War in Dagestan (1999)

War in Dagestan
Part of the spillover of theSecond Chechen War,Post-Soviet conflicts
Location of the Republic of Dagestan (red) within European Russia
Date 7 August – 14 September 1999 (1 month and 1 week) Location Dagestan,Russia Result Russian victory
Belligerents
Islamic Djamaat of Dagestan CPID Chechnya IIPB SPIR Religious Police	Russia Dagestan Militia Armed Forces Army Navy Air Force VDV Spetsnaz GRU FSB MVD Militsiya Internal Troops OMON
Commanders and leaders
Shamil Basayev Ramzan Akhmadov Dokka Umarov Movladi Udugov Ibn al-Khattab Abu Zarr Shishani(Gerat) Arbi Barayev Movsar Suleimanov Abdul-Malik Mezhidov Abdul-Vahhab Shishani Ismail Razakov (Bagram) Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov Shirvani Basaev Abu al-Walid Hakim al-Medani† Yaqub al-Ghamidi Abu Jafar al-Yemeni Rappani Khalilov Abdurrahman az-Zarki (Chechen from Jordan) Magomed Tsagarayev Ruslan Haihoroev† Huta Ahmadov(Abdurrahman)† Garib Shishani Baudi Bakuyev Umar Edilsultanov Isa Umarov Adallo Aliev Sirazhudin Ramazanov Bagaudin Kebedov Magomed Tagaev	Boris Yeltsin Vladimir Putin Viktor Kazantsev Gennady Troshev Alexander Baranov Adilgerei Magomedtagirov Magomed Omarov Magomedali Magomedov Said Amirov
Strength
Up to 1,500–2,000 fighters in early August, more than 10,000 militants by the end of September	17,000 soldiers, thousands of policemen and volunteers
Casualties and losses
Russian claim: 2,500 militants killed	275 servicemen killed, 15 missing and 937 wounded (per Russia) Significant losses to local Dagestani police and militias
Unknown number of civilian casualties

The1999 war in Dagestan,also known as theDagestan incursions(Russian:Война в Дагестане), was an armed conflict that began when theChechen-basedIslamic International Peacekeeping Brigade(IIPB), anIslamistgroup led byShamil Basayev,Ibn al-Khattab,Ramzan AkhmadovandArbi Barayev,invaded the neighboring Russian republic ofDagestanon 7 August 1999, in support of theShuraof Dagestanseparatistrebels. The war ended with a major victory for theRussian FederationandRepublic of Dagestanand the retreat of the IIPB. The invasion of Dagestan alongsidea series of apartment bombingsin September 1999 served as the maincasus bellifor theSecond Chechen War.

Background

During the inter-war period of 1996 to 1999, a war-ravaged Chechnya descended into chaos and economic collapse.Aslan Maskhadov's government was unable to rebuild the region or to prevent a number of warlords from taking effective control. The relationship between the government and radicals deteriorated. In March 1999, Maskhadov closed down theChechen parliamentand introduced aspects ofSharia.Despite this concession, extremists such asShamil Basayevand theSaudi-born IslamistIbn Al-Khattabcontinued to undermine the Maskhadov government. In April 1998, the group publicly declared that its long-term aim was the creation of a union ofChechnyaandDagestanunderIslamicrule and the expulsion ofRussiansfrom the entireCaucasian Region.

In late 1997,Bagaudtin Kebedov(also known as Bagaudtin Magomedov), the ethnicAvarleader of the radical wing of the DagestaniWahhabis(Salafists), fled with his followers to Chechnya. There he established close ties with Ibn Al-Khattab and other leaders of Chechnya's Wahhabi community. In January 1999, Khattab began the formation of an "Islamic Legion" with foreignMuslimvolunteers. At the same time, he commanded the "peacemaking unit of the Majlis (Parliament) of Ichkeria and Dagestan".A series of invasions of Dagestan from Chechnya took place during the inter-war period, culminating in the 1997 attack on a federal military garrison of the 136th Motorized Rifle Regiment near the Dagestani town ofBuinaksk.Other attacks targeted civilians and Dagestani police on a regular basis.

In April 1999, Kebedov, the "Emir of theIslamic Djamaat of Dagestan,"made an appeal to the" Islamic patriots of theCaucasus"to" take part in thejihad"and participate in" liberating Dagestan and the Caucasus from the Russian colonial yoke. "According to this" prominent "Wahhabi's vision, proponents of the idea of a free Islamic Dagestan were to enlist in the" Islamic Army of the Caucasus "that he founded, and report to the army's headquarters in the village ofKaramakhifor military duty. Chechen separatist government officialTurpal-Ali Atgeriyevclaimed that he alerted theFederal Security Service of the Russian Federation(FSB) DirectorVladimir Putin,in the summer of 1999, of the imminent invasion of Dagestan.

Invasion and the Russian counterattack

On 4 August 1999, severalRussian Ministry of Internal Affairs(MVD) servicemen were killed in a border clash with a group of Kebedov's fighters. On 7 AugustShamil BasayevandIbn al-Khattabofficially launched an invasion into Dagestan with a group of roughly 1,500–2,000 armed militants consisting ofIslamicradicals fromChechnya,including other internationalIslamists.

Khattab described himself as the "military commander of the operation", while Basayev was the "overall commander in the battlefield".They seized villages in the districts ofTsumadi(Echeda,Gakko,Kedy,Kvanada, Gadiri and Gigatl) andBotlikh(Godoberi,Miarso,Shodroda,Ansalta,Rakhataand Inkhelo).On 10 August, they announced the birth of the "independentIslamic Stateof Dagestan "and declared war on" the traitorous Dagestani government "and" Russia's occupation units ".

The federal military response to the invasion was slow, and the efforts were initially fumbling and disorganized. As a result, all of the early resistance, and much of the later resistance, was undertaken by Dagestani police, spontaneously organized citizen militias, and individual Dagestani villagers.Basayev and Khattab were not welcomed as "liberators" as they had expected; the Dagestani villagers considered the invaders as unwelcome religious fanatics. Instead of an anti-Russian uprising, a mass mobilization of volunteers formed in the border areas against the invading army.

As resistance to the invaders stiffened, Russianartilleryandairstrikescame into action. The first use of aerially deliveredfuel-air explosives(FAEs) against populated areas occurred in this conflict, notably on the village ofTandoby the federal forces.The rebels were stalled by the ferocity of the bombardments: their supply lines were cut and scattered with remotely detonatingmines.This gaveMoscowtime to assemble acounter-attackunderColonel-GeneralViktor Kazantsev,commander of theNorth Caucasus Military District.On 23 August, the Basayev and Khattab announced they were withdrawing fromBotlikhsky Districtto "redeploy" and begin a "new phase" in their operations.The war also saw the first use of theT-90tank. In theKadarzone, a group of 8 to 12 T-90S tanks pushed through stubborn resistance. One of the tanks was hit by sevenrocket-propelled grenadesand remained in action.

On the night of 4 September, as the federal forces were wiping out the last bastions of resistance in theKadarregion, acar bombdestroyed a military housing building in the Dagestani town ofBuynaksk,killing 64 people, the first in a wave ofRussian apartment bombings.On the morning of 5 September,Chechenrebels launched a second invasion into the lowlandNovolaksky regionof Dagestan,seizing the border village of Tukhchar,this time with a larger force numbering 200 fighters led byUmar Edilsultanov.Several Russian and Dagestani troops were executed on the way as they captured the village. The rebels came within a mere five kilometers of the major city ofKhasavyurt.The second invasion at the height of the hostilities in theKaramakhizone on 5 September came as an unpleasant surprise toMoscowandMakhachkala.According to Basayev, the purpose of the second invasion was to distract federal forces attackingKaramakhiandChabanmakhi.Intensive fighting continued until 12 September, when federal forces supported by local volunteers finally forced theIslamistsback toChechnya,even though sporadic armed clashes continued for some time.

By 13 September, all the villages had been recaptured, and the militants were routed and pushed back fully into Chechnya the following day. Meanwhile, theRussian Air Forcehad already begun bombing targets inside Chechnya. The federal side announced that they suffered 275 dead, 15 missing and approximately 937 wounded. The number of civilians killed were never compiled.

Aftermath

Russiafollowed up with a bombing campaign of southeasternChechnya;on 23 September, Russianfighter jetsbombed targets in and around the Chechen capitalGrozny.Aslan Maskhadov,the president of theChechen republic of Ichkeria,opposed the invasion ofDagestan,and offered a crackdown on the renegade warlords.This offer was refused by the Russian government.In October 1999, after a string offour apartment bombingsfor which Russia blamed the Chechens, Russian ground forces invaded Chechnya, starting theSecond Chechen War.After the Russian victory, Dagestan has been a site of an ongoing, low-levelinsurgency,which became part of the wholeinsurgency in the North Caucasus.This conflict between the government and the armedIslamistunderground in Dagestan (in particular theShariat Jamaatgroup) was aided by the Chechen guerrillas. It claimed the lives of hundreds of people, mostly civilians.

The invasion of Dagestan resulted in the displacement of 32,000 Dagestani civilians. According to researcherRobert Bruce Ware,BasayevandKhattab's invasions were potentiallygenocidal,in that they attacked mountain villages and destroyed entire populations of small ethno-linguistic groups. Furthermore, Ware asserts that the invasions are properly described as terrorist attacks because they initially involved attacks against Dagestani civilians and police officers.

Opposing forces

Federal forces

Despite the initial poor showing of the government forces (for example, military helicopters were hit byanti-tank guided missilesduring a rebel raid on theBotlikhairfield),MoscowandMakhachkalawere able to put together an impressive fighting force. For instance, the light infantry units were partially drawn from theSpetsnaz,paratroopersandnaval infantry,crucial tomountainandcounter-insurgencywarfare.

The government forces consisted of three main elements:lightandair mobile infantryunits able to operate in the mountains and in small ambush and assault forces; larger mechanized units to seal areas off and maintain area security; and artillery with air support elements that were able to interdict supply lines and box in the rebels. Most of the 'teeth' were drawn from regular army units, with the exception of the MVD'sInternal Troops' 102nd Brigade, theRuscommandoforce and the local DagestaniOMON.Makhachala long expected an incident of this sort, and since its OMON troops proved ineffectual in 1996 whenChechenrebelsseized hostagesin the Dagestani city ofKizlyar,it placed a part of its scarce resources into turning this force into a small local army. The Dagestani OMON force numbered almost 1,000 men and, bar the absence of heavy armored vehicles and artillery, they were equipped asmotorised infantry;the force even had a number of antiquatedBTR-60andBTR-70armoured personnel carriers,as well as heavy support weapons.

At the end of 1997 the republic also began raising volunteer territorialmilitia.During the emergency, its ranks of reservists and volunteers almost reached 5,000. Their training and equipment were minimal, making them little more than a home guard force. However, their motivation to defend and recapture their homes as well as intimate knowledge of the terrain made them a reliable garrison force.

Insurgent forces

The insurgents proved to be a collection ofChechen,DagestaniandArabguerrillas. Estimates of the insurgent forces' strength has been estimated of being 1,500-2,000 men. While mostly experienced veterans of theChechen Warsand other wars, they were lightly equipped. They possessed ample supplies of small arms, support weapons, several9M111 FagotATGMs,mortarsand ample ammunition but they appeared to have only twoBTR-60s,possibly captured from government forces in the first days of the attack, a singleT-12 antitank gunand a few truck-mountedZU-23anti-aircraft gunsto use as fire support.

Their first-among-equals leader wasShamil Basayev,Chechen rebel leader, erstwhile prime minister. Basayev's position was in many ways an ambiguous one. He was a staunchMuslimbut didn't share the extremeWahhabismof many of his allies; however, he strongly believed thatDagestanandChechnyashould be one state. Although a seasoned and wily guerrilla commander, this war saw him used as a political figurehead. His CPCD was officially charged with forming new "structures of Islamic self-government" in rebel-held areas. The brevity of the occupation and the opposition of many locals to their "liberation" meant that this was never a serious process.

Ibn al-Khattab'sIslamic International Peacekeeping Brigadeformed the core of the insurgent forces, accounting for perhaps half of the rebel fighters. Having fought against theRussiansduring theFirst Chechen War,he went on to wage an open campaign against PresidentMaskhadov,whom he regarded as too close toMoscow.Khattab concluded a marriage of political convenience with Basayev, but in effect retained operational command and a veto on political direction.

The third element in the loose rebeltriumviratewere the Dagestani Islamic militants. BesidesBagauddin Kebedov,the two key figures wereNadir KhachilayevandSiradjin Ramazanov.An ethnicLakand former leader of the Union of Muslims in Russia, Khachilayev had a long pedigree of opposition to the local regime ofMagomedali Magomedov.In 1998 he launched an abortive attempt to storm the government buildings in the Dagestani capital,Makhachkala.Khachilayev escaped toChechnyawhere he found sanctuary with Islamist guerrilla movements, eventually forging an alliance with Khattab. Despite their Dagestani origins, he and the self-styled prime minister of 'Islamic Dagestan', Ramazanov, proved marginal, reflecting their failure to bring recruits to their side after they launched the operation. The self-proclaimedShura of Dagestanwelcomed the "liberation" and declared an Islamic state, but proved to have relatively little authority.

Alleged agreement between Basayev and Russian authorities to start the war

The invasion ofDagestanleading to the start of theSecond Chechen Warwas regarded by theRussianjournalistAnna Politkovskayaas a provocation initiated fromMoscowto start war inChechnya,because Russian forces provided safe passage forIslamicfighters back to Chechnya.

According toBoris Berezovsky,the war was planned for six months before the Dagestan events, over his objections.Berezovsky confirmed thatMovladi Udugovcame to see him, but denied that he conspired with Udugov. However, according to Berezovsky "UdugovandBasayevconspired withStepashinandPutinto provoke a war to toppleMaskhadov..., but the Chechen condition was for the Russian army to stop at theTerek River.Instead, Putin double-crossed the Chechens and started an all-out war. "In September 1999, transcripts of a number of alleged phone conversations conducted byBoris BerezovskywithMovladi Udugov,Gaji Makhachevand other radicalChechensin June and July 1999 were published byMoskovskij Komsomoletsnewspaper.

It has also been reported that the head of the Russian presidential administration of theBoris Yeltsin,Alexander Voloshin,administration paid money to Shamil Basayev to stage this military operation.In early August 1999, the investigative Russian journalVersiyapublished a report that Voloshin had met secretly with Basayev on 4 July 1999. The meeting was arranged by a retired officer of theGRU,Anton Surikov, and took place at a villa owned by the arms dealerAdnan KhashoggibetweenNiceandMonaco.Many of the participants of the meeting had fought on the same side during theAbkhazia-Georgia conflictduring the early 1990s. According toBoris Kagarlitsky,those who arranged the meeting made one mistake; the security system blocked monitoring from the outside but provided perfect conditions for monitoring from the inside.French intelligencewas able to listen in on everything that transpired.However,Ilyas Akhmadovbelieved that Basayev hadn't actually been in Nice. According to Akhmadov, Basayev was portrayed in shortswhile Chechen men, especially fighters, do not wear shorts. Additional reasons not to take the story seriously were that Basayev had been a participant of a rally inGroznyon 3 July 1999, and that Akhmadov didn't know an instance when Basayev left theNorth Caucasusin the years after theFirst Chechen War.According to a press report cited by Timur Muzayev from the International Institute of Humanities and Political Research, speakers at the rally in Grozny on 3 July 1999 included Aslan Maskhadov, Shamil Basayev, andRuslan Gelayev;these men and others called for reconciliation and unity.

Shamil Basayev allegedly worked for Russian GRU, at least prior to the Second Chechen War.According toIlyas Akhmadov,who worked for Basayev's1997 election campaignand accepted a Foreign Minister position in Maskhadov's government in 1999, allegations that Shamil Basayev was working for Russians should be viewed as an element of the political strife among Chechen leaders, as he criticized what he called "tangents about how Shamil was Russia's agent", noting that "Shamil equally strongly believed that Maskhadov's various calls for peace benefited only Russia".

External links

• Media related toWar of Dagestanat Wikimedia Commons
• War in Dagestan - Jane's Europe News (October 1999)
• ISN Case Study: The North Caucasus on the Brink (August 2006)Archived2021-04-17 at theWayback Machine