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Battle of the Mons pocket

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For the 1914 battle, seeBattle of Mons.
Battle of the Mons pocket
Part of theWestern FrontofWorld War II
Date31 August – 5 September 1944
Location
Vicinity ofMons,Belgium
Result Allied victory
Belligerents
United States
Belgium		 Germany
Commanders and leaders
Courtney Hodges
J. Lawton Collins		 Erich Straube
Units involved
First United States Army
Belgian resistance		 Army Task Group Straube
Strength
~70,000
Casualties and losses
~89 killed 3,500 killed
25,000 captured

Thebattle of the Mons pocketwas an engagement fought betweenAlliedandGermanforces during late August and early September 1944. It formed part of the final stages of the rapid Alliedadvance across France and Belgium.During the battleUnited States Armyforces, assisted by theBelgian Resistance,encircleda large number of retreatingGerman ArmyandWaffen-SStroops near the town ofMonsin Belgium. The German forces were disorganised and unable to counter the Allied forces. Around 3,500 Germans were killed and 25,000 madeprisoners of war.Allied casualties were light.

Background[edit]

The Allied advance through France and Belgium between 26 August and 10 September 1944
Main article:Allied advance from Paris to the Rhine

In late July and August 1944, Allied forces broke out of theNormandy beachheadand rapidly advanced across France, liberating the country from German occupation.[1]The overriding goal of the Allied forces at this time was to advance quickly enough to reach theRhine riverbefore the Germans could man and reactivate theSiegfried Linedefences which ran along the border between France and Germany. On 27 August GeneralOmar Bradley,the commander of theTwelfth Army Groupwhich was the main US Army force in northern France, ordered the armies under his command to "go as far as practicable" until they out-rantheir supply lines.[2]The US Army was well-suited to this type of warfare, as its units were highly motorized and trained to conduct large scale mobile operations.[3]

The German forces in France had suffered heavy losses during the fighting in Normandy, and attempted to fall back ahead of the Allied forces. Their ability to do so was limited by the rapid Allied advance, road congestion, destroyed bridges and Allied air attacks.[4]The Germany Army's infantry units were much less mobile than their Allied equivalents, as they lacked motor transport.[3]At the start of the Allied breakout the German dictatorAdolf Hitlerdirected that defensive positions be prepared along theSommeandMarnerivers in northern France. These positions were to be used to fight a delaying action.[5]However, by the time the German forces reached the defensive positions along the Somme and Marne they were in no condition to offer serious resistance; a US Army history of the campaign described the German units at this time as "exhausted, disorganized, and demoralized".[5]By late August the German forces in northern France and Belgium were retreating in disarray.OB Westwas attempting to re-establish a coherent line along theSchelderiver's estuary, theAlbert Canaland theMeuse River.[6]

Prelude[edit]

Allied advance[edit]

In late August Bradley decided that theFirst Armyshould temporarily prioritise cutting off the retreat of German units in northern France and Belgium over reaching the Rhine. The Army's commander, Lieutenant generalCourtney Hodges,was directed on 31 August to advance to the north to cut the highway betweenLilleandBrussels.Hodges' main objective was the town ofTournaiin Belgium, which he was ordered to liberate by midnight on 2 September. This task was assigned toXIX Corpswhich was responsible for the northernmost element of the First Army's area of operations.[7]XIX Corps reached the town at 10 pm on 2 September. During the advance it captured 1,300 Germans.[8]V Corps,which was in the center of the First Army's line, simultaneously advanced towardLandreciesand took it on 2 September; few German units were encountered.[9]

German retreat[edit]

The5th Panzer Armywas the main unit facing the Allies in northern France during late August, and was responsible initially for forces in the region from the channel coast to Paris. It was unable to slow the Allied offensive, andcommand and controlsoon broke down.[10]The Army's headquarters atAmienswas overrun by British troops on 31 August, though its commander SS-Oberst-GruppenführerSepp Dietrichand his staff escaped.[11]

In late August large numbers of German military personnel were moving through the area to the south west of Mons. They were mainly members ofLVIII Panzer Corps,LXXIV Army CorpsandII SS Panzer Corps.[12]These corps included the badly battered remnants of ten combatdivisions,as well as smaller units and many support personnel.[13]All three corps headquarters were out of contact with superior commands.[12]

On 31 August the three German corps commanders decided to group their forces as a provisionalarmyled by the commander of LXXIV Army Corps, General der InfanterieErich Straube.[12]This command was designated Army Task Group Straube.[14]Straube had no sources of information on the broader conditions in the area, but was able to determine from intercepted Allied radio broadcasts and other sources of information that his command was in imminent danger of being encircled. In response, he decided to withdraw his forces to an area near Mons wherecanalsandmarshyconditions would aid defensive efforts.[12]The next day the German commanders decided to attempt a breakout to the northeast, with the goal of reaching theNivellesarea in Belgium. This would require moving their forces almost 70 kilometres (43 mi) through the Mons area in the face of the rapid Allied advance.[13]

Battle[edit]

TheVII Corpswas responsible for the eastern sector of the First Army's area of operations. It was commanded by Major GeneralJ. Lawton Collins,and included the3rd Armoured Division,1st Infantry Divisionand9th Infantry Division.[15]

Collins was ordered on 31 August to cease his corps drive to the north-east, and turn north towardsAvesnes-sur-Helpe,MaubeugeandMons.The 3rd Armored Division led this advance, with the 1st Infantry Division on the corps' left and the 9th Infantry Division on the right of the line. The4th Cavalry Groupwas assigned responsibility for maintaining contact with theThird Armyto the south.[15]The corps initially encountered only Germanoutposts.[16]The 3rd Armored Division advanced rapidly, and communications problems meant that Collins did not receive orders from Hodges on 2 September to stop short of Mons to conserve fuel supplies.[15]At this time, Collins did not appreciate the size of the German force approaching Mons.[17]The 3rd Armored Division liberated Mons on the morning of 3 September. At this time the 1st Infantry Division was at Avesnes and the 9th Infantry Division atCharleroi.[15]

The VII Corps' advance, and that of First Army's other two corps, trapped the German forces under Straube. The 3rd Armored Division set up roadblocks on the road between Mons and Avesnes, and the 1st Infantry Division attacked to the north-west from Avesnes into the German forces. XIX Corps was to the west of the pocket, V Corps to its south and British forces were advancing rapidly to block the Germans' escape to the north. The German forces were badly disorganised, and lacked fuel and ammunition.[12]Around 70,000 Germans were trapped in the pocket.[18]

There was some fighting between American and German forces on the night of 2/3 September. As part of this combat, a tank unit of the 3rd Armoured division destroyed a mile-long column of German vehicles.[12]American air units also attacked German forces in the Mons pocket, and inflicted heavy casualties.[19]Many motorised German units managed to escape from the pocket though by fighting their way through American forces.[13]During 3 September large numbers of German troops surrendered to the Americans, with the 1st Infantry and 3rd Armored Divisions taking between 7,500 and 9,000 prisoners.[20]

The 3rd Armored Division disengaged from the Mons pocket during 4 September in order to resume VII Corps' advance to the east. The 1st Infantry Division continued to eliminate German positions with the assistance ofBelgian Resistancefighters, and took large numbers of prisoners. This continued the next day, with the26th Infantry Regimenttaking a group of 3,000 Germans prisoner nearWasmes.[21]The battle concluded during the evening of 5 September.[18]

Overall, around 25,000 Germans were captured in the Mons area.[20]German casualties included approximately 3,500 killed. The remainder of the German troops, including the staffs of the three corps headquarters, escaped before the encirclement was complete.[18][22]The German units also lost large quantities of equipment, including 40armored fighting vehicles,100half-tracks,120 artillery guns, 100 antitank and antiaircraft guns and almost 2000 vehicles.[18]

The VII Corps suffered few casualties. The 3rd Armored Division lost 57 men killed, and the 1st Infantry Division had 32 killed and 93 wounded. Losses of equipment were also light, and included two tanks, atank destroyerand 20 other vehicles.[17]

Aftermath[edit]

On 3 September the German High Commander in the West, GeneralfeldmarschallWalter Model,decided it was impossible to hold positions in northern France and Belgium, and that his forces should withdraw to the Siegfried Line. By this time many German units were not putting up a fight when they encountered Allied forces.[4]

The number of Germans taken prisoner in the Mons pocket was the second highest of any engagement during the 1944 campaign in the west, exceeded only by the capture of some 45,000 in theFalaise pocketduring August.[23]Had the Americans advanced more quickly or their commanders understood the size of the German forces and prioritised the engagement, many more could have been taken prisoner.[17]

The victory at Mons opened a 75-kilometer (47 mi)-wide gap in the German front line.[24]This cleared the path for the First Army's advance to the Siegfried Line, and aided theliberation of Belgiumby British forces.[22][25]On 6 September Hodges told his staff the war would be over within 10 days if the weather held.[25]This proved too optimistic: logistical problems, difficult terrain, and the recovery of the German Army as it neared the national border slowed the Allied advance.[26]Despite the losses at the Mons pocket, most of the German forces in Northern France and Belgium managed to reach Germany. By 10 September the German high command had managed to re-establish a continuous front line from theNorth Seato Switzerland.[27]The Allies were unable to cross the Rhine until March 1945.[28]

The Mons pocket received little press coverage at the time of the battle. Few historians have since covered it.[23]In 1961 the US Army official historianMartin Blumensonwrote that "the head-on encounter at Mons was, from the tactical point of view, a surprise for both sides. Neither Americans nor Germans had been aware of the approach of the other, and both had stumbled into an unforeseen meeting that resulted in a short, impromptu battle."[20]In 1999Peter Mansoorgave the battle as an example of the US Army's ability to "move fast and strike hard". He argued that the engagement, along with the breakout from Normandy which had followedOperation Cobraand theinvasion of southern Francein August 1944, demonstrated that the US Army was able to conductmaneuver warfarein 1944, despite some commentators arguing that it had failed to do so.[29]Robert M. Citinonoted in 2017 that the battle of the Mons pocket had formed part of "one of the greatest operational victories of all time", and Hodges "had capped his operational sequence with an impressive littlekesselschlacht".[30]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

Citations[edit]

  1. ^Hogan 1995,pp. 9–24.
  2. ^Blumenson 1961,pp. 676–677.
  3. ^abMansoor 1999,p. 173.
  4. ^abBlumenson 1961,p. 678.
  5. ^abHogan 1995,p. 24.
  6. ^Blumenson 1961,p. 677.
  7. ^Blumenson 1961,p. 679.
  8. ^Blumenson 1961,pp. 680–681.
  9. ^Blumenson 1961,p. 681.
  10. ^Citino 2017,p. 332.
  11. ^Ludewig 2012,p. 170.
  12. ^abcdefBlumenson 1961,p. 683.
  13. ^abcLudewig 2012,p. 189.
  14. ^Ludewig 2012,p. 348.
  15. ^abcdBlumenson 1961,p. 682.
  16. ^Ludewig 2012,p. 188.
  17. ^abcPallud 2002,p. 33.
  18. ^abcdPallud 2002,p. 31.
  19. ^Craven & Cate 1983,p. 274.
  20. ^abcBlumenson 1961,p. 684.
  21. ^Pallud 2002,p. 27.
  22. ^abLudewig 2012,p. 190.
  23. ^abPallud 2002,p. 4.
  24. ^Ludewig 2012,p. 191.
  25. ^abHogan 1995,p. 25.
  26. ^Hogan 1995,pp. 25–26.
  27. ^Blumenson 1961,p. 697.
  28. ^Blumenson 1961,p. 702.
  29. ^Mansoor 1999,p. 160.
  30. ^Citino 2017,p. 333.

Works consulted[edit]

  • Blumenson, Martin(1961).Breakout and Pursuit.United States Army in World War II.Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History.OCLC5594822.
  • Citino, Robert M.(2017).The Wehrmacht's Last Stand: The German Campaigns of 1944–1945.Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.ISBN9780700624942.
  • Craven, Wesley Frank; Cate, James Lea, eds. (1983) [1951].Europe: Argument to V-E Day. January 1944 to May 1945.The Army Air Forces in World War II. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History.ISBN091279903X.
  • Hogan, David W. (1995).Northern France.The US Army Campaigns of World War II. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History.ISBN0160451175.
  • Ludewig, Joachim (2012).Rückzug: The German Retreat from France, 1944.Le xing ton, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky.ISBN978-0813140803.
  • Mansoor, Peter R.(1999).The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941–1945.Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.ISBN978-0-7006-1226-0.
  • Pallud, Jean Paul (2002). "The Battle of the Mons Pocket".After the Battle(115): 2–33.ISSN0306-154X.

Further reading[edit]

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