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April Glaspie

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April Catherine Glaspie
13thUnited States Ambassador to Iraq
In office
September 5, 1988 – July 30, 1990
PresidentRonald Reagan
George H. W. Bush
Preceded byDavid George Newton
Succeeded byJoseph C. Wilson
Personal details
Born(1942-04-26)April 26, 1942(age 82)
Vancouver,British Columbia,Canada
Alma materJohns Hopkins University'sPaul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
ProfessionDiplomat

April Catherine Glaspie(born April 26, 1942) is an American formerdiplomatand senior member of theForeign Service,best known for her role in the events leading up to theGulf War.

Early life

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Glaspie was born inVancouver,British Columbia,and graduated fromMills CollegeinOakland, California,in 1963, and fromJohns Hopkins University'sPaul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studiesin 1965.

In 1966 Glaspie entered the United Statesforeign service,where she became an expert on theMiddle East.In 1969, Glaspie won theMeritorious Honor Awardfrom the State Department.[1]She was also the winner of the 1977 Director General's Award for Reporting and as a result her name was inscribed on a permanent plaque in the Department's Foreign Service Lounge.[1]After postings inKuwait,Syria,andEgypt,Glaspie was appointedambassador to Iraqin 1988. She was the first woman to be appointed an American ambassador to an Arab country. She had a reputation as a respectedArabist,and her instructions were to broaden cultural and commercial contacts with the Iraqi regime.

Subsequently, Glaspie was posted to the U.S. Mission to theUnited NationsinNew York City.She was later posted toSouth AfricaasConsul generalinCape Town.She held this post until her retirement in 2002.

Career

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United States Ambassador to Iraq

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Meetings with Saddam Hussein

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See also:Iraq-United States relations

Glaspie's appointment as U.S. ambassador to Iraq followed a period from 1980 to 1989[2]during which the United States had given covert support to Iraq duringits war with Iran.

Glaspie had her first meeting with Iraqi PresidentSaddam Husseinand his Deputy Prime Minister,Tariq Aziz,on July 25, 1990. In her telegram from July 25, 1990, to the Department of State, Glaspie summarized the meeting as follows:

Saddam told the ambassador on July 25 thatMubarakhas arranged for Kuwaiti and Iraqi delegations to meet inRiyadh,and then on July 28, 29 or 30, the Kuwaiti crown prince will come to Baghdad for serious negotiations. "Nothing serious will happen" before then, Saddam had promised Mubarak.[citation needed]

One version of the transcript has Glaspie saying:[citation needed]

We can see that you have deployed massive numbers of troops in the south. Normally that would be none of our business, but when this happens in the context of your threats against Kuwait, then it would be reasonable for us to be concerned. For this reason, I have received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship — not confrontation — regarding your intentions: Why are your troops massed so very close to Kuwait's borders?

Later the transcript has Glaspie saying:[citation needed]

We have no opinion on your Arab-Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait.Secretary Bakerhas directed me to emphasize the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960s, that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America.

April Glaspie meets Saddam Hussein in 1990 (Sadoun al-Zubaydicenter)

Another version of the transcript (the one published inThe New York Timeson 23 September 1990) has Glaspie saying:

But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait. I was in the American Embassy in Kuwait during the late 1960s. The instruction we had during this period was that we should express no opinion on this issue and that the issue is not associated with America. James Baker has directed our official spokesmen to emphasize this instruction. We hope you can solve this problem using any suitable methods via Klibi (Chedli Klibi,Secretary General of theArab League) or viaPresident Mubarak.All that we hope is that these issues are solved quickly.

When these purported transcripts were made public, Glaspie was accused of having given tacit approval for theIraqi invasion of Kuwait,which took place on August 2, 1990. It was argued that Glaspie's statements that "We have no opinion on your Arab-Arab conflicts" and that "the Kuwait issue is not associated with America" were interpreted by Saddam as giving free rein to handle his disputes with Kuwait as he saw fit. It was also argued that Saddam would not have invaded Kuwait had he been given an explicit warning that such an invasion would be met with force by the United States.[3][4]JournalistEdward Mortimerwrote in theNew York Review of Booksin November 1990:

It seems far more likely that Saddam Hussein went ahead with the invasion because he believed the US would not react with anything more than verbal condemnation. That was an inference he could well have drawn from his meeting with US Ambassador April Glaspie on July 25, and from statements by State Department officials in Washington at the same time publicly disavowing any US security commitments to Kuwait, but also from the success of both theReaganand theBushadministrations in heading off attempts by the US Senate to impose sanctions on Iraq for previous breaches of international law.

In September 1990, a pair of British journalists confronted Glaspie with the transcript of her meeting with Saddam Hussein, to which she replied that "Obviously, I didn't think, and nobody else did, that the Iraqis were going to take all of Kuwait."[5]

In April 1991 Glaspie testified before theSenate Foreign Relations Committee.She said that at the July 25 meeting she had "repeatedly warned Iraqi President Saddam Hussein against using force to settle his dispute with Kuwait." She also said that Saddam had lied to her by denying he would invade Kuwait. Asked to explain how Saddam could have interpreted her comments as implying U.S. approval for the invasion of Kuwait, she replied: "We foolishly did not realize he [Saddam] was stupid." In July 1991 State Department spokespersonRichard Bouchersaid at a press briefing:[6]

We have faith in Ambassador Glaspie's reporting. She sent us cables on her meetings based on notes that were made after the meeting. She also provided five hours or more of testimony in front of the Committee about the series of meetings that she had, including this meeting with Saddam Hussein.

The cables that Glaspie sent from Iraq about her meeting with Saddam are no longer classified.[5]Glaspie's cable on her meeting with Saddam reports that PresidentGeorge H. W. Bush"had instructed her to broaden and deepen our relations with Iraq." Saddam, in turn, offered "warm greetings" to Bush and was "surely sincere" about not wanting war, the cable said.[7]

Glaspie herself for years remained silent on the subject of her actions in Iraq. But in March 2008 she gave an interview to theLebanesenewspaperDar Al-Hayat.[8]In the interview, she said she has no regrets. "It is over," Glaspie said.

Nobody wants to take the blame. I am quite happy to take the blame. Perhaps I was not able to make Saddam Hussein believe that we would do what we said we would do, but in all honesty, I don't think anybody in the world could have persuaded him.

In the interview, Glaspie recalled that her meeting with Saddam was interrupted when the Iraqi president received a phone call from Egyptian PresidentHosni Mubarak.Saddam told her he had assured Mubarak that he would try to settle the dispute, she said. Her cable backs up this version of events; the Iraqi transcript, prepared by Saddam's official English language translator,Sadoun al-Zubaydi,records Saddam saying that Mubarak called before he met with Glaspie. [9] [2]

Retrospective views

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In 2002, theWashington Report on Middle East Affairspublished a new account of the Glaspie-Saddam meeting byAndrew Killgore,a former U.S. ambassador toQatar.Killgore summarized the meeting as follows:[10]

At their meeting, the American ambassador explained to Saddam that the United States did not take a stand on Arab-Arab conflicts, such as Iraq’s border disagreement with Kuwait. She made clear, however, that differences should be settled by peaceful means.

Glaspie’s concerns were greatly eased when Saddam told her that the forthcoming Iraq-Kuwait meeting inJeddahwas for protocol purposes, to be followed by substantive discussions to be held in Baghdad.

In response to the ambassador’s question, Saddam named a date when Kuwaiti Crown PrinceShaikh Sa’ad Abdallahwould be arriving in Baghdad for those substantive discussions. (This appears in retrospect to have been Saddam’s real deception.)

The points referenced in the second and third paragraphs do not appear in the purported transcripts of the Glaspie-Saddam meeting that were released by Iraq, and on which most of the subsequent criticism of Glaspie is based. If there is a full transcript of the meeting in existence, or if the State Department declassifies Glaspie's cables about the meeting, a different assessment might be reached on her performance.

James Akins,the U.S. Ambassador toSaudi Arabiaat the time, offered a somewhat different perspective in a 2000 interview onPBS:[11]

[Glaspie] took the straight American line, which is we do not take positions on border disputes between friendly countries. That's standard. That's what you always say. You would not have said, 'Mr. President, if you really are considering invading Kuwait, by God, we'll bring down the wrath of God on your palaces, and on your country, and you'll all be destroyed.' She wouldn't say that, nor would I. Neither would any diplomat.

Joseph C. Wilson,Glaspie'sDeputy Chief of Missionin Baghdad, referred to her meeting with Saddam Hussein in a May 14, 2004 interview onDemocracy Now!:an "Iraqi participant in the meeting [...] said to me very clearly that Saddam did not misunderstand, did not think he was getting a green or yellow light."

Wilson's and Akins' views on this question are in line with those of former Deputy Prime MinisterTariq Aziz,who stated in a 1996 interview withFrontlinethat, prior to theinvasion of Kuwait,Iraq "had no illusions" about the likelihood of U.S. military intervention. Similarly, in a 2000Frontlineinterview, Aziz declared, "There were no mixed signals", and further elaborated:

...it was a routine meeting.... She didn't say anything extraordinary beyond what any professional diplomat would say without previous instructions from his government. She did not ask for an audience with the president [Saddam]. She was summoned by the president.... She was not prepared.... People in Washington were asleep, so she needed a half-hour to contact anybody in Washington and seek instructions. So, what she said were routine, classical comments on what the president was asking her to convey to President Bush.[12]

Kenneth Pollackof theBrookings Institution,writing inThe New York Timeson February 21, 2003, disagreed with the previously cited views of observers likeEdward Mortimer.On Mortimer's stated belief that it was likely Saddam Hussein went ahead with the invasion because he drew as inference from his meeting with Glaspie that the US would react with nothing more than verbal condemnation, Pollack said:

In fact, all the evidence indicates the opposite: Saddam Hussein believed it was highly likely that the United States would try to liberate Kuwait but convinced himself that we would send only lightly armed, rapidly deployable forces that would be quickly destroyed by his 120,000-manRepublican Guard.After this, he assumed, Washington would acquiesce to his conquest.

ProfessorsJohn MearsheimerandStephen Waltwrite in the January/February 2003 edition ofForeign Policythat Saddam approached the U.S. to find out how it would react to an invasion into Kuwait. Along with Glaspie's comment that "'[W]e have no opinion on the Arab–Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait', the U.S. State Department had earlier told Saddam that Washington had 'no special defense or security commitments to Kuwait.' The United States may not have intended to give Iraq a green light, but that is effectively what it did."[13]

Following theUS diplomatic cables leakand the January 2011 publication of Glaspie's July 1990 cable describing her discussion with Saddam,Juan Colenoted that Glaspie "pressed the dictator on the meaning of his troop build-up on the Kuwaiti border, letting him clearly know of American anxieties," and argued that "her infamous reference to the U.S. not getting involved in inter-Arab disputes referred to a limited issue, the exact border between Iraq and Kuwait, and could not possibly have been interpreted as permission to invade Kuwait!" Cole concluded: "Ms. Glaspie's detractors owe her an apology."[14][15]

In his 2024 bookThe Achilles Trap,Steve Collargues that Glaspie became a convenient scapegoat for broader United States Government failures to recognize and respond to Saddam Hussein's intention to invade Kuwait. Coll suggests Glaspie was especially constrained by the positive attitudes toward Saddam of the Bush administration at that time:

[Glaspie] became a convenient distraction from the fact that her Boss, President Bush, wrote several ingratiating letters to Saddam during 1990. Glaspie was in no position to threaten Saddam with America's military might, absent instructions; Bush was commander in chief.

Additionally, Coll points to Saddam's admission years later, and recent supporting evidence, that the meeting with Glaspie had little impact on his intention to invade, which at the time of the meeting was already decided.[16]

United Nations ambassador in Somalia

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Main article:United Nations Operation in Somalia II

Glaspie served as aUnited Nationsambassador during pivotal events in 1993 in theUnited Nations Operation in Somalia IIduring theSomali Civil War.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 794was unanimously passed on December 3, 1992, which approved a coalition ofUnited Nations peacekeepersled by the United States. Forming theUnified Task Force(UNITAF), the alliance was tasked with assuring security until humanitarian efforts aimed at stabilizing the situation were transferred to the UN. Landing in 1993, the UN peacekeeping coalition started the two-yearUnited Nations Operation in Somalia II(UNOSOM II) primarily in the south.[17]UNITAF's original mandate was to use "all necessary means" to guarantee the delivery of humanitarian aid in accordance toChapter VII of the United Nations Charter.[18]

Major disagreements between the UN and theSomali National Alliance(SNA) began soon after the establishment of UNOSOM II, centering on the perceived true nature of the operations political mandate.[19]In early May 1993, SNA head GeneralMohammed Farah Aididand ColonelAbdullahi Yusufof theSomali Salvation Democratic Front(SSDF) agreed to convene a peace conference for central Somalia. In light of recent conflict between the two, the initiative was seen a major step towards halting the Somali Civil War.[20][21]Gen. Aidid, having initiated the talks with Col. Yusuf, considered himself the conference chair, setting the agenda.[19]Beginning 9 May, elder delegations from their respective clans,Habr GidrandMajerteen,met.[22]While Aidid and Yusuf aimed for a central Somalia-focused conference, they clashed with UNOSOM, which aimed to include other regions and replace Aidid's chairmanship with ex-PresidentAbdullah Osman,a staunch critic of Aidid.[19]As the conference began, Aidid sought assistance from UNOSOM ambassadorLansana Kouyate,who proposed air transport for delegates and a 14-day accommodation. However, he was called back to New York and replaced by April Glaspie, following which UNOSOM retracted its offer. Aidid resorted to private aircraft to transport delegates. Following the aircraft incident, Aidid would publicly rebuke theUnited NationsonRadio Mogadishufor interference in Somali internal affairs.[23]

The contention between the Somali National Alliance and UNOSOM from this point forward would begin to manifest in anti-UNOSOM propaganda broadcast from SNA controlledRadio Mogadishu.[19]

Radio Mogadishu

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Radio Mogadishuwas a popular broadcasting station controlled by theSNA.[24]It had in recent weeks begun airing anti American and anti-UNOSOM propaganda condemning interference in Somali politics after UN envoyAdmiral Johnathan Howehad rejected the May peace conference Aidid had set up.[24]On the airwaves Aidid would publicly accuse UNOSOM II of engaging incolonialismand "imperialistdesigns ".[25]These broadcasts greatly incensed UNOSOM officials and consequently a significant debate occurred over how best to deal with the station. According to then UNOSOM advisorJohn Drysdale,the UN's 'obsession' with the station was largely driven by US diplomat April Galspie. She held the view that the station should be destroyed or transferred to UNOSOM control, and felt so passionately about the issue that she had threatened to resign if the station was not dealt with. While certain UN officials felt that Radio Mogadishu broadcasts had become a threat to UNOSOM's image, other officials and advisors noted that the broadcasts rhetoric were relatively mild and well within the bounds of reasonable speech. Drysdale argues that, "There was virtually nothing in these broadcasts during May to which UNOSOM could have taken exception to. The language was moderate; there was no incitement, no subversion."[26]

From 1 May to 3 June 1993, Aidid spoke on the station publicly eight times. Four of the broadcasts were critical of UNOSOM, and focused on the UN's handling of the May peace conference. There were also three uncritical statements of UNOSOM, during which he thanked officials publicly for aiding Somalia's rehabilitation. The most serious public criticism was on 3 June 1993, when Aidid accused the UN of interference in the creation of a judiciary.[26]

On May 31, 1993, Aidids political rivals met withJohnathan Howeand attempted to convince him to take over Radio Mogadishu, a meeting Aidid was made well aware of. Rumor quickly began spreading across the city that the UNOSOM had actually resolved to shut down Radio Mogadishu entirely, which further angered Aidid, rumors which corroborated after the fact by the US special envoy to Somalia,Robert B. Oakley.[24][27]The belief that UNOSOM was planning to seize station was reportedly widespread among Mogadishu residents.[28]Mohammed Sahnoun,the representative of theUN Secretary-Generalin Somalia duringUNOSOM I,reported that rumours of an attempted UN shut down of the station had reached him days before the incident.[29]According to ambassadorOakley,Aidid saw the targeting of his SNA controlled station as specifically unfair on account of his main political rivalAli Mahdialso having a radio station that UNOSOM was not threatening, due to Mahdi's claim that it was private.[24]

Radio Mogadishu and 5 June 1993 inspection

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Main article:June 1993 attack on Pakistani military in Somalia
Mogadishu skyline from UNOSOM convoy (1993)

Radio Mogadishuwas considered a vital piece of SNA infrastructure that had been captured following a vicious battle withAli Mahdi'sforces. Following theKismayo and Galkayo incidentsthat station began to air anti-UNOSOM propaganda, incensing high ranking UN personnel. It was feared that the broadcasts would shift the attitudes of the Somali public towards the United Nations operation, leading UNOSOM officials to resolve to close the station. In mid-May, the Pakistani contingent was asked to draw up a plan to shut down the station. The Pakistanis did not possess the technical expertise required for such an operation and requested that the US supply experts.[19][30]

Importantly,Radio Mogadishuhad also been anAuthorized Weapons Store Site(AWSS), subject to UNOSOM inspection. It was decided the American special forces technicians would accompany a Pakistani weapons inspection team to the site in order to determine how to disable the station. Gen. Aidid and the upper echelons of theSomali National Alliance,had been made aware of the discussions to seize or destroy the station.[19]

According to the 1994 United Nations Inquiry:

Opinions differ, even among UNOSOM officials, on whether the weapons inspections of 5 June 1993 was genuine or was merely a cover-up for reconnaissance and subsequent seizure of Radio Mogadishu.[31]

On the morning of Saturday June 5, 1993 an element of the Pakistani force in Somalia had been tasked with the inspection of siteAWSS 5,which happened to be located at Aidid controlledRadio Mogadishu.The station was popular across the city, even among those who did not like Aidid or the Habr Gidr clan and concern that UNOSOM was coming to shut it down infuriated many citizens of Mogadishu.[32]The fighting would result in 24 Pakistanis and dozens of Somalis killed.[33]UNOSOM believed forces associated with Aidid were behind the attack.[34]The 1994 UN Inquiry would conclude that in absence of a "...more convincing explanation," it believed theSomali National Alliancewas most likely behind the attack. Despite this, the commission noted that no evidence existed to back previous UNOSOM assertions that the attack had been pre-planned or pre-meditated by the SNA, and further noted that the incident had likely been a spontaneous reaction.[33]

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Glaspie was portrayed byJacqueline Kingin the limited seriesHouse of Saddam.[35]

References

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  1. ^ab"April Glaspie wins '77 reporting award".Department of State Newsletter.No. 197. January 1978. pp. 20–21 – via Hathitrust and University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Library.
  2. ^abBradsher, Keith (10 February 1994)."Senator Says U.S. Let Iraq Get Lethal Viruses".The New York Times.New York Times.Retrieved6 April2018.
  3. ^Saddam's message of friendship to George BushSept 23, 1990
  4. ^Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting with U.S. EnvoySept 23, 1990
  5. ^abEx-Envoy Details Hussein Meetingwashingtonpost
  6. ^"US Department of State Daily Press Briefing #113".Archived fromthe originalon 2010-07-10.Retrieved2010-10-06.
  7. ^American Embassy in Iraq (July 25, 1990)."Saddam's Message of Friendship to President Bush"(PDF)– via The Washington Post.
  8. ^Dar Al Hayat
  9. ^Bradsher, Keith (1994-02-10)."Senator Says U.S. Let Iraq Get Lethal Viruses".The New York Times.ISSN0362-4331.Retrieved2020-01-01.
  10. ^"Tales of the Foreign Service: In Defense of April Glaspie"Washington Report on Middle East Affairs,August 2002
  11. ^"Interviews - James Akins - The Survival Of Saddam - FRONTLINE - PBS".PBS.
  12. ^"Interviews - Tariq Aziz - The Survival Of Saddam - FRONTLINE - PBS".PBS.
  13. ^John Mearsheimer;Stephen Walt(Jan–Feb 2003). "An unnecessary war".Foreign Policy(134): 54.
  14. ^Jeffery, Simon (2011-01-07)."WikiLeaks: the latest developments".The Guardian.Retrieved2017-10-12.
  15. ^Cole, Juan(2011-01-03)."Glaspie Memo Vindicates Her, Shows Saddam's Thinking".Informed Comment.Retrieved2017-10-12.
  16. ^Coll, Steve(2024).The Achilles Trap: Saddam Hussein, the C.I.A., and the Origins of America's Invasion of Iraq.Penguin Press. pp. 169–170.ISBN9780525562269.
  17. ^Ken Rutherford,Humanitarianism Under Fire: The US and UN Intervention in Somalia,Kumarian Press, July 2008ArchivedMarch 10, 2020, at theWayback MachineISBN1-56549-260-9
  18. ^"United Nations Operation In Somalia I – (Unosom I)".United Nations.Archivedfrom the original on April 8, 2011.RetrievedJanuary 29,2012.
  19. ^abcdefYamin, Tughral (2019).UN Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia The Pakistani Perspective.Paramount Books.ISBN9789696375227.
  20. ^Drysdale, John(1994).Whatever Happened to Somalia?: A tale of tragic blunders.Haan.ISBN1874209510,p. 167.
  21. ^"Peacemaking at the Crossroads: Consolidation of the 1993 Mudug Peace Agreement"(PDF).Puntland Development Research Centre.
  22. ^Drysdale 1994,p. 167.
  23. ^Drysdale 1994,p. 167-168.
  24. ^abcdOakley, Robert B. (1995).Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping.United States: United States Institute of Peace Press. pp. 115–121.ISBN1878379410.
  25. ^Peterson, Scott (2000).Me against my brother: at war in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda: a journalist reports from the battlefields of Africa.New York: Routledge.ISBN0-415-92198-8.OCLC43287853.
  26. ^abDrysdale 1994,p. 173-174.
  27. ^Boulden, Jane (2001).Peace enforcement: the United Nations experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia.Praeger.ISBN0-275-96906-1.OCLC925049446.
  28. ^"UN troops died 'trying to take Somali radio station': Security Council".The Independent.1993-06-07.Retrieved2023-05-16.
  29. ^Lyman, Rick (6 Oct 1993)."The Day Somalia Fell Apart - Again -- June 5 Incident Started Setback".archive.seattletimes.Retrieved2023-05-16.
  30. ^Drysdale 1994,pp. 164–195.
  31. ^UN Secretary-General (1994-06-01).UN Commission of Inquiry Established under Security Council Resolution 885 (1994) to Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II(Report). p. 22.
  32. ^Maren, Micheal (1997).The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid International Charity.United States: The Free Press. pp. 222–228.ISBN0743227867.
  33. ^abReport of the Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 885 (1993) to Investigate Armed Attack on UNOSOM II Personnel Which Led to Casualties Among Them.United Nations.1994.
  34. ^McCoy, Dorcas (2000)."American Post-Cold War Images and Foreign Policy Preferences Toward 'Dependent' States: A Case Study of Somalia".World Affairs.163(1): 43.JSTOR20672595.
  35. ^"Jacqueline King".AHA.Retrieved2020-01-01.
[edit]
Diplomatic posts
Preceded by United States Ambassador to Iraq
1988–1990 		Succeeded by
post abolished


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