Battle of Tsushima

Battle of Tsushima
	Part of theRusso-Japanese War
	; Painting depictingAdmiral Tōgōon the "Compass Deck" above the bridge ofMikasaat the start of the battle. Thesignal flagbeing hoistedrepresents the letterZ,a special instruction to his fleet.
Date	27–28 May 1905
Location	Tsushima Strait34°33.98′N130°9.06′E/ 34.56633°N 130.15100°E
Result	Japanese victory
Belligerents
Empire of Japan	Russian Empire
Commanders and leaders
Tōgō Heihachirō; Kamimura Hikonojō; Kataoka Shichirō	Zinovy Rozhestvensky; Nikolai Nebogatov; Oskar Enqvist
Strength
5 battleships; 29 cruisers; 3 gunboats; 21 destroyers; 45 torpedo boats; 22 auxiliary vessels	8 battleships; 3 coastal battleships; 9 cruisers; 9 destroyers; 9 auxiliary vessels
Casualties and losses
117 dead; 583 injured; 3 torpedo boats sunk; (255tonssunk)	5,045 dead; 803 injured; 6,016 captured; 6 battleships sunk; 1 coastal battleship sunk; 14 other ships sunk; 2 battleships captured; 2 coastal battleships captured; 1 destroyer captured; 6 ships disarmed; (135,893tonssunk)

TheBattle of Tsushima(‹See Tfd›Russian:Цусимское сражение,Tsusimskoye srazheniye), also known in Japan as theBattle of the Sea of Japan(Japanese:Nhật Bản hải hải chiến,Hepburn:Nihonkai kaisen),was the final naval battle of theRusso-Japanese War,fought on 27–28 May 1905 in theTsushima Strait.A devastating defeat for theImperial Russian Navy,the battle was the onlydecisiveengagement ever fought between modern steelbattleshipfleets^[4]^[5]and the first in whichwireless telegraphy(radio) played a critically important role. The battle was described by contemporarySir George Clarke^[f]as "by far the greatest and the most important naval event sinceTrafalgar".^[6]

The battle involved the Japanese Combined Fleet under AdmiralTōgō Heihachirōand the Russian Second Pacific Squadron under AdmiralZinovy Rozhestvensky,which had sailed over seven months and 18,000nautical miles(33,000 km) from theBaltic Sea.The Russians hoped to reachVladivostokand establish naval control of the Far East in order to relieve theImperial Russian ArmyinManchuria.The Russian fleet had a large advantage in the number of battleships, but was overall older and slower than the Japanese fleet. The Russians were sighted in the early morning on 27 May, and the battle began in the afternoon. Rozhestvensky was wounded and knocked unconscious in the initial action, and four of his battleships were sunk by sunset. At night, Japanesedestroyersandtorpedo boatsattacked the remaining ships, and AdmiralNikolai Nebogatovsurrendered in the morning of 28 May.

All 11 Russian battleships were lost, out of which seven were sunk and four captured. Only a few warships escaped, with one cruiser and two destroyers reaching Vladivostok, and two auxiliary cruisers as well as one transport escaping back to Madagascar. Three cruisers wereinternedatManilaby the United States until the war was over. Eight auxiliaries and one destroyer were disarmed andremandedat Shanghai by China. Russian casualties were high, with more than 5,000 dead and 6,000 captured. The Japanese, which had lost no heavy ships, had 117 dead.

The loss of almost every heavy warship of theBaltic Fleetforced Russia to sue for peace, and theTreaty of Portsmouthwas signed in September 1905. In Japan, the battle was hailed as one of the greatest naval victories inJapanese history,and Admiral Tōgō was revered as a national hero.^[g]His flagshipMikasahas been preserved as amuseum shipinYokosukaHarbour.

Background

Conflict in the Far East

On 8 February 1904, destroyers of theImperial Japanese Navylaunched a surprise attack on the Russian Far East Fleet anchored inPort Arthur;three ships – two battleships and a cruiser – were damaged in the attack. The Russo-Japanese war had thus begun. Japan's first objective was to secure its lines of communication and supply to the Asian mainland, enabling it to conduct a ground war inManchuria.To achieve this, it was necessary to neutralize Russian naval power in the Far East. At first, the Russian naval forces remained inactive and did not engage the Japanese, who staged unopposed landings in Korea. The Russians were revitalised by the arrival of AdmiralStepan Makarovand were able to achieve some degree of success against the Japanese, but on 13 April Makarov's flagship, the battleshipPetropavlovsk,struck a mine and sank; Makarov was among the dead.^[7]His successors failed to challenge the Japanese Navy, and the remaining six Russian battleships^[h]and five armoured cruisers^[i]were effectively bottled up in their base at Port Arthur.

By May, the Japanese had landed forces on theLiaodong Peninsulaand in August began thesiege of the naval station.On 9 August, AdmiralWilgelm Vitgeft,commander of the 1st Pacific Squadron, was ordered to sortie his fleet toVladivostok,^[8]link up with the Squadron stationed there, and then engage the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) in a decisive battle.^[9]Both squadrons of theRussian Pacific Fleetwould ultimately become dispersed during theBattle of the Yellow Sea,where Admiral Vitgeft was killed by asalvostrike from the Japanese battleshipAsahion 10 August, and theBattle off Ulsanon 14 August 1904. What remained of Russian Pacific naval power wouldeventually be sunk in Port Arthurin December 1904.^[10]

Departure

With the inactivity of the First Pacific Squadron after the death of Admiral Makarov and the tightening of the Japanese noose around Port Arthur, the Russians considered sending part of theirBaltic Fleetto the Far East. The plan was to relieve Port Arthur by sea, link up with the First Pacific Squadron, overwhelm the Imperial Japanese Navy, and then delay the Japanese advance into Manchuria until Russian reinforcements could arrive via theTrans-Siberian railroadand overwhelm the Japanese land forces there. As the situation in the Far East deteriorated, the Tsar (encouraged by his cousinKaiser Wilhelm II),^[11]agreed to the formation of theSecond Pacific Squadron.^[12]This would consist of five divisions of the Baltic Fleet, including 11 of its 13 battleships. The squadrons, including the later-formedThird Pacific Squadron,departed the Baltic ports ofReval (Tallinn)andLibau (Liepāja)on 15–16 October 1904 (Rozhestvensky fleet)^[j]and 2 February 1905 (Nebogatov fleet),^[13]and on 3 November 1904 (armoured cruisersOlegandIzumrud,auxiliary cruisersUralandTerek,destroyersGromkiyandGrozniy^[k]under the command of Captain 1st rankLeonid Dobrotvorsky.^[15]), numbering 48 ships and auxiliaries.^[16]^[l]

Dogger Bank

The Rozhestvensky and von Fölkersahm squadrons sailed throughØresundstrait into theNorth Sea.The Russians had heard fictitious reports of Japanesetorpedo boatsoperating in the area and were on high alert. In theDogger Bank incident,the Rozhestvensky squadron mistook a group of British fishing trawlers operating near theDogger Bankat night for hostile Japanese ships. The fleet fired upon the small civilian vessels, killing several British fishermen; one trawler was sunk while another six were damaged.^[12]In confusion, the Russians even fired upon two of their own vessels, killing some of their own men. The firing continued for twenty minutes before Rozhestvensky ordered firing to cease; greater loss of life was avoided as the Russian gunnery was highly inaccurate.^[17]The British were outraged by the incident and incredulous that the Russians could mistake a group offishing trawlersfor Japanese warships, thousands of kilometres from the nearest Japanese port. Britain almost entered the war in support of Japan, with whom it hadAnglo-Japanese alliance(but was neutral in the war, as their mutual defense clause stipulated "when either nation faced 'more than one' adversaries in a war" ). The Royal Navysortiedand shadowed the Russian fleet until a diplomatic agreement was reached.^[12]France, which had hoped to eventually bring the British and Russians together in ananti-German bloc,intervened diplomatically to restrain Britain from declaring war.^[12]The Russians were forced to accept responsibility for the incident, compensate the fishermen, and disembark officers who were suspected ofmisconductto give evidence to the enquiry.^[18]^[19]^[20]

Routes

Thedraughtof the newer battleships, which had proven to be considerably greater than designed,^[22]preventing their passage through theSuez Canal^[m]caused the fleet to separate after leaving Tangier on 3 November 1904. The newer battleships, cruisers, fast auxiliaries and the destroyers for protection, proceeded around theCape of Good Hopeunder the command of Admiral Rozhestvensky while the older battleships and cruisers made their way through the Suez Canal under the command of Admiral von Fölkersahm. They planned to rendezvous in Madagascar, and both sections of the fleet successfully completed this part of the voyage.^[22]The longer journey around Africa took a toll on the Russian crews under Rozhestvensky, "who had never experienced such a different climate or such a long time at sea" as "conditions on the ships deteriorated, and disease and respiratory issues killed a number of sailors".^[20]The voyage took half a year in rough seas, with difficulty obtaining coal for refueling – as the warships could not legally enter the ports of neutral nations – and themoraleof the crews plummeted. The Russians needed 500,000 short tons (450,000 t) of coal and 30 to 40 re-coaling sessions to reach French Indochina (now Vietnam), and coal was provided by 60 colliers from theHamburg-Amerika Line.^[n]By April and May 1905 the reunited fleet had anchored atCam Ranh Bayin French Indochina.^[o]^[16]^[28]

The Russians had been ordered to break theblockade of Port Arthur,but the battleships in the port were sunk by the Japanese land artillery, and the heavily fortified city/port had already fallen on 2 January just after the Second Pacific Squadron arrived atNossi Be,Madagascar,before the arrival of the Fölkersahm detachment. The objective was therefore shifted to linking up with the remaining Russian ships stationed in the port ofVladivostok,before bringing the Japanese fleet to battle.^[29]

Prelude

The Russians had three possible routes to enter the Sea of Japan and reach Vladivostok: the longer were theLa Pérouse StraitandTsugaru Strait,on either side of Hokkaido. Admiral Rozhestvensky did not reveal his choice even to his subordinates until 25 May, when it became apparent he chose Tsushima by ordering the fleet to head North East after detaching transportsYaroslavl,Vladimir,Kuronia,Voronezh,LivoniaandMeteoras well as auxiliary cruisersRionandDnieprwith the instruction to go to the near-by neutral port of Shanghai.^[30]The Tsushima Strait is the body of water eastward of theTsushima Islandgroup, located midway between the Japanese island of Kyushu and the Korean Peninsula, the shortest and most direct route from Indochina. The other routes would have required the fleet to sail east around Japan.^[p]The Japanese Combined Fleet and the Russian Second and Third Pacific Squadrons, sent from the Baltic Sea now numbering 38, would fight in the straits between Korea and Japan near the Tsushima Islands.^[30]

Because of the 18,000-mile (29,000 km) journey, the Russian fleet was in a poor condition for battle. Apart from the four newestBorodino-class battleships,Admiral Nebogatov's 3rd Pacific Fleet consisted of older and poorly maintained warships.^[32]Overall, the Japanese side had a maneuvrability advantage. The long voyage, combined with a lack of opportunity for maintenance, meant the Russian ships were heavilyfouled,significantly reducing their speed.^[33]The Japanese 1st Battle Division could exceed 18knots(33 km/h) and regularly maneuvred at 15 knots, but the Russian fleet included warships with the maximum speed of 14 to 15 knots (with new engines/boilers, normal load, and clean hull) and the auxiliaries of 10–12 knots, that limited the fleet speed to 9 knots.^[34]

Additionally, there were significant deficiencies in the Russian naval fleet's equipment and training. Russian naval tests with their torpedoes exposed major technological failings.^[q]Tōgō's greatest advantage was that of experience, having five of the ten fleet commanders in either navy with combat experience aboard modern warships on his side,^[r]while Rozhestvensky had none. The others were all Russian admirals whom Tōgō had defeated, includingOskar Starck,who had been relieved of his command following his humiliating defeat in theBattle of Port Arthur;AdmiralStepan Makarov,killed by a mine off Port Arthur;Wilgelm Vitgeft,who had been killed in theBattle of the Yellow Sea;and Admiral(Prince) Pavel Ukhtomskywho was relieved and recalled to Mukden by ViceroyYevgeni Alekseyev^[s]after six battleships of the Pacific Squadron failed to reachVladivostokas a result of theBattle of the Yellow Sea.^[36]AdmiralKarl Jessen,who experienced theBattle off Ulsan,remained inVladivostok.

Battle

First contact

Because the Russians wanted to slip undetected into Vladivostok, they approached Japanese waters in radio silence. They steered outside regular shipping channels to reduce the chance of detection. On the night of 26 May 1905 the Russian fleet approached theTsushima Strait.^[37]

In the night, thick fog blanketed the straits, giving the Russians an advantage. At 02:45 on 27 MayJapan Standard Time(JST), the Japaneseauxiliary cruiser Shinano Maruobserved three lights on what appeared to be a vessel on the distant horizon and closed to investigate. These lights were from the Russian hospital shipOrel,^[t]which, in compliance with therules of war,had continued to burn them.^[38]At 04:30,Shinano Maruapproached the vessel, noting that she carried no guns and appeared to be an auxiliary. TheOrelmistook theShinano Marufor another Russian vessel and did not attempt to notify the fleet. Instead, she signaled toShinano Maruin Russian code, which made no sense to the Japanese ship. TheShinano Maruthen sighted the shapes of ten other Russian ships in the mist.

Wireless telegraphy played an important role from the start. At 04:55,Captain Narikawaof theShinano Marusent a message to the Combined Fleet command onboardMikasainMasampothat the "Enemy is in grid 203". By 05:00, intercepted radio signals informed the Russians that they had been discovered and that Japanese scouting cruisers were shadowing them. Admiral Tōgō received the message at 05:05, and immediately began to prepare his battle fleet for a sortie.^[39]

Beginning of the battle

At 06:34, before departing with theCombined Fleet,Admiral Tōgōwired a confident message to the navy minister inTokyo:

In response to the report that enemy ships have been sighted, the Combined Fleet will immediately commence action and attempt to attack and destroy them. Weather today fine but high waves.^[40]

The final sentence of this telegram has become famous in Japanese military history, and has been quoted by former Japanese Prime MinisterShinzō Abe.^[41]

The entire Japanese fleet was put to sea, with Tōgō in his flagshipMikasaleading over 40 vessels to meet the Russians. Meanwhile, the shadowing Japanese scouting vessels sent wireless reports every few minutes as to the formation and course of the Russian fleet. There was mist which reduced visibility and the weather was poor. Wireless gave the Japanese an advantage; in his report on the battle, Admiral Tōgō noted the following:

Though a heavy fog covered the sea, making it impossible to observe anything at a distance of over five miles, [through wireless messaging] all the conditions of the enemy were as clear to us, who were 30 or 40 miles distant, as though they had been under our very eyes.^[42]

At 13:40, both fleets sighted each other, ready to engage. At around 13:55, Tōgō ordered the hoisting of theZ flag,issuing a predetermined announcement to the entire fleet:

The Empire's fate depends on the result of this battle, let every man do his utmost duty.^[43]

By 14:45, Tōgō had "crossed the Russian T",^[44]enabling him to fire broadsides, while the Russians could reply only with their forward turrets.^[45]^[46]

Daylight action

Russian battleshipOslyabya,the first warship sunk in the battle

The Russians sailed from south-southwest to north-northeast; "continuing to a point of intersection which allowed only their bow guns to bear; enabling him [Tōgō] to throw most of the Russian batteries successively out of bearing."^[47]The Japanese fleet steamed from northeast to southwest, then Tōgō ordered the fleet to turn 180-degrees in sequence, which enabled his ships to take the same course as the Russians. Although Tōgō's U-turn was successful, Russiangunneryhad proven surprisingly good and the flagshipMikasawas hit 15 times in five minutes. Before the end of the engagement, she was struck 15 more times by large calibre shells.^[48]Rozhestvensky had only two alternatives, "a charge direct, in line abreast", or to commence "a formalpitched battle."^[47]He chose the latter, and at 14:08, the Japanese flagshipMikasawas hit at about 7,000 metres, with the Japanese replying at 6,400 meters. Superior Japanese gunnery then took its toll,^[49]with most of the Russian battleships being crippled.

Captain 2nd Rank Vladimir Semenoff, a Russian staff officer aboard the flagshipKnyaz Suvorov,said "It seemed impossible even to count the number of projectiles striking us. Shells seemed to be pouring upon us incessantly one after another. The steel plates and superstructure on the upper decks were torn to pieces, and the splinters caused many casualties. Iron ladders were crumpled up into rings, guns were literally hurled from their mountings. In addition to this, there was the unusually high temperature and liquid flame of the explosion, which seemed to spread over everything. I actually watched a steel plate catch fire from a burst."^[50]^[51]

Ninety minutes into the battle, the first warship to be sunk was the Russian battleshipOslyabyafrom Rozhestvensky's 2nd Battleship division.^[u]This was the first time a modern armoured warship had been sunk by gunfire alone.^[53]

A direct hit on the Russian battleshipBorodino's magazines by the Japanese battleshipFujicaused her to explode, which sent smoke thousands of metres into the air and trapped all but one^[v]of her crew onboard as she sank.^[50]Rozhestvensky was knocked out of action by a shell fragment that struck his skull. In the evening, Rear AdmiralNikolai Nebogatovtook over command of the Russian fleet. The Russians lost the battleshipsKnyaz Suvorov,Oslyabya,Imperator Aleksandr IIIandBorodino.The Japanese ships suffered only light damage.

Night attacks

At night, around 20:00, 21destroyersand 45 Japanesetorpedo boats^[w]were thrown against the Russians.^[x]They were deployed initially from the north, east and west while being slightly visible, forcing the Russians, roughly in the order of cruisers, battleships and auxiliaries groups, to turn west.^[55]The Japanese were aggressive, continuing their attacks for three hours without a break; as a result, during the night there were a number of collisions between the small craft and Russian warships.^[y]The Russians were dispersed in small groups. By 23:00, it appeared that the Russians had vanished, but they revealed their positions to their pursuers by switching on their searchlights – ironically, the searchlights had been turned on to spot the attackers. The old battleshipNavarinstruck a chained floating mines^[z]laid in front and was forced to stop in order not to push the chain forward, inviting other floating mines on the chain in on herself. She was consequently torpedoed four times and sunk. Out of a crew of 622, only three survived, one to be rescued by the Japanese and the other two by a British merchant ship.^[56]

The battleshipSissoi Velikywas badly damaged by a torpedo in the stern and was scuttled the next day. Two oldarmoured cruisers–Admiral NakhimovandVladimir Monomakh– were badly damaged, the former by a torpedo hit to the bow, the latter by colliding with a Japanese destroyer. They were bothscuttledby their crews the next morning offTsushima Island,where they headed while taking on water.^[57]The night attacks placed a great strain on the Russians, as they lost two battleships and two armoured cruisers, while the Japanese lost only three torpedo boats.^[58]

XGEsignal and Russian surrender

At 05:23 on 28 May, what remained of the Russian fleet was sighted heading northeast. Tōgō's battleships proceeded to surround Nebogatov's remaining squadron south of the island ofTakeshimaand commenced main battery fire at 12,000 meters.^[59]TheRussian cruiserIzumrudthen turned southeast and started to flee.^[60]Realising that his guns were outranged by at least one thousand metres,^[ab]and the Japanese battleships had proven on the day before to be faster than his own so that he could not close the distance if he tried, Nebogatov ordered the four battleships remaining under his command to surrender.^[ac]^[ad]XGE,an international signal of surrender, was hoisted; however, the Japanese navy continued to fire as they did not have "surrender" in their code books and had to hastily find one that did.^[61]Still under heavy fire, Nebogatov then ordered a white tablecloth sent up the masthead, but Tōgō, having faced the difficult decision to sink a British transport ship full of Chinese soldiers during theFirst Sino-Japanese Waras the commander of IJN cruiserNaniwa,^[ae]knew the signal meant a request for a truce or parley, not 'surrender' in the legal definition, and that either meaning contradicted not stopping the ships.

His lieutenants found the codebook that included XGE signal and reported that stopping engines is a requirement for the signal and all the Russian ships were still moving, so he continued firing while the response flag signal "STOP" hoisted.^[62]Nebogatov then orderedSt. Andrew's Crosslowered and theJapanese national flagraised on thegaffand all engines stopped.^[63]Seeing the requirement for the signal met, Tōgō gave the cease-fire and accepted Nebogatov's surrender. Nebogatov surrendered knowing that he could be shot for doing so.^[50]He said to his men:

You are young, and it is you who will one day retrieve the honour and glory of the Russian Navy. The lives of the two thousand four hundred men in these ships are more important than mine.^[50]

DamagedOryol^[t]atMaizuru Naval Arsenal^[af]

As an example of the level of damage inflicted on a Russian battleship,Oryol^[t]was hit by five 12-inch, nine 8-inch, 39 six-inch and 21 smaller or unidentified shells.^[ag]This damage caused her to list, and the engine ceased to operate when she was being taken by the Japanese navy to First Battle Division home port ofSaseboinNagasakiafter Tōgō accepted the surrender. CruiserAsamaand then battleshipAsahihad to towOryol,and their destination was changed to the closerMaizuru Naval Arsenalto avoid losing the prize of war. Her commander CaptainYung,who was seriously injured on 27 May, died in the night of the 29th onboard battleshipAsahien route.^[ah]^[64]

Capture of Rozhestvensky

Russian destroyerBuyniy,after rescuing the squadron command including Admiral Rozhestvensky from the burningKnyaz Suvorovat 17:30 during the day battle on the 27th, found cruiserDonskoi,destroyersByedoviyandGrozniyin convoy on the morning of 28 May. Rozhestvensky choseByedoviyto move the fleet command officers and himself asBuyniyhad serious damages andDonskoi,being an old ship, was very slow. (Later in the afternoon,Buyniywas sunk by gunfire fromDonskoiafter taking the crew aboard.) Leaving the strugglingBuyniyand the slowDonskoi^[aj]behind,ByedoviyandGrozniyheaded for Vladivostok.^[66]

Japanese destroyersSazanamiandKagerōhad mechanical issues during the night battle on the 27th and had to fix the problems at thePort of Ulsan.^[ak]Both destroyers finished their temporary repair work by the morning of the 28th and left the port together. They spotted the two Russian destroyers on the way to join the rest of the Combined Fleet and engaged at 15:25.^[65]^[am]

DestroyerGrozniyincreased speed being chased byKagerō,butByedoviyslowed down and stopped in the face of firing and approachingSazanamiwhile raising a white flag.^[69]^[an]Grozniywas able to keep sufficient distance fromKagerō,exchanging just a few long-distance shots at about 18:30, before nightfall.^[70]She became one of the three warships reaching Vladivostok after surviving the battle.

The Combined Fleet command could not believe the news when cruiserAkashi,which rendezvousedSazanamion the morning of the next day, sent a radio telegraph message about the capture of Admiral Rozhestvensky, as they were certain to have sunkKnyaz Suvorovand assumed the squadron commander went down with the flagship.^[68]But cruiserAkashi,accompanied bySazanamiandKagerō,arrived at Sasebo port in the morning of 30 May withByedoviyin tow, with not only the injured admiral but also the surviving members of the Russian fleet command onboard.^[ao]^[68]^[65]

Conclusion

Until the evening of 28 May, isolated Russian ships were pursued by the Japanese until almost all were destroyed or captured. The cruiserIzumrud,which escaped from the Japanese despite being present at Nebogatov's surrender, was destroyed by her crew after running aground on the Siberian coast.^[72]

The wounded Admiral Rozhestvensky went to the Imperial Japanese Naval Hospital inSaseboto recover from a head injury caused by shrapnel; there, the victorious Admiral Tōgō visited him personally in plain clothes, comforting him with kind words: "Defeat is a common fate of a soldier. There is nothing to be ashamed of in it. The great point is whether we have performed our duty."^[75]

On 10 June 1905, Tsar Nicholas II sent a telegram:

"Tokyo. Adjutant General Rozhdestvensky. From the bottom of my heart I thank you and all the ranks of the squadron who honestly fulfilled their duty in battle, for their selfless service to Russia. Your feat was destined to be crowned with success, but your fatherland will always be proud of your selfless courage. I wish you a speedy recovery, and may God console you all. Nikolai"^[76]

Rozhestvensky and other officers were placed on trial in August 1905 after returning to Russia. Rozhestvensky claimed full responsibility for the fiasco and was sentenced to death, but the Tsar commuted his death sentence. Flag captains Clapier de Colongue (Second Pacific Squadron) and Cross (Third Pacific Squadron), Staff officers Filippinovsky, Leontieff, together with the commanders of the surrendered battleships, Captains Vladimir Smirnov (Nikolai I),Nikolai Lishin^[as](Apraksin),Sergei Grogoryev(Senyavin),^[77]and theByedoviycommander Nikolai Baranov were sentenced to 10 years in prison and dismissed from service (Nicholas II pardoned them on 1 May 1909).^[78]The executive officer ofOryol(who was in charge of the ship at the surrender) Captain 2nd rank K.L.Schwede and other officers were acquitted.^[76]

Admiral Nebogatov, who surrendered the fleet, was also sentenced to death, which was commuted to 10 years imprisonment and eventually pardoned by the Tsar. He was released from the Trubetskoy Bastion prison inPeter and Paul Fortressin May 1909.

Contributing factors

Commander and crew experience

Admiral Rozhestvensky faced a more combat-experienced battleship admiral inTōgō Heihachirō.Admiral Tōgō had already killed two Russian admirals:Stepan Makarovoutside of Port Arthur in the battleshipPetropavlovskin April 1904, thenWilgelm Vitgeftin his battleshipTsesarevichin August of the same year. Before those two deaths, Tōgō had chased AdmiralOskar Starck,also flying his flag in thePetropavlovsk,off the battlefield. Admiral Tōgō and his men had two battleship fleet action experiences, which amounted to over four hours of combat experience in battleship-to-battleship combat atPort Arthurand theYellow Sea.^[79] The Japanese fleets had practiced gunnery extensively since the beginning of the war, usingsub-calibrepractice guns^[at]mounted in their larger guns.^[au]^[av]^[aw]

In contrast, Russian battleshipBorodinounderwentsea trialsfrom 23 August to 13 September 1904^[63]as a brand new ship upon her completion,^[82]and the new crew did not have much time for training before she set sail for the Pacific on 15 October 1904.Borodino's sister ship,Knyaz Suvorov,started trials on 9 August,Oryol^[t]started trials the latest on 10 September 1904, leavingImperator Aleksandr III(the trials finished in October 1903) as the onlyBorodino-classship actually ready for deployment.^[63]^[ax]As the Imperial Russian Navy planned on building 10Borodino-class battleships (5 were ultimately built) with the requirement for thousands of additional crewmen, the basic training, quality and experience of the crew and cadets were far lower^[83]than those onboard the battleships in the seasoned Pacific Fleet.^[84]

TheImperial Russian Admiralty Council(Адмиралтейств-совет) and the rest of the Admiralty were quite aware of this disadvantage, and opposed the September dispatch plan^[ay]for the following reasons:

1. The Japanese navy has completed the battle preparations with all the crew having some combat experience.
2. The long voyage is mostly through extreme tropical weather, so a meaningful training is practically impossible on the way.
3. Therefore, the newly created Second Pacific Fleet should conduct training in the Baltic until the next spring while waiting for theriggingof another battleship,Slava,^[az]and the purchase of Chilean and Argentine warships.^[ba]^[63]

However, at the council in the imperial presence on 23 August 1904 held at thePeterhof Grand Palace,this opinion was overruled by Admiral Rozhestvensky (Commander in Chief of the Fleet),Navy Minister Avellan,andTsar Nicholas II;for it was deemed impossible to re-arrange the massive coaling for the long voyage if the navy broke the contract that was already signed withHamburg-American Steamship Lineof Germany.^[63]

Salvo firing director system

Up to theBattle of the Yellow Seaon 10 August 1904, naval guns were controlled locally by agunnery officerassigned to that gun or a turret. He specified the elevation and deflection figures, gave the firing order while keeping his eyes on theinclinometersindicating the rolling and pitching angles of the ship, received the fall of shot observation report from the spotter on the mast, calculated the new elevation and deflection to 'walk' the shots in on the target for the next round, without much means to discern or measure the movements of his own ship and the target. He typically had a view on the horizon, but with the new 12-inch gun's range extended to over 8 miles (13 km), his vantage point was lower than desired.^[86]^[bb]

In the months before the battle, the Chief Gunnery Officer ofAsahi,Lieutenant CommanderKatō Hiroharu,aided by a Royal Navy advisor who introduced him to the use of the early mechanical computerDumaresqin fire control, introduced a system for centrally issuing the gun-laying^[bc]and salvo-firing orders by voice.^[bd]Using a central system allowed the spotter to identify a salvo of distant shell splashes much more effectively than trying to identify a single splash among the many in the confusion of fleet-to-fleet combat. Further, the spotter needed to keep track of just one firing at a time as opposed to multiple shots on multiple stopwatches, in addition to having to report to just one officer on the bridge. The 'director' officer on the bridge had the advantage of having a higher vantage point than in the gun turrets, in addition to being steps away from the ship commander giving orders to change the course and the speed in response to the incoming reports on target movements.^[89]

This fire control director system was introduced to other ships in the fleet, and the training and practice on this system were carried out in the months waiting for the arrival of the Baltic Fleet^[av]^[au]while its progress was reported by the British intelligence from their naval stations atGibraltar,Malta,Aden(Yemen),Cape of Good Hope,Trincomalee(Ceylon),SingaporeandHong Kong,among other locations.^[90]

As a result, Japanese fire was more accurate in the far range (3 to 8 miles or 5 to 13 kilometres),^[be]on top of the advantage they held in the shorter distances using the latest 1903 issueBarr and StroudFA3coincidence rangefindersof baselength 5 ft (1.5 m),^[bf]which had a range of 6,000 yards (5,500 m), while the Russian battleships were equipped withLugeolstadiametric rangefindersfrom the 1880s (except battleshipsOslyabyaandNavarin,which had the Barr and Stroud 1895 issue FA2 of baselength 4.5 ft (1.4 m) retrofitted), which only had a range of about 4,400 yards (4,000 m).^[92]

Wireless telegraphy

Thewireless telegraph(radio) had been invented during the last half of the 1890s, and by the turn of the century, nearly all major navies were adopting this improved communications technology. Tsushima was "the first major sea battle in which wireless played any role whatsoever".^[93]^[94]

LieutenantAkiyama Saneyuki(who was the key staff to Admiral Tōgō in formulating plans and directives before and during the battle as a Commander, who also went aboardNikolai Ito accompany Admiral Nebogatov toMikasafor a formal meeting with Tōgō) had been sent to the United States as anaval attachéin 1897. He witnessed the capabilities of wireless telegraphy firsthand during theSpanish–American War,and sent several memos to theNavy General Staffurging that they push ahead as rapidly as possible to acquire the new technology.^[94]The IJN command became heavily interested in the technology; however, it found theMarconi wirelesssystem, which was then operating with the Royal Navy, to be exceedingly expensive.

The Japanese therefore decided to create their own radio sets by setting up a wireless research committee under ProfessorKimura Shunkichi,^[bg]which eventually produced an acceptable system. In 1901, having attained radio transmissions of up to 60 miles (97 km) with the Type 34 (34th year of Meiji = 1901) set, the Navy formally adopted wireless telegraphy. Two years later, a laboratory, a factory, and the wireless telegraphy curriculum were set up atImperial Japanese Navy Mines Training Schoolin Yokosuka to produce the Type 36 (1903) wireless sets,^[bh]and these were quickly installed on every major warship in theCombined Fleetby the time the war started.^[94]

Alexander Stepanovich Popovof the Naval Warfare Institute had built and demonstrated a wireless telegraphy set in 1900. However, technology improvement and production in the Russian empire lagged those of Germany, and "System Slaby-Arco",^[bi]^[95]originally made byAllgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft(AEG) and then produced in volume by its successor wireless-set makerTelefunkenin Germany (by 1904, this system was in wide use byKaiserliche Marine) was adopted by the Imperial Russian Navy. Although both sides had early wireless telegraphy, the Russians were using German sets tuned and maintained by German technicians half-way into the voyage,^[96]while the Japanese had the advantage of using their own equipment maintained and operated by their own navy specialists trained at the Yokosuka school.^[bj]

British support

TheUnited Kingdomassisted Japan by manufacturing guns^[bk]and building battleships for the IJN.^[97]As the ally in theAnglo-Japanese Alliance,the UK also assisted Japan in intelligence, finance, technology, training and other aspects of the war against Russia. At the time, Britain owned and controlled more harbour facilities around the world – specifically shipyards andcoaling stations– than Russia and its allies (France,^[bl]and to some extent Germany) combined. The UK also obstructed, where possible, Russian attempts to purchase ships and coal.^[90]France openly allowed the Baltic Fleet warships intoTangierport before and after theDogger Bank Incident;and the UK formally protested in the post-Dogger Bank negotiations, pointing out that the 'Neutral' countries cannot accept warships of the fighting countries into their ports without enforcing internment,^[bm]and if France is no longer neutral in the war, the UK is obligated to commence military action in support of Japan as required in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.^[bn]As a result, the rendezvous point for Rozestvensky and Fölkersahm squadrons was changed from the port ofDiego Suarezto the remote islands ofÎle Sainte-MarieandNosy Bein Madagascar, and free access to the ports includingSaigonandBa Ngoi port in Cam Ranh Baywas denied for the fleet inFrench Indochina.^[bo]

This support created a major logistics problem for around the world deployment of the Baltic Fleet to the Pacific in procuring coal and supplies on the way.^[101]^[102]AtNosy BeinMadagascarand atCamranh Bay,French Indochina,the fleet was forced to be anchored for about two months each, seriously degrading morale of the crew. By the time it reached theSea of Japan,the hulls of all the ships in the fleet were heavilyfouledin addition to carrying the extra coal otherwise not required on deck.^[103]^[o]

The Japanese ships, on the other hand, were well maintained in the ample time given by the intelligence. For example, battleshipAsahiwas under repair from November 1904 to April 1905 atSasebo Naval Arsenalfor two 12-inch guns lost and serious damage to the hull from striking a mine. They were divided into battle divisions of as much uniform speed and gun range so that a fleet would not suffer a bottleneck in speed, and the range of guns would not render some ships useless within a group in extended-range combat.^[104]^[d]

At the end of theArgentine-Chilean naval arms racein 1903, two Chilean-ordered and British-built battleships (then calledConstituciónandLibertad) and two Argentine-ordered, Italian-built cruisers (then calledBernardino RivadaviaandMariano Moreno) were offered to Russia and the purchase was about to be finalized.^[105]Britain stepped in as the mediator ofPacts of Maythat ended the race, bought the Chilean battleships (which becameHMSSwiftsureandHMSTriumph), and brokered the sale of Argentine cruisers to Japan.^[bp]This support not only limited the growth of the Imperial Russian Navy but also helped IJN in obtaining the Italian-built cruisers (IJNKasugaandNisshin) with a strong armour design^[bq]that enabled IJN to use them on the main line of battle along with the heavier-armoured battleships.^[108]^[br]

High explosive and cordite

The Japanese used mostlyhigh-explosiveshells filled withShimose powder,which was a purepicric acid(as opposed to the FrenchMeliniteor the BritishLyddite,which were picric acid mixed withcollodion(French) or withdinitrobenzeneandvaseline(British) for stability).^[109]Engineer Shimose Masachika (1860–1911) solved the instability problem of picric acid on contact with iron and other heavy metals by coating the inside of a shell with unpigmentedJapanese lacquerand further sealing with wax.^[110]Because it was undiluted, Shimose powder had a stronger power in terms of detonation velocity and temperature than other high explosives at the time.^[109]These shells had a sensitive Ijuin fuse^[111](named after Vice AdmiralIjuin Gorō^[bs]) at the base as opposed to the tip of a shell that armed itself when the shell was spun by the rifling. These fuses were designed to explode on contact and wreck the upper structure of ships.^[bt]^[114]The Japanese Navy importedcorditefrom Great Britain as the smokeless propellant for these Shimose shells,^[109]so that the smoke off the muzzle would not impede the visibility for the spotters.

In the early 1890s, Vice AdmiralStepan O. Makarov,then the Chief Inspector of Russian naval artillery, proposed a new 12-inch gun design, and assigned a junior officer, Semyon V. Panpushko, to research the use of picric acid as the explosive in the shell. However, Panpushko was blown into pieces in an accidental explosion in experiment due to the instability.^[bu]Consequently, high explosive shells remained unreachable for the Russian Navy at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, and the navy continued to use the older armour-piercing rounds withguncotton(Nitrocellulose, Pyroxylin) bursting charges and the insensitive delayed-detonation fuses. They mostly usedbrown powderorblack powderas the propellant, exceptSissoi Velikyand the fourBorodino-class ships that used smokeless gunpowder for the main 12-inch guns.^[115]

As a result, Japanese hits caused more damage to Russian ships than Russian hits on Japanese ships. Shimose blasts often set the superstructure, the paintwork and the large quantities of coal stored on the decks on fire,^[101]and the sight of the spotters on Russian ships was hindered by the large amount of smoke generated by the propellant on each uncoordinated firing.^[bv]Moreover, the sensitivity difference of the fuse caused the Japanese off-the-target shells to explode upon falling on the water creating a much larger splash that sent destabilizing waves to Russianinclinometers,^[bw]^[bx]as opposed to the Russian shells not detonating upon falling on the water.^[by]This made an additional difference in theaforementioned shot accuracyby aiding the Japanese spotters to make an easier identification in fall of shot observation.

Gun range and rate of fire

The Makarov proposal resulted inModel 1895 12-inch gunthat extended the range of the previous Model 1886 12-inch Krupp guns (installed onImperator Nikolai IandNavarin) from 5–6 km to 11 km (at 15-degrees elevation) at the expense of significantly limited amount of explosives that can be contained in the 332 kg (732 lb) shell.^[118]^[bz]Reload time was also improved from 2–4 minutes previously to a rated 90 seconds, but in reality, it was 2.5–3 minutes.^[121]These guns were installed toSissoi Velikyand the fourBorodino-class ships.^[115]

The four Japanese battleships,Mikasa,Shikishima,FujiandAsahi,had the latestArmstrong 12-inch 40-calibre naval gundesigned and manufactured bySir W.G. Armstrong & Companyahead of its acceptance by the Royal Navy in the UK. These British-built 12-inch guns had a range of 15,000 yards (14 km) at 15-degrees elevation and the rate of fire at 60 seconds with a heavier 850 lb (390 kg) shell.^[ca]One of the reasons for the Royal Navy's late adoption of this type of gun was the accidental shell explosions in the barrel Japanese battleships experienced up to theBattle of the Yellow Seain August 1904, which were diagnosed and almost rectified^[cb]by the Japanese Navy with the use of aforementioned Ijuin Fuse^[111]by the time of this battle.

The Russian fleet had 20 of the 1895-issue longer-range 12 "guns on five battleships compared to 16 of the Armstrong 12" guns on four battleships for the Japanese. Statistically, this 20% advantage in the number of guns was much more than offset by the 60% disadvantage in the rate of fire difference of one shot in 2.5 minutes versus one minute. The range difference of 11 km versus 14 km translated into a flatter trajectory (smaller elevation and fall angle) for the Japanese shells, which resulted in a better hit rate for the Japanese shots^[cc]when both sides had an equal distance facing each other in 11 km and shorter range.^[ce]

Aftermath

Battle damage and casualties

Source:^[124]

Battle damage to the cruiserZhemchug,with shell hole in the stack

Russian 2nd. & 3rd. Pacific Fleet^[125]^[126]	Primary Armament	Water Line/Turret Armour	Disp./Length	Speed in Knots	Damage/Casualties/Remarks
Russian 2nd. & 3rd. Pacific Fleet^[125]^[126]	Primary Armament	Water Line/Turret Armour	Launched/Builder	Speed in Knots	Damage/Casualties/Remarks
Oslyabya, battleship	4 10-inch guns 11 6-inch guns	9 inches 9 inches	14,639tons/132.4m 1898/Russia	18.3	First modern battleshipsunkby gunfire alone, sunk at 15:10 27 May.^[u]She was the flagship for the fleet's second in command,Rear Admiral von Fölkersahm,who had died 3 days earlier.^[cf]The Japanese and most of the Russian fleet were unaware of his death. Complement 771 officers and men.
Imperator Aleksandr III, battleship (Borodinoclass)	4 12-inch guns 12 6-inch guns	7 5/8 inches 10 inches	14,409tons/121m 1901/Russia	17.7	Sunkby gunfire from Japanese 1st Battle Div. at 18:50 27 May, complement 830 officers and men, 4 survivors.^[127]
Knyaz Suvorov, battleship (Borodinoclass), fleet flagship	4 12-inch guns 12 6-inch guns	7 5/8 inches 10 inches	14,646tons/121m 1902/Russia	17.5	Shot into a wreck.Sunkat 19:20 27 May.Destroyerswere ordered to administer thecoup de grace,"while she had a gun above water she fired...[Suvorov's] stubborn gallantry, no words can do justice. If there is immortality in naval memory it is hers and theirs. "Of her 40 officers and 888 men there were no survivors^[127]^[128](except the injured Admiral Rozhestvensky and his staff who were rescued from the burning ship at 17:30 by destroyerBuyniy).^[129]^[ao]
Borodino, battleship (Borodinoclass)	4 12-inch guns 12 6-inch guns	7 5/8 inches 10 inches	14,317tons/121m 1901/Russia	16.2	Sunkat 19:30 27 May by a 12-inchParthian shotfrom the battleshipFujiwhich detonated the ammunition magazines, 1 survivor^[v]from a complement of 32 officers and 822 men.^[127]^[130]
Oryol,^[t] battleship (Borodinoclass)	4 12-inch guns 12 6-inch guns	1-10 inches 5.7–7.64 inches	14,378tons/121m 1902/Russia	18	Damaged seriously.Capturedat 10:30 on 28 May under the command of Rear AdmiralNebogatov.The ship commander, CaptainNikolay Yungwas seriously injured during the battle on 27 May and died in the night of 29 May on battleshipAsahi.^[ah]Recommissioned as IJNIwamiafter an extensive repair on 2 November 1907. Stricken 1 September 1922. Sunk as an air-raid target on 10 July 1924.^[132]
Navarin, battleship	4 12-inch guns 8 6-inch guns	16 inches 12 inches	10,370tons/107m 1891/Russia	15.9	Sunkin the night of 27 May by destroyer torpedoes, 3 survivors from a complement of 674 officers and men. 1 man picked up by local fishing boat, 2 picked up by a British merchantman.^[56]
Sissoi Veliky, battleship	4 12-inch guns 6 6-inch guns	16 inches 12 inches	10,567tons/107.23m 1894/Russia	15.7	Damaged heavily in the night of 27 May by destroyer torpedoes and could not keep up with Nebogatov group. Disabled by 06:00 on 28 May,Surrenderedto armed merchant cruisersShinano MaruandDainan Maruat 08:15, capsized andSankat 10:05.^[133]47 men lost, 42 officers and 571 men saved.^[134]
Imperator Nikolai I, battleship flagshipfor 3rd Pacific Fleet	2 12-inch guns 4 9-inch guns	2.5–10 inches 6–14 inches	9,748tons/105.61m 1889/Russia	14	Capturedat 10:30 28 May as the flagship for the commander of the 3rd Pacific Fleet, Rear AdmiralNikolai Nebogatov,when he hoisted the flag signal "XGE P" meaning "Surrendered. Go still (proceeding slow)."^[135]Received one 12-inch, two 8-inch, and two 6-inch hits. 5 officers/men killed, 35 wounded. Recommissioned as IJNIki.Stricken 1 May 1915. Sunk as a gunnery target for IJN battleshipsKongōandHieion 3 October 1915.
Admiral Ushakov, battleship^[136](coastal battleship, or armoured coast defense vessel.^[137])	4 10-inch guns 4 4.7-inch guns	10 inches 8 inches	5,081tons/87.3m 1893/Russia	16.1	Arrived late at 15:00 28 May to the Nebogatov surrender site. She did not accept the signaled news of surrender and started firing while fleeing from the site. Shot into a wreck byIwateandYakumo,scuttledat 19:00 as she was already sinking. 12 officers and 339 men saved from her complement of 422 officers and men.^[138]Her commander, CaptainVladimir Nikolaevich Miklukha,refused help from the Japanese and went down with his ship.^[139]^[cg]
Admiral Seniavin, battleship^[136](Coastal battleship, or armoured coast defense vessel.^[137])	4 10-inch guns 4 4.7-inch guns	9.8 inches 3–7.9 inches	4,232tons/84.6m 1894/Russia	16	Capturedat 10:30 28 May following the surrender together with her sister-shipGeneral-Admiral Apraksin,flagshipImperator Nikolai I,and the battleshipOryol.^[140]Admiral Seniavinbecame IJNMishima,stricken 10 October 1935. Sunk as an air-raid target for IJNHōshōon 5 May 1936.
General-Admiral Apraksin, battleship^[136](Coastal battleship, or armoured coast defense vessel.^[137])	3 10-inch guns 4 4.7-inch guns	9.8 inches 3–7.9 inches	4,165tons/80.62m 1896/Russia	15	Capturedat 10:30 28 May following the surrender together with her sister-shipAdmiral Seniavin,flagshipImperator Nikolai I,and the battleshipOryol.^[135]General-Admiral Apraksinbecame IJNOkinoshima,decommissioned 1 April 1922, used as a training ship forSasebo Marine Corps^[ch]until stricken in 1924. Sold in 1925, scrapped in 1939.
Admiral Nakhimov, armoured cruiser	8 8-inch guns 10 6-inch guns	10 inches 8 inches	7,906tons/103.3m 1885/Russia	16.6	Sunkin the night of 27 May by destroyer torpedoes. Over 600 men saved by lifeboats, local fishing boats, and armed merchant cruiserSado Maru.^[141]
Vladimir Monomakh, armoured cruiser	5 6-inch guns 6 4.7-inch guns	6 inches –	5,683tons/90.3m 1882/Russia	15.8	Sunkin the night of 27 May by destroyer torpedoes. 32 officers and 374 men rescued by armed merchant cruiser IJNManshu(IJNManshuwas the Austrian-built cruise shipManchuria^[ci]owned and operated by the RussianChinese Eastern Railwaybefore the war). Complement of 493 officers/men.^[141]
Dmitrii Donskoi, armoured cruiser	6 6-inch guns 10 4.7-inch guns	6 inches –	5,976tons/93.4m 1883/Russia	16.5	The Japanese 3rd and 4th battle divisions found and engagedDonskoion 28 May. Shot into a wreck in the afternoon but survived through nightfall.Scuttledin the early morning 29 May by her crew who rowed toMatsushima Island.^[cj]^[142]The survivors, including the saved crew ofOslyabya,were taken prisoner that afternoon by landing parties from destroyerFubukiandKasuga Maru.^[143]^[ck]Her commander, Captain 1st rankIvan Lebedev,died in a hospital in Sasebo.
Svetlana, protected cruiser	6 6-inch guns 10 47mm Hotchkiss guns	2 inches –	3,924tons/101m 1896/France	21	Sunkat 10:50, 28 May by gunfire from IJN cruisersNiitaka,Otowaand destroyerMurakumoeast of Jukbyeon Bay on the east coast of Korea.^[cl]Estimated 169 men lost. 290 men (23 wounded) rescued by IJNAmerika Maru.^[144]
Izumrud, protected cruiser	8 4.7-inch guns 4 47mm Hotchkiss guns	1.3–3.0 inches 1.3 inches	3,153tons/111m 1903/Russia	24	Ran aground outside of St. Vladimir Bay (300 km ENE of Vladivostok)^[72]^[cm]in the night of 29 May.Destroyedby her crew. Complement of 350 eventually reached Vladivostok by land.
Bezuprechni, torpedo boat destroyer	3 torpedo tubes (carried 6 torpedoes) 1 3-inch gun 5 3-pounder guns	N/A	350tons/64m 1902/Russia	26	Sunkby gunfire on 28 May from IJN protected cruiserChitosewhich expended 68 120mm, and 39 3-inch shells; joined later by IJN torpedo boat destroyerAriake,which expended 12 rounds of her 3-inch shells atBezuprechni.^[145]
Buyniy, torpedo boat destroyer	3 torpedo tubes (carried 6 torpedoes) 1 3-inch gun 5 3-pounder guns	N/A	350tons/64m 1901/Russia	26	Shot into a wreck during the day 27 May.^[cn]Kingston valvesopened, and then she wassunkby gunfire from the armoured cruiserDmitrii Donskoion 28 May.^[146]Survivors ofBuyniyonboardDmitrii Donskoipaddled ashore with the rest of the men to Matsushima Island whenDonskoiwas scuttled on 29 May.^[147]
Gromkiy, torpedo boat destroyer	3 torpedo tubes (carried 6 torpedoes) 1 3-inch gun 5 3-pounder guns	N/A	420tons/64m 1904/Russia	26	IJN torpedo boat destroyerShiranuidueled withGromkiyon 28 May for over an hour at ranges from 4,000 to 5,000 meters. DestroyerShiranuiwas equipped with 2 3-inch guns and 4 6-pounder guns, 2 torpedo tubes and 4 torpedoes, with a complement of 52 men. IJN Torpedo Boat #63 arrived, andGromkiysurrendered.Japaneseprize crewboardedGromkiy,but she was so heavily damaged that she began to sink, forcing the prize crew to quickly abandon ship. She rolled over andsankat 12:43.^[148]
Blestyashchiy, torpedo boat destroyer	3 torpedo tubes (carried 6 torpedoes) 1 3-inch gun 5 3-pounder guns	N/A	440tons/64m 1901/Russia	26	Took active role in rescuing survivors ofOslyabya,and received an 8-inch hit while doing so during the day action 27 May. This hit killed the commander,Alexander Sergeevich Shamov.Scuttledafter the crew and eightOslyabyasurvivors were transferred to destroyerBodriyon 28 May.^[co]3 men lost.^[cp]
Bistriy, torpedo boat destroyer	3 torpedo tubes (carried 6 torpedoes) 1 3-inch gun 5 3-pounder guns	N/A	350tons/64m 1901/Russia	26	AccompaniedSvetlanato the end. Fired upon and chased by cruisersNiitakaandOtowaand destroyerMurakumo.Destroyedafter running ashore^[72]north of Jukbyeon Bay^[cq]on 28 May by her crew, who surrendered to the Japanese Jukbyeon signal station guards.
Byedoviy, torpedo boat destroyer	3 torpedo tubes (carried 6 torpedoes) 1 3-inch gun 5 3-pounder guns	N/A	350tons/64m 1903/Russia	26	Surrendered andcapturedby IJN DestroyerSazanamiin the late afternoon on 28 May with Admiral Rozhestvensky and the members of Russian Second Pacific Fleet command.^[cn]^[cr]Byedoviybecame IJNSatsuki,stricken 1 April 1913, BU 1921.^[cs]
Ural, auxiliary cruiser	2 4.7-inch 4 76mm guns 8 57mm Hotch. Guns^[ct]	N/A	7,840tons/160m 1890/Germany	20	Sunkby the Japanese 1st Div. bombardment and a torpedo by battleshipShikishimaat 17:51 on 27 May.^[151]
Irtysh, auxiliary cruiser	8 3-pounder guns	N/A	7,661tons/- 1899/Great Britain^[cu]	10.5	Disabled by battle damage andabandoned4 km off the Japanese coast ofShimaneon 28 May.Sankbefore dawn 29 May. All 235 onboard including Captain Egormyshev were rescued by the residents ofWakitown.^[153]^[154]^[cv]^[cw]
Kamchatka, Repair ship	6 47mm Hotchkiss guns	N/A	7,200tons/76.25m 1902/Russia	12	Shot into a wreck by the Japanese 1st Div. at 17:36,sunkby Sixth Div.^[d]at 19:30 on 27 May.^[155]
Orel,^[156]^[t] Hospital ship	N/A	N/A	5,073tons/131.7m 1889/Great Britain^[cx]	19	Capturedby IJN merchant cruiserSado Maruat 15:30 on 27 May.^[157]^[cy]Converted back to ocean liner, renamedKusuho Maruand operated byTōyō Kisen Kaishaon Tokyo-Honolulu route.^[158]Engines and other equipment gutted at Port of Osaka in 1910,^[159]and returned to Russia in 1916, scrapped shortly after.
Rus, Ocean tug	N/A	N/A	611tons/51.4m 1903/Germany^[160]	10	Sunkby Japanese cruisers after being rammed by auxiliary cruiserAnadyr(On her way to save the crew of the sinkingUral) on 27 May.^[161]

TheRussian cruiserAlmaz(imperial yacht) and two torpedo boat destroyersGrozniyandBraviyreached Vladivostok.^[162]Protected cruisers,Aurora,Zhemchug,andOleg,escaped to theU.S. Naval Base Subic Bayin thePhilippines,and were interned.^[163]Ammunition shipKoreya,transportsYaroslavl,Vladimir,Kuronia,Voronezh,LivoniaandMeteoras well as ocean tugSvirwent to Shanghai and eventually returned home. DestroyerBodriy^[co]was interned in Shanghai.^[164]TransportsMercury,Tambov,Herman Lerke,Count Stroganovand repair shipKseniawere sent home viaSaigon.^[30]Auxiliary cruisersRionandDniepr^[165]eventually reached back home after some raiding activities in theYellow Sea.Auxiliary cruisersKubanandTerekwere interned atBataviainDutch East Indiesby the Netherlands. Auxiliary (merchant) cruiserAnadyrescaped toMadagascar.Hospital shipsOrel^[156]^[t]andKostromawere captured by the Japanese.Kostromawas released afterwards.^[cy]

Japanese Combined Fleet^[168]	Primary Armament	Water Line/Turret Armour	Disp./Length	Speed In Knots	Damage/Casualties/Remarks
Japanese Combined Fleet^[168]	Primary Armament	Water Line/Turret Armour	Launched/Builder	Speed In Knots	Damage/Casualties/Remarks
Mikasa, battleship fleet flagship	4 12-inch guns 14 6-inch guns	9 inches 14 inches	15,140tons/131.7m 1900/Great Britain	18.5	Took over 30 large-calibre hits; ventilators and funnels holed, armour penetrated in several places, top part of rear mast lost; over 100 casualties, complement of 875 officers/men.^[169]
Shikishima, battleship	4 12-inch guns 14 6-inch guns	9 inches 14 inches	14,850tons/133.5m 1898/Great Britain	19	Several large-calibre hits in the total of nine times. Lost one 12-inch gun barrel to a "burst" (barrel exploded).^[170]
Fuji, battleship	4 12-inch guns 10 6-inch guns	18 inches 14 inches	12,533tons/114m 1896/Great Britain	18.5	Several large-calibre hits in the total of 12 times. Lost eight men and nine wounded.^[171]One 12-inch gun barrel shot off by a 12-inch shell fromImperator Nikolai I.^[170]
Asahi, battleship	4 12-inch guns 14 6-inch guns	9 inches 14 inches	15,200tons/129.62m 1899/Great Britain	18.3	A few large-calibre hits in the total of 6 hits.^[172]Complement of 835 officers/men, lost 1 officer and 6 men, 5 men seriously wounded, 1 officer and 18 men lightly wounded.^[173]
Kasuga, armoured cruiser	1 10-inch gun 2 8-inch guns 14 6-inch guns	5 1/2 inches 5 1/2 inches	7,700tons/105m 1902/Italy	20.1	One 12-inch, one 6-inch, and one unidentified hits.^[174]Complement of 609 officers/men.
Nisshin, armoured cruiser flagshipof 1st Div.^[d]	4 8-inch guns 14 6-inch guns	5.9 inches 5.9 inches	7,700tons/105m 1903/Italy	20.2	Hit by 6 twelve-inch, 1 nine-inch, 2 six-inch and 4 unidentified shells.^[175]^[da]Two 8-inch gun barrels shot off, another 8-inch gun lost to a "burst". The 1st Div. command, Vice AdmiralMisu Sōtarō,seriously injured, his Chief of Staff, CommanderMatsui Kenkichikilled. Complement 609 officers/men; 50 casualties.^[170]
Asama, armoured cruiser (2nd Div.)	4 8-inch guns 14 6-inch guns 5 torpedo tubes	3.5-7 inches 6.3 inches	9,710tons/134.7m 1898/Great Britain	22.1	Hit by a 12-inch shell at 14:27 on 27 May, which took her steering mechanism out of order, and she fell out of formation. Received three 12-inch, two 8-inch, and about seven smaller hits. Lost 11 men, injured 13 out of the complement of 676.
Iwate, armoured cruiser (2nd Div.)	4 8-inch guns 14 6-inch guns 4 torpedo tubes	3.5–7 inches 6.3 inches	9,423tons/132.3m 1900/Great Britain	20.75	2nd Div. initially fired onOslyabya,then the Russian 3rd Pacific Squadron, and faced the damagedKnyaz Suvorovwho appeared out of a mist at about 2,000m range at 15:35 on 27 May. Hit by two 12-inch, three 8-inch, two 6-inch, and four smaller/unidentified shells. One of them hit the starboard forward upper 6 "casemate, igniting the ready-use ammunition inside. 40 officers/men killed and 37 wounded out of the Complement of 672.
Kasagi, armoured cruiser 3rd Div. flagship^[d]	2 8-inch guns 10 12 cm guns 5 torpedo tubes	- 4.5 inches	4,862tons/114.1m 1898/U.S.A.	22.5	Japanese 3rd Div. engagedOleg,AuroraandZhemchugat about 14:30 27 May, and the flagshipKasagireceived a 6 "hit below waterline where she does not have armour plates. This hit flooded a boiler room and a coal bunker, killing one and injuring nine men, which necessitated a repair.Kasagiand her American-built sisterChitosewithdrew from the battle and Vice AdmiralDewa Shigetōmoved his flag toChitose.Complement of 405.
Harusame, torpedo boat destroyer First Destroyer Div. lead ship^[d]	2 3-inch guns 4 57mm guns 2 torpedo tubes	N/A	375tons/69.2m 1902/Japan	29	In the confusion of the night attack on 27 May,Harusamecollided withYūgiriand incurred serious flooding but avoided sinking. Complement 62.
Yūgiri, torpedo boat destroyer (Fifth Destroyer Div.)^[d]	1 8 cm gun 5 57mm guns 2 torpedo tubes	N/A	322tons/63.6m 1899/Great Britain	30	During the night of 27 May,Yūgiricollided with the fellow destroyerHarusame,seriously damaging the bow. She avoided sinking and limped back to Sasebo on 28 May. Complement 58.
Torpedo Boat#34	1 3-pounder gun 3 torpedo tubes	N/A	83tons/39m 1899/Germany	24	Sunkby Russian gunfire, 27 May. This boat belonged toTakeshiki Guard Districtoutside of the Combined Fleet.
Torpedo Boat #35	1 3-pounder gun 3 torpedo tubes	N/A	83tons/39m 1899/Germany	24	Sunkby Russian gunfire, 27 May. This boat belonged toTakeshiki Guard Districtoutside of the Combined Fleet.
Torpedo Boat #69	2 3-pounder guns 3 torpedo tubes	N/A	89tons/40.1m 1902/Japan	24	Sankduring a torpedo attack on the night of 27 May, after colliding with IJN torpedo boat destroyerAkatsuki.Akatsuki(later renamedYamabiko) was a Russian prize fromBattle of the Yellow Sea,captured on 12 August 1904, theex-Reshitel‘nyi.^[db]^[177]

Russian losses

Russian personnel losses were 216 officers and 4,614 men killed; with 278 officers and 5,629 men taken as Prisoners Of War (POW). Interned in neutral ports were 79 officers and 1,783 men. Escaping toVladivostokandDiego-Suarezwere 62 officers and 1,165 men.^[162]

The battle was humiliating for Russia, which lost all its battleships and most of its cruisers and destroyers. The battle effectively ended the Russo-Japanese War in Japan's favour. The Russians lost 4,380 killed and 5,917 captured with a further 1,862 interned.^[75]Two admirals,RozhestvenskyandNebogatov,were captured by the Japanese Navy. The second in command of the fleet, Rear AdmiralDmitry Gustavovich von Fölkersahm,after suffering acerebral hemorrhageon 16 April, died in the night of 24 May 1905 onboard battleshipOslyabya.^[63]Vice AdmiralOskar Enqvistfled to Manila onboard cruiserOlegand was interned by the United States.

Battleships

The Russians lost eleven battleships, including three smallercoastal battleships,either sunk or captured by the Japanese, or scuttled by their crews to prevent capture. Four were lost to enemy action during the daylight battle on 27 May:Knyaz Suvorov,Imperator Aleksandr III,BorodinoandOslyabya.Navarinwas lost during the night action on 27–28 May, while theSissoi VelikyandAdmiral Ushakov^[163]were either scuttled or sunk the next day. Four other battleships, under Rear Admiral Nebogatov, were forced to surrender and would end up asprizes of war.This group consisted of only one modern battleship,Oryol,along with the old battleshipImperator Nikolai Iand two smallcoastal battleships General-Admiral ApraksinandAdmiral Seniavin.^[163]

Cruisers

The Russian Navy lost five of its nine cruisers during the battle, three more were interned by the Americans, with just one reaching Vladivostok.Vladimir MonomakhandSvetlanawere sunk the next day after the daylight battle. The cruiserDmitrii Donskoifought against six Japanese cruisers on the 28th and barely survived with many officers and crew killed onboard, and wasscuttledon 29 May 1905 due to heavy damage.Izumrudran aground on the Siberian coast.^[163]Three Russianprotected cruisers,Aurora,Zhemchug,andOleg,escaped to theU.S. navalbase atManila^[163]in the then-American-controlled Philippineswhere they were interned by the United States. The armed yacht (classified as a cruiser)Almaz,alone was able to reach Vladivostok.^[178]

Destroyers and auxiliaries

Imperial Russia also lost six of its nine destroyers in the battle, had one interned by the Chinese, and the other two reached Vladivostok.Buyniy( "Буйный" ),Bezuprechniy( "Безупречный" ),Gromkiy( "Громкий" ) andBlestyashchiy( "Блестящий" ) were sunk on 27 May.Bistriy( "Быстрый" ) was beached and destroyed by her crew the next day.Byedoviy( "Бедовый" ) surrendered also on 28 May. DestroyerBodriy( "Бодрый" )^[co]ran out of coal, and was interned inShanghai.^[164]Grozniy( "Грозный" ) andBraviy( "Бравый" ) reached Vladivostok.^[179]

Of the auxiliaries, repair shipKamchatka,auxiliary cruiserUraland ocean tugRuswere sunk on 27 May, auxiliary cruiserIrtyshwas disabled, abandoned on 28 May, then sank on 29 May. Ammunition shipKoreyaand ocean tugSvirreached Shanghai and returned home. After being ordered to separate from the fleet on 22 May,^[p]auxiliary cruisersKubanandTerekwere interned atBataviainDutch East Indiesby the Netherlands on 9 June 1905 after raiding a British and a Danish steamer destined for Japan. TransportsYaroslavl,Vladimir,Kuronia,Voronezh,LivoniaandMeteorwere detached from the fleet on 25 May, reached Shanghai and returned home. Auxiliary cruisersRionandDniepr^[165]escorted the transports to Shanghai, engaged incommerce raidingactivities in theYellow Sea,and returned toKronstadton 31 July 1905.^[180]TransportsMercury,Tambov,Herman Lerke,Count Stroganovand repair shipKsenia,which accompanied the Third Pacific Fleet toCam Ranh Bay,had been sent home viaSaigon.^[30]Merchant cruiserAnadyrescaped toMadagascarand then returned home. Thehospital shipsOrelandKostromawere captured during the battle;Kostromawas released afterwards.^[cy]

Japanese losses

The Japanese lost three torpedo boats (Nos.34,35and69). Personnel losses were 117 officers and men killed and 583 officers and men wounded.^[162]^[75]

Political consequences

Imperial Russia's prestige was badly damaged and the defeat was a blow to theRomanov dynasty.Most of the Russian fleet was lost; the fast armed yachtAlmaz(classified as a cruiser of the 2nd rank) and the destroyersGroznyandBravywere the only Russian ships to reach Vladivostok.^[178]InThe Guns of August,the American historian and authorBarbara Tuchmanargued that because Russia's loss destabilized the balance of power in Europe, it emboldened theCentral Powersand contributed totheir decision to go to war in 1914.^[181]

The battle had a profound cultural and political impact on the world. It was the first defeat of a European power by an Asian nation in the modern era.^[182]^[183]It also heightened the alarm of "TheYellow Peril"as well as weakening the notion ofwhite superioritythat was prevalent in some Western countries.^[184]^[185]Mahatma Gandhi(India),Mustafa Kemal Atatürk(Turkey),Sun Yat-sen(China) andJawaharlal Nehru(India) were amongst the future national leaders to celebrate this defeat of a colonial power.^[186]The victory established Japan as the sixth greatest naval power^[187]while the Russian navy declined to one barely stronger than that ofAustria-Hungary.^[187]

InThe Guinness Book of Decisive Battles,the British historianGeoffrey Reganargues that the victory bolstered Japan's increasingly aggressive political and military establishment. According to Regan, the lopsided Japanese victory at Tsushima:

...created a legend that was to haunt Japan's leaders for forty years.A British admiralonce said, 'It takes three years to build a ship, but 300 years to build a tradition.' Japan thought that the victory had completed this task in a matter of a few years... It had all been too easy. Looking atTōgō's victory over one of the world's great powers convinced some Japanese military men that with more ships, and bigger and better ones, similar victories could be won throughout the Pacific. Perhaps no power could resist the Japanese navy, not even Britain and the United States.^[75]

Regan also believes the victory contributed to the Japanese road to later disaster, "because the result was so misleading. Certainly the Japanese navy had performed well, but its opponents had been weak, and it was not invincible... Tōgō's victory [helped] set Japan on a path that would eventually lead her" to the Second World War.^[75]

Takano Isoroku, the future Japanese admiralYamamoto Isorokuwho would plan theattack on Pearl Harborand command the Imperial Japanese Navy through much of theSecond World War,served as a junior officer (aboardNisshin) during the battle and was wounded and lost two fingers by an accidental explosion of an 8-inch shell in a forward gun. Had he lost a third, he would have been medically discharged from theIJN.^[188]

Dreadnought arms race

Prior to the Russo-Japanese War, countries constructed their battleships with mixed batteries of mainly 6-inch (152 mm), 8-inch (203 mm), 10-inch (254 mm) and 12-inch (305 mm) guns, with the intent that these battleships fight on the battle line in a close-quarter, decisive fleet action. The Battle of Tsushima conclusively demonstrated that faster battleships and big guns^[189]with longer ranges were superior to batteries of mixed-size guns.^[190]

Britain'sFirst Sea Lord,Admiral Jackie Fisher,reasoned that the Japanese victory at Tsushima confirmed the importance of large guns and speed for modern battleships.^[191]^[192]Captain William Pakenhamof the British Royal Navy, who had been present aboard the Japanese battleshipAsahias an official observer during the Tsushima Battle, "famously remarked...the effect of the fire of every gun is so much less than that of the next larger size, that when 12in guns are firing, shots from 10in pass unnoticed...everything in this war has tended to emphasize the vast importance to a ship, at every stage of her career, of carrying some of the heaviest and furthest shooting guns that can be got into her."^[193]In October 1905 the British started the construction ofHMSDreadnought,which marked the beginning of a naval arms race between Britain and Germany in the years before 1914.^[194]

The battle also accelerated the naval arms race on a geopolitical level; though the Anglo-German naval arms race had begun in 1897, the collapse of Russian naval power in 1905 allowed Britain to send the bulk of its naval forces to other regions, reassured by the naval superiority of its ally Japan in the Far East. In turn, the presence of a larger British fleet in Europe meant that the Germans must build a proportionally larger fleet to maintain the same relative power, in accordance withTirpitz'sfleet in beingprinciple. The Royal Navy, in turn, must increase its fleet size to maintain the relative power as set out by itstwo-power standard.Thispositive feedbackmeant that any external increase in the regional naval power of one side – in this case, the British – would precipitate not just a proportional increase in naval power from the opposing side, but rather amutualmulti-stage build-up in naval power on both sides, before settling to a higher equilibrium. Ultimately, the Germans passed three of its fiveFleet Actsafter Tsushima within a span of 6 years.^[195]

Upon the breakout ofWorld War I,the British and Germans were both aware of the potentially devastating consequences of a naval defeat on the scale of Tsushima. Britain needed its battle fleet to protect its empire, and the trade routes vital to its war effort. Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, described British AdmiralJohn Jellicoeas "the only man who on either side could lose the war in an afternoon."^[196]German naval commanders, for their part, understood the importance KaiserWilhelm IIattached to his navy and the diplomatic prestige it carried. As a result of caution, the British and German fleets met in only one major action in World War I, the indecisiveBattle of Jutland.^[197]

Timeline

The battleshipMikasa,AdmiralTōgō's flagship at the battle of Tsushima, preserved as a memorial in Yokosuka, Japan

The Russian flagshipKnyaz Suvorovwas sunk with most of the crew.^[ao]

Note^[dc]

27 May 1905 (JST)

04:45 TheShinano Maru(Japan) locates theRussian Baltic Fleetand sends a wireless message "Spotted enemy fleet in grid 203." to cruiserItsukushima,which relays it to the Combined Fleet flagshipMikasa.
05:05 Tōgō receives the message, begins preparation to depart.
05:55AkitsushimarelaysIzumi's report "Enemy appears to be headed for the Eastern channel of Tsushima."^[202]
06:05 The 1st (Japanese battleshipMikasa,Shikishima,Fuji,Asahi,Kasuga,Nisshin), 2nd (Izumo,Azuma,Tokiwa,Yakumo,Asama,Iwate) and 4th (Naniwa,Takachiho,Akashi,Tsushima) battle divisions^[d]of the Japanese Combined Fleet leave Jinhae (Chinhae, or Chinkai) Bay^[dd]head South East at 12 knots. "Weather is half-cloudy, wind from the South West, wave is still high from the stormy weather in the last two days."
06:20 "Prepare for battle" ordered onMikasa.
07:00 CruiserIzumirelievesShinano Maruof reporting task, closes in to 10,000 metres of Russian battleshipKnyaz Suvorovon the starboard, then increases the distance and shadows the Baltic Fleet alone;^[203]reports "Enemy fleet is in grid 224 (20 nm NW of Ukushima Island, Nagasaki) heading North North East".
08:30Kasagireports "3rd battle div. is at grid 251(33°40′N129°00′E/ 33.67°N 129.0°E/33.67; 129.0), heading NNE at 10 Knots. "^[202]
09:39 1st battle division reaches 10nm NNE of Mitsushima Lighthouse^[de],turns ESE at 15 knots.
10:00Mikasasends a wireless message to theImperial General Headquarters:"Upon receiving its spotting report, Combined Fleet is going into battle with enemy fleet today nearOkinoshima Island.Today's weather is fine but waves are high. (Japanese: Bổn ngày thiên khí sáng sủa なれども sóng cao し) ".
10:30 The 5th battle division (Itsukushima,Matsushima,Hashidate,Chin'en) makes contact with the Baltic Fleet. Stays with the fleet on its left flank (West side).
11:00 Details of Russian fleet formation is assembled: "Head of the fleet,Izumrud.Right (East) flank, 1st column Destroyers, 2nd columnKnyaz Suvorov,Borodino-class,Borodino-class,Borodino-class,Oslyabya,Sissoi Veliky,Navarin,Nakhimov;3rd and 4th columns (slightly behind) Transports and Auxiliaries guarded by destroyers; 5th column (Left flank -West)Nikolai I,Admiral-class coastal battleship, Admiral-class, Admiral-class,Oleg,Aurora,Donskoi,Monomakh"
11:30 The 3rd battle division (Kasagi,Chitose,Otowa,Niitaka) makes contact with the Baltic Fleet. Stays with the fleet on its left flank.
11:55 Tōgō gathers all hands onMikasarear deck, tells the known situation, and says "Accurate aim on all the shots is the foremost and the only wish I have at this moment."^[200]^: p.1
12:00Mikasa's chief navigation officer^[df]records the current coordinates,34°27′N130°1′E/ 34.450°N 130.017°E/34.450; 130.017.^[200]^: p.1
12:00 Russian fleet starts shifting formations.KasagiandItsukushimareport all the details in radio telegrams: "Right flankSuvorovand 3Borodino-class; Left flankOslyabya,Veliky,Navarin,Nakhimov,Nikolai Iand Admiral-class ships. "
12:30 The 6th battle division (Suma,Izumi,Chiyoda,Akitsushima) tails the Baltic Fleet afterSuma,ChiyodaandAkitsushimacatching up with the shadowing and reportingIzumi.
12:38 "Battle stations" ordered onMikasa.^[200]^: p.2
13:30 The Japanese main group (Mikasa,Shikishima,Fuji,Asahi,Kasuga,Nisshinand the 2nd battle division in this order) gains visual contact.
13:35 The Russian main group (Suvorov,Aleksandr III,BorodinoandOryolin this order) shifts heading Left (to North^[dg]) to cover the Left column led byOslyabya.
13:39Mikasahoists the battle flag, heading SSW approaching the West side of the Russian Left flank.
13:54Mikasato the closest Russian ship,Oslyabya:12,000m.Mikasasends up the 'Z' flag, meaning "The Empire's fate depends on the result of this battle, let every man do his utmost duty."
14:00MikasatoOslyabya:10,000m.Mikasaturns her helm aport and starts a U-turn with the 5 ships following in sequence to head NNE.
14:03ShikishimatoOslyabya:9,000m. AsShikishimastarts to turn,Oslyabyaopens fire.
14:07FujitoOslyabya:8,200m.Fujicompletes her turn.Knyaz Suvorovand the Russian Baltic Fleet open fire with their main batteries.
14:10AsahitoOslyabya:7,300m.Asahicompletes her turn.Mikasaopens fire onOslyabyawith a salvo 6 "test shot to establish distance baseline.^[200]^: p.2^[dh]
14:12KasugatoOslyabya:6,500m.Mikasareceives her first hit from the Russian guns.Shikishima,Fuji,Asahi,KasugaandNisshinopen fire onOslyabya.
14:14NisshintoOslyabya:6,000m.Oslyabyaloses her front mast and the center stack.
14:15Oslyabyais severely set on fire and slows down.
14:19MikasatoSuvorov:5,800m. Japanese main group concentrates fire on the Russian flagship,Knyaz Suvorov,which is now leading the Left column heading NNE.
14:25Mikasaloses top part of rear mast.^[di]Mikasaand her line turns NE and then to East to "cross the T". Russian Left column turns NE and to ESE in response.
14:43Knyaz Suvorovis set on fire and falls away from the battle line.
14:50 With the Japanese 1st Battle Div. completely overtaking the Russian battleships heading ESE,Aleksandrturns to the North withBorodinoandOryolfollowing.
14:55Mikasaand the 5 ships make immediate U-turn Left on the spot and heads WNW in reverse order (Nisshinfirst,Mikasalast). Japanese 2nd Battle Div. continues on heading SE and then SW attacking the secondary Russian warships.
15:10NisshintoAleksandr:4,000m.Oslyabyasinks.Knyaz Suvorovattempts to withdraw.
15:14AsahitoAleksandr:3,000m.Aleksandr,apparently giving up fleeing North, turns SE withBorodinoandOryolfollowing.
15:18AsahitoBorodino:2,500m.
15:50Nisshinand the 5 ships make another immediate U-turn Left, heads NE in normal order (Mikasafirst,Nisshinlast). Japanese 1st battle div. loses sight of the Russian main group in the battle smoke and mist.
16:45 One torpedo from the Japanese 4th Destroyer Div. hitsKnyaz Suvorovin the port side stern, causing her to list about 10 degrees to port.^[42]
17:00 Japanese 2nd battle div. finds the Russian main group close to where the Japanese 3rd Squadron (5th and 6th battle divs.) was attacking the Russian auxiliaries protected by cruisers.^[205]
17:30 Russian destroyerBuyniyrescues Admiral Rozhestvensky and his staff fromKnyaz Suvorov.^[206]
17:51 Russian auxiliary cruiserUralsunk by the 1st battle division bombardment and a torpedo by battleshipShikishima.^[207]
18:03Mikasaand the 1st Battle Div. catches up to the remainder of the Russian main group (heading N) in NW, and concentrate fire on the leadingAleksandr III.
18:16Aleksandr III(heading NW) catches major fire. Japanese main group concentrates fire onBorodino(heading NW).
19:03Imperator Aleksandr IIIsinks.
19:04 Huge explosion occurs inBorodino's stern.
19:05 Japanese main group concentrates fire onOryol(heading NW).
19:20Knyaz Suvorovsinks.
19:28 The Sun sets.
19:30Borodinosinks. Russian repair shipKamchatkasinks.
19:30 Leaving the destroyer divisions and torpedo boat flotillas in position to commence attack in the dark, Japanese 1st Battle Division leaves the battleground after ordering 2nd and 4th battle divisions to gather inMatsushima Islandarea in the North.^[42]^[y]

28 May 1905 (JST)^[208]^[209]^[168]

05:23 The scout ship of the 5th battle division,Yaeyama,sends "Spotted enemy in grid 603 heading NE" toItsukushima.
05:30 The Japanese Combined Fleet starts assembling a surrounding formation with over 20 capital ships among all the battle divisions.
09:30 Formation is mostly in place.Mikasaand the 1st battle division approach from the North heading South.
09:38Mikasagains visual contact with the remaining Baltic Fleet in SSE.
10:00Izumrudturns SE and runs at high speed away from the rest of the Russian fleet.
10:31Nisshinopens fire at 9,000m toNikolai IwithOryol,ApraksinandSeniavinfollowing in this order.
10:34 Admiral Nebogatov signals "XGE P", which is "Surrendered. Go still (Proceeding slow)" in the International Code of Signals used at the time.
10:40Mikasa,after changing course to ENE, opens fire at 6,900m with a starboard salvo 6 "test shot. The Russian ships do not return fire.
10:42Kasugahoists flag signal "enemy surrendered".
10:45 Admiral Tōgō accepts the surrender. CruiserSvetlanasunk by the 3rd battle division on its way North to the surrounding formation.
10:50Mikasaturns South and lowers the battle flag.
10:53 Firing stops.
11:53 CommanderAkiyama Saneyukiand Lieutenant Yamamoto Shinjirō departMikasaand head forNikolai Ion torpedo-boatKiji.
13:37Kijireturns toMikasawith Admiral Nevogatov and his staff.Asamacommander, CaptainYashiro Rokurō,acts as the interpreter in the Tōgō-Nebogatov meeting.

Crossing the T: Japanese are in white, the Russians in red. At this point, Second Battle Div. followed the wake of First Battle Div.
OslyabyaandKnyaz Suvorovare damaged and breaking off.Imperator Aleksandr III,Borodino,andOryolturn North, fleeing from the out-running Japanese divisions.
The Japanese first and second divisions sandwiching the Russian fleet.
The Russian ships in a shambles.

On film

The battle has been the main focus for two historical films in Japan. The first, 1969'sBattle of the Japan Sea( Nhật Bản hải biển rộng chiến,Nihonkai Daikaisen), directed by Seiji Maruyama, starringToshiro Mifuneas Admiral Tōgō, with music byMasaru Satoand special effects byEiji Tsuburaya.It was dramatized again in 1983'sBattle Anthem( Nhật Bản hải biển rộng chiến ・ hải ゆかば,Nihonkai Daikaisen – Umi Yukaba) with Mifune reprising his role.

Another, more recent, depiction is episode 4, season 3 of the 2009–2011NHK taiga dramaseriesSaka no Ue no Kumo(Bản の thượng の vân)(lit. "Clouds Above the Slope" ).

Explanatory notes

^33°49′51″N130°30′55″E/ 33.8307873742222°N 130.5153998022605°E/33.8307873742222; 130.5153998022605
^Replica of this compass can be seen on battleshipMikasain Yokosuka. The original is displayed atMunakata Taishashrine^[a]in Kyūshū where the compass was dedicated as an oblation for the three daughter goddesses ofgod of marinersafter this battle as the symbol of guiding the Combined Fleet.^[1]
^This painting shows Tōgō wearing a sword. In reality, it was prohibited for any officer to wear a sword on this deck for its effect on compass reading. The cushion-like coverings on the naval compass turret^[b]and side railings are rolled sailor hammocks (rolled canvas awnings on the mast) as a part of the "prepare for battle" procedure to reduce the risk posed by shrapnel.^[2]
^^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^h ⁱSeeOrder of battle at the Battle of Tsushima.
^31 torpedo boats of the Combined Fleet, 4 torpedo boats fromKure Naval District,and 10 torpedo boats fromTakeshiki Guard District.^[d]
^^a ^bOne of the premier military planners of the UK at the time, having served on theElgin Commissionand being one of the primary members ofEsher Committeetogether withLord EsherandAdmiral Sir John (Jacky) Fisher.
^He ended up being enshrined as a deity atTōgō Shrinelater in 1940, even though during his lifetime the admiral balked at the idea of being deified.
^Tsesarevich,Retvizan,Pobeda,Peresvet,PoltavaandSevastopol
^Askold,Pallada,Diana,NovikandBayan
^von Fölkersahm, who had previously inherited the gunnery school of the Baltic Fleet from Rozhestvensky as the Commandant, led a group of smaller ships, departed Reval and Libau a few days later and split from Rozhestvensky group at Tangier to head for Suez Canal.
^According to Pleshakov (2002),RionandDnieprare included andUral,Terek,GromkiyandGrozniyare excluded from this unit.^[14]
^^a ^bThe Baltic Fleet left Russia in four groups, commanded by Admiral Rozhestvensky, Rear Admiral von Fölkersahm, Rear Admiral Nebogatov and Captain Leonid Dobrotvorsky. Later, illness incapacitated Fölkersahm and his eventual death just 3 days before the Battle of Tsushima promoted Rear Admiral Nobogatov to de facto Second in Command of the fleet.
^Two hours after the initial departure still under tow, battleshipOryol,having a designed normal-load draught of 26ft,^[23]got stuck aground on the fairway at the mouth of Kronstadt port, which had 27ft depth, requiring dredgers to dig extra one and a half feet.^[24]Suez Canal had a draught limit of 22 feet until 1956.^[25]
^400,000 to 500,000 tons of coal was purchased by Russia atCardiffin the UK after the beginning of this war,^[26]and was described bySir George Clarke^[f]as "if the Russian fleet goes to the Far East (with) its motive power will be derived from British coal, mainly bought after the beginning of the war by a belligerent, which has made (the) coal absolute contraband".^[27]This explains why the Hamburg Amerika Line refused to provide coaling beyond French Indochina, as the Japanese would be legally entitled to capture the German colliers carrying contraband for the Russians.
^^a ^bTheHamburg-American Steamship Linerefused to provide coaling beyond French Indochina.^[63]
^^a ^bAuxiliary cruisersTerekandKubanwith a captured British transportOldhamire(with Russian officers and some Russian crew) were sent East on 22 May as a diversion ploy to head for La Pérouse.^[31]^[30]
^In one such trial, of the seven torpedoes fired, one jammed in the tube, two veered ninety degrees to port, one went ninety degrees to starboard, two kept a steady course but went wide of the mark, and the last went round in circles 'popping up and down like a porpoise', causing panic throughout the fleet. "^[35]
^Admirals Dewa (Battle of Port ArthurandBattle of the Yellow Sea), Kataoka (Battle of the Yellow Sea), Uryū (Battle of Chemulpo Bay), Kamimura (Battle of Port ArthurandBattle off Ulsan) and himself.
^Commander in Chief of Imperial Russian Armyand Navyin the Far East, Tsar Nikolas II's uncle. His headquarters was located inMukdenbefore the Russian defeat inBattle of Mukdenin February 1905. Alekseyev himself commanded Port Arthur after the dismissal of Starck until the arrival of Makarov (24 February – 8 March 1904), then again after the death of Makarov (13 April 1904) until the assignment ofNikolai Skrydlovwho could not reach Port Arthur due to the siege. He left Port Arthur on 5 May 1904 just before the Japanese army cut off the railroad between Port Arthur and Mukden.
^^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^hBattleshipOryoland the hospital shipOrelhad the same name Орёл in Russian, meaning 'Eagle'. As two different spellings have traditionally been used in English for this Russian word, this article uses 'Oryol' for the battleship and 'Orel' for the hospital ship for clarity.
^^a ^bAccording to Semenoff,^[52]a rescued officer ofOslyabyasaid later on destroyerBuyniy,"it was three Japanese shells accidentally hitting nearly the same spot on the waterline below the forward turret, creating a huge hole that caused the hull to almost heel over on the spot and settled under-water" that sunkOslyabya.
^^a ^bSpotter, foreman Semyon Semyonovich Yushchin, who swam out of a casemate, held onto a floating debris, and was picked up by Japanese destroyerOboroin the night.^[54]
^21 destroyers and 31 torpedo boats of the Combined Fleet, 4 torpedo boats fromKure Naval District,and 10 torpedo boats fromTakeshiki Guard District.^[d]
^After the war, Admiral Rozhestvensky was asked in a Russian court martial why he chose day time to pass the most dangerous zone ofTsushima Strait.His answer was "Because torpedo boats in the night is a greater risk for battleships."
^^a ^bLighthouses at the North-end ("Mitsushima Lighthouse"(in Japanese).) and the South-end ("Kousaki Lighthouse"(in Japanese).) of Tsushima were lit to indicate the borders of the area on the East side of Tsushima Island in which destroyers and torpedo boats are ordered to be free to attack any larger-than-destroyer ship in the dark.
^^a ^bThe composition of Shimose Powder, director-controlled salvo firing, the use of Ijuin Fuse and the shells not beingarmour-penetrating/delayed-detonation, and this chained floating mines on the Japanese side, and Makarov Tip, the death ofRear Admiral von Fölkersahm,which strait the fleet was headed going into the Sea of Japan, and the use of Barr and Stroud rangefinders byOslyabyaandNavarinon the Russian side were top secrets at the time. Most of the official records were not kept on these items.
^SeeRussian battleship Oryol#Construction and career
^Oryolhad lost its front left main gun, and the rear left gun could no longer be raised to extended-range elevations,^[aa]meaning that only four 12-inch guns were left in the fleet: two older black-powder firing (shorter range) guns onImperator Nikolai I,and two longer-range guns on the damagedOryolthat had however lost both of its rangefinders.
^During Nebogatov's court martial, his defense for surrendering his battle fleet was because his guns were outranged by the Japanese guns.
^In retrospect, the Japanese main 12 "guns outranged his shorter-range 12" Krupp guns by 8000 metres and the longer-range 1895-issue 12 "guns by about 3000 metres. See theGun range and rate of firesection for details. The Japanese fleet had 14 (out of 16) of the 12 "Armstrong guns operational on the four main battleships at the time.
^SeeBattle of Pungdo#Kowshing Incidentfor details of this incident on 25 July 1894. He had suffered pneumonia and was taken off duty for 3 years from 1887 before the Sino-Japanese war. He utilised the time to research and became an expert in international law. Japan had just signed theAnglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigationwith the UK on 16 July 1894, and his decision to sink the British ship (flying the British civilian ensign) after a boarding inspection, maritime capture, and demanding to abandon ship, was later cleared by British jurists to be in compliance withAdmiralty law.He also experienced Chinese cruiserJiyuanfleeing from theBattle of Pungdoafter raising a white flag and theJapanese naval ensign.
^35°28′51″N135°22′28″E/ 35.480815°N 135.374341°E/35.480815; 135.374341
^SeeRussian battleship Oryol#Construction and careerfor details. Due to her position in the Russian formation being the last in line of fourBorodino-class battleships,Oryolprobably received the least number of large calibre shells and possibly the most number of small calibre hits among the four.
^^a ^bOryol's officers and most of the crew were taken aboard battleshipAsahi,which towed and then accompaniedOryol,after her engines were temporarily repaired, to Maizuru. TheBurial at seawas conducted for Captain Nikolay Viktorovich Yung at 07:30 on 30 May 1905 onboardAsahi,all hands on fore-deck with all Russians and Japanese lined up.Half-mastwas flown on battleshipsAsahi,Oryoland cruiserAsama.^[131]After the funeral, a piece of cardboard with "35°56'13" North, 135°10'East "written on, was given by a Japanese officer to the junior navigator, Lieutenant Leonid Larionov who was personally close to the captain from his childhood.^[77]
^33°09′42″N129°42′02″E/ 33.161794°N 129.700501°E/33.161794; 129.700501
^Buiniyhad boiler and engine troubles, 20-years-old sail-rig-equippedDonskoicould not exceed 13 knots.^[65]
^wheredestroyer tender/torpedo boat depot shipwith repair equipment/personnelKasuga Maruwas.^[67]
^Carl Zeiss1904 Marine-Glas m.Revolver zwei vergrößerungen x5 und x10"Battleship Mikasa and Zeiss Binoculars"(in Japanese).
^Lieutenant Tsukamoto Katsukuma onboardSazanami,who spotted the Russian destroyers at 14:15, used to be assigned toMikasa.He had seen Admiral Tōgō many times and admired the state of the art binoculars^[al]used by the admiral. He spent 350 Yen (equivalent to one year's Lieutenant salary) of personal funds to purchase the same model, and the binoculars had reached him stationed atTsushimafrom the agent in Tōkyō before this battle.^[68]
^According to Novikov-Priboy,^[65]Byedoviyraised a white table cloth on the foremast, Red Cross flag on the rear mast, and had lowered the Saint Andrew's Cross from the stern flag pole, by the instruction of the Flag Captain Clapier de Colongue (the most senior officer onboard the destroyer after the injured admiral, outranking the ship commander Captain 2nd rank Nikolai Baranov), who reasonedByedoviyhad become a hospital ship.
^^a ^b ^cAdmiralRozhestvenskywas saved with his staff, theFlag Captain Konstantin Clapier de Colongue,Flag Navigation Officer Filipinoffsky, Captain 2nd rankVladimir Semenoff,and Flag-Lieutenant Leontieff,^[198]Surgeon Pyotr Kudinoff, flag officers Krzhizhanovsky, Demchinsky and cadet Maksimov, staff clerk Matizen and admiral's messenger Pyotr Poochkoff, together with 13 otherSuvorovcrew who jumped onto the destroyer during the rescue.^[65]^[cn]
^59°56′55″N30°18′48″E/ 59.948492°N 30.313317°E/59.948492; 30.313317
^^a ^b59°57′20″N30°20′16″E/ 59.955432°N 30.337789°E/59.955432; 30.337789
^On the front row, 3rd from the left to right; Chief medical officer (M.D., Admiral)Saneyoshi Yasuzumi,AdmiralsIjuin Gorō,Kamimura Hikonojō,Tōgō Heihachirō,Navy Minister (Admiral)Yamamoto Gonnohyōe,Head ofNavy General Staff(Admiral)Itō Sukeyuki,AdmiralsKataoka Shichirō,Dewa Shigetō,Under Secretary of Navy (Admiral)Saitō Makoto,Head of Planning Dept. of Navy Ministry (Admiral)Yamashita Gentarō.

AdmiralsUryū Sotokichi,Misu Sōtarō(who lost an eye in the battle),Taketomi Kunikane,Tōgō Masamichi,Yamada Hikohachi,Shimamura HayaoandOgura Byōichirōalso participated in the battle. SeeOrder of battle at the Battle of Tsushimafor the responsibilities of the admirals during this battle.
^Lishin, who had earnedSt.George's Crossfor bravery four times, volunteered and served in the Army after his release as a low-rank soldier duringWorld War Iand was noticed by Nicholas II during an inspection. The Tsar reinstated his Navy rank, and Lishin was assigned to The Second Baltic Fleet as a Captain in August 1915.
^Large calibre long barrel rifle with special mounts to be centered in the bore
^^a ^bDuring the 11 days from 28 March to 7 April 1905,Mikasahad 5 days with gunnery training sessions. In these 5 days,Mikasafired 9,066 rounds of practice ammunition.
^^a ^bAs an indication of unusually high level of gunnery training Tōgō applied to the fleet, theMaizuru Naval Arsenalrequested an increase in 1905 fiscal year budget for additional 40,000 rounds of sub-calibre practice ammunition on 17 May 1905 forMikasa,34,000 rounds for cruiserNisshin,1,000 rounds per gun for destroyerSazanami,among others, as they depleted annual allocations merely one and a half months into the fiscal year (Fiscal years begin on 1 April). These requests were all approved by the Fleet Management Dept. of the Naval Ministry for the entire fleet.^[80]
^The Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron departed Libau with small supply of sub-calibre practice ammunition. The transportIrtyshwas loaded with additional practice ammunition for the squadron, but was delayed in departure due to an accident, and was left behind at Libau for repair. The Russian Admiralty decided to unload the ammunition, send it via the Trans-Siberian railroad to Vladivostok, and reload the ship with coal, without notifying Rozhestvensky (who was promoted to rear admiral on the strength of founding the gunnery training school of the Baltic Fleet.^[65]), who learned about the decision after reaching Madagascar. The squadron conducted four practice sessions each at Nosy Be and Cam Ranh Bay.^[81]
^See the articles onRussian battleshipKnyaz Suvorov,Russian battleshipOryol,andRussian battleshipImperator Aleksandr III.
^The official departure date from Kronstadt was 11 September 1904.^[85]
^Launched on 29 August 1903. Commissioned in October 1905. The last ofBorodino-class ships.
^See#British support
^Approximate distance to horizon is calculated by sqrt(2 xhxR) whereRis theEarth radiusandhis the observation height above the sealevel. (seehorizonfor details.) Using battleshipMikasaas the example, the height of gunsight on top of 12 "main gun turret (technically they are barbettes with armoured covers that make them look like turrets) is about 10 to 11m from the waterline and the bridge height is about 16 to 18m from the waterline by estimating from thesideview plan.Using the globally-averaged earth radius of 6,371,000m^[87]for theR,the distance observable from the turret is sqrt(2 x 11 x 6371000m) = 11.8km. The distance observable from the bridge is sqrt(2 x 16 x 6371000m) = 14.3km. Mikasa's main guns had a range of 14km.(This explanatory note is provided for the benefit of the readers in accordance withWP:CALC.)
^What ship to target, and the distance to the target were specified on the bridge. Each gun/turret aimed the target to determine the deflection, and used a distance-to-elevation conversion table for the gun to set the elevation.
^All the gunnery personnel onMikasawas given a lecture on telephone systems at 17:20 on 18 April 1905 in Chinhae Bay.^[88]
^On 6-7 April 1905,Mikasaconducted the second sub-calibre gunnery training competition againstShikishima.Mikasascored 285 hits / 927 shots (30.7%),Shikishimascored 258/974 (26.5% hitrate) on opposite course;Mikasascored 894/1703 (52.5%),Shikishimascored 1085/1672 (64.9%) on the same course with the target at the distance of 280–720 m at 6 knots, with towed target by torpedo-boat at 6 knots.^[91]
^Baselength is the distance between the left and the right lens or mirror facing the target, which largely determines the effective range of a rangefinder.
^(1866–1938) Graduated fromTokyo University,Physics Dept.; studied atLawrence Scientific School(Harvard) andSheffield Scientific School(Yale) from 1893 to 1896.ja: Mộc thôn tuấn cát
^See a picture of faithful replica set onboard battleshipMikasainYokosuka.Mikasa Preservation Committee."Type 36 wireless set registered as Essential Historical Material for Science and Technology in 2008"(in Japanese).
^SeeAdolf SlabyandGeorg von Arco.
^For background information on the usage of wireless telegraphy at the time, and how tuning and maintenance were essential (just like drivers being required to be mechanics at the outset of automobiles), see:Packard, Winthrop (February 1904)."The Work of a Wireless Telegraph Man".The World's Work.
^IJN almost exclusively usedArmstrongguns on its heavier ships of the time. CruisersChitoseandKasagiwere built in the US, but their main guns were Armstrong. CruisersKasugaandNisshinwere built in Italy with Armstrong guns (Sir W.G. Armstrong & Company had a factory,Stabilimenti meccanici di Pozzuoli,in Italy). IJN licensed the design ofArmstrong 8 "guns and had started producing it in 1902.
^SeeFranco-Russian Alliancefor details.
^The time was in betweenHague Conventions of 1899 and 1907,and international agreements were not formalised on naval warfare yet (except on hospital ships). This argument made by Great Britain, based on Section IV "On the Internment of belligerents and the care of the wounded in neutral countries," (Article 57) of the 1899 agreement (which says "A neutral State which receives in its territory troops belonging to the belligerent armies shall intern them"^[98]), may have been acceptable to most governments in the world at the time. However, as it was incorporated into the 1907 Convention, it said "Belligerents are forbidden to use neutral ports and waters as a base of naval operations against their adversaries (Article 5)" with further articles permitting up to 24-hour stay (Article 12) for the maximum of three warships of a belligerent at war in any neutral port (Article 15) if the neutral power permitted.^[99]
^The alliance required both countries to join the war if one of them faces "more than one" countries as the adversary. The Franco-Russian Alliance had a similar requirement, but in wars against Germany only. The French government had to accept the logic, as France did not wish to risk going into war against the UK, nor wish to give any excuse for the Royal Navy to attack the Russian warships with or without declaring war.
^When the Rozestvensky squadron reachedDakarafter leaving Tangier, the ships were allowed into the port and carry out coaling, but upon exchanges of telegram messages with Paris by the local authorities, they were banned from the port.^[100]The German government, who had internedRussian battleshipTsesarevichatQingdaoon 11 August 1904, took a lenient stance towards the squadron as a neutral power in the war. After the Dakar stop, the Rozestvensky squadron reachedAngra Pequena BayinGerman South West Africaon 15 November 1904 (Gregorian), and the localLüderitzauthorities, busy in theHerero and Namaqua genocide,did not object to the mooring and coaling in the port until their departure on 21 November 1904.^[100]
^The Imperial Russia also tried to purchase Argentine cruisersGeneral BelgranoandPueyrredón,and Chilean cruisersEsmeraldaandChacabuco,all of which were also blocked by Great Britain.^[106]^[105]
^Being in theGiuseppe Garibaldi classof armoured cruisers, and ordered by Argentina with the likelihood of facing the Chilean battleships in mind, they were the forerunners of the laterbattlecruisers.The design prioritised on heavy armour at the expense of speed and cruise range which were important for other designs forcommerce raiding/protection. TheRoyal Italian Navyranked this class of warships as 2nd-class battleships.^[107]
^Effectively replacing the two battleships previously lost in the war, theHatsuseandYashima.
^He was credited with this invention as he spearheaded its development program as one of the leaders of IJN (as the senior member ofNavy General Staff), together with Navy Minister (Admiral)Yamamoto Gonnohyōewho appointedTōgō Heihachirōto the Commander in Chief of theCombined Fleetdisregarding seniority ranking within IJN. He was a major proponent ofAnglo-Japanese Allianceafter having attended theGreenwich Naval Academyfor a period, and was the key figure in IJN's tight relationship withArmstrong Mitchell & Company.
^After hitting Russian battleshipPeresvet13 times with 12 "and 15 more times with 6" or 8 "shells;^[112]hittingRetvizan18 times,Tsesarevich15 times,^[113]Poltava12–14 times, andPobeda11 times with 8 "and larger armour-piercing shells with delayed detonation fuze without being able to sink any of them (likewise none of the Japanese battleships was sunk despite receiving many hits) in theBattle of the Yellow Sea,the Japanese tactical priority shifted from sinking to the destruction ofsuperstructure.This concept of high explosive incendiary shells (the first example of what is called the HEI-BF "High Explosive Incendiary – Base Fuze" shells today) was not used by any navy in the world at the time. The Russian Navy used what is known asMakarov tipon its shells to improve penetrating performance upon hitting the target at an angle, without the experience ofhigh explosive armour-piercing shellsnot being effective enough against the Harvey / Krupp armour andcompartmented hullused on the battleships.
^Shimose Masachika also experienced an accidental explosion in 1887 and had lost dexterity on the left fingers.ja: Hạ lại nhã duẫn
^On Christmas day on Julian Calendar in 1904 off Madagascar, Alexey Novikov-Priboy onboard battleshipOryolwrote: "At noon, the ocean expanse was filled with the thunder of guns. Each ship fired a salute of thirty-one shots. The squadron was enveloped in black powder smoke."^[96]
^12 "shells creating an" incomparably larger splash than the enemy's on the water "^[116]
^"Japanese shells exploded even when they hit the water."^[34]
^12 "shells creating a" tall splash of 10–20 m "^[117]
^These shells held 5.3 kg^[119]ofguncotton,compared to 19.3 kg of Shimose powder for the Armstrong 12 ".^[120]
^SeeArmstrong Whitworth 12-inch 40-calibre naval gunfor details.
^BattleshipShikishimastill experienced this problem and lost a gun in the battle.
^When the trajectory is nearly flat, the shot hits the target even with a large range dispersion (+-100m or more at 10km range) because the height of the target ship effectively enlarges the target size. There is no such effect for the fall angles closer to 90 degrees no matter how tall the target is.
^Nomoto Tsunaakira(1858–1922) Commander ofAsahi.Later Admiral. He had 3 tours of duty in Russia before the battle; once on an Imperial Russian Navy cruiserAdmiral Nakhimov,^[122]twice as a military attaché toJapanese consulatein Russia."Naval Academy class of 7th"(in Japanese).
^After the Nebogatov surrender, the Second in Command of battleshipOryol,Captain 2nd Rank K.L. Schwede, who was in charge of the ship at the surrender (the ship commander Captain 1st RankN. Yungwas seriously wounded and unconscious) was interviewed by Captain T. Nomoto^[cd]on battleshipAsahi.It turned out they knew each other from previous assignments of Nomoto in Russia. Schwede desperately wanted to know why the Japanese shots had so much better hit rates in the battle. Nomoto did not (or could not) explain and just boasted "Our guns are meant and made to hit the target."^[123]
^See#Russian losses
^Seeru:Адмирал Ушаков (броненосец).
^In IJN, the training facilities for new recruits were called hải binh đoàn(かいへいだん,kaiheidan)"Sea Soldier Corps" which is translated as marine corps today.
^Built byStabilimento Tecnico TriestinoinTriesteas‹See Tfd›Russian:Маньчжурия,romanized:Manijuryain 1901.
^37°29′29″N130°55′11″E/ 37.4915276°N 130.9197994°E/37.4915276; 130.9197994
^Naas, Roberta (21 July 2018)."Russian ship sunk in 1905 discovered, said to have $130 Billion in gold aboard".Forbes.
^37°36′N129°48′E/ 37.6°N 129.8°E/37.6; 129.8SeeRussian cruiser Svetlana (1896)#Russo-Japanese War.
^40°27′50″N133°02′11″E/ 40.4639063°N 133.0362708°E/40.4639063; 133.0362708
^^a ^b ^cDestroyerBuyniy,after saving over 130Oslyabyacrew in the water, made a heroic rescue of the injured Admiral Rozhestvensky and his staff from the destroyed and burning battleshipKnyaz Suvorovat 17:30 on 27 May, but she suffered severe damage in doing so. Admiral Rozhestvensky and the staff were transferred to destroyerByedoviybefore she was abandoned and sunk.
^^a ^b ^cDestroyersBlestyashchiyandBodriyaccompanied cruisersOleg,ZhemchugandAurora.Bodriywas left behind whenBlestyashchiycrew needed to be picked up whenBlestyashchiy's damages made her no longer seaworthy in the escape.Bodriyran out of coal and was later rescued by a British transport vessel, which towed her to Shanghai to be interned.^[149]
^Seeru:Блестящий (миноносец)
^36°45′07″N129°28′06″E/ 36.751956°N 129.468349°E/36.751956; 129.468349
^Byedoviyhad over 80 personnel onboard at the time of surrender according to a Japanese Navy record.^[150]
^Seeja: Cao nguyệt ( chiến lợi 駆 trục hạm )for details.
^Seeru:Урал (вспомогательный крейсер)
^Purchased fromHAPAGin 1904. ex-Belgia^[152]
^Teru Matsumoto (10 June 2015)."Ceremony is held to mark 110th anniversary of rescue involving Russian ship".
^35°00′09″N132°11′38″E/ 35.002558°N 132.193921°E/35.002558; 132.193921
^Built for Russian Volunteer Fleet Association, Odessa as a passenger ship, and then converted to a hospital ship.
^^a ^b ^cAt 22:45 on 18 May 1905, the Baltic Fleet spotted and conducted a boarding inspection on a British transport vessel, SSOldhamire,that was sailing alongside the fleet. AsOldhamirewas carrying 150,000 cans of oil destined for Japan, she became subject of a maritime capture, and was forced to join the fleet with Russian officers onboard. The removed captain, the chief engineer, and two more British personnel were kept in captivity onboard the hospital shipOrel.This imprisonment of 3rd-country nationals violated the international maritime agreements for hospital ships;^[cz]consequently,Orelwas kept as a prize of war by Japan.^[63]
^Convention (III) for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention of 22 August 1864. The Hague, 29 July 1899.,^[166]which defines Hospital Ships to be "solely for the purpose of assisting the wounded, sick or shipwrecked".^[167]SeeHague Convention on Hospital Shipsfor signatory countries (note the absence of the UK).
^These were the most hits received afterMikasa.
^The original Japanese destroyerAkatsukisank after striking a mine in thesiege of Port Arthuron 17 May 1904. IJN concealed the loss and gave the 'Akatsuki' name to the capturedReshitel‘nyias if the original returned to service. At the beginning of this battle, there was a plan to dispatchAkatsuki,being indistinguishable from other Russian destroyers, in front of the Baltic Fleet to lay chained floating mines.^[z]Tōgō did not use this ploy, and the destroyer was added to the Navy list asYamabiko(andAkatsukistruck) after the war.^[176]
^There are considerable discrepancies not only between the Russian and Japanese records, but also among the Japanese records on time-line. This timeline is assembled mostly from the Japanese records.^[199]^[168]^[200]^[201]
^35°04′15″N128°40′33″E/ 35.070744°N 128.675710°E/35.070744; 128.675710
^34°43′26″N129°26′38″E/ 34.7238471936982°N 129.44398787201965°E
^Nunome Mitsuzō,later Admiral.ja: Bố mục mãn tạo
^According to a Russian record, "2 point (22.5-degrees) to Port at once".^[204]
^Japanese navy had found the 6 "guns to be more accurate than 12" guns, and formalized the procedure to use a 6-inch salvo firing for initial establishment of distance.
^With the upper mast,Mikasalost radio transmission capability due to the loss of antenna. From this point on, Tōgō relied on hand semaphore signaling to the immediately followingShikishimafor orders to be transmitted by radio.

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^Lengerer 2008,pp. 64, 66.
^Bogdanov 2004,p. 77.
^Corbett 2015b,p. 308.
^^a ^bTsukamoto 1907,p. 119.
^^a ^b ^cBritish Naval Attache Reports 2003,p. 441.
^^a ^b ^cCorbett 2015b,p. 420.
^Tsukamoto 1907,pp. 125–126.
^Corbett 2015b,p. 327.
^Tsukamoto 1907,p. 124.
^^a ^bCorbett 2015b,p. 307
^Corbett 2015b,pp. 331, 332.
^Wright 1976,pp. 142, 144.
^Kowner 2006,p. 365.
^Corbett 2015b,p. 313.
^Chesneau & Kolesnik 1979,p. 207.
^Corbett 2015b,p. 330.
^Corbett 2015b,pp. 308, 309.
^"Japanese Navy, Russo-Japanese War"(in Japanese).
^Tsukamoto 1907,p. 152.
^Tsukamoto 1907,pp. 88–90.
^"Hamburg-American Line (theshipslist )".
^"Irtysh (Иртыш) (+1905)".
^"The Irtysh surrender incident".Archivedfrom the original on 31 May 2022.Retrieved21 April2022.
^Tsukamoto 1907,p. 89.
^^a ^b"Tyne built ships, OREL".
^"On captured Russian hospital ships Angara and Oryol"(in Japanese).^{: page 2/9 or 0042/0049}
^Usami 2007,p. 138.
^"On captured Russian hospital ships Angara and Oryol"(in Japanese).^{: page 6/9 or 0046/0049}
^Ex-GermanRolandbuilt by Schömer & Jensen."Russian Tugboat Rus - 1903".
^"SS Rus (Руси) (+1905)".
^^a ^b ^cCorbett 2015b,p. 333
^^a ^b ^c ^d ^eWillmott 2009,p. 118.
^^a ^b"Picture ofBodriyin Shanghai ".Retrieved28 March2024.
^^a ^b"TYNE BUILT SHIPS -A history of Tyne shipbuilders and the ships that they built".
^"Convention (III) for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention of 22 August 1864. The Hague, 29 July 1899".Archivedfrom the original on 24 May 2022.Retrieved24 May2022.
^"Article 1".Archivedfrom the original on 24 May 2022.Retrieved24 May2022.
^^a ^b ^cTsukamoto 1907.
^Corbett 2015b,pp. 283, 287.
^^a ^b ^cCorbett 2015b,p. 283
^Campbell 1978,p. 263.
^Campbell 1978,pp. 128–35, 260, 262.
^Tsukamoto 1907,pp. 98–106.
^Campbell 1978,pp. 258, 260, 263.
^Campbell 1978,pp. 260, 262–263.
^Tikowara & Grant 2008.
^Corbett 2015b,pp. 29, 446.
^^a ^bWillmott 2009,p. 119.
^Thiess 1954,p. 435ff.
^"Steamboat-cruiser" Smolensk ""(in Russian).
^Tuchman 1962.
^Forczyk 2009,Back cover
^Pleshakov 2002,p. xvi.
^Corbett 2015a,pp. 31, 32, 56.
^"the Impact of the Russo-Japanese War in Asia".The American Forum for Global Education. Archived fromthe originalon 6 January 2003.Retrieved25 April2010.
^Mishra, Pankaj (20 March 2013)."The guns of Tsushima, and the birth of modern Asia".National Post.
^^a ^bSondhaus 2001,p. 192.
^Egorov, Boris (29 November 2021)."Yamamoto Isoroku, who fought the Imperial Russian Navy: One Scene from Battle of the Sea of Japan"(in Japanese). Russia Beyond.Retrieved19 April2024.
^Massie 1991,pp. 470–480.
^Semenoff 1907,pp. 125, 135.
^Massie 1991,pp. 471, 474, 480.
^Busch 1969,p. 215.
^Friedman 2008,p. 68.
^Turner 1913,pp. 129–147.
^Gardiner & Budzbon 1985,pp. 134–135.
^Churchill 1927,p. 106.
^"Battle of Jutland | History, Facts, & Outcome | Britannica".britannica.24 May 2023.
^Semenoff 1907,p. 142 in footnote.
^Navy General Staff, ed. (27 May 1905)."Battleship Mikasa Wartime Daily Log 4(2)"(in Japanese). pp. 0509–0514.Retrieved18 April2024.
^^a ^b ^c ^d ^eHikojirō Ijichi."Imperial Japanese Navy records, 27 May 1905, Classified, Detail reports on battle of the Japan Sea Nr.2, submitted by the commander of Mikasa"(in Japanese).Archivedfrom the original on 25 June 2022.Retrieved14 May2022.
^Corbett 2015b,p. 223.
^^a ^bNavy General Staff, ed. (27 May 1905)."Battleship Mikasa Wartime Daily Log 4(4)"(in Japanese). p. 0577.Retrieved19 April2024.
^Semenoff 1907,p. 40.
^Semenoff 1907,p. 42.
^Semenoff 1907,p. 138.
^Semenoff 1907,pp. 140–153.
^Campbell 1978,pp. 134, 260.
^Navy General Staff, ed. (28 May 1905)."Battleship Mikasa Wartime Daily Log 4(2)"(in Japanese). pp. 0518–0522.Retrieved19 April2024.
^Corbett 2015b,p. 324.

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British Naval Attache Reports (2003) [1907].The Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905.Nashville, TN: The Battery Press.ISBN 0-89839-324-8.
Brook, Peter (1999).Warships for Export: Armstrong Warships 1867–1927.Gravesend, Kent, UK: World Ship Society.ISBN 0-905617-89-4.
Busch, Noel F. (1969).The Emperor's Sword: Japan vs. Russia in the Battle of Tsushima.New York: Funk & Wagnall's.
Campbell, N.J.M. (1978). Preston, Antony (ed.). "The Battle of Tsu-Shima".Warship.2(5). London: Conway Maritime Press.ISBN 0-87021-976-6.
Chesneau, Roger; Kolesnik, Eugene M. (1979).Conway′s All the World′s Fighting Ships 1860–1905.New York: Mayflower Books.ISBN 0-8317-0302-4.
Churchill, Sir Winston S.(1927).The World Crisis, Vol. III.London: Scribner's.ISBN 1-47422-339-7.
Corbett, Sir Julian(2015a) [1914].Maritime Operations In The Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905, Vol. 1.Naval Institute Press.ISBN 978-1-59114-197-6.
Corbett, Sir Julian(2015b) [1915].Maritime Operations In The Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905, Vol. 2.Naval Institute Press.ISBN 978-1-59114-198-3.
Dougherty, Martin J., ed. (2012).100 Battles that Shaped the World.Bath: Parragon Book Service.ISBN 9781445466804.
Evans, David C;Peattie, Mark R(1997).Kaigun: strategy, tactics, and technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941.Annapolis, Maryland:Naval Institute Press.ISBN 0-87021-192-7.
Forczyk, Robert (2009).Russian Battleship vs Japanese Battleship, Yellow Sea 1904–1905.Osprey.ISBN 978-1-84603-330-8.
Friedman, Norman(2008).Naval Firepower; Battleship Guns and Gunnery in the Dreadnaught Era.Seaforth Publishing.ISBN 978-1-84832-185-4.
García, Manuel Domecq (1998).A record by Argentine military attaché: Battle of the Sea of Japan(in Japanese). Translated by Katsuji Tsushima. Argentina-Japan Association.ISBN 4-901009-02-8.
Gardiner, Robert; Budzbon, Przemyslaw (1 May 1985). Gray, Randal (ed.).Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1906–1921.London:Naval Institute Press.ISBN 978-0870219078.
Great Britain Committee of Imperial Defence (1920).Official history, naval and military, of the Russo-Japanese War. Prepared by the Historical section of the Committee of Imperial Defence.Vol. III. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office.
Grove, Eric(1995).Big Fleet Actions: Tsushima-Jutland-Philippine Sea.London: Arms & Armour Press.ISBN 978-1854092816.
Horne, Alistair(2015).Hubris. The Tragedy of War in the Twentieth Century.HarperCollins.ISBN 978-0-06-239780-5.
The Hutchinson Unabridged Encyclopedia with Atlas and Weather Guide.Helicon. 2018.ISBN 9781786845689.
Koenig, William (1977).Epic Sea Battles(2004 revised ed.). London: Octopus Publishing Group Ltd.ISBN 0-7537-1062-5.
Kowner, Rotem(2006).Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War.Scarecrow.ISBN 978-0810849273.
Lardas, Mark (2018).Tsushima 1905: Death of a Russian Fleet.Bloomsbury Publishing.ISBN 9781472826855.Archivedfrom the original on 25 June 2022.Retrieved31 May2021.
Launiainen, Petri (6 June 2018).A Brief History of Everything Wireless: How Invisible Waves Have Changed the World.Springer.ISBN 9783319789101.
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Mahan, Alfred Thayer(April 1906)."Reflections, Historic and Other, Suggested by the Battle of the Japan Sea".Proceedings.36(2). US Naval Institute.
Massie, Robert K.(1991).Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War.New York: Random House.ISBN 0-394-52833-6.
McLaughlin, Stephen (2003).Russian & Soviet Battleships.Annapolis, Maryland:Naval Institute Press.ISBN 1-55750-481-4.
Miyanaga, Takashi (March 2004)."Hosei University Academic Repository, The North Sea Incident".Shakai Shirin(in Japanese).50.doi:10.15002/00021006.
Nish, Ian (15 August 2022).The Russo-Japanese War, 1904–5: Volume 1.BRILL.ISBN 9789004531789.
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Pleshakov, Constantine (2008).The Tsar's Last Armada: The Epic Voyage to the BATTLE of TSUSHIMA.London: Hachette.ISBN 9780786725496.
Pleshakov, Konstantin (2002).The Tsar's last armada: the epic journey to the Battle of Tsushima.New York: Basic Books.ISBN 0-465-05792-6.
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Thiess, Frank(1954).Tsushima(in German). Rowohlt Verlag.ASIN B0000BOK7K.
Tikowara, Hesibo; Grant, Robert Francis Sidney (2008).Before Port Arthur in a Destroyer: The Personal Diary of a Japanese Naval Officer.BiblioBazaar.ISBN 978-0554710389.^[b]
Tsukamoto, Yoshitane (June 1907). Imperial Japanese Navy Records (ed.)."Battle of the Sea of Japan as seen from BattleshipAsahi"(in Japanese). Sorokaku Publishing.Retrieved19 May2022.^[a]
Tuchman, Barbara W.(1962).The Guns of August.New York: Presidio Press.ISBN 0-345-47609-3.
Turner, Edward Raymond (April 1913). "The Rivalry of Germany and England".The Sewanee Review.21(2): 129–147.JSTOR 27532610.
Ugryumov, Aleksandr (3 April 2022).People of Tsushima. Russian sailors in the heroic epic(in Russian). Litres.ISBN 9785044264687.
Usami, Shozo (2007).Japan as seen from Kasato Maru(in Japanese). Tokyo: Kaibundo Publishing.ISBN 978-4-303-63440-7.
Vego, Milan N. (2009). Naval War College Press (U.S.) (ed.).Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice.Government Printing Office. p. V2 Historical Companion.ISBN 978-1-884733-62-8.
Watts, Anthony J. (1990).The Imperial Russian Navy.London: Arms and Armour Press.ISBN 0-85368-912-1.
Willmott, H. P. (2009).The Last Century of Sea Power: From Port Arthur to Chanak, 1894–1922, Volume 1.Indiana University Press.ISBN 978-0-25300-356-0.
Wright, Christopher C. (1976).Imperial Russian Cruisers, Part 3.Vol. 2 (International Naval Research Organization. XIII ed.). Toledo, Ohio: Warship International.

Notes:

^^a ^bSemenoff (1907) and Tsukamoto (1907) are excellent first-hand sources on this battle. Captain 2nd rankV. Semenoff,having experiencedSiege of Port ArthurandBattle of the Yellow Seabefore this battle, was onboardKnyaz Suvorovas a staff officer to Admiral Rozhestvensky. Accounting Officer Y. Tsukamoto with the rank of trung chủ kế ('Chū-Shukei' -accounting officer rank equivalent to Commander) was assigned toAsahijust before this battle for the purpose of recording the battle events.
^This is a diary in Japanese translated first into Spanish, which is translated further into English. The author could be Fujiwara Eisaburō ( đằng nguyên anh Tam Lang 1873-1925, later Admiral)."Đằng nguyên anh Tam Lang"(in Japanese).

External links

Bykov, P.D., Captain 1st.rank."Russo Japanese War 1904–1905"(in Russian).
History– This Day In History: The Battle of Tsushima Strait
Battlefleet 1900– Free naval wargame rules covering pre-dreadnought era, including Russo-Japanese War
Russojapanesewar– complete order of battle of both fleets, Admiral Tōgō's post-battle report and the account of Russian ensign Sememov

[1] 33°49′51″N130°30′55″E/ 33.8307873742222°N 130.5153998022605°E/33.8307873742222; 130.5153998022605

[3] Replica of this compass can be seen on battleshipMikasain Yokosuka. The original is displayed atMunakata Taishashrine^[a]in Kyūshū where the compass was dedicated as an oblation for the three daughter goddesses ofgod of marinersafter this battle as the symbol of guiding the Combined Fleet.^[1]

[5] This painting shows Tōgō wearing a sword. In reality, it was prohibited for any officer to wear a sword on this deck for its effect on compass reading. The cushion-like coverings on the naval compass turret^[b]and side railings are rolled sailor hammocks (rolled canvas awnings on the mast) as a part of the "prepare for battle" procedure to reduce the risk posed by shrapnel.^[2]

[order-7] ^^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^h ⁱSeeOrder of battle at the Battle of Tsushima.

[8] 31 torpedo boats of the Combined Fleet, 4 torpedo boats fromKure Naval District,and 10 torpedo boats fromTakeshiki Guard District.^[d]

[Clarke-11] One of the premier military planners of the UK at the time, having served on theElgin Commissionand being one of the primary members ofEsher Committeetogether withLord EsherandAdmiral Sir John (Jacky) Fisher.

[13] He ended up being enshrined as a deity atTōgō Shrinelater in 1940, even though during his lifetime the admiral balked at the idea of being deified.

[15] Tsesarevich,Retvizan,Pobeda,Peresvet,PoltavaandSevastopol

[16] Askold,Pallada,Diana,NovikandBayan

[22] von Fölkersahm, who had previously inherited the gunnery school of the Baltic Fleet from Rozhestvensky as the Commandant, led a group of smaller ships, departed Reval and Libau a few days later and split from Rozhestvensky group at Tangier to head for Suez Canal.

[25] According to Pleshakov (2002),RionandDnieprare included andUral,Terek,GromkiyandGrozniyare excluded from this unit.^[14]

[Dobrot-28] The Baltic Fleet left Russia in four groups, commanded by Admiral Rozhestvensky, Rear Admiral von Fölkersahm, Rear Admiral Nebogatov and Captain Leonid Dobrotvorsky. Later, illness incapacitated Fölkersahm and his eventual death just 3 days before the Battle of Tsushima promoted Rear Admiral Nobogatov to de facto Second in Command of the fleet.

[38] Two hours after the initial departure still under tow, battleshipOryol,having a designed normal-load draught of 26ft,^[23]got stuck aground on the fairway at the mouth of Kronstadt port, which had 27ft depth, requiring dredgers to dig extra one and a half feet.^[24]Suez Canal had a draught limit of 22 feet until 1956.^[25]

[41] 400,000 to 500,000 tons of coal was purchased by Russia atCardiffin the UK after the beginning of this war,^[26]and was described bySir George Clarke^[f]as "if the Russian fleet goes to the Far East (with) its motive power will be derived from British coal, mainly bought after the beginning of the war by a belligerent, which has made (the) coal absolute contraband".^[27]This explains why the Hamburg Amerika Line refused to provide coaling beyond French Indochina, as the Japanese would be legally entitled to capture the German colliers carrying contraband for the Russians.

[refusal-42] TheHamburg-American Steamship Linerefused to provide coaling beyond French Indochina.^[63]

[terek-47] Auxiliary cruisersTerekandKubanwith a captured British transportOldhamire(with Russian officers and some Russian crew) were sent East on 22 May as a diversion ploy to head for La Pérouse.^[31]^[30]

[52] In one such trial, of the seven torpedoes fired, one jammed in the tube, two veered ninety degrees to port, one went ninety degrees to starboard, two kept a steady course but went wide of the mark, and the last went round in circles 'popping up and down like a porpoise', causing panic throughout the fleet. "^[35]

[53] Admirals Dewa (Battle of Port ArthurandBattle of the Yellow Sea), Kataoka (Battle of the Yellow Sea), Uryū (Battle of Chemulpo Bay), Kamimura (Battle of Port ArthurandBattle off Ulsan) and himself.

[54] Commander in Chief of Imperial Russian Armyand Navyin the Far East, Tsar Nikolas II's uncle. His headquarters was located inMukdenbefore the Russian defeat inBattle of Mukdenin February 1905. Alekseyev himself commanded Port Arthur after the dismissal of Starck until the arrival of Makarov (24 February – 8 March 1904), then again after the death of Makarov (13 April 1904) until the assignment ofNikolai Skrydlovwho could not reach Port Arthur due to the siege. He left Port Arthur on 5 May 1904 just before the Japanese army cut off the railroad between Port Arthur and Mukden.

[Oryol-57] ^^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^hBattleshipOryoland the hospital shipOrelhad the same name Орёл in Russian, meaning 'Eagle'. As two different spellings have traditionally been used in English for this Russian word, this article uses 'Oryol' for the battleship and 'Orel' for the hospital ship for clarity.

[Oslyabya-73] According to Semenoff,^[52]a rescued officer ofOslyabyasaid later on destroyerBuyniy,"it was three Japanese shells accidentally hitting nearly the same spot on the waterline below the forward turret, creating a huge hole that caused the hull to almost heel over on the spot and settled under-water" that sunkOslyabya.

[yushchin-76] Spotter, foreman Semyon Semyonovich Yushchin, who swam out of a casemate, held onto a floating debris, and was picked up by Japanese destroyerOboroin the night.^[54]

[77] 21 destroyers and 31 torpedo boats of the Combined Fleet, 4 torpedo boats fromKure Naval District,and 10 torpedo boats fromTakeshiki Guard District.^[d]

[78] After the war, Admiral Rozhestvensky was asked in a Russian court martial why he chose day time to pass the most dangerous zone ofTsushima Strait.His answer was "Because torpedo boats in the night is a greater risk for battleships."

[lighthouse-80] Lighthouses at the North-end ("Mitsushima Lighthouse"(in Japanese).) and the South-end ("Kousaki Lighthouse"(in Japanese).) of Tsushima were lit to indicate the borders of the area on the East side of Tsushima Island in which destroyers and torpedo boats are ordered to be free to attack any larger-than-destroyer ship in the dark.

[mines-81] The composition of Shimose Powder, director-controlled salvo firing, the use of Ijuin Fuse and the shells not beingarmour-penetrating/delayed-detonation, and this chained floating mines on the Japanese side, and Makarov Tip, the death ofRear Admiral von Fölkersahm,which strait the fleet was headed going into the Sea of Japan, and the use of Barr and Stroud rangefinders byOslyabyaandNavarinon the Russian side were top secrets at the time. Most of the official records were not kept on these items.

[87] SeeRussian battleship Oryol#Construction and career

[88] Oryolhad lost its front left main gun, and the rear left gun could no longer be raised to extended-range elevations,^[aa]meaning that only four 12-inch guns were left in the fleet: two older black-powder firing (shorter range) guns onImperator Nikolai I,and two longer-range guns on the damagedOryolthat had however lost both of its rangefinders.

[89] During Nebogatov's court martial, his defense for surrendering his battle fleet was because his guns were outranged by the Japanese guns.

[90] In retrospect, the Japanese main 12 "guns outranged his shorter-range 12" Krupp guns by 8000 metres and the longer-range 1895-issue 12 "guns by about 3000 metres. See theGun range and rate of firesection for details. The Japanese fleet had 14 (out of 16) of the 12 "Armstrong guns operational on the four main battleships at the time.

[92] SeeBattle of Pungdo#Kowshing Incidentfor details of this incident on 25 July 1894. He had suffered pneumonia and was taken off duty for 3 years from 1887 before the Sino-Japanese war. He utilised the time to research and became an expert in international law. Japan had just signed theAnglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigationwith the UK on 16 July 1894, and his decision to sink the British ship (flying the British civilian ensign) after a boarding inspection, maritime capture, and demanding to abandon ship, was later cleared by British jurists to be in compliance withAdmiralty law.He also experienced Chinese cruiserJiyuanfleeing from theBattle of Pungdoafter raising a white flag and theJapanese naval ensign.

[95] 35°28′51″N135°22′28″E/ 35.480815°N 135.374341°E/35.480815; 135.374341

[96] SeeRussian battleship Oryol#Construction and careerfor details. Due to her position in the Russian formation being the last in line of fourBorodino-class battleships,Oryolprobably received the least number of large calibre shells and possibly the most number of small calibre hits among the four.

[Yung-97] Oryol's officers and most of the crew were taken aboard battleshipAsahi,which towed and then accompaniedOryol,after her engines were temporarily repaired, to Maizuru. TheBurial at seawas conducted for Captain Nikolay Viktorovich Yung at 07:30 on 30 May 1905 onboardAsahi,all hands on fore-deck with all Russians and Japanese lined up.Half-mastwas flown on battleshipsAsahi,Oryoland cruiserAsama.^[131]After the funeral, a piece of cardboard with "35°56'13" North, 135°10'East "written on, was given by a Japanese officer to the junior navigator, Lieutenant Leonid Larionov who was personally close to the captain from his childhood.^[77]

[99] 33°09′42″N129°42′02″E/ 33.161794°N 129.700501°E/33.161794; 129.700501

[101] Buiniyhad boiler and engine troubles, 20-years-old sail-rig-equippedDonskoicould not exceed 13 knots.^[65]

[104] wheredestroyer tender/torpedo boat depot shipwith repair equipment/personnelKasuga Maruwas.^[67]

[105] Carl Zeiss1904 Marine-Glas m.Revolver zwei vergrößerungen x5 und x10"Battleship Mikasa and Zeiss Binoculars"(in Japanese).

[107] Lieutenant Tsukamoto Katsukuma onboardSazanami,who spotted the Russian destroyers at 14:15, used to be assigned toMikasa.He had seen Admiral Tōgō many times and admired the state of the art binoculars^[al]used by the admiral. He spent 350 Yen (equivalent to one year's Lieutenant salary) of personal funds to purchase the same model, and the binoculars had reached him stationed atTsushimafrom the agent in Tōkyō before this battle.^[68]

[109] According to Novikov-Priboy,^[65]Byedoviyraised a white table cloth on the foremast, Red Cross flag on the rear mast, and had lowered the Saint Andrew's Cross from the stern flag pole, by the instruction of the Flag Captain Clapier de Colongue (the most senior officer onboard the destroyer after the injured admiral, outranking the ship commander Captain 2nd rank Nikolai Baranov), who reasonedByedoviyhad become a hospital ship.

[Suvorov-111] AdmiralRozhestvenskywas saved with his staff, theFlag Captain Konstantin Clapier de Colongue,Flag Navigation Officer Filipinoffsky, Captain 2nd rankVladimir Semenoff,and Flag-Lieutenant Leontieff,^[198]Surgeon Pyotr Kudinoff, flag officers Krzhizhanovsky, Demchinsky and cadet Maksimov, staff clerk Matizen and admiral's messenger Pyotr Poochkoff, together with 13 otherSuvorovcrew who jumped onto the destroyer during the rescue.^[65]^[cn]

[112] 59°56′55″N30°18′48″E/ 59.948492°N 30.313317°E/59.948492; 30.313317

[aurora-114] 59°57′20″N30°20′16″E/ 59.955432°N 30.337789°E/59.955432; 30.337789

[116] On the front row, 3rd from the left to right; Chief medical officer (M.D., Admiral)Saneyoshi Yasuzumi,AdmiralsIjuin Gorō,Kamimura Hikonojō,Tōgō Heihachirō,Navy Minister (Admiral)Yamamoto Gonnohyōe,Head ofNavy General Staff(Admiral)Itō Sukeyuki,AdmiralsKataoka Shichirō,Dewa Shigetō,Under Secretary of Navy (Admiral)Saitō Makoto,Head of Planning Dept. of Navy Ministry (Admiral)Yamashita Gentarō.

AdmiralsUryū Sotokichi,Misu Sōtarō(who lost an eye in the battle),Taketomi Kunikane,Tōgō Masamichi,Yamada Hikohachi,Shimamura HayaoandOgura Byōichirōalso participated in the battle. SeeOrder of battle at the Battle of Tsushimafor the responsibilities of the admirals during this battle.

[121] Lishin, who had earnedSt.George's Crossfor bravery four times, volunteered and served in the Army after his release as a low-rank soldier duringWorld War Iand was noticed by Nicholas II during an inspection. The Tsar reinstated his Navy rank, and Lishin was assigned to The Second Baltic Fleet as a Captain in August 1915.

[125] Large calibre long barrel rifle with special mounts to be centered in the bore

[practice-126] During the 11 days from 28 March to 7 April 1905,Mikasahad 5 days with gunnery training sessions. In these 5 days,Mikasafired 9,066 rounds of practice ammunition.

[subc-128] As an indication of unusually high level of gunnery training Tōgō applied to the fleet, theMaizuru Naval Arsenalrequested an increase in 1905 fiscal year budget for additional 40,000 rounds of sub-calibre practice ammunition on 17 May 1905 forMikasa,34,000 rounds for cruiserNisshin,1,000 rounds per gun for destroyerSazanami,among others, as they depleted annual allocations merely one and a half months into the fiscal year (Fiscal years begin on 1 April). These requests were all approved by the Fleet Management Dept. of the Naval Ministry for the entire fleet.^[80]

[130] The Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron departed Libau with small supply of sub-calibre practice ammunition. The transportIrtyshwas loaded with additional practice ammunition for the squadron, but was delayed in departure due to an accident, and was left behind at Libau for repair. The Russian Admiralty decided to unload the ammunition, send it via the Trans-Siberian railroad to Vladivostok, and reload the ship with coal, without notifying Rozhestvensky (who was promoted to rear admiral on the strength of founding the gunnery training school of the Baltic Fleet.^[65]), who learned about the decision after reaching Madagascar. The squadron conducted four practice sessions each at Nosy Be and Cam Ranh Bay.^[81]

[132] See the articles onRussian battleshipKnyaz Suvorov,Russian battleshipOryol,andRussian battleshipImperator Aleksandr III.

[136] The official departure date from Kronstadt was 11 September 1904.^[85]

[137] Launched on 29 August 1903. Commissioned in October 1905. The last ofBorodino-class ships.

[138] See#British support

[141] Approximate distance to horizon is calculated by sqrt(2 xhxR) whereRis theEarth radiusandhis the observation height above the sealevel. (seehorizonfor details.) Using battleshipMikasaas the example, the height of gunsight on top of 12 "main gun turret (technically they are barbettes with armoured covers that make them look like turrets) is about 10 to 11m from the waterline and the bridge height is about 16 to 18m from the waterline by estimating from thesideview plan.Using the globally-averaged earth radius of 6,371,000m^[87]for theR,the distance observable from the turret is sqrt(2 x 11 x 6371000m) = 11.8km. The distance observable from the bridge is sqrt(2 x 16 x 6371000m) = 14.3km. Mikasa's main guns had a range of 14km.(This explanatory note is provided for the benefit of the readers in accordance withWP:CALC.)

[142] What ship to target, and the distance to the target were specified on the bridge. Each gun/turret aimed the target to determine the deflection, and used a distance-to-elevation conversion table for the gun to set the elevation.

[144] All the gunnery personnel onMikasawas given a lecture on telephone systems at 17:20 on 18 April 1905 in Chinhae Bay.^[88]

[148] On 6-7 April 1905,Mikasaconducted the second sub-calibre gunnery training competition againstShikishima.Mikasascored 285 hits / 927 shots (30.7%),Shikishimascored 258/974 (26.5% hitrate) on opposite course;Mikasascored 894/1703 (52.5%),Shikishimascored 1085/1672 (64.9%) on the same course with the target at the distance of 280–720 m at 6 knots, with towed target by torpedo-boat at 6 knots.^[91]

[149] Baselength is the distance between the left and the right lens or mirror facing the target, which largely determines the effective range of a rangefinder.

[153] (1866–1938) Graduated fromTokyo University,Physics Dept.; studied atLawrence Scientific School(Harvard) andSheffield Scientific School(Yale) from 1893 to 1896.ja: Mộc thôn tuấn cát

[154] See a picture of faithful replica set onboard battleshipMikasainYokosuka.Mikasa Preservation Committee."Type 36 wireless set registered as Essential Historical Material for Science and Technology in 2008"(in Japanese).

[155] SeeAdolf SlabyandGeorg von Arco.

[158] For background information on the usage of wireless telegraphy at the time, and how tuning and maintenance were essential (just like drivers being required to be mechanics at the outset of automobiles), see:Packard, Winthrop (February 1904)."The Work of a Wireless Telegraph Man".The World's Work.

[159] IJN almost exclusively usedArmstrongguns on its heavier ships of the time. CruisersChitoseandKasagiwere built in the US, but their main guns were Armstrong. CruisersKasugaandNisshinwere built in Italy with Armstrong guns (Sir W.G. Armstrong & Company had a factory,Stabilimenti meccanici di Pozzuoli,in Italy). IJN licensed the design ofArmstrong 8 "guns and had started producing it in 1902.

[161] SeeFranco-Russian Alliancefor details.

[164] The time was in betweenHague Conventions of 1899 and 1907,and international agreements were not formalised on naval warfare yet (except on hospital ships). This argument made by Great Britain, based on Section IV "On the Internment of belligerents and the care of the wounded in neutral countries," (Article 57) of the 1899 agreement (which says "A neutral State which receives in its territory troops belonging to the belligerent armies shall intern them"^[98]), may have been acceptable to most governments in the world at the time. However, as it was incorporated into the 1907 Convention, it said "Belligerents are forbidden to use neutral ports and waters as a base of naval operations against their adversaries (Article 5)" with further articles permitting up to 24-hour stay (Article 12) for the maximum of three warships of a belligerent at war in any neutral port (Article 15) if the neutral power permitted.^[99]

[165] The alliance required both countries to join the war if one of them faces "more than one" countries as the adversary. The Franco-Russian Alliance had a similar requirement, but in wars against Germany only. The French government had to accept the logic, as France did not wish to risk going into war against the UK, nor wish to give any excuse for the Royal Navy to attack the Russian warships with or without declaring war.

[167] When the Rozestvensky squadron reachedDakarafter leaving Tangier, the ships were allowed into the port and carry out coaling, but upon exchanges of telegram messages with Paris by the local authorities, they were banned from the port.^[100]The German government, who had internedRussian battleshipTsesarevichatQingdaoon 11 August 1904, took a lenient stance towards the squadron as a neutral power in the war. After the Dakar stop, the Rozestvensky squadron reachedAngra Pequena BayinGerman South West Africaon 15 November 1904 (Gregorian), and the localLüderitzauthorities, busy in theHerero and Namaqua genocide,did not object to the mooring and coaling in the port until their departure on 21 November 1904.^[100]

[174] The Imperial Russia also tried to purchase Argentine cruisersGeneral BelgranoandPueyrredón,and Chilean cruisersEsmeraldaandChacabuco,all of which were also blocked by Great Britain.^[106]^[105]

[176] Being in theGiuseppe Garibaldi classof armoured cruisers, and ordered by Argentina with the likelihood of facing the Chilean battleships in mind, they were the forerunners of the laterbattlecruisers.The design prioritised on heavy armour at the expense of speed and cruise range which were important for other designs forcommerce raiding/protection. TheRoyal Italian Navyranked this class of warships as 2nd-class battleships.^[107]

[178] Effectively replacing the two battleships previously lost in the war, theHatsuseandYashima.

[182] He was credited with this invention as he spearheaded its development program as one of the leaders of IJN (as the senior member ofNavy General Staff), together with Navy Minister (Admiral)Yamamoto Gonnohyōewho appointedTōgō Heihachirōto the Commander in Chief of theCombined Fleetdisregarding seniority ranking within IJN. He was a major proponent ofAnglo-Japanese Allianceafter having attended theGreenwich Naval Academyfor a period, and was the key figure in IJN's tight relationship withArmstrong Mitchell & Company.

[185] After hitting Russian battleshipPeresvet13 times with 12 "and 15 more times with 6" or 8 "shells;^[112]hittingRetvizan18 times,Tsesarevich15 times,^[113]Poltava12–14 times, andPobeda11 times with 8 "and larger armour-piercing shells with delayed detonation fuze without being able to sink any of them (likewise none of the Japanese battleships was sunk despite receiving many hits) in theBattle of the Yellow Sea,the Japanese tactical priority shifted from sinking to the destruction ofsuperstructure.This concept of high explosive incendiary shells (the first example of what is called the HEI-BF "High Explosive Incendiary – Base Fuze" shells today) was not used by any navy in the world at the time. The Russian Navy used what is known asMakarov tipon its shells to improve penetrating performance upon hitting the target at an angle, without the experience ofhigh explosive armour-piercing shellsnot being effective enough against the Harvey / Krupp armour andcompartmented hullused on the battleships.

[187] Shimose Masachika also experienced an accidental explosion in 1887 and had lost dexterity on the left fingers.ja: Hạ lại nhã duẫn

[189] On Christmas day on Julian Calendar in 1904 off Madagascar, Alexey Novikov-Priboy onboard battleshipOryolwrote: "At noon, the ocean expanse was filled with the thunder of guns. Each ship fired a salute of thirty-one shots. The squadron was enveloped in black powder smoke."^[96]

[191] 12 "shells creating an" incomparably larger splash than the enemy's on the water "^[116]

[192] "Japanese shells exploded even when they hit the water."^[34]

[194] 12 "shells creating a" tall splash of 10–20 m "^[117]

[198] These shells held 5.3 kg^[119]ofguncotton,compared to 19.3 kg of Shimose powder for the Armstrong 12 ".^[120]

[200] SeeArmstrong Whitworth 12-inch 40-calibre naval gunfor details.

[201] BattleshipShikishimastill experienced this problem and lost a gun in the battle.

[202] When the trajectory is nearly flat, the shot hits the target even with a large range dispersion (+-100m or more at 10km range) because the height of the target ship effectively enlarges the target size. There is no such effect for the fall angles closer to 90 degrees no matter how tall the target is.

[204] Nomoto Tsunaakira(1858–1922) Commander ofAsahi.Later Admiral. He had 3 tours of duty in Russia before the battle; once on an Imperial Russian Navy cruiserAdmiral Nakhimov,^[122]twice as a military attaché toJapanese consulatein Russia."Naval Academy class of 7th"(in Japanese).

[206] After the Nebogatov surrender, the Second in Command of battleshipOryol,Captain 2nd Rank K.L. Schwede, who was in charge of the ship at the surrender (the ship commander Captain 1st RankN. Yungwas seriously wounded and unconscious) was interviewed by Captain T. Nomoto^[cd]on battleshipAsahi.It turned out they knew each other from previous assignments of Nomoto in Russia. Schwede desperately wanted to know why the Japanese shots had so much better hit rates in the battle. Nomoto did not (or could not) explain and just boasted "Our guns are meant and made to hit the target."^[123]

[210] See#Russian losses

[224] Seeru:Адмирал Ушаков (броненосец).

[226] In IJN, the training facilities for new recruits were called hải binh đoàn(かいへいだん,kaiheidan)"Sea Soldier Corps" which is translated as marine corps today.

[228] Built byStabilimento Tecnico TriestinoinTriesteas‹See Tfd›Russian:Маньчжурия,romanized:Manijuryain 1901.

[229] 37°29′29″N130°55′11″E/ 37.4915276°N 130.9197994°E/37.4915276; 130.9197994

[232] Naas, Roberta (21 July 2018)."Russian ship sunk in 1905 discovered, said to have $130 Billion in gold aboard".Forbes.

[233] 37°36′N129°48′E/ 37.6°N 129.8°E/37.6; 129.8SeeRussian cruiser Svetlana (1896)#Russo-Japanese War.

[235] 40°27′50″N133°02′11″E/ 40.4639063°N 133.0362708°E/40.4639063; 133.0362708

[Buyniy-237] DestroyerBuyniy,after saving over 130Oslyabyacrew in the water, made a heroic rescue of the injured Admiral Rozhestvensky and his staff from the destroyed and burning battleshipKnyaz Suvorovat 17:30 on 27 May, but she suffered severe damage in doing so. Admiral Rozhestvensky and the staff were transferred to destroyerByedoviybefore she was abandoned and sunk.

[Bodriy-242] DestroyersBlestyashchiyandBodriyaccompanied cruisersOleg,ZhemchugandAurora.Bodriywas left behind whenBlestyashchiycrew needed to be picked up whenBlestyashchiy's damages made her no longer seaworthy in the escape.Bodriyran out of coal and was later rescued by a British transport vessel, which towed her to Shanghai to be interned.^[149]

[243] Seeru:Блестящий (миноносец)

[244] 36°45′07″N129°28′06″E/ 36.751956°N 129.468349°E/36.751956; 129.468349

[Byedoviy-246] Byedoviyhad over 80 personnel onboard at the time of surrender according to a Japanese Navy record.^[150]

[247] Seeja: Cao nguyệt ( chiến lợi 駆 trục hạm )for details.

[248] Seeru:Урал (вспомогательный крейсер)

[251] Purchased fromHAPAGin 1904. ex-Belgia^[152]

[254] Teru Matsumoto (10 June 2015)."Ceremony is held to mark 110th anniversary of rescue involving Russian ship".

[255] 35°00′09″N132°11′38″E/ 35.002558°N 132.193921°E/35.002558; 132.193921

[258] Built for Russian Volunteer Fleet Association, Odessa as a passenger ship, and then converted to a hospital ship.

[oldhamire-260] At 22:45 on 18 May 1905, the Baltic Fleet spotted and conducted a boarding inspection on a British transport vessel, SSOldhamire,that was sailing alongside the fleet. AsOldhamirewas carrying 150,000 cans of oil destined for Japan, she became subject of a maritime capture, and was forced to join the fleet with Russian officers onboard. The removed captain, the chief engineer, and two more British personnel were kept in captivity onboard the hospital shipOrel.This imprisonment of 3rd-country nationals violated the international maritime agreements for hospital ships;^[cz]consequently,Orelwas kept as a prize of war by Japan.^[63]

[271] Convention (III) for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention of 22 August 1864. The Hague, 29 July 1899.,^[166]which defines Hospital Ships to be "solely for the purpose of assisting the wounded, sick or shipwrecked".^[167]SeeHague Convention on Hospital Shipsfor signatory countries (note the absence of the UK).

[280] These were the most hits received afterMikasa.

[282] The original Japanese destroyerAkatsukisank after striking a mine in thesiege of Port Arthuron 17 May 1904. IJN concealed the loss and gave the 'Akatsuki' name to the capturedReshitel‘nyias if the original returned to service. At the beginning of this battle, there was a plan to dispatchAkatsuki,being indistinguishable from other Russian destroyers, in front of the Baltic Fleet to lay chained floating mines.^[z]Tōgō did not use this ploy, and the destroyer was added to the Navy list asYamabiko(andAkatsukistruck) after the war.^[176]

[308] There are considerable discrepancies not only between the Russian and Japanese records, but also among the Japanese records on time-line. This timeline is assembled mostly from the Japanese records.^[199]^[168]^[200]^[201]

[310] 35°04′15″N128°40′33″E/ 35.070744°N 128.675710°E/35.070744; 128.675710

[312] 34°43′26″N129°26′38″E/ 34.7238471936982°N 129.44398787201965°E

[313] Nunome Mitsuzō,later Admiral.ja: Bố mục mãn tạo

[315] According to a Russian record, "2 point (22.5-degrees) to Port at once".^[204]

[316] Japanese navy had found the 6 "guns to be more accurate than 12" guns, and formalized the procedure to use a 6-inch salvo firing for initial establishment of distance.

[317] With the upper mast,Mikasalost radio transmission capability due to the loss of antenna. From this point on, Tōgō relied on hand semaphore signaling to the immediately followingShikishimafor orders to be transmitted by radio.

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[FOOTNOTEDougherty2012144–145-6] Dougherty 2012,pp. 144–145.

[FOOTNOTESterling2008459-9] Sterling 2008,p. 459 "The naval battle of Tsushima, the ultimate contest of the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War, was one of the most decisive sea battles in history."

[FOOTNOTEVego2009V-76-10] Vego 2009,p. V-76 "In retrospect, the battle of Tsushima in May 1905 was the last 'decisive' naval battle in history."

[FOOTNOTESemenoff1907ix-12] Semenoff 1907,p. ix.

[FOOTNOTESondhaus2001188-14] Sondhaus 2001,p. 188.

[FOOTNOTEForczyk200948-17] Forczyk 2009,p. 48.

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[FOOTNOTEMahan1906457–458-65] Mahan 1906,pp. 457–458.

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[75] "St. Petersburg Gazette".Issue No.55(in Russian): col.23. 10 March 1906.

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[118] : Quan hạm thức # đại Nhật Bản đế quốc hải quân

[FOOTNOTERegan1992178-119] Regan 1992,p. 178.

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[129] Bykov, P.D., Captain 1st Rank."Second pacific squadron composition and characteristics of ships. Command structure and tactical organization. Passage from Indochina to the Korea Strait"(in Russian).

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[133] "Imperial Japanese Navy Records, Navy Office Intelligence Nr. 433"(in Japanese). 12 November 1904. p. 0101. Archived fromthe originalon 18 October 2020.quoted a telegram dated 10 November 1904 from Consul Mitsuhashi (Mitsuhashi Nobukata, later Mayor of Yokohama City) atCopenhagenandThe Hague,stating "Two Danish harbor pilots who went aboard the fleet flagship andAdmiral Nakhimovin the Danish waters said the officers including the fleet commander seemed tense and irritable, while the crew appeared to be a bunch of fodders. "

[FOOTNOTEForczyk200936-134] Forczyk 2009,p. 36.

[135] Lindsay, Captain A.B. (1907) forSemenoff 1907,p. xxii in Translator's Preface.

[139] Koda, Yoji (25 April 2024)."The Russo-Japanese War: Primary Causes of Japanese Success".Naval War College Review.58, No.2 (Spring 2005): KODA 34–35.JSTOR 26394181.Retrieved19 April2024.

[140] NASA."Earth Fact Sheet".

[143] Navy General Staff, ed. (18 April 1905)."Battleship Mikasa Wartime Daily Log 3(7)"(in Japanese). p. 0339.Retrieved16 April2024.

[salvo-145] Navy General Staff, ed. (17 April 1905)."Battleship Mikasa Wartime Daily Log 3(7)"(in Japanese). pp. 0336–0337.Retrieved16 April2024.

[FOOTNOTEBritish_Assistance1980-146] British Assistance 1980.

[147] Navy General Staff, ed. (7 April 1905)."Battleship Mikasa Wartime Daily Log 3(6)"(in Japanese). pp. 0289–0296.Retrieved15 April2024.

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[162] "Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II); July 29, 1899".

[163] "Laws of War: Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War (Hague XIII); October 18, 1907".

[FOOTNOTENovikov-Priboy1937Book_1,_Chapter_2-166] Novikov-Priboy 1937,Book 1, Chapter 2.

[FOOTNOTECorbett2015b142,_161,_193-168] Corbett 2015b,pp. 142, 161, 193.

[169] Gray, Steven."Fuelling mobility: coal and Britain's naval power, c. 1870–1914"(PDF).University of Portsmouth.Archived(PDF)from the original on 27 December 2021.Retrieved26 October2020.

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[Arg-Chile-172] Imperial Japanese Navy Records, Navy General Office Intelligence, 1904 Nr. 418 on p. 4 (p. 58 in the original) (in Japanese)https:// jacar.archives.go.jp/das/image/C09050537400?IS_KIND=DetailSummary Archived25 June 2022 at theWayback Machine

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[FOOTNOTEGarcía1998-177] García 1998.

[koike-179] Koike, Shigeki (2006)."The Russo-Japanese War and the system of SHIMOSE gunpowder"(PDF).Bulletin of Papers(in Japanese).1(49). Takasaki City University of Economics.Archived(PDF)from the original on 5 March 2016.Retrieved18 September2020.

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[183] ru:Пересвет (броненосец)#Бой в Жёлтом море

[184] ru:Цесаревич (броненосец)#Сражение в Жёлтом море,

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[FOOTNOTETsukamoto1907134–135-205] Tsukamoto 1907,pp. 134–135.

[FOOTNOTECorbett2015b445,_446-207] Corbett 2015b,pp. 445, 446.

[FOOTNOTECorbett2015bChapters_X,_XI,_XIII,_XIV-208] Corbett 2015b,Chapters X, XI, XIII, XIV.

[FOOTNOTEBritish_Naval_Attache_Reports2003362-209] British Naval Attache Reports 2003,p. 362.

[corb291-211] Corbett 2015b,p. 291

[FOOTNOTEBritish_Naval_Attache_Reports2003375-212] British Naval Attache Reports 2003,p. 375.

[FOOTNOTETsukamoto190783-213] Tsukamoto 1907,p. 83.

[FOOTNOTEBritish_Naval_Attache_Reports2003378-214] British Naval Attache Reports 2003,p. 378.

[FOOTNOTETsukamoto1907143–144-215] Tsukamoto 1907,pp. 143–144.

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[FOOTNOTEBritish_Naval_Attache_Reports2003441-220] British Naval Attache Reports 2003,p. 441.

[FOOTNOTECorbett2015b420-221] Corbett 2015b,p. 420.

[FOOTNOTETsukamoto1907125–126-222] Tsukamoto 1907,pp. 125–126.

[FOOTNOTECorbett2015b327-223] Corbett 2015b,p. 327.

[FOOTNOTETsukamoto1907124-225] Tsukamoto 1907,p. 124.

[corb307-227] Corbett 2015b,p. 307

[FOOTNOTECorbett2015b331,_332-230] Corbett 2015b,pp. 331, 332.

[FOOTNOTEWright1976142,_144-231] Wright 1976,pp. 142, 144.

[FOOTNOTEKowner2006365-234] Kowner 2006,p. 365.

[FOOTNOTECorbett2015b313-236] Corbett 2015b,p. 313.

[FOOTNOTEChesneauKolesnik1979207-238] Chesneau & Kolesnik 1979,p. 207.

[FOOTNOTECorbett2015b330-239] Corbett 2015b,p. 330.

[FOOTNOTECorbett2015b308,_309-240] Corbett 2015b,pp. 308, 309.

[241] "Japanese Navy, Russo-Japanese War"(in Japanese).

[FOOTNOTETsukamoto1907152-245] Tsukamoto 1907,p. 152.

[FOOTNOTETsukamoto190788–90-249] Tsukamoto 1907,pp. 88–90.

[250] "Hamburg-American Line (theshipslist )".

[252] "Irtysh (Иртыш) (+1905)".

[253] "The Irtysh surrender incident".Archivedfrom the original on 31 May 2022.Retrieved21 April2022.

[FOOTNOTETsukamoto190789-256] Tsukamoto 1907,p. 89.

[Orel-257] "Tyne built ships, OREL".

[259] "On captured Russian hospital ships Angara and Oryol"(in Japanese).^{: page 2/9 or 0042/0049}

[FOOTNOTEUsami2007138-261] Usami 2007,p. 138.

[262] "On captured Russian hospital ships Angara and Oryol"(in Japanese).^{: page 6/9 or 0046/0049}

[263] Ex-GermanRolandbuilt by Schömer & Jensen."Russian Tugboat Rus - 1903".

[264] "SS Rus (Руси) (+1905)".

[corb333-265] Corbett 2015b,p. 333

[FOOTNOTEWillmott2009118-266] Willmott 2009,p. 118.

[Bodriypic-267] "Picture ofBodriyin Shanghai ".Retrieved28 March2024.

[dniepr-268] "TYNE BUILT SHIPS -A history of Tyne shipbuilders and the ships that they built".

[269] "Convention (III) for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention of 22 August 1864. The Hague, 29 July 1899".Archivedfrom the original on 24 May 2022.Retrieved24 May2022.

[270] "Article 1".Archivedfrom the original on 24 May 2022.Retrieved24 May2022.

[FOOTNOTETsukamoto1907-272] Tsukamoto 1907.

[FOOTNOTECorbett2015b283,_287-273] Corbett 2015b,pp. 283, 287.

[corb283-274] Corbett 2015b,p. 283

[FOOTNOTECampbell1978263-275] Campbell 1978,p. 263.

[FOOTNOTECampbell1978128–35,_260,_262-276] Campbell 1978,pp. 128–35, 260, 262.

[FOOTNOTETsukamoto190798–106-277] Tsukamoto 1907,pp. 98–106.

[FOOTNOTECampbell1978258,_260,_263-278] Campbell 1978,pp. 258, 260, 263.

[FOOTNOTECampbell1978260,_262–263-279] Campbell 1978,pp. 260, 262–263.

[FOOTNOTETikowaraGrant2008-281] Tikowara & Grant 2008.

[FOOTNOTECorbett2015b29,_446-283] Corbett 2015b,pp. 29, 446.

[FOOTNOTEWillmott2009119-284] Willmott 2009,p. 119.

[FOOTNOTEThiess1954435ff-285] Thiess 1954,p. 435ff.

[286] "Steamboat-cruiser" Smolensk ""(in Russian).

[FOOTNOTETuchman1962-287] Tuchman 1962.

[288] Forczyk 2009,Back cover

[FOOTNOTEPleshakov2002xvi-289] Pleshakov 2002,p. xvi.

[FOOTNOTECorbett2015a31,_32,_56-290] Corbett 2015a,pp. 31, 32, 56.

[291] "the Impact of the Russo-Japanese War in Asia".The American Forum for Global Education. Archived fromthe originalon 6 January 2003.Retrieved25 April2010.

[292] Mishra, Pankaj (20 March 2013)."The guns of Tsushima, and the birth of modern Asia".National Post.

[FOOTNOTESondhaus2001192-293] Sondhaus 2001,p. 192.

[294] Egorov, Boris (29 November 2021)."Yamamoto Isoroku, who fought the Imperial Russian Navy: One Scene from Battle of the Sea of Japan"(in Japanese). Russia Beyond.Retrieved19 April2024.

[FOOTNOTEMassie1991470–480-295] Massie 1991,pp. 470–480.

[FOOTNOTESemenoff1907125,_135-296] Semenoff 1907,pp. 125, 135.

[FOOTNOTEMassie1991471,_474,_480-297] Massie 1991,pp. 471, 474, 480.

[FOOTNOTEBusch1969215-298] Busch 1969,p. 215.

[FOOTNOTEFriedman200868-299] Friedman 2008,p. 68.

[FOOTNOTETurner1913129–147-300] Turner 1913,pp. 129–147.

[FOOTNOTEGardinerBudzbon1985134–135-301] Gardiner & Budzbon 1985,pp. 134–135.

[FOOTNOTEChurchill1927106-302] Churchill 1927,p. 106.

[303] "Battle of Jutland | History, Facts, & Outcome | Britannica".britannica.24 May 2023.

[FOOTNOTESemenoff1907142_in_footnote-304] Semenoff 1907,p. 142 in footnote.

[305] Navy General Staff, ed. (27 May 1905)."Battleship Mikasa Wartime Daily Log 4(2)"(in Japanese). pp. 0509–0514.Retrieved18 April2024.

[mikasareport-306] Hikojirō Ijichi."Imperial Japanese Navy records, 27 May 1905, Classified, Detail reports on battle of the Japan Sea Nr.2, submitted by the commander of Mikasa"(in Japanese).Archivedfrom the original on 25 June 2022.Retrieved14 May2022.

[FOOTNOTECorbett2015b223-307] Corbett 2015b,p. 223.

[4(4)-309] Navy General Staff, ed. (27 May 1905)."Battleship Mikasa Wartime Daily Log 4(4)"(in Japanese). p. 0577.Retrieved19 April2024.

[FOOTNOTESemenoff190740-311] Semenoff 1907,p. 40.

[FOOTNOTESemenoff190742-314] Semenoff 1907,p. 42.

[FOOTNOTESemenoff1907138-318] Semenoff 1907,p. 138.

[FOOTNOTESemenoff1907140–153-319] Semenoff 1907,pp. 140–153.

[FOOTNOTECampbell1978134,_260-320] Campbell 1978,pp. 134, 260.

[321] Navy General Staff, ed. (28 May 1905)."Battleship Mikasa Wartime Daily Log 4(2)"(in Japanese). pp. 0518–0522.Retrieved19 April2024.

[FOOTNOTECorbett2015b324-322] Corbett 2015b,p. 324.

[recording-323] Semenoff (1907) and Tsukamoto (1907) are excellent first-hand sources on this battle. Captain 2nd rankV. Semenoff,having experiencedSiege of Port ArthurandBattle of the Yellow Seabefore this battle, was onboardKnyaz Suvorovas a staff officer to Admiral Rozhestvensky. Accounting Officer Y. Tsukamoto with the rank of trung chủ kế ('Chū-Shukei' -accounting officer rank equivalent to Commander) was assigned toAsahijust before this battle for the purpose of recording the battle events.

[324] This is a diary in Japanese translated first into Spanish, which is translated further into English. The author could be Fujiwara Eisaburō ( đằng nguyên anh Tam Lang 1873-1925, later Admiral)."Đằng nguyên anh Tam Lang"(in Japanese).

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