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Franz Halder

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Franz Halder
Halder in 1938
Chief of the General Staff
of theGerman Army High Command
In office
1 September 1938 – 24 September 1942
LeaderAdolf Hitler
Walther von Brauchitschas Chief of the German Army High Command (until 19 December 1941)
Preceded byLudwig Beck
Succeeded byKurt Zeitzler
Personal details
Born30 June 1884
Würzburg,Bavaria,Germany
Died2 April 1972 (aged 87)
Aschau im Chiemgau,Bavaria,West Germany
Spouse
Gertrud Erl[1]
​
​
(m.1907)​
Signature
Military service
AllegianceGerman Empire(1902–1918)
Weimar Republic(1918–1933)
Nazi Germany(1933–1942)
Branch/serviceGerman Army
Years of service1902–1942
RankGeneraloberst(Colonel-General)
Battles/warsWorld War I

World War II

AwardsKnight's Cross of the Iron Cross

Franz Halder(30 June 1884 – 2 April 1972) was a German general and thechief of staffof theArmy High Command (OKH)inNazi Germanyfrom 1938 until September 1942. DuringWorld War II,he directed the planning and implementation ofOperation Barbarossa,the 1941 invasion of theSoviet Union.Halder became instrumental in the radicalisation of warfare on theEastern Front.He had his staff draft both theCommissar Order(issued on 6 June 1941) and theBarbarossa Decree(signed on 13 May 1941) that allowed German soldiers to execute Soviet citizens for any reason without fear of later prosecution, leading to numerous war crimes and atrocities during the campaign. After the war, he had a decisive role in the development of themyth of the cleanWehrmacht.

Halder began his military service in 1914. In 1937 he met and became a supporter ofAdolf Hitler.Halder participated in the strategic planning for the 1939 Germaninvasion of Poland.The plans authorised theSSto carry out security tasks – on behalf of the army – that included the imprisonment or execution of Poles. In July 1940 he began planning for theAxisinvasion of the Soviet Union,Operation Barbarossa,which began on 22 June 1941. That summer Halder engaged in a long-running and divisive dispute with Hitler over strategy. Hitler removed Halder from command in September 1942. After the20 July 1944 plotto assassinate Hitler, Halder was arrested as it came to light that he had been involved in an earlier plot, leading to his imprisonment. As chief of OKH General Staff, he had kept extensive notes, later published asThe Halder Diaries.

After World War II Halder served as a lead consultant for theUS Army Historical Division.He oversaw the writing of over 2,500 historical documents by 700 former German officers, whom he instructed to remove material detrimental to the image of the German armed forces. Halder used his influence to foster a false history of the German-Soviet conflict in which the German army fought a "noble war" and which denied its war crimes. The US Army overlooked Halder'sapologiabecause Halder's group was providing military insights on theSoviet Unionthat it deemed important in the light of theCold War.Halder succeeded in his aim of exonerating the German Army: first with the US military, then amongst widening circles of politicians and eventually in American popular culture. In 1961, he was awarded theMeritorious Civilian Service Award.

Early life and military career

Halder was born inWürzburg,the son of an officer. In 1902, he joined an artillery regiment under the command of his father. Halder was educated at theBavarian War Academy,graduating in 1914. DuringWorld War I,he served in a variety of staff roles and was awarded theIron Cross1st Class. In 1919, he was transferred to theReichswehr,where he served in staff and training roles, including underWalther von Brauchitschin the army training department. In 1931, he was appointed as chief of staff of a military district. After being promoted togeneralmajor(general-major) in October 1934, Halder served as the commander of the7th Infantry Divisionin Munich.[2]

In theWehrmacht

Further information:German re-armament § Nazi government era

In August 1936, Halder was promoted togeneralleutnant(lieutenant-general). He then became the director of the Manoeuvres Staff of theWehrmacht.Between October 1937 and February 1938, Halder served as director of the Training Branch, on the General Staff of the Army, in Berlin. During the 1937Wehrmachtmanoeuvres, Halder metAdolf Hitlerand became a loyal supporter. This personal contact also enabled him to progress through the ranks quickly.[2]

On 1 February 1938, Halder was promoted togeneral of the Artillery.[2]He was appointed chief of the General Staff of theArmy High Commandon 1 September. He succeeded GeneralLudwig Beckwho had resigned on 18 August amid theSudetenlandcrisis.[3]Halder was approached by conservative nationalist officers about heading the envisaged coup d'état should Hitler start a war, but he declined. Halder discussed the situation informally with US diplomat Raymond Geist and indicated that the Army feared that Hitler was about to start a war with the West. In any case, the war was averted by the conclusion of theMunich Agreementthat ceded Sudetenland to Germany.[3]

World War II

Invasions of Poland and Western Europe

Photograph of Franz Halder looking at Walther von Brauchitsch who is standing to Halder's left as they study a map
Halder withWalther von Brauchitschduring the invasion of Poland in 1939
Photograph of Halder standing on Adolf Hitler's left side looking at a map with four other officers
Halder (far right) alongside Hitler, 1940

Halder participated in the strategic planning for theInvasion of Poland.His plans authorised theSSto carry out security tasks on behalf of the army that included the imprisonment or execution of Polish citizens, whether Jewish orgentile.[4][a]On 1 September 1939, the German offensive began, resulting in declarations of war by France and theBritish Empire.On 19 September, Halder noted in his diary that he had received information fromReinhard Heydrich.The SS were beginning their campaign to "clean house" in Poland of Jews, intelligentsia, Catholic clergy, and the aristocracy. Halder was aware ofThe Holocaustbut did not object to the murders.[5]He dismissed the crimes as aberrations and refused one general's request to pursue the SS and police perpetrators.[6]

At the end of 1939, Halder oversaw the development of the invasion plans of France, theLow Countriesand theBalkans.During a meeting with Hitler on 5 NovemberWalther von Brauchitsch,the Army commander-in-chief, attempted to talk Hitler into putting off the invasion of France. Hitler refused and berated Brauchitsch for incompetence.[7]As a consequence, Halder and Brauchitsch discussed overthrowing Hitler because they feared the invasion was doomed.[8]They decided against the idea.[9]On 23 November 1939Carl Friedrich Goerdelermet with Halder to ask him to reconsider his decision.[10]He refused, saying that Hitler was a great leader, and "one does not rebel when face to face with the enemy".[10]Halder's contemplation of resistance to Hitler owed more to political turf battles than it did to disagreement over the regime's racism and antisemitism.[6]

GeneralErich von Manstein's bold plan for invading France through theArdennes Forestproved successful, and ultimately led to thefall of France.On 19 July 1940, Halder was promoted togeneraloberst(colonel-general) and began to receiveundisclosed monthly extralegal paymentsfrom Hitler that effectively doubled his already large wage. The payments helped ensure his loyalty to Hitler and reduced his qualms over sending millions of men to their deaths.[11]

Invasion of the Soviet Union

Main article:Operation Barbarossa

On 30 March 1941 Halder attended the conference where Hitler described the planned invasion to about 200 seniorWehrmachtofficers. He later wrote in his diary, summarising Hitler's remarks:

We must forget the concept of comradeship between soldiers. A Communist is no comrade before or after the battle. This is a war of extermination. (...) Commanders must make the sacrifice of overcoming their personal scruples.[12]

Halder was instrumental in the subsequent preparation and implementation ofwar crimesduring the invasion of the Soviet Union.[13]He had his staff draft both theCommissar Orderand theBarbarossa Decreewithout Hitler's instruction or interference.[14]The author of the orders wasEugen Müller,who reported on his work directly to Halder.[15]The Commissar Order required politicalcommissarsto be executed immediately when captured.[16]Halder also insisted that a clause be added to the Barbarossa Decree giving officers the right to raze whole villages and execute the inhabitants.[13]The decree freed soldiers from any form of prosecution for war crimes committed in the East.[16]The decree had no specific target: Soviet citizens could be killed at any time and for any reason.[17]Until this time only the SS could kill citizens without fear of later prosecution. These orders allowed officers throughout the army to execute citizens with no repercussions.[18]Ulrich von Hassell,discussing the orders given by Halder, said the conquered population were being controlled bydespotism.He added that Germans were being turned into a type of being that previously existed only in enemy propaganda.[19]Omer Bartovdescribed the orders as "the barbarisation of warfare".[19]

The offensive began on 22 June 1941 where the German forces initially met muted resistance. Halder brashly wrote in his diary on 3 July that the war was already won.[20]Nicolaus von Belowreported that this confidence was shared at Fuhrer Headquarters in the month of July.[21]Halder's confidence was dashed with dramatic effect in early August with the arrival of new intelligence information from hisForeign Armies East.[22]He wrote in his diary on 11 August that he had underestimated the "Russian colossus".[23]At the start of the campaign, he had reckoned the enemy had 200 divisions, but now 360 had been counted. He added: "We destroy a dozen of them, then the Russians put another dozen in their place."[23]In mid-August, the German advance had stalled, and at the same time, effective long-term defence was impossible so far from friendly territory. Halder wrote of the situation: "Everything that has so far been achieved is for nothing."[24]During that summer, Hitler and the Army General Staff led by Halder had been engaged in a long and divisive dispute over strategy.[25]By mid-September, it was clear Operation Barbarossa had failed in its central objective to quickly overcome the Soviet Union.[25]

Operation Typhoon

Main article:Battle of Moscow

Operation Typhoon, the German offensive at theBattle of Moscow,began on 2 October 1941.[16]In early October, the German forces encircled the bulk of the Soviet armies defending the capital city in theVyazma and Bryansk pocket.[26]Halder determined the strategy for Typhoon, and it was subsequently endorsed by Hitler.[27]Typhoon had the same basic flaw as Barbarossa; officers on the front line were unable to change Halder's objectives even when those objectives were impossible.[27]

The Barbarossa Decree and Commissar Order became a fundamental aspect of the battle for Moscow.[28]By this time, thousands of Soviet civilians and defenceless prisoners in already occupied Russia were being murdered every day.[28]The killings were unprecedented in the modern era and radicalised the defence of Moscow.[28]On 5 December Operation Typhoon was over. Halder wrote in his diary there was no more strength and a withdrawal may be necessary.[29]The withdrawal, when it came, was dictated by the Soviet army.[30]The crisis on the battlefield prompted Hitler to remove von Brauchitsch and assume command of OKH himself.[31]

Halder vehemently pushed for ablitzkriegassault on Moscow and believed if the capital could be taken the war would be won. However, he did not understand the fundamental underpinnings of blitzkrieg and the impossibility of carrying out a lightning war in the vast expanse of the Soviet Union.[32]Even if Moscow had fallen, Stalin would have moved his base of operations farther east and the war would have continued.[33]

David Stahelwrites: "The Soviet Union was nothing less than a militarised juggernaut and, while deeply wounded in Germany's 1941 campaign, there is no evidence to suggest it was about to collapse either politically or militarily."[34]The responsibility for the failure fell on Halder, Hitler andFedor von Bock.[35]The war in the Soviet Union and the winter that followed was one of the worst chapters in the history of the German army—there were over one million casualties.[36]

Case Blue

Main article:Case Blue

In the spring of 1942, Halder, along with the German high command, began planning a new ambitious offensive in the Soviet Union. This was despite the heavy losses theWehrmachthad suffered in 1941. Under the code name "Case Blue", the plan envisaged an offensive against the southern sector of the front. The aim was to capture the Soviet oil fields in theCaucasus.[37]The directive for the offensive was issued by Hitler on 5 April 1942, envisaging a complex sequence of staggered operations.[38]The offensive began on 28 June 1942 and at the outset appeared successful;Friedrich Pauluscut through a defensive position with ease and Bock wrote: "There was nothing left: The enemy has not succeeded in organizing a new defense anywhere."[39]

The Soviet army had adopted a new strategy known as the "elastic defence"that was highly uncharacteristic of prior engagements and left the German army closing in on an enemy that had already left.[40]Confusion ensued leading to the failure of the campaign. Bock was removed as Commander ofArmy Group B,replaced byMaximillian von Weichsand Halder was marginalised.[41]The relationship between Hitler and Halder became strained. Halder's diary entries became increasingly sarcastic, and Hitler mocked him. On one occasion Hitler said Halder had spentWorld War Iin an office "sitting on that same swivel stool".[42]On 24 September Hitler replaced Halder as Chief of Staff of theOKHwithKurt Zeitzlerand retired him to theFührer Reserve.[43]

Imprisonment

On 23 July 1944, after the failed20 July assassination attempt on Hitler's lifeby German Army officers, theGestapoarrested Halder. Although he was not involved in 20 July plot, intense interrogations of the conspirators revealed that Halder had been involved in earlier conspiracies against Hitler. Halder was imprisoned at both theFlossenbürgandDachau concentration camps.Halder's wife Gertrud chose, and was allowed, to accompany her husband into imprisonment. He had no complaints about the quarters or provisions and was not treated poorly. He was in VIP company that included former French premierLeon Blumand former Austrian ChancellorKurt Schuschnigg.[44]On 31 January 1945, Halder was officially dismissed from the army. In the last days of April 1945, together with otherspecialprisoners, he wastransferred to the South Tyrolwhere he was liberated byUS troops.[45]

Antisemitism

Before the invasion of the Soviet Union, three million soldiers destined for the front received a key order. It was titled "Guidelines for the Conduct of the Troops in Russia".The language was determined by Halder. It describedBolshevismas the "mortal enemy of the National Socialist German people" and urged German forces to "crack down hard" and "eliminate all resistance". Jews were mentioned in the order and intended to be part of the elimination.[46]In April 1941 Halder drafted an order for the security police and Security Service duringOperation Marita.The order defined the enemy as saboteurs, terrorists, communists and Jews.[47]The "criminal orders" drafted by Halder document his solidarity with Hitler's antisemitic and racist policies. The commanders under Halder includingErich Hoepner,Erich von Manstein andWalter von Reichenaugave antisemitic speeches and orders.[48]

Post-war

Criminal investigation

On 5 May 1945 Halder was arrested by the advancing American troops and was interned awaiting trial or release.[49]He was relieved not to be part of theNuremberg Trials;instead, he was tried in a German court on charges of aiding the Nazi regime. Halder denied any knowledge of the regime's atrocities and claimed to be outside the decision-making process; he was found not guilty.[50]

During the trial the prosecuting attorney gained access to Halder's personal diary which detailed his formulation of the Barbarossa Decree and Commissar Order so he was subsequently sent for retrial.[50]Halder was working for the American Historical Division providing information on the Soviet Union, and the Americans refused to allow the retrial. It was dropped in September 1950.[51]

Myth of the cleanWehrmacht

Photograph of Halder sitting in a witness box looking to his right
Halder as a witness at theHigh Command Trial,1948
Main article:Myth of the clean Wehrmacht

Halder played a key role in creating themyth of the cleanWehrmacht.It was a false, mythic view of the Nazi-Soviet war in which the German army fought a "noble war". It denies the existence of, or disregards, German war crimes.[52]The genesis for the myth was the "Generals' Memorandum" created in November 1945 and submitted to theInternational Military Tribunalin Nuremberg. The memorandum was titled "The German Army from 1920 to 1945". It was co-authored by Halder and former field marshalsWalter von BrauchitschandErich von Mansteinand other senior military figures. It aimed to portray the German armed forces as apolitical and largely innocent of the crimes committed by the Nazi regime.[53][54]The strategy outlined in the memorandum was later adopted byHans Laternser,the lead counsel for the defence at theHigh Command Trialof seniorWehrmachtcommanders.[53]The document was written at the suggestion of American GeneralWilliam J. Donovan,who later founded theCIA,and viewed the Soviet Union as a global threat to world peace. Donovan served as a deputy prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal; he and some other US representatives did not believe the trials should proceed. He believed America should do everything it could to secure Germany as a military ally against the Soviet Union in the growingCold War.[54]

As the Cold War progressed, the military intelligence provided by the German section of theUS Army Historical Divisionbecame increasingly important to the Americans.[55]Halder oversaw the German section of the research program which became known as the "Halder Group".[56]His group produced over 2,500 major historical manuscripts from over 700 distinct German authors detailing World War II.[51]Halder used the group to reinvent war-time history using truth, half-truth, distortion and lies.[52]He set up a "control group" of trusted former Nazi officers who vetted all the manuscripts and, if necessary, required authors to change their content.[57]Halder's deputy in the group wasAdolf Heusingerwho was also working for theGehlen Organization,the United States military intelligence organisation in Germany.[58]Halder expected to be addressed as "General" by the writing teams and behaved as their commanding officer while dealing with their manuscripts.[59]His aim was to exonerate German army personnel from the atrocities they had committed.[60]

Halder laid down a version of history that all the writers had to abide by. This version stated that the army was the victim of Hitler, and they had opposed him at every opportunity. The writers had to emphasise the "decent" form of war conducted by the army and blame the SS for the criminal operations.[59]He enjoyed a privileged position, as the few historians working on World War II history in the 1950s had to obtain historical information from Halder and his group. His influence extended to newspaper editors and authors.[61]Halder's instructions were sent down the chain of command and were recorded by former field marshalGeorg von Küchler.They said: "It is German deeds, seen from the German standpoint, that are to be recorded; this will constitute a memorial to our troops", "no criticism of measures ordered by the leadership" is allowed and no one is to be "incriminated in any way," instead the achievements of theWehrmachtwere to be emphasised.[62]The military historianBernd Wegner,examining Halder's work, wrote: "The writing of German history on the Second World War, and in particular on the Russian front, was for over two decades, and in part up to the present day—and to a far greater extent than most people realize—the work of the defeated."[63]Wolfram Wettewrote, "In the work of the Historical Division the traces of the war of annihilation for which the Wehrmacht leadership was responsible were covered up".[61]

Halder sought to distance himself and the German army from Hitler, Nazism and war crimes. He claimed to have been against the Russian campaign and that he had warned Hitler against his "adventure" in the East.[64]He omitted any mention of the Barbarossa Decree that he had helped formulate or the Commissar Order which he had supported and disseminated.[64]Halder also claimed implausibly that the invasion of the Soviet Union was a defensive measure.[65]

The Americans were aware the manuscripts contained numerousapologia.However, they also contained intelligence that the Americans viewed as important in the event of a war between the US and the Soviet Union.[60]Halder had coached former Nazi officers on how to make incriminating evidence disappear.[66]Many of the officers he coached such asHeinz Guderianwent on to write best-selling biographies that broadened the appeal of the apologia.[57]Halder succeeded in his aim of rehabilitating the German officer corps, first with the US military, then widening circles of politics and finally millions of Americans.[67]

In 1949 Halder wroteHitler als Feldherrwhich was translated into English asHitler as Commanderand published in 1950. The work contains the central ideas behind the myth of the cleanWehrmachtthat were subsequently reproduced in countless histories and memoirs. The book describes an idealised commander who is then compared to Hitler. The commander is noble, wise, against the war in the East and free of any guilt. Hitler alone is responsible for the evil committed; his complete immorality is contrasted with the moral behaviour of the commander who has done no wrong.[68]

Halder's myth-making was not concentrated solely on absolving himself and the German army from war crimes; he also created two strategic and operational myths. The first is that Hitler alone was responsible for the military blunders during the invasion of the Soviet Union. The second myth is that the blitzkrieg campaign he so strongly advocated would have resulted in the capture of Moscow and won the war for Germany.[69]The historiansRonald SmelserandEdward J. Davieswriting inThe Myth of the Eastern Frontsaid "Franz Halder embodies better than any other high German officer the dramatic difference between myth and reality as it emerged after World War II".[49]

Retirement

Halder's work with the Historical Commission drew to a close at the end of the 1950s, and he received praise fromThe Pentagon.Rear Admiral Walter Ansel who had worked with Halder while researchingOperation Sealion,the planned Invasion of England, recommended he become an associate of theUnited States Naval Institute.In 1961 he was awarded theMeritorious Civilian Service Awardfor this work. This award was bestowed by Major General Edgar C. Doleman on behalf of PresidentJohn F. Kennedy.Halder thus became the only German to be decorated by both Adolf Hitler and an American president.[70](He had received theKnight's Cross of the Iron Crossfrom Hitler in 1939.[71])

During the 1960s, Halder became akin to a "historical icon", fielding questions from historians and general public alike.[72]Halder died in 1972 inAschau im Chiemgau,Bavaria.

Awards

Notes

  1. ^Many Polish troops and armed civilians were certain to wind up behind the German front lines...The Germans' approach to solving this problem, to which the idea of total war lent a kind of intellectual justification, was to counter any resistance with the utmost brutality, in the belief that they could cow the population into passivity and even, perhaps, collaboration. In line with that approach, on July 24, 1939, General Wagner, now the army's quartermaster general, issued a set of special regulations that authorized German troops to take and execute hostages in the event of attacks by snipers or irregulars. In some regions German forces were also to detain all Polish males – Jewish and gentile – between the ages of seventeen and forty-five as prisoners of war, whether found armed or not. And because front-line combat troops were in high demand, the army's leaders quickly decided to use SS and police units to augment their own forces for security tasks. Halder informed his subordinates on the general staff of such plans as early as April 1939, and the SS began putting together its preparations in early May.[4]

References

  1. ^Barnett 2003,p. 126.
  2. ^abcdLeMo 2019.
  3. ^abMüller 2015,p. 96.
  4. ^abMegargee 2006,p. 13.
  5. ^Rossino 2003,pp. 22, 116, 176.
  6. ^abSmelser & Davies 2008,p. 58.
  7. ^Wheeler-Bennett 1967,p. 471.
  8. ^Wheeler-Bennett 1967,pp. 470–472.
  9. ^Wheeler-Bennett 1967,pp. 471–472.
  10. ^abWheeler-Bennett 1967,p. 474.
  11. ^Smelser & Davies 2008,p. 62.
  12. ^Bellamy 2007,p. 27.
  13. ^abStahel 2009,p. 101.
  14. ^Smelser & Davies 2008,pp. 60–61.
  15. ^Smelser & Davies 2008,p. 60.
  16. ^abcStahel 2015,p. 25.
  17. ^Stahel 2015,p. 28.
  18. ^Stahel 2015,pp. 25–26.
  19. ^abStahel 2009,p. 102.
  20. ^Stahel 2009,p. 196.
  21. ^Stahel 2009,p. 197.
  22. ^Stahel 2009,p. 387.
  23. ^abStahel 2009,p. 388.
  24. ^Stahel 2009,p. 396.
  25. ^abStahel 2015,p. 17.
  26. ^Stahel 2015,p. 21.
  27. ^abStahel 2015,p. 117.
  28. ^abcStahel 2015,p. 24.
  29. ^Stahel 2015,p. 308.
  30. ^Stahel 2015,p. 309.
  31. ^Wheeler-Bennett 1967,p. 525.
  32. ^Stahel 2009,p. 446.
  33. ^Fugate 1984,p. 315.
  34. ^Stahel 2009,p. 448.
  35. ^Stahel 2015,p. 20.
  36. ^Citino 2007,p. 9.
  37. ^Citino 2007,pp. 9–11, 86.
  38. ^Citino 2007,pp. 156–157.
  39. ^Citino 2007,p. 172.
  40. ^Citino 2007,p. 173.
  41. ^Citino 2007,pp. 176, 180.
  42. ^Citino 2007,p. 238.
  43. ^Stahel 2013,p. 306.
  44. ^Smelser & Davies 2008,pp. 62–63.
  45. ^Hartmann 1991.
  46. ^Wette 2006,p. 94.
  47. ^Wette 2006,p. 103.
  48. ^Wette 2006,pp. 95–96.
  49. ^abSmelser & Davies 2008,p. 63.
  50. ^abSmelser & Davies 2008,p. 64–65.
  51. ^abSmelser & Davies 2008,p. 65.
  52. ^abSmelser & Davies 2008,p. 56.
  53. ^abHebert 2010,p. 99–101.
  54. ^abWette 2006,pp. 206–207.
  55. ^Smelser & Davies 2008,p. 64.
  56. ^Smelser & Davies 2008,p. 56,65.
  57. ^abSmelser & Davies 2008,p. 67.
  58. ^Wette 2006,p. 230.
  59. ^abWette 2006,p. 231.
  60. ^abSmelser & Davies 2008,p. 66.
  61. ^abWette 2006,p. 232.
  62. ^Wette 2006,pp. 232–233.
  63. ^Wette 2006,p. 229.
  64. ^abSmelser & Davies 2008,p. 57.
  65. ^Smelser & Davies 2008,p. 59.
  66. ^Smelser & Davies 2008,p. 66–67.
  67. ^Smelser & Davies 2008,p. 71.
  68. ^Smelser & Davies 2008,pp. 56–57.
  69. ^Fugate 1984,pp. 310–312.
  70. ^Smelser & Davies 2008,pp. 72–73.
  71. ^abScherzer 2007,p. 362.
  72. ^Smelser & Davies 2008,p. 73.
  73. ^Smelser & Davies 2008,p. 72.

Bibliography

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