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Battle of the Duisburg Convoy

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Battle of the Duisburg Convoy
Part of TheBattle of the Mediterraneanof theSecond World War

Italian tankerMinatitlánon fire and sinking in the morning of 9 November 1941
Date8/9 November 1941
Location
OffCalabria,Mediterranean Sea
37°08′N18°09′E/ 37.133°N 18.150°E/37.133; 18.150
Result British victory
Belligerents
United Kingdom Italy
Commanders and leaders
William Agnew Bruno Brivonesi
Strength
2 light cruisers
2 destroyers		 2 heavy cruisers
10 destroyers
7 merchant ships
Casualties and losses
1 destroyer damaged 1 destroyer sunk
2 destroyers damaged
7 merchant ships sunk

TheBattle of the Duisburg Convoy(Battle of the BETA Convoy) was fought on the night of8/9 November1941 between an Italianconvoy,its escorts and four British ships. The convoy was named BETA (Duisburgrefers to the largest ship) by the Italian naval authorities and carried supplies for theItalian Army(Regio Esercito) civilian colonists and theAfrika KorpsinItalian Libya.

Force Kof theRoyal Navy,based at Malta, was sent to attack the convoy based on information gleaned from decrypts of Axis signals coded on theEnigma machine,covered by thefortuitousflight of a reconnaissance aircraft. The convoy was annihilated and the destroyerFulminewas sunk, with no loss and almost no damage to Force K. TheMaestrale-class destroyerLibecciowas sunk next day by the British submarineHMSUpholder,while picking up survivors.

The Italians were severely criticised by the German naval attaché and pressured to accept liaison officers atSupermarina(headquarters of theRegia Marina) and on its ships. Italian attempts to reduce the risk of interception by British forces, by sending individual ships, pairs and smaller convoys from several ports at once was futile, because the British were reading Italian naval codes; the next convoy was forced to return to port.

Background

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Italian belligerence

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The declaration of war byItalyon 10 June 1940 placed the Italian Royal Air Force (Regia Aeronautica) astride the traditional British sea route toIndian Oceanports through the Mediterranean andSuez CanalinEgypt.The Italian Royal Navy (Regia Marina) roughly trebled the numbers ofbattleships,cruisersandsubmarinesavailable to the Axis against theRoyal Navy.The British had held the eastern end of the Mediterranean andFrancethe western end but on 25 June 1940 thefall of Franceended the participation of theFrench Navy(Marine Nationale) in the Allied domination of the Mediterranean. The British basedForce HatGibraltar,theMediterranean FleetatAlexandriain Egypt and used the island of Malta in the central Mediterranean as base of operations. In September 1940, theItalian invasion of Egypttook place fromItalian Libya(Africa Settentrionale Italiana,ASI) leading to the capture ofSidi Barrani.The Italian Army invaded Greece the following October.[1]

1940–1941

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class=notpageimage|
Tripoli and Benghazi were the largest cities in Libya

In early November 1940, the Italian offensive in Greece had been defeated and the Italian battleshipsLittorio,Conte di CavourandDuiliohad been damaged by Royal Navy torpedo bombers at theBattle of Taranto.The ship losses of the Italian Fleet had made it easier for the British to supply Malta and Greece.[2]TheAxisforces involved theWestern Desert Campaignwere supplied across the Mediterranean by convoys from Italy to the ASI.Tripoliwas the mainentrepôtof the colony, which had lesser ports to the east, includingBenghazi.[3]The normal wartime route for Italian supply deliveries to Libya went about 600 mi (970 km) westwards around Sicily and then hugged the coast fromTunisiaeastwards to Tripoli, to evade British aircraft, ships and submarines from Malta. Once in Africa, Axis supplies had to be carried huge distances by road or in small consignments oncoastal trading vessels,the distance from Tripoli to Benghazi being about 650 mi (1,050 km).[4]

Unternehmen Sonnenblume

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Main articles:Operation CompassandOperation Sonnenblume

In early 1941, afterOperation Compass,the big British and Commonwealth victory in Egypt andCyrenaica,the best-equipped units in the BritishXIII Corpswere sent to Greece as part ofOperation Lustreto assist the Greek Army against the Italian invaders and to be ready to meet an anticipated German invasion.Adolf Hitlerresponded to the Italian disaster in Egypt with Directive 22 (11 January 1941) orderingUnternehmen Sonnenblume(Operation Sunflower), the deployment of a newDeutsches Afrika Korps(DAK) to Libya, as a barrier detachment (Sperrverband). The DAK had fresh troops with better tanks, equipment and air support than the surviving Italian forces in the ASI.[5]The Axis force raided and quickly defeated the British at El Agheila on 24 March and atMersa el Bregaon 31 March, exploited the success and by 15 April, had pushed the British back to the Libyan–Egyptian border at Sollum and besieged the small Libyan port of Tobruk.[6]Several Axis attempts to seize Tobruk failed and the front line settled on the Egyptian border into November 1941.[7]

Malta

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From 1 June to 31 October 1941, British forces based at Malta sank about 220,000 long tons (220,000 t) of Axis shipping on the African convoy routes, 94,000 long tons (96,000 t) by the navy and 115,000 long tons (117,000 t) byRoyal Air Force(RAF) andFleet Air Arm(FAA) aircraft from Malta and Egypt. Loaded Axis ships sailing to Africa accounted for 90 per cent of the losses and the Malta-based squadrons were responsible for about 75 per cent of ships sunk by aircraft.[8]In October 1941 the British re-establishedForce K,a flotilla of surface ships at Malta for the first time since April, plus a detachment ofSwordfishtorpedo bombers. Italian air reconnaissance discovered the ships on 21 October and cancelled sailings for Tripoli, leaving only the inferior facilities at Benghazi to receive convoys.[9]

Prelude

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Duisburg (BETA) convoy

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The convoy consisted of two German vessels, SSDuisburg7,889gross register tonnage(GRT) and SSSan Marco(3,113 GRT) and the Italian MVMaria(6,339 GRT), SSSagitta(5,153 GRT) and MVRina Corrado(5,180 GRT), carrying 389 vehicles, 34,473 long tons (35,026 t) of munitions, fuel in barrels and troops for the Italian and German forces in Libya. The tankersConte di Misurata(7,599 GRT) andMinatitlan(5,014 GRT) carried 17,281 long tons (17,558 t) of fuel.[10]A powerful escort was arranged for the convoy operation to counter Force K, the British flotilla recently based at Malta. The convoy was routed to the east of Malta, since the airfields in Libya were under Axis occupation, rather than the usual west and along the Tunisian coast. The convoy speed was 9 kn (17 km/h; 10 mph) and the distant escort had to sail a zig-zag course at 16 kn (30 km/h; 18 mph). Brivonesi andSupermarinawere under the impression that the British ships would not be able to attack because they overlooked the fact that British ships were equipped with radar and prepared only for night attacks by aircraft.[11]

Force K

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Force K (CaptainWilliam Agnew) consisted of the light cruisersHMSAuroraandPenelopewith six6-inch gunsin twin turrets each and two treble21-inch torpedo tubes.The destroyersHMSLanceandLivelyfrom Force H, with four twin4-inch gunseach and two quadruple 21-inch torpedo tubes, joined Force K at Malta. Intended to fight at night, all of the ships were equipped with radar and the cruisers had new searchlights with better performance.[12]

7–8 November

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The Duisburg (BETA) Convoy, the 51st German–Italian sailing since 8 February departed from Naples on 7 November and Force K sailed the next day, forewarned by the British success in decyphering Italian signals concerning Axis shipping movements in the Mediterranean.[9]Alerted by decrypts Axis ofEnigma machinemessages, aMarylandreconnaissance bomber of69 Squadronfound the Duisberg Convoy during the afternoon of 8 November.[13]

Battle

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8/9 November

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Map of the central Mediterranean

Force K made 28 kn (52 km/h; 32 mph) north-east of Malta, withAuroraleading the ships in line-ahead. The main convoy was found around midnight about 135 nmi (250 km; 155 mi) east of Syracuse.[11]There was slight moonlight to the east and the British ships took up position with the moon silhouetting the convoy. Agnew was under instructions to attack the nearest escorts first and then fire on the convoy, dealing with the other escorts as they appeared. The British ships slowed to 20 kn (37 km/h; 23 mph) and the gun crews were ordered to fire steadily, volume of fire being less important than accuracy. As the ships closed with the convoy, radar detected more ships, assumed to be destroyers and escorts but actually the distant escort (scorta a distanza). Force K sent an attack signal at12:47 a.m.which was received byTriestebut jamming fromLivelyprevented a warning reaching the convoy; the only ships aware of the attack were 9.2 nmi (10.6 mi; 17.0 km) away.[14]

Aiming by radar, the British opened fire at about12:58 a.m.from a range of 5,200 yd (2.6 nmi; 3.0 mi; 4.8 km) down to 3,000 yd (1.5 nmi; 1.7 mi; 2.7 km).Grecalewas hit by the first three salvoes fromAurora;Lanceand the 4-inch secondary armament ofAurorabombarded a merchant ship.PenelopeengagedMaestrale,the leader of the close escort (scorta diretta) and was on target with the first salvoes andLivelybegan to shell the merchant ships three minutes afterwards. At first, the Italians thought that they were under air attack and the wireless mast ofMaestralewas hit.[15]Fulmineattacked but was soon severely damaged by British gunfire, Milano losing an arm but remaining in command until the ship sank.Grecalewas hit and came to a stop outside torpedo range and was later towed back to port byOriani.Euro,undamaged, came within 6,600 ft (2,000 m) of the British ships but mistook them forTriesteandTrento,aided by the ships not firing onEuro.Maestralehad been signalling for Italian ships to rally on the port (far) side of the convoy, leading to Cigala countermanding an order to launch torpedoes. Moments later, British ships opened fire butEurowas no longer in a position to attack with torpedoes. Six British shells hitEurobut at such short range they passed through without exploding, killing about twenty members of the crew.[16]

Italian destroyerFulmine

The distant escort was on the right-hand side of the convoy, steaming twice as fast, zig-zagging to keep station and also thought that the convoy was under air attack. At1:13 a.m.Brivonesi signalled toSupermarinathat torpedo bombers were attacking and then sailed for the point where the British ships had first been sighted, instead of their current position.[15]When watchmen onTriestesaw the arc of shells and ships beginning to burn, the distant escort was about 5,000 yd (2.5 nmi; 2.8 mi; 4.6 km) distant at the end of its zig-zag away from the convoy. As the escort closed on the convoy the British ships moved beyond the glare of the burning ships and became much harder to identify.[17]Trentofired star shells, then bothTriesteandTrentoopened fire at the British ships at 8,700 yd (4.3 nmi; 4.9 mi; 8.0 km). From1:10 to 1:25 a.m.the British engaged the Axis merchant ships with shell and torpedo, the ships taking little evasive action. The close escort on the east side of the convoy moved off withMaestraleandEuroto rally and then attacked again, the Italian salvoes having no effect and the ships then being driven off. The distant escort sighted the British again and fired 207 8 in (200 mm) rounds, managing to straddle some of the British ships. The fires and explosions on the merchant ships obscured the British ships and Brivonesi ordered the distant escort to turn north at 24 kn (44 km/h; 28 mph) to intercept them but made no further contact. Some shells had landed close to British ships as they finished off the convoy but caused only splinter damage toLively's funnel; by1:40 a.m.firing has ceased.[15]

9 November

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Example of a Savoia-Marchetti SM.84 torpedo-bomber

All of the Axis merchant ships had sunk or were on fire and sinking. At2:05 a.m.the British went behind the convoy to search for more ships and thenAuroraincreased speed to 25 kn (46 km/h; 29 mph) and headed for Malta. Force K was ineffectively chased by the covering force, not noticing Italian salvoes at2:07 a.m.Soon afterwards, a flashing light was seen to the north, which was investigated in case it was more Italian ships but it turned out to be the submarineHMSUpholder,signalling a challenge. The commander reported that two Italian destroyers had sailed northwards. Force K resumed the journey to Malta. At8:10 a.m.Hurricane fighter escorts arrived and two SM.84 torpedo bombers of 242aSquadrigliaattacked the force to the south-east of Malta and claimed a hit on a cruiser at8:35 a.m.[18]

At around9:20 a.m.two SM.79s of the 278aSquadrigliaattacked and also reported a hit on a cruiser. The British observed that the bombers released their torpedoes from too far away and turned away as soon as the ships fired on them. The British claimed one bomber shot down but this was wrong, despiteLivelyinsisting that a torpedo-bomber was seen at the horizon, on fire and crashing into the sea;Livelyalso reported seeing a Hurricane dive into the sea. Force K reached harbour at Malta by1:05 p.m.that afternoon, having sunk about 39,800 long tons (40,400 t) of Axis shipping.[18]The destroyerLibecciowas torpedoed byUpholderwhile rescuing some of the704 survivorsof the BETA Convoy.Libecciowas taken in tow byEurobut sunk after an internal structural collapse. The Italian cruisers were also looking for survivors and managed to evade torpedoes.[19]

Aftermath

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Analysis

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In 1948,Marc'Antonio Bragadinwrote that the battle was a serious Italian defeat, in which individuals had shown exemplary bravery but the escorts had lacked coordination. Mistakes had been made because of the confusion caused by the surprise and speed of the British attack and through mistaken identity. The Italians had no answer to the superior British night-fighting equipment and tactics, which had revolutionised maritime night fighting. Technical obsolescence made an Italian attempt to counter the British at night a useless sacrifice of crews and ships.[20]Writing in 1957, the British official historian of the Royal Navy,Stephen Roskill,wrote that morale in theRegia Marinasuffered greatly after such a formidable escort had failed to prevent the disaster. Next day, Rommel signalled to Berlin that convoys to the ASI has been suspended and that of60,000 troopsdue in Benghazi, only8,093 hadarrived.[21]In 1960, Ian Playfair, in volume III of "History of the Second World War,The Mediterranean and Middle East,the official British campaign history, wrote that the destruction of the Duisburg (BETA) Convoy was a severe blow to the Axis forces in Cyrenaica. Some supplies arrived in ships sailing alone or in pairs, more journeys were undertaken by submarine and fuel was carried by warships. Fewer convoys with more escorts and air cover were planned and four convoys sailed on 20 November.[22]

In 2002, Jack Greene and Alessandro Massignani wrote that the German navalattaché,AdmiralWerner Löwisch,criticised Italian night fighting training, noting that of his 150 training sessions on the cruiserLeipzig,130 had been at night. Italian ships had no night fighting equipment like low-light-level rangefinders; torpedo boats (escort destroyers in British parlance) could not engage targets further out than 10,000 yd (5.7 mi; 9.1 km). In a report to Berlin, Weichold blamed a lack of training and accused Brivonesi of incompetence. In retrospect the Italians had erred in assuming that a night attack by ships was unlikely; merchant ships should have been instructed to scatter or sail away from an attack. The destroyers on the port side should not have withdrawn but attacked at once without regard for the risk of friendly fire and the distant escort should have estimated the position of Force K instead of heading towards the sighting, attacking the British as they sailed for Malta. Brivonesi wascourt-martialledand sacked for not attacking (and reinstated on 5 June 1942).[23]

In 2009,Vincent O'Harawrote that the destruction of the Duisburg (BETA) Convoy was "one of the most brilliant British naval surface victories of the war" in which the British demonstrated better tactical ability, equipment and leadership, combined with luck, surprise and Italian incompetence. The Germans were outraged and wanted to foist German naval officers ontoSupermarinaand even Italian ships. Grand AdmiralErich Raedertold Hitler that,

Today the enemy has complete naval and air supremacy in the area of the German transport routes....[T]he Italians are not able to bring any major improvements in the situation, due to the oil situation and due to their own operational and tactical impotence.[24]

Supermarinatried smaller, dispersed convoys and sailing convoys at the same time to mislead the British but the British code breakers exposed the ruse. When four ships sailed from Naples on 20 November with an escort of heavy and light cruisers, British submarines from Malta torpedoed two cruisers, forcing the convoy to turn back.[25]

Orders of battle

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Regia Marina

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Close Escort(Captain Ugo Bisciani) [Ship data from O'Hara (2009) unless indicated][10]

Distant Escort(Vice AdmiralBruno Brivonesi) [Ship data from O'Hara (2009) unless indicated][10]

Axis merchant ships

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Data from Jordan (2006) unless indicated[27]

  • Ships sunk at 37° 08' N, 18° 09' E unless indicated
  • Cargo, 389 vehicles, 13,290 long tons (13,500 t) general cargo, 1,579 long tons (1,604 t) munitions, 17,281 long tons (17,558 t) fuel[10]
  • German
    • SSDuisburg7,389 GRT, 13 kn (24 km/h; 15 mph), sunk
    • SSSan Marco3,113 GRT, sunk
  • Italian
    • MVMaria6,339 GRT, 11.5 kn (21.3 km/h; 13.2 mph), sunk
    • SSSagitta5,269 GRT, 10 kn (19 km/h; 12 mph), sunk
    • SSRina Corrado5,180 GRT, 11 kn (20 km/h; 13 mph), sunk
    • SSConte di Misurata5,014 GRT, 8 kn (15 km/h; 9.2 mph), sunk, 37° 10' N, 18° 10' E
    • SSMinatitlan7,599 GRT, 12 kn (22 km/h; 14 mph), sunk

Royal Navy

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Data from Greene and Massignani (2002) unless indicated.[28]
Force K(Captain William Agnew)[13]

Footnotes

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  1. ^Roskill 1957,pp. 293–320.
  2. ^Greene & Massignani 2002,pp. 56–114.
  3. ^Stegemann 2015,pp. 717–718.
  4. ^Cooper 1978,pp. 361–362.
  5. ^Stegemann 2015,pp. 654–656.
  6. ^Stegemann 2015,pp. 673–684.
  7. ^Playfair 2004,pp. 153–159.
  8. ^Richards & Saunders 1975,pp. 169–170;Playfair 2004,pp. 324–325.
  9. ^abStegemann 2015,p. 718.
  10. ^abcdO'Hara 2009,p. 143.
  11. ^abGreene & Massignani 2002,p. 194.
  12. ^Greene & Massignani 2002,p. 193;Roskill 1957,p. 532.
  13. ^abRohwer & Hümmelchen 2005,p. 113.
  14. ^Greene & Massignani 2002,pp. 194–195.
  15. ^abcGreene & Massignani 2002,p. 195.
  16. ^Bragadin 1957,pp. 133–134.
  17. ^Bragadin 1957,p. 134.
  18. ^abO'Hara 2009,pp. 144;Smith & Walker 1974,pp. 59–61.
  19. ^Greene & Massignani 2002,p. 195;Bragadin 1957,p. 134.
  20. ^Bragadin 1957,pp. 134–135.
  21. ^Roskill 1957,pp. 532–533.
  22. ^Playfair 2004,p. 105.
  23. ^Greene & Massignani 2002,pp. 195–196.
  24. ^O'Hara 2009,p. 147.
  25. ^O'Hara 2009,p. 148.
  26. ^Bragadin 1957,p. 133.
  27. ^Jordan 2006,pp. 63, 229, 232–233, 236, 468, 531, 533, 535.
  28. ^Greene & Massignani 2002,p. 193.

References

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  • Bragadin, Marc'Antonio(1957) [1948]. Fioravanzo, G. (ed.).The Italian Navy in World War II.Translated by Hoffman, G. (Eng. trans. ed.). Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute.OCLC602717421.
  • Cooper, Matthew (1978).The German Army 1933–1945: Its Political and Military Failure.Briarcliff Manor, NY: Stein and Day.ISBN978-0-8128-2468-1.
  • Greene, Jack; Massignani, Alessandro (2002) [1998].The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940–1943.Rochester: Chatham.ISBN978-1-86176-057-9.
  • Jordan, Roger W. (2006) [1999].The World's Merchant Fleets 1939: The Particulars and Wartime Fates of 6,000 Ships(2nd ed.). London: Chatham/Lionel Leventhal.ISBN978-1-86176-293-1.
  • O'Hara, Vincent (2009).Struggle for the Middle Sea: The Great Navies at War in the Mediterranean Theater, 1940–1945.Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.ISBN978-1-61251-408-6.
  • Playfair, I. S. O.; et al. (2004) [1st. pub. HMSO:1960]. Butler, Sir James (ed.).The Mediterranean and Middle East: British Fortunes Reach Their Lowest Ebb (September 1941 to September 1942).History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. Vol. III. Uckfield, UK: Naval & Military Press.ISBN978-1-84574-067-2.
  • Richards, D.; Saunders, H. St G. (1975) [1954].Royal Air Force 1939–45: The Fight Avails.Vol. II (repr. ed.). London: HMSO.ISBN978-0-11-771593-6.Retrieved19 July2019.
  • Rohwer, Jürgen; Hümmelchen, Gerhard (2005) [1972].Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939–1945: The Naval History of World War Two(3rd rev. ed.). London: Chatham.ISBN978-1-86176-257-3.
  • Roskill, S. W.(1957) [1954].Butler, J. R. M.(ed.).The Defensive.History of the Second World War United Kingdom Military Series: The War at Sea 1939–1945. Vol. I (4th impr. ed.). London: HMSO.OCLC881709135.Retrieved21 December2015.
  • Smith, Peter; Walker, Edwin (1974).The Battles of the Malta Striking Forces.Sea Battles in Close-up (No. 11). Shepperton: Ian Allan.ISBN0-7110-0528-1.
  • Stegemann, B.; Schreiber, G.; Vogel, D. (2015) [1995]. Falla, P. S. (ed.).The Mediterranean, South-East Europe and North Africa, 1939–1941: From Italy's Declaration of non-Belligerence to the Entry of the United States into the War.Germany and the Second World War.Vol. III. Translated by McMurry, D. S.; Osers, E.; Willmot, L. (2nd pbk. trans. Oxford University Press, Oxford ed.). Freiburg im Breisgau: Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt.ISBN978-0-19-873832-9.

Further reading

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  • Baroni, Piero (2007).La guerra dei radar: il suicidio dell'Italia: 1935/1943[The Radar War: The Suicide of Italy: 1935/1943] (in Italian). Milano: Greco & Greco. p. 277.ISBN978-88-7980-431-8.
  • Brown, David (1990).Warship Losses of World War II(1st ed.). London: Arms & Armour Press.ISBN0-85368-802-8.
  • Cocchia, A. (1962).La Difesa del Traffico con L'Africa Settentrionale dal 1 ottobre 1941 al 30 settembre 1942[The Defence of Traffic with North Africa from 1 October 1941 to 30 June 1942]. Marina italiana nella seconda guerra mondiale. Vol. VII. Roma: Ufficio storico della Marina militare.OCLC221140047.
  • Shores, C. F.; Cull, B.; Malizia, N. (1987).Malta: The Hurricane Years: 1940–41.London: Grub Street.ISBN0-948817-06-2.
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