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Force Z

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
This article is about the Royal Navy squadron. For the commando unit, seeLayforce.For other uses, seeZ Force (disambiguation).

Force Z
The loss of HMSPrince of Walesand HMSRepulse,10 December 1941. Photograph taken from a Japanese aircraft during the initial high-level bombing attack.Repulse,near the bottom of the view, has just been hit by a bomb.
Active1941
CountryUnited Kingdom
BranchRoyal Navy
Size2 × capital ships
4 × destroyers
Garrison/HQSingapore
EngagementsSinking ofPrince of WalesandRepulseaka Battle of Malaya
Commanders
Notable
commanders		Admiral Sir Tom Phillips†(Flag Officer)
Captain John Leach†(HMSPrince of Wales)
Captain William Tennant(HMSRepulse)

Force Zwas a British naval squadron during theSecond World War,consisting of the battleshipHMSPrince of Wales,the battlecruiserHMSRepulseand accompanyingdestroyers.Assembled in 1941, the purpose of the group was to reinforce the British colonial garrisons in the Far East and deterJapaneseexpansion intoBritish possessions,particularly Malaya and Singapore. Lack of aircraft to protect Force Z, underestimation of the Japanese armed forces, and the political rather than naval motive for its deployment are blamed for the destruction of the force.

Background

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Strategy for Far East reinforcement

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Main article:Singapore strategy

Inter-war British planning for a war against theEmpire of Japansought to defend British interests in China (the "offensive" strategy), and to defend imperial lines of communications, particularly through the Indian Ocean (the "defensive strategy" ).Singaporewas chosen as the mainRoyal Navy(RN) base. It put the fleet within steaming range of China. The base was also on the "Malay Barrier", the eastern forward defence zone for the Indian Ocean,[1]although strictly speaking Singapore was not required to pursue a defensive strategy.[2]In the 1920s the RN could reinforce the Far East fleet from Britain and the Mediterranean Sea[3]to sufficiently pursue the offensive strategy.[4]By the late 1930s, war with Germany and a strongerImperial Japanese Navy(IJN) had to be considered; in the event of a European war fewer naval forces would be available for the Far East fleet; reinforcement would arrive incrementally and the total end strength would suffice only for the defensive strategy.[5]

In strategic discussions during 1940, Britain requested naval assistance from the United States in the Atlantic (against Germany) and the Malay Barrier (specifically to Singapore, against Japan) in the event that the United States entered the war. The required US naval forces would come from thePacific Fleet.The Pacific Fleet was not large enough to fulfill both missions. The Americans had misgivings about deploying the Pacific Fleet to Singapore and chose the Atlantic.[6]TheAlliesagreed that the Atlantic theatre was paramount[7]and the choice was affirmed at theABC-1talks the next year.[6]

Still, the British wanted a naval force at Singapore, which they believed was the only place where the vital Indian Ocean trade routes and the eastern British Dominions could be adequately covered.[8]To accomplish this, American naval forces arriving in the Atlantic would replace British naval forces, freeing British naval forces to redeploy eastwards. In February 1941, the RN planned the creation and movement of theEastern Fleetto the Indian Ocean and Singapore based on this substitution.[9]

The reinforcement of the Far East by the Eastern Fleet would occur in two phases. The first phase moved, at the earliest possible time, a minimum force into the Indian Ocean able to counter Japanese cruisers engaged incommerce raiding;the first phase would occur early in the Atlantic substitution. The second phase moved the bulk of the Eastern Fleet to Singapore or - if Singapore had fallen - the eastern Indian Ocean after American naval mobilization in the Atlantic was complete. The transfer of the Eastern Fleet was projected to be completed 80 days after the entry of the United States into the war. The basic structure of the plan remained unchanged from February 1941 to early December 1941, although the details were regularly revised.[10]

By August 1941, phase 1 was planned asForce H,joined as soon as possible by the phase 2battleships,theNelson-classandRevenge-class battleships.The limiting factor to forming the full Eastern Fleet was a shortage ofcruisersanddestroyers.[11]The first Britishcapital shipsto arrive in the Indian Ocean were the battleshipHMSRevengein mid-September, and the battlecruiserHMSRepulsein early October.[12]

Return to offensive plans

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The United States did not wait to enter the war to become active in the Atlantic. By August 1941, there was sufficient American participation in the Atlantic to make apeacetimeexecution of the British Far East naval reinforcement plan feasible.[13]In September, it was proposed that phase 1 could be made more powerful, and the core of the Eastern Fleet could be in place by January 1942. The shortage of destroyers would prevent the deployment of capital ships beyond the Malay Barrier, but retaining capital ships in the Indian Ocean would free cruisers to operate beyond the Malay Barrier.[12]

With such a powerful force, the RN returned tooffensiveplans against Japan in September. At ABC-1, the United States rejected reinforcing theUnited States Asiatic Fleet[14]with a US aircraft carrier task force.[15]The new RN plan resurrected the concept. Singapore would be the Eastern Fleet's main repair base.Manila,in thePhilippines,would be its forward operating base come wartime.[16]It would over-optimistically rely onRoyal Air Force(RAF) cover in Malaya, and the major American air reinforcement of the Philippines announced at the Atlantic Conference;[16][17]the latter factor may not even have been considered by RN strategists.[18]

British assessment of Japanese intentions

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In July, the Japanese moved into southernIndochina.In response, the British reassessed Japanese intentions from August to early September, which came to a number of conclusions. The Japanese were waiting for the outcome of theGerman invasion of the Soviet Unionbefore deciding on anorthernorsouthernexpansion strategy, but were concentrating resources in anticipation of the former. Malaya was vulnerable due to the Japanese encroachment in Indochina, but was not immediately threatened due to the northern option and the monsoon season, which would preventamphibious landingson Malaya until February 1942. The assessment was fatally flawed. It underestimated economic factors driving Japanese toward the southern strategy.[19]It also failed to appreciate that theGulf of Thailandwas reasonably sheltered against the monsoon.[20]

As a result, air reinforcement to Malaya was deferred; aircraft went to the Middle East, and to theSoviet Unionas aid. Overall, Japan seemed at such a disadvantage that increased military deterrence might still prevent war or delay its onset.[19]

SelectingPrince of Wales

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In late August, Prime MinisterWinston Churchilldiscussed Far East reinforcement with AdmiralDudley Pound,theFirst Sea Lord.Churchill proposed augmenting phase 1 with aKing George V-class battleship.The United States declared its intent to deploy modern battleships to the Atlantic at theAtlantic Conferencein early August; this would make aKing George V-class ship available.[21]Pound favoured keeping theKing George Vs in Britain.[22]

Pound proposed basing theNelsons, thebattlecruiserHMSRenown,and anaircraft carrierat Singapore. This would be for deterrent value in peacetime, to be withdrawn toCeylonon the onset of war; the British believed a wartime fleet at Singapore had to be competitive with a major portion of the IJN.[23]Interestingly, Pound did not envision an aircraft carrier in the Far East until spring 1942.[24]

In meetings on 17 and 20 October, the British Defence Committee formally discussed Far East naval reinforcement in response to the fall of the moderateKonoegovernment on 16 October. In agreement with August-September assessment of Japanese intentions, Churchill and his cabinet favoured the deployment of a modern battleship for deterrent effect.[25]The RN, as part of its offensive strategy, planned to send theNelsonandRevenge-class battleships to Singapore, but theNelsons could not deploy.HMSNelsonwas damaged in the Mediterranean Sea in late-September.[22]CrewleavepreventedHMSRodneyfrom deploying until mid-December, and a gun refit scheduled from February to May 1942 was required before she could conduct further operations. With working up, the earliest either could reach the Far East was August 1942. TheKing George V-classHMSPrince of Waleswas, aside from theRevenges, the only worked-up battleship that could sail east before Spring 1942.[26]On 20 October, the Committee decided to sendPrince of WalestoCape Town,South Africa.[27]Once at Cape Town, a review would decide whether to send the ship onward to Singapore;[28]this would keepPrince of Walesavailable to respond to an emergency in home waters.[29]

Churchill requested an aircraft carrier for Force Z on 17 October, but nothing came of this;[30]the earliest available carrier would beHMSIndomitablein November after working up.[19]Contrary to post-war accounts,Indomitablewas not allocated to Force Z. Neither Admiralty plans during the period, nor the secret session of theParliament of the United Kingdomon 19 December concerning the loss of Force Z, nor the 7 December tabulation of current and intended fleet strength in the Far East, allocate the carrier to the Eastern Fleet. The carrier did not receive any orders to this effect prior to grounding inKingston, Jamaica,on 2 November, at the start of a three-week work-up. Joining Force Z by 8 December would have required no grounding and abandoning the work-up.[30][31]

Prince of Walessails to Singapore

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Prince of Walesand the escorting destroyersHMSElectra,Express,andHMSHesperus,were formed intoForce Gin Britain; they sailed fromGreenockon 25 October 1941. The group was commanded by AdmiralSir Tom Phillips,[32]who had played a major role in shaping naval strategy in the Far East.[33]Hesperuswas temporarily assigned fromWestern Approaches Command.Three days laterHMSLegionalso temporarily joined the escort whileElectraandExpressdetached to refuel atPonta Delgadain theAzores.HesperusandLegionleft Force G the following day with the return of the other destroyers. Force G refuelled atFreetownon 5 November[34]and arrived at Cape Town early on the 16 November.[35]

On 2 November, Churchill was notified that Pound intended to conduct the review agreed upon on 20 October before Force G arrived at Cape Town. Pound never conducted the review. The Admiralty, in accordance with its offensive plans, was committed to the move to Singapore beforePrince of Walessailed.[35]On 21 October, the Admiralty informed relevant naval commands that the battleship was on route to Singapore.[29]Once Force G sailed, the Admiralty sought to expedite the transit. On 6 November, Phillips expected to stay in Cape Town for seven days, and arrive at Singapore on 13 December. On 11 November, the Admiralty formally orderedPrince of Walesto combine withRepulseat Ceylon before proceeding to Singapore. The orders also suggested - with reservations from Churchill - that the battleship might abandon its escort in the interest of speed; consequently, Force G remained in Cape Town for only two days. Up to 5 October, Churchill still believed the decision to movePrince of Walesbeyond Cape Town was still under review, and accepted Pound's advice and decisions;[35]Churchill was unaware that the Admiralty had readopted an offensive stance the previous October.[27]

British plans to provide media coverage of the arrival of Force G at Cape Town for propaganda and deterrence were disrupted by the shortened duration of the visit. Interviews of ships crew and visits by photographers were cancelled.[34]Japanese diplomats reported the visit on 19 November; thereafter the Japanese expectedPrince of Walesto arrive at Singapore at the end of November.[36]

Force G departed Cape Town on the afternoon of 18 November.[35]It refuelled atMauritiusandPort T,Addu Atollon the journey eastwards.[34]It arrived at Ceylon on 29 November and was joined byRepulse,[36]and the destroyersHMSEncounterandHMSJupiter;[34]the destroyers were transfers from the Mediterranean Fleet.[32]Phillips disembarked and flew ahead to Singapore to meet with local commanders;[34]on 4 December he also flew to the Philippines to meet with American commanders.[36]Force G finally arrived at Singapore on 2 December[37]and was redesignated to Force Z on 8 December at the outbreak of war.[38]

Final deployment and loss

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Main article:Sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse

Phillips ordered Force Z to sortie on 8 December against Japaneseamphibious landings on Malayain the Gulf of Thailand.EncounterandJupiterwere out of action with defects and were replaced by theFirst World WardestroyersHMASVampireandHMSTenedos.[39]Prince of WalesandRepulseweresunk by Japanese aircrafton 10 December 1941, becoming the first capital ships moving at sea to be sunk solely by enemy aircraft.

British air forces in Malaya were insufficient to provide air cover to Force Z. Poor pre-war forecasts of Japanese intentions caused the deferment of air reinforcement,[19]and by the time war was likely it was impossible to provide sufficient reinforcement in time.[40]

Phillips also failed to make full use of intelligence resources. As a result, he grossly underestimated the scale of attack, and believed that the majority of enemy attack aircraft would be level bombers rather than land-based naval torpedo bombers.[41]

See also

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References

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Notes

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  1. ^Boyd: page 60
  2. ^Boyd: page 72
  3. ^Boyd: page 75
  4. ^Boyd: page 56
  5. ^Boyd: page 70
  6. ^abBoyd: pages 186-188
  7. ^Boyd: page 212
  8. ^Boyd: page 216
  9. ^Boyd: page 215
  10. ^Boyd: page 209-210
  11. ^Boyd: page 280-281
  12. ^abBoyd: page 284
  13. ^Boyd: page 275
  14. ^Boyd: page 186
  15. ^Boyd: page 191
  16. ^abBoyd: page 285
  17. ^Boyd: page 287
  18. ^Boyd: page 289
  19. ^abcdBoyd: page 290-291
  20. ^Boyd: page 292
  21. ^Boyd: page 279-280
  22. ^abBoyd: page 281
  23. ^Boyd: page 281-282
  24. ^Boyd: page 282-283
  25. ^Boyd: page 294-295
  26. ^Boyd: page 295
  27. ^abBoyd: page 297
  28. ^Mahoney and Middlebrook: chapter 3
  29. ^abBoyd: page 311
  30. ^abBoyd: page 301
  31. ^Boyd: page 302
  32. ^abMahoney and Middlebrook: chapter 4
  33. ^Boyd: chapter 7
  34. ^abcdeMahoney and Middlebrook: chapter 5
  35. ^abcdBoyd: page 312
  36. ^abcBoyd: page 314
  37. ^Boyd: page 317
  38. ^Boyd: page 294
  39. ^Mahoney and Middlebrook: chapter 6
  40. ^Boyd: page 171
  41. ^Boyd: page 320-323

Books

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  • Boyd, Andrew (2017).The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters.Seaforth.ISBN978-1-4738-9248-4.
  • Mahoney, Patrick; Middlebrook, Martin (2014).The Sinking of the Prince of Wales & Repulse: The End of the Battleship Era.Pen & Sword.ISBN978-1-84415-075-5.
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