics. The Red Army was also faced with a new challenge in anti-tank warfare after losing most of its tank fleet and a considerable part of its anti-tank capable cannons.

Anti-tank tactics during the war were largely integrated with the offensive or defensive posture of the troops being supported, usually infantry. Most anti-tank tactics depend on the range effectiveness of various weapons and weapon systems available. These are divided as follows:

Operational range over the horizon (20–40 km range)
Bomber aircraft and long range artillery
Tactical staging areas (7–20 km range)
Ground attack aircraft and field artillery includingMRLs
Tactical zone forming-up area and rear combat zone (2–7 km range)
Heavy anti-tank guns and mortars
Tactical forward combat zone (1–2 km range)
Anti-tank guns and tanks deployed in defense
Engagement distance (200–1000 m range)
Mines and anti-tank rifles
Close combat distance (25–200 m range)
Infantry anti-tank weapons

Ground-to-air cooperation was not yet systematic in any army of the period, but given sufficient warning ground attack aircraft could support ground troops even during an enemy attack in an attempt to interdict the enemy units before they come into tactical combat zone. Various bomb loads can be used depending on what type of tank unit is engaged in at the time or who its accompanying troops are. This is an indirect form of anti-tank warfare where the tanks are denied the opportunity to even reach combat.

Field artillery was particularly effective in firing against tank formations because although they were rarely able to destroy a tank by direct penetration, they would severely crater the area preventing the tanks from moving therefore causing them to become nearly stationary targets for the ground attack aircraft, or disrupting the enemy schedule and allowing own troops more time to prepare their defense.

Anti-tank defense proper was by 1942 designed in First World War fashion with several prepared trench lines incorporating anti-tank weapons of different abilities. Depending on terrain and the available line-of-sight, the longer-ranged guns could begin to fire on approaching tanks from as far as 2 kilometers, which was also the range at which German Panther and Tiger tank gunners were trained to fire. Anti-tank guns were usually deployed to cover terrain more suitable for tanks, and were protected by minefields laid at about 500 meters to 1 kilometer from their positions by combat engineers. In the Red Army the anti-tank rifle units would be positioned throughout the forward trench line and would engage the lighter tanks and any other vehicles, such as infantry half-tracks in an attempt to separate them from the tanks. The anti-tank guns deployed further back would often hold their fire until enemy tanks were within the most effective range for their ammunition. Where there were insufficient anti-tank weapons, engineers would construct anti-tank obstacles such asdragon's teethorczech hedgehog.

Towed anti-tank guns were thought to be the primary means of defeating tanks. At thebattle of Kurskfor example, the Red Army deployed more artillery regiments than infantry regiments and towed gun densities reached over 20 guns per kilometer of defended tactical zone. A towed gun was much cheaper than a tank and could be concealed in a shallow position. When time allowed, dugouts with strong overhead cover could be constructed. Guns deployed on reverse slopes and in flanking positions could take a toll of attacking tanks. However, gun crews were vulnerable to artillery, mortar HE fire and enemy infantry. Their positions had to be carefully selected and once engaged, they generally could not redeploy. Experience strongly suggested that towed AT guns were less effective than self-propelled AT weapons and took heavier casualties.

The tactic of ambushing enemy armor at grazing shot distances was perfected during World War 2. Some combatants, like the Soviet Red Army, doctrinalized it and used it to engage heavy German armor at optimal distances and angles.

Self-propelled anti-tank guns were rare at the beginning of WW2, although theBelgian Armydeployed a few T.15 tank destroyers and the French army was developing several wheeled and tracked designs. The advantages of mobility and even thin armor protection were so compelling that most armies were using self-propelled AT guns by mid-war. Examples of these weapons included theUS M10,GermanJagdpanzer IV,and SovietSU-85.

Infantry close assault[edit]

The tank is still vulnerable to infantry, especially in close country or built-up areas. Rough terrain may expose the floor armor, and high ground such as multi-story buildings may expose the top armor. Their large size and loud noise can allow enemy infantry to spot, track and evade tanks until an opportunity presents itself for counter-attack.

Because tank crews have limited visibility from inside the tank, infantry can get close to a tank given enough concealment and if the hatches are closed. If tank crewmen unbutton for better visibility they become vulnerable to small arms fire, grenades and molotov cocktails. An infantryman cannot be targeted by a tank's main gun when close, as it cannot depress sufficiently. Close defense weapons such as pistol ports, hull-, coaxial- and pintle-mounted machine guns gave them some protection however.

Whilst many hand-held infantry anti-tank weapons will not penetrate the front armor of a tank, they may penetrate the less heavily armored top, rear, and sides. Anti-tank weapons can damage the tracks or running gear to inflict amobility kill.Early WWII tanks had open vision slits that could be fired through to harm the crew. Later tanks' slits had thick glass, and sights and periscopes which could still be damaged with powerful small arms such asanti-tank riflesandheavy machine guns,hampering the crew. If all else fails, the hatch could also be forced open and grenades thrown inside, although later tank designs often have hatches designed to be difficult to open from the outside.

Tanks were also vulnerable to hand-placed anti-tank mines. Infantry have even immobilized tanks using a set of plates covered with leaves and dirt as dummy mines – the ruse being augmented by the crew's obscured vision – infantry can then attack the stopped tank. This tactic was taught to theBritish Home Guardduring World War II since they were not often provided with long-range anti-tank weapons.^[15]

In some cases in World War II, a tactic of some infantry was to run directly up to a tank, avoiding its main and machine guns, and pour petrol over and into the tank and light it, sometimes blocking the exit, burning the crew alive.^{[citation needed]}

In the Japanese army, the use of satchel charges and pole charges was widespread. Although the charges could knock out any allied tank, the tactic was extremely close-range and the sappers were vulnerable to allied weapons.

Suicide bombing[edit]

Chinese troops in theSecond Sino-Japanese Warusedsuicide bombingagainst Japanese tanks. Chinese troopsstrapped explosives like grenade packs or dynamite to their bodiesand threw themselves under Japanese tanks to blow them up.^[16]This tactic was used during theBattle of Shanghai,where a Chinese suicide bomber stopped a Japanese tank column by exploding himself beneath the lead tank,^[17]and at theBattle of Taierzhuangwhere dynamite and grenades were strapped on by Chinese troops who rushed at Japanese tanks and blew themselves up.^[18]^[19]^[20]^[21]^[22]^[23]During one incident at Taierzhuang, Chinese suicide bombers obliterated four Japanese tanks with grenade bundles.^[24]^[25]

North Korean tanks were attacked by South Koreans with suicide tactics during the North Korean invasion of the South.^[26]^[27]

American tanks at Seoul were attacked by North Korean suicide squads,^[28]who used satchel charges.^[29]A North Korean soldier who exploded an American tank with a suicide bomb named Li Su-Bok is hailed as a hero in North Korean propaganda.^[30]

During theIran–Iraq War,the IranianMohammad Hossein Fahmidehblew himself up under an Iraqi tank with a grenade.

According to the Sudanese writer Mansour Al-Hadj, Sudanese jihadists were trained to attack enemy tanks by suicide bombing them.^[31]

Korean War[edit]

The initial assault by North Korean KPA forces during theKorean Warwas aided by the use of SovietT-34-85tanks.^[32]A North Koreantank corpsequipped with about 120 T-34s spearheaded the invasion. These drove against a ROK Army with few anti-tank weapons adequate to deal with the Soviet T-34s.^[33]The North Korean tanks had a good deal of early successes against South Korean infantry, elements of the24th Infantry Division,and the United States builtM24 Chaffeelight tanks that they encountered.^[34]^[35]For the UN forces, aerial interdiction by ground attack aircraft was the only means of slowing the advancing North Korean armor. The tide turned in favour of the United Nations forces in August 1950 when the North Koreans suffered major tank losses during a series of battles in which the UN forces brought heavier equipment to develop an anti-tank role, including U.S.M4A3 Shermanmedium tanks backed byM26 Pershingheavy tanks, along with BritishCenturion,Churchill,andCromwelltanks.^[36]

In the U.S., the 2.36 in (60 mm) M9A1bazookarocket launcher evolved into the more powerful 3.5 in (89 mm) M20 "Super Bazooka", which was used to good effect against North Korean armored spearheads during the Korean War. However, the M20 proved difficult and cumbersome to portage on foot over long distances. TheAnti-Tank Aircraft Rocket,developed by the navy, also proved effective against North Korean tanks.

Cold War[edit]

In the Cold War era, HEAT became an almost universal choice outside of artillery and tank units. The British had developed theHigh-explosive squash head(HESH) warhead as a weapon for attacking fortifications during the war, and found it surprisingly effective against tanks. Although these systems allowed infantry to take on even the largest tanks, and, like HEAT, its effectiveness was independent of range, infantry typically operated at short range. A major influence in anti-tank warfare came with the development and evolution ofanti-tank guided missiles(ATGM) that could be fired by infantry operators, from ground vehicles and by aircraft. Increasing use ofcombined armstactics allowed the attacking infantry to suppress the anti-tank crews effectively, meaning that they could typically get off only one or two shots before being countered or forced to move.