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Collective Security Treaty Organization

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Collective Security Treaty Organization
Организация Договора о коллективной безопасности
AbbreviationCSTO
Formation
  • 14 February 1992 (as the Unified Armed Forces)
  • 15 May 1992 (as Collective Security Treaty)
  • 7 October 2002 (as Collective Security Treaty Organization)
TypeMilitary alliance
HeadquartersMoscow,Russia
Location
Region served
Eastern Europe,Caucasus,Central Asia,Northern Asia
Membership
6 members
3 former members
1 observer
1 former observer
Official language
Russian
Secretary General
Imangali Tasmagambetov
Chairman
Alexander Lukashenko
Websiteodkb-csto.org

TheCollective Security Treaty Organization(CSTO)[note 3]is anintergovernmentalmilitary allianceinEurasiaconsisting of sixpost-Soviet states:Armenia,[note 1]Belarus,Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan,Russia,andTajikistan,formed in 2002. The Collective Security Treaty has its origins in theSoviet Armed Forces,which was replaced in 1992 by theUnited Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States,and was then itself replaced by the successor armed forces of the respective independent states.

Similar toArticle 5 of the North Atlantic Treatyand theInter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,Article 4 of the Collective Security Treaty (CST) establishes that an aggression against one signatory would be perceived as an aggression against all. The 2002 CSTO charter reaffirmed the desire of all participating states to abstain from the use or threat of force. Signatories are prohibited from joining other military alliances.[5]

Operational procedures[edit]

Similar to NATO, the CSTO maintains a Parliamentary Assembly.[6]

CSTO employs a "rotating presidency" system in which the country leading the CSTO alternates every year.[7]

In order to deploy military bases of a third country in the territory of the CSTO member-states, it is necessary to obtain the official consent of all its members.[8]

Activities[edit]

Military exercises[edit]

The CSTO holds yearly military command exercises for the CSTO nations to have an opportunity to improve inter-organizational cooperation. The largest of such exercises was held in Southern Russia and central Asia in 2011, consisting of more than 10,000 troops and 70 combat aircraft.[9]

Peacekeeping force[edit]

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) maintains a peacekeeping force that has been deployed to areas of conflict, including Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The force is composed of troops from member states and is designed to provide stability and security in the region.

On 6 October 2007, CSTO members agreed to a major expansion of the organization that would create a CSTO peacekeeping force that could deploy under aUnited Nationsmandate or without one in its member states. The expansion would also allow all members to purchase Russian weapons at the same price as Russia.[10]

In January 2022, the CSTO deployed 2,000 of its peacekeepers toKazakhstanto quellthe local unrest.[11]

Collective Rapid Reaction Force[edit]

Main article:Collective Rapid Reaction Force

On 4 February 2009, an agreement to create the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (KSOR) (Russian: Коллекти́вные си́лы операти́вного реаги́рования (КСОР)) was reached by five of the seven members, with plans finalized on 14 June. The force is intended to be used to repulse military aggression, conduct anti-terrorist operations, fighttransnational crimeand drug trafficking, and neutralize the effects of natural disasters.[12]

Belarus and Uzbekistan initially refrained from signing on to the agreement. Belarus did so because of a trade dispute with Russia, and Uzbekistan due to general concerns. Belarus signed the agreement the following October, while Uzbekistan has never done so. A source in the Russian delegation said Uzbekistan would not participate in the collective force on a permanent basis but would "delegate" its detachments to take part in operations on anad hocbasis.[12]

On 3 August 2009, theMinistry of Foreign AffairsofUzbekistancriticized plans byRussiato establish a military base in southernKyrgyzstanfor the CSTO rapid reaction force, stating,

The implementation of such projects on complex and unpredictable territory, where the borders of three Central Asian republics directly converge, may give impetus to the strengthening of militarization processes and initiate all kinds of nationalistic confrontations. […] Also, it could lead to the appearance of radical extremist forces that could lead to serious destabilization in this vast region.[13]

History[edit]

Foundation[edit]

GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic DevelopmentGeorgia (country)AzerbaijanUkraineMoldovaTajikistanTurkmenistanCollective Security Treaty OrganizationEurasian Economic UnionUzbekistanKyrgyzstanKazakhstanArmeniaUnion StateBelarusRussiaCommonwealth of Independent StatesCommonwealth of Independent States Free Trade AreaBaltic AssemblyLithuaniaLatviaEstoniaCommunity for Democracy and Rights of NationsAbkhaziaTransnistriaSouth Ossetia
A clickableEuler diagramshowing the relationships among various supranational organisations in the territory of the former Soviet Unionv•d•e

On 15 May 1992, six post-Soviet states belonging to theCommonwealth of Independent States— Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—signed the Collective Security Treaty (also referred to as the Tashkent Pact or Tashkent Treaty).[14]Three other post-Soviet states—Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia—signed in 1993 and the treaty took effect in 1994. The CST was set to last for a 5-year period unless extended. On 2 April 1999, six of the nine—all but Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan—agreed to renew the treaty for five more years. At the same time, Uzbekistan joined theGUAMgroup, established in 1997 by Georgia,Ukraine,Azerbaijan, andMoldova,and largely seen as intending to counter Russian influence in the region.[15]

The CSTO was founded in 2002 when the six member states agreed to create theCollective Security Treaty Organizationas a military alliance.[16]As an attempt to develop a successor alliance to theWarsaw Pact,the CSTO is comparatively weak.[17]

2003 to 2012[edit]

In 2004 the CSTO was granted Observer status in the UN General Assembly.[18]

During 2005, the CSTO partners conducted some commonmilitary exercises.

CSTO andEAECleaders in 2006

Uzbekistan withdrew from GUAM in 2005 and joined the CSTO in 2006 as a full member and its membership was later ratified by the Uzbek parliament on 28 March 2008.[19]

In October 2007, the CSTO signed an agreement with theShanghai Cooperation Organisation(SCO), in the Tajik capital ofDushanbe,to broaden cooperation on issues such as security, crime, and drug trafficking.[20]

On 6 October 2007, CSTO members agreed to a major expansion of the organization that would create a CSTO peacekeeping force that could deploy under aU.N.mandate or without one in its member states. The expansion would also allow all members to purchase Russian weapons at the same price as Russia.[21]

On 29 August 2008, Russia announced it would seek CSTO recognition of the independence ofAbkhaziaandSouth Ossetia.Three days earlier, on 26 August, Russia recognized the independence of Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[22]

In 2009, Belarus boycotted the CSTO summit due to theirMilk Warwith Russia.[23]After refusing to attend a CSTO summit in 2009, Lukashenko said: "Why should my men fight in Kazakhstan? Mothers would ask me why I sent their sons to fight so far from Belarus. For what? For a unified energy market? That is not what lives depend on. No!"[24]

AfterKurmanbek Bakiyevwas ousted from office asPresident of Kyrgyzstanas a result ofriotsinKyrgyzstanin April 2010, he was granted asylum inBelarus.Belarusian PresidentAlexander Lukashenkoexpressed doubt about the future of the CSTO for failing to prevent Bakiyev's overthrow, stating: "What sort of organization is this one, if there is bloodshed in one of our member states and an anticonstitutional coup d'état takes place, and this body keeps silent?"[25]

Lukashenko had previously accusedRussiaof punishingBelaruswith economic sanctions after Lukashenko's refusal to recognize the independence ofAbkhaziaandSouth Ossetia,stating: "The economy serves as the basis for our common security. But if Belarus's closest CSTO ally is trying... to destroy this basis and de facto put the Belarusians on their knees, how can one talk about consolidating collective security in the CSTO space?"[26]

During a trip toUkraineto extend Russia's lease of the Crimean portSevastopolin return for discountednatural gas supplies,Russian PresidentDmitry Medvedevwas asked about whetherBelaruscould expect a similar deal and responded: "Real partnership is one thing and a declaration of intentions is another; reaching agreement on working seriously, meeting each other halfway, helping each other is one thing and making decisions about granting permanent residence to people who have lost their job is another." The Belarusian President defended himself against this criticism by citing former Russian PresidentVladimir Putin's invitation ofAskar Akayevto Russia after he was ousted asPresident of Kyrgyzstanduring the 2005Tulip Revolution.[27]

The following month, President Medvedev ordered the CEO of Russia's natural gas monopolyGazpromto cut gas supplies to Belarus in a dispute over outstanding debts.[28]Subsequently, the Russian television channelNTV,run byGazprom,aired a documentary film which compared Lukashenko to Bakiyev.[29]Then the Russian President's foreign policy adviserSergei Prikhodkothreatened to publish the transcript of a CSTO meeting where Lukashenko said that his administration would recognize Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence.[30]

In June 2010,ethnic clashesbroke out between ethnicKyrgyzandUzbeksin southern Kyrgyzstan, leading interim Kyrgyz PresidentRoza Otunbayevato request the assistance of Russian troops to quell the disturbances.Kurmanbek Bakiyevdenied charges that his supporters were behind the ethnic conflict and called on the CSTO to intervene.[31]Askar Akayevalso called for the CSTO to send troops, saying: "Our priority task right now should be to extinguish this flame of enmity. It is very likely that we will need CSTO peacekeepers to do that."[citation needed]The organisation was considered by some a "paper tiger"since it failed to intervene.[32]

Russian PresidentDmitry Medvedevsaid that "only in the case of a foreign intrusion and an attempt to externally seize power can we state that there is an attack against the CSTO", and that, "all the problems of Kyrgyzstan have internal roots", while CSTO Secretary GeneralNikolai Bordyuzhacalled the violence "purely a domestic affair".[33]Later, however, Bordyuzha admitted that the CSTO response may have been inadequate and claimed that "foreign mercenaries" provoked theKyrgyzviolence against ethnicUzbekminorities.[34]

On 21 July 2010, interim Kyrgyz PresidentRoza Otunbayevacalled for the introduction of CSTO police units to southernKyrgyzstansaying: "I think it's important to introduce CSTO police forces there, since we're unable to guarantee people's rights on our own." She also added: "I'm not seeking the CSTO's embrace and I don't feel like bringing them here to stay but the bloodletting there will continue otherwise."[35]Only weeks later the deputy chairman of Otubayeva's interimKyrgyzgovernment complained that their appeals for help from the CSTO had been ignored.[36]The CSTO was unable to agree on providing military assistance toKyrgyzstanat a meeting inYerevan,Armenia,which was attended byRoza Otunbayevaas well asAlexander Lukashenko.[37]

The CSTO meeting inNur-Sultan,Kazakhstan, 8 November 2018

On 10 December 2010, the member states approved a declaration establishing a CSTO peacekeeping force and a declaration of the CSTO member states, in addition to signing a package of joint documents.[38]

Since 21 December 2011, the Treaty parties can veto the establishment of new foreign military bases in the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).[8]

On 28 June 2012, Uzbekistan suspended its membership in the CSTO.[39]

2013 to 2022[edit]

In August 2014, 3,000 soldiers from the members of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan participated in psychological andcyber warfareexercises in Kazakhstan under war games managed by CSTO.[40]

On 19 March 2015, the CSTO Secretary GeneralNikolai Bordyuzhaoffered to send apeacekeepingmission toDonbas,Ukraine. "The CSTO has a peacekeeping capacity. Our peacekeepers continuously undergo corresponding training. If such a decision is taken by the United Nations, we stand ready to provide peacekeeping units".[41]

In July 2021, CSTO Secretary-GeneralStanislav Zaswas criticised by Armenian politicians for callingan incursionby Azerbaijani forces onto Armenian territory a "border incident", where the CSTO remained inactive during the conflict.[42]

CSTO Summit 2022

In July 2021, Tajikistan appealed to members of CSTO for help in dealing with security challenges emerging from neighboringAfghanistan.[43]Thousands of Afghans, including police and government troops, fled to Tajikistan afterTalibaninsurgentstook control of many partsof Afghanistan.[44]

On 5 January 2022, CSTO peacekeepers were announced to be deployed to Kazakhstan in response toanti-government unrest in the country.[45]On 11 January the same year, CSTO forces began their withdrawal from Kazakhstan.[46]

Since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 there has been no CSTO involvement or official participation of other CSTO members in the conflict, apart fromBelaruswhich agreed to house Russian troops which then attacked Ukraine from across its border. Following the2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive,the border between Ukraine and Belarus was cleared of Russian forces.

2023 to present[edit]

Relations betweenRussiaandKazakhstanhave deteriorated since the start ofRussia's invasion of Ukraine.The latter has refused to recognise theDonetskand theLuhanskPeople's Republics.

After the start ofrenewed fightingbetween Armenia and former member Azerbaijan on 13 September 2022, Armenia triggered Article 4 of the treaty, and a CSTO mission including CSTO Secretary GeneralStanislav ZasandAnatoly Sidorovwas sent to monitor the situation along the border.[47][48]Similar eventsalso took place near theKyrgyzstan–Tajikistan borderthroughout 2022.

After the CSTO mission took a rather uncommitted position in the conflict, criticism towards CSTO membership inside Armenian political circles increased, with the secretary of theSecurity Council of Armenia,Armen Grigoryan,even stating that he saw no more hope for the CSTO.[49]The lack of Russian support during the conflict prompted a national debate in Armenia, as an increasing percentage of the population indicated doubt as to whether it is beneficial to continue CSTO membership, calling forrealignment of the state with NATOinstead.[50]This coincided with a visit fromSpeaker of the United States House of RepresentativesNancy Pelosito Yerevan on 17 September 2022, largely seen as an effort to reorient the security alliance structure of Armenia.[51]

To discuss the results of the CSTO mission sent on 15 September 2022, an extraordinary session of the CSTO was held via videoconference on 28 October 2022. With the leaders of all member states and CSTO Secretary GeneralStanislav Zasin attendance, the meeting was chaired by Armenian Prime MinisterNikol Pashinyan,who concurred with the report presented by the Secretary General while also reiterating the importance for a clear political assessment of Azerbaijani aggression and a roadmap for the restoration of Armenian territorial integrity.[52][53]

A regular Collective Security Council meeting took place on 23 November 2022 with the leaders of all CSTO members present to discuss matters of international and regional security.[54]After Pashinyan refused to sign the joint declaration because it did not "reach a decision on a CSTO response to Azerbaijan's aggression against Armenia", speculation arose regarding the continuation of the CSTO.[55][56]Secretary General Stanislas Zas indicated that, though numerous measures in the diplomatic as well as military spheres were generally agreed upon, no consensus regarding the situation on the border could be reached.[57]On the occasion of the meeting and in the midst of the2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine,Belarusian PresidentAlexander Lukashenkostated that many in their countries had started to discuss the possibility that the CSTO may cease to exist if Russia loses the war in Ukraine.[58][59]He later expanded on his opinion on the matter, stating that the CSTO will continue on and nobody will fall, if there is unity.[58]Meanwhile, during the meeting inYerevan,large groups of protestors gathered and called for the withdrawal of Armenia from the CSTO and for the country to develop closer relations with the United States and the West.[50]In the aftermath of the meeting, the US think tankThe National Interestreleased an analysis on the current state of the CSTO, concluding that, while the alliance is in a fragile state, only few other nations could fill the void created by a possible Russian exit and step in as a power broker in the region.[60]Economic dependencies between the member states have also increased since the start of the invasion and would dissuade the alliance from splitting up.[60]

The diplomatic friction continued into January 2023, after Pashinyan refused to hold common military drills, because the organisation did not unequivocally condemn Azerbaijan over its perceived aggression.[61]In response,Dmitry Peskov,the Press Secretary of the President of Russia, stated that Armenia remains a very close ally and promised to continue the dialogue.[62]To mend their ties,Sergey Lavrovoffered the deployment of a CSTO mission along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border on 2 February 2023 within one or two days, "if our Armenian allies, friends are still interested in it like before".[63]

Meeting of the Council of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in Minsk (May 2023)

In May 2023, afterthe conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan escalated,theArmenian Prime MinisterNikol Pashinyansaid that Armenia could consider withdrawing from the treaty due to the lack of support from Russia in the conflict.[64]In an interview with CNN broadcast on 1 June 2023, Pashinyan stated that "Armenia is not an ally of Russia in the war in Ukraine".[65]

On 3 September 2023, during an interview, Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that it was a strategic mistake for Armenia to solely rely on Russia to guarantee its security. Pashinyan stated, "Moscow has been unable to deliver and is in the process of winding down its role in the wider South Caucasus region" and "the Russian Federation cannot meet Armenia's security needs. This example should demonstrate to us that dependence on just one partner in security matters is a strategic mistake." Pashinyan accused Russian peacekeepers deployed to uphold theceasefire dealof failing to do their job. Pashinyan confirmed that Armenia is trying to diversify its security arrangements, most notably with the European Union and the United States.[66]

During the2023 Armenian proteststhat began following the2023 Azerbaijani offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh,demonstrators surrounded theRussian embassyin Yerevan criticizing Russia's refusal to intervene in the offensive. Some protesters called for the rejection of theAlma-Ata Protocol,and Armenia's withdrawal from the CSTO.[67]

Armenia declined participating in military exercises and the CIS summit in Kyrgyzstan in October 2023 and asked forRussian peacekeeping forcesto return to Russia.[68]The Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, went further in late October saying he saw "no advantage" in the presence ofRussian troops in Armenia.Currently around 10,000 Russian troops are in stationed inGyumri.[69]

On 23 February 2024, Armenian Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, confirmed that Armenia has frozen its participation in the CSTO. Pashinyan stated, "We have now in practical terms frozen our participation in this treaty" and "membership of the CSTO was under review" during a live broadcast interview.[70]On 28 February 2024, during a speech made in theNational Assembly,Pashinyan further stated that the CSTO is "a threat to the national security of Armenia". Responding to Pashinyan's remarks, Dmitri Peskov stated that the CSTO charter does not include provisions for a "frozen membership" status.[71]On 12 March, Pashinyan said that the CSTO needed to clarify "what constitutes Armenia's sovereign territory", as the organization had not come to Armenia's defence when requested followingAzerbaijani troops crossing the border into Armenia's internationally recognized territory.Pashinyan said that if the CSTO's response did not align with Armenia's expectations, the country would officially withdraw from the organization.[72]On 8 May 2024, Armenia announced it had stopped making financial contributions to the CSTO,[73]leading Russia to state that it was still obligated to pay its membership dues.[3]On 12 June 2024, Armenia announced that it would formally withdraw from the alliance at an unspecified later date,[3]with Pashinyan stating, "We will leave. We will decide when to exit...Don't worry, we won't return".[74]

Membership[edit]

Member states[edit]

Map showing the CSTO members, observers and associated members. Includes theRussian-occupied territories of Ukraine,theRussian-occupied territories in Georgia,and the breakaway republicTransnistria.

Member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization:

Country Year of entry
Armenia 1994
Belarus
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Russia
Tajikistan

Former member states of CST and CSTO[edit]

Country Organisation Year of entry Year of withdrawal
Azerbaijan CST 1994 1999
Georgia
Uzbekistan CST 1994 1999
CSTO 2006 2012

Non-member observer states in the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly[edit]

TheNational Assembly of the Republic of Serbiaand theWolesi Jirga (lower house) of the National Assembly of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistanwere accordedobserver statusin the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly in 2013, though the Islamic Republic collapsed in 2021 as theTaliban took over.[75]Also, theParliamentary Assembly of the Union of Belarus and Russiahas observer status in the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly.[76]

Country Participating Body Year of entry
Serbia National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia[77] 2013[77]
RussiaBelarusUnion State Parliamentary Assembly of the Union of Belarus and Russia 2010[78][79]
Afghanistan[80][76] National Assembly of the Republic of Afghanistan[77] 2013[77]

Potential membership[edit]

In May 2007, the CSTO secretary-general Nikolai Bordyuzha suggestedIrancould join the CSTO saying, "The CSTO is an open organization. If Iran applies in accordance with our charter, we will consider the application".[81]If Iran joined it would be the first state outside the former Soviet Union to become a member of the organization.

In 2021, Uzbekistan, after becoming observer to EAEU on 11 December 2020,[82]conducted a bilateral military exercise with Russia and trilateral military exercise with Russia and Tajikistan, while its president joined a CSTO meeting as a guest, sparking rumours about potential reentry into CSTO.[83]

Secretary General[edit]

Main article:Secretary General of the CSTO

The current secretary general is former Kazakh Prime MinisterImangali Tasmagambetov,who took office on 1 January 2023.

Policy agenda[edit]

Information technology and cyber security[edit]

The member states adopted measures to countercyber securitythreats and information technology crimes in a Foreign Ministers Council meeting in Minsk, Belarus.[84]Foreign Minister Abdrakhmanov put forward a proposal to establishing a Cyber Shield system.[84]

Military personnel[edit]

The following list is sourced from the 2020 edition of "The Military Balance" published annually by theInternational Institute for Strategic Studies.

Flag Country Active military Reserve military Paramilitary Total Per 1000 capita
(total). 		Per 1000 capita
(active)
Armenia Armenia[85][note 4][note 5] 70,600 210,000 4,300 284,900 93.6 23.2
Belarus Belarus[86] 85,000 580,750 110,000 775,750 81.2 8.9
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan[87] 108,000 132,000 30,000 270,000 13.8 5.5
Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan[88] 23,000 300,500 9,500 333,000 57.5 4
Russia Russia[89][note 6] 1,320,000 2,000,000 554,000 3,874,000 27.2 9.3
Tajikistan Tajikistan[90] 9,500 600,000 7,500 617,000 72.9 1.1

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^abArmenia hasde facto"frozen" its membership as of February 2024,[1][2]and in June announced its intention to formally withdraw from the alliance.[3]
  2. ^Did not sign original treaty.[4]
  3. ^Name in official language:
    • Russian:Организация Договора о коллективной безопасности (ОДКБ),romanized:Organizacija dogovora o kollektivnoj bezopasnosti (ODKB)
    Names in other member state languages:
    • Armenian:Հավաքական անվտանգության պայմանագրի կազմակերպություն,romanized:Havakiakan Anvtangutian pajmanagri kazmakerputiun
    • Belarusian:Арганізацыя Дамовы аб калектыўнай бяспецы,romanized:Arhanizacyja damovy ab kalektyŭnaj biaspecy
    • Kazakh:Ұжымдық қауіпсіздік туралы шарт ұйымы (ҰҚШҰ),romanized:Ūjymdyq qauıpsızdık turaly şart ūiymy
    • Kyrgyz:Жамааттык коопсуздук жөнүндө келишим уюму,romanized:Jamaattıq koopsuzduq jönündö kelişim uyumu
    • Tajik:Созмони Аҳдномаи амнияти дастаҷамъӣ,romanized:Sozmoni Ahdomai Amniyati Dastacamûî
    Names in former member state languages:
    • Azerbaijani:Kollektiv Təhlükəsizlik Müqaviləsi Təşkilatı (KTMT)
    • Georgian:კოლექტიური უსაფრთხოების ხელშეკრულების ორგანიზაცია,romanized:k'olekt'iuri usaprtkhoebis khelshek'rulebis organizatsia
    • Uzbek:Коллектив хавфсизлик шартномаси ташкилоти (КХШТ),romanized:Kollektiv xavfsizlik shartnomasi tashkiloti (KXShT)
  4. ^The reserve military of Armenia consists mostly of ex-conscripts who have seen service within the last 15 years.
  5. ^Does not include Army forces ofArtsakh,which had an Armenian-backedarmy.
  6. ^The potential reserve personnel of Russia may be as high as 20 million, depending on how the figures are counted. However, an estimated 2 million have seen military service within the last five years.

References[edit]

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  3. ^abcGavin, Gabriel (12 June 2024)."Armenia to quit Russia's military alliance amid split with Putin".Politico.Retrieved12 June2024.
  4. ^"Multilateral Treaty on collective security. Concluded at Tashkent on 15 May 1992. Correction of 18 May 1995 of the above-mentioned Treaty. Correction of 9 October 1995 of the above-mentioned Treaty"(PDF).Archived(PDF)from the original on 9 January 2022.
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  9. ^Miller, Jonathan Berkshire (23 September 2011)."Russia Launches War Games".The Diplomat.Archivedfrom the original on 26 September 2011.Retrieved26 September2011.
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  11. ^Grynszpan, Emmanuel (7 June 2022)."Moscow's influence wanes in Central Asian countries".Le Monde.Archivedfrom the original on 7 June 2022.Retrieved7 June2022.
  12. ^abWith Russian Prodding, CSTO Begins Taking ShapeArchived24 December 2014 at theWayback MachineRetrieved on 24 November 2009
  13. ^Tashkent Throws Temper Tantrum over New Russian Base in KyrgyzstanArchived16 May 2010 at theWayback Machine,EurasiaNet, 3 August 2009
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  16. ^"From Treaty to Organization".Archivedfrom the original on 5 August 2022.Retrieved12 January2022.
  17. ^Gärtner, Heinz (2023). "Great Power Conflict".China and Eurasian powers in a Multipolar World Order 2.0: Security, Diplomacy, Economy and Cyberspace.Mher Sahakyan. New York:Routledge.pp. xxiv.ISBN978-1-003-35258-7.OCLC1353290533.
  18. ^"Collective Security Treaty Organization".Retrieved29 August2023.
  19. ^"IIS7".Archived fromthe originalon 27 February 2014.Retrieved24 December2014.
  20. ^"Security alliances led by Russia, China link up".Archived fromthe originalon 11 September 2013.Retrieved6 October2007.
  21. ^"Gendarme of Eurasia".Kommersant.8 October 2007. Archived fromthe originalon 1 February 2014.
  22. ^Halpin, Tony (30 August 2008)."Kremlin announces that South Ossetia will join 'one united Russian state".The Times.Archived fromthe originalon 3 September 2008.Retrieved30 August2008.
  23. ^"Belarus leader may snub Moscow security meet".Reuters.13 June 2009.Archivedfrom the original on 27 May 2018.
  24. ^Kimer, James (28 May 2010)."Lukashenko Plays Coy with Russia, Again".Robert Amsterdam.Archivedfrom the original on 15 September 2022.
  25. ^Makhovsky, Andrei (25 April 2010)."Belarus leader raps Russia, may snub security summit".Reuters.Archivedfrom the original on 15 September 2022.
  26. ^Solovyov, Dmitry (14 June 2009). Lawrence, Janet (ed.)."Belarus-Russia rift widens, Minsk snubs Moscow meet".Reuters.Archivedfrom the original on 15 September 2022.
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