HMSHood

This article is about the Admiral-class battlecruiser. For other ships of the same name, seeList of ships called HMSHood.

Hood,17 March 1924
History
United Kingdom
Name	Hood
Namesake	AdmiralSamuel Hood
Ordered	7 April 1916
Builder	John Brown & Company
Cost	£6,025,000
Yard number	460
Laid down	1 September 1916
Launched	22 August 1918
Commissioned	15 May 1920
In service	1920–1941
Identification	Pennant number:51
Motto	Ventis Secundis(Latin:"With Favourable Winds" )
Nickname(s)	The Mighty Hood
Fate	Sunk during theBattle of the Denmark Strait,24 May 1941
Badge	ACornish choughbearing an anchor facing left over the date 1859
General characteristics
Class and type	Admiral-classbattlecruiser
Displacement	46,680long tons(47,430t) (deep load)
Length	860 ft 7 in (262.3 m)
Beam	104 ft 2 in (31.8 m)
Draught	32 ft (9.8 m)
Installed power	24Yarrow boilers 144,000shp(107,000kW)
Propulsion	4 shafts; 4 gearedsteam turbines
Speed	32knots(59 km/h; 37 mph)
Range	5,332nautical miles(9,875 km; 6,136 mi) at 20 knots (37 km/h; 23 mph) (1931)
Complement	1,433 (1919)
Armament	As built: 4 × twin15 in (381 mm) guns 12 × single5.5 in (140 mm) guns 4 × single4 in (102 mm)AA guns 6 ×21 in (533 mm) torpedotubes 1941, as sunk: 4 × twin 15 in guns 7 × twin4 inAA guns 3 × octuple2 pdr (40 mm)AA guns 4 × quadruple0.5 in (12.7 mm) MGs 5 × 20-barrel "Unrotated Projectile"mounts 4 × 21 intorpedo tubes
Armour	Belt:6–12 in (152–305 mm) Decks:0.75–3 in (19–76 mm) Barbettes:5–12 in (127–305 mm) Turrets:11–15 in (279–381 mm)

HMSHood(pennant number51) was abattlecruiserof theRoyal Navy(RN).Hoodwas the first of the planned fourAdmiral-classbattlecruisers to be built during theFirst World War.Already under construction when theBattle of Jutlandoccurred in mid-1916, that battle revealed serious flaws in her design, and despite drastic revisions she was completed four years later. For this reason, she was the only ship of her class to be completed, as theAdmiraltydecided it would be better to start with a clean design on succeeding battlecruisers, leading to the never-builtG-3 class.Despite the appearance of newer and more modern ships,Hoodremained the largest warship in the world for 20 years after her commissioning, and her prestige was reflected in her nickname, "The Mighty Hood".

Hoodwas involved in manyshowing-the-flagexercises between hercommissioningin 1920 and theoutbreak of war in 1939,including training exercises in theMediterranean Seaand a circumnavigation of the globe with theSpecial Service Squadronin 1923 and 1924. She was attached to theMediterranean Fleetfollowing the outbreak of theSecond Italo-Ethiopian Warin 1935. When theSpanish Civil Warbroke out the following year,Hoodwas officially assigned to the Mediterranean Fleet until she had to return to Britain in 1939 for an overhaul. By this time, advances in naval gunnery had reducedHood's usefulness. She was scheduled to undergo a major rebuild in 1941 to correct these issues, but the outbreak of theSecond World Warin September 1939 kept the ship in service without the upgrades.

When war withGermanywas declared,Hoodwas operating in the area aroundIceland,and she spent the next several months hunting for Germancommerce raidersandblockade runnersbetween Iceland and theNorwegian Sea.After a brief overhaul of her propulsion system, she sailed as theflagshipofForce H,and participated in thedestruction of the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir.Transferred to theHome Fleetshortly afterwards,Hoodwas dispatched toScapa Flow,and operated in the area as a convoy escort and later as a defence against apotential German invasionfleet.

In May 1941,Hoodand thebattleshipPrince of Waleswere ordered to intercept theGerman battleshipBismarckand theheavy cruiserPrinz Eugen,which were en route to the Atlantic, where they were to attack convoys. On 24 May 1941, early in theBattle of the Denmark Strait,Hoodwas struck by several German shells, exploded, and sank with the loss of all but 3 of her crew of 1,418. Due to her publicly perceived invincibility, the loss affected British morale.

The RN conducted two inquiries into the reasons for the ship's quick demise. The first, held soon after the ship's loss, concluded thatHood's aftmagazinehad exploded after one ofBismarck's shells penetrated the ship's armour. A second inquiry was held after complaints that the first board had failed to consider alternative explanations, such as an explosion of the ship'storpedoes.It was more thorough than the first board but concurred with the first board's conclusion. Despite the official explanation, some historians continued to believe that the torpedoes caused the ship's loss, while others proposed an accidental explosion inside one of the ship'sgun turretsthat reached down into the magazine. Other historians have concentrated on the cause of the magazine explosion. The discovery of the ship's wreck in 2001 confirmed the conclusion of both boards, although the exact reason the magazines detonated is likely to remain unknown, since that portion of the ship was obliterated in the explosion.

Design and description

Main article:Admiral-class battlecruiser

Profile drawing ofHoodas she was in 1921, in Atlantic Fleet dark grey

The Admiral-class battlecruisers were designed in response to the GermanMackensen-classbattlecruisers, which were reported to be more heavily armed and armoured than the latest British battlecruisers of theRenownand theCourageousclasses.The design was revised after the Battle of Jutland to incorporate heavier armour and all four ships werelaid down.OnlyHoodwas completed, because the ships were very expensive and required labour and material that could be put to better use building merchant ships needed to replace those lost to theGerman U-boat campaign.

The Admirals were significantly larger than their predecessors of theRenownclass. As completed,Hoodhad anoverall lengthof 860 feet 7 inches (262.3 m), a maximumbeamof 104 feet 2 inches (31.8 m), and adraughtof 32 feet (9.8 m) atdeep load.This was 66 feet (20.1 m) longer and 14 feet (4.3 m) wider than the older ships. Shedisplaced42,670long tons(43,350t) at load and 46,680 long tons (47,430 t) at deep load, over 13,000 long tons (13,210 t) more than the older ships. The ship had ametacentric heightof 4.2 feet (1.3 m) at deep load, which minimised herrolland made her a steady gun platform.

The additional armour added during construction increased her draught by about 4 feet (1.2 m) at deep load, which reduced herfreeboardand made her very wet. At full speed, or in heavy seas, water would flow over the ship'squarterdeckand often entered themessdecksand living quarters through ventilation shafts.This characteristic earned her the nickname of "the largest submarine in the Navy".The persistent dampness, coupled with the ship's poor ventilation, was blamed for the high incidence oftuberculosisaboard.The ship's complement varied widely over her career; in 1919, she was authorised 1,433 men as a squadron flagship; in 1934, she had 81 officers and 1,244ratingsaboard.

The Admirals were powered by fourBrown-Curtis gearedsteam turbines,each driving onepropeller shaftusing steam provided by 24Yarrow boilers.The battlecruiser's turbines were designed to produce 144,000shaft horsepower(107,000kW), which would propel the ship at 31knots(57 km/h; 36 mph), but duringsea trialsin 1920,Hood's turbines provided 151,280 shp (112,810 kW), which allowed her to reach 32.07 knots (59.39 km/h; 36.91 mph).She carried enoughfuel oilto give her an estimated range of 7,500nautical miles(13,900 km; 8,600 mi) at 14 knots (26 km/h; 16 mph).

Armament

Themain batteryof the Admiral-class ships consisted of eightBL15-inch (381 mm) Mk I gunsin hydraulically powered twingun turrets.The turrets were designated 'A', 'B', 'X', and 'Y' from bow to stern,and 120 shells were carried for each gun.The ship'ssecondary armamentconsisted of twelveBL 5.5-inch (140 mm) Mk Iguns, each with 200 rounds.They were shipped onshieldedsingle-pivot mountsfitted along the upper deck and the forward shelter deck. This high position allowed them to be worked during heavy weather, as they were less affected by waves and spray compared with thecasematemounts of earlier Britishcapital ships.Two of these guns on the shelter deck were temporarily replaced byQF 4-inch (102 mm) Mk Vanti-aircraft (AA) gunsbetween 1938 and 1939. All the 5.5-inch guns were removed during another refit in 1940.

A close-up ofHood's aft 15-inch guns in 1926, rotated to the extreme arc of their travel, covering the port bow quarter; firing in this position could cause blast damage to the deck and superstructure

The ship's original anti-aircraft armament consisted of four QF 4-inch Mk V guns on single mounts. These were joined in early 1939 by four twin mounts for theQF 4-inch Mark XVIdual-purpose gun.The single guns were removed in mid-1939 and a further three twin Mark XIX mounts were added in early 1940.In 1931, a pair of octuple mountings for the 40-millimetre (1.6 in)QF 2-pounder Mk VIII gun"pom-pom" were added on the shelter deck, abreast of thefunnels,and a third mount was added in 1937. Two quadruple mountings for theVickers 0.5-inch (12.7 mm) Mk IIImachine gun were added in 1933 with two more mountings added in 1937. To these were added fiveunrotated projectile(UP) launchers in 1940, each launcher carrying 20 seven-inch (178 mm) rockets.When they detonated, the rockets shot out lengths of cable that were kept aloft byparachutes;the cable was intended to snag aircraft and draw up the small aerial mine that would destroy the aircraft.

The Admirals were fitted with six fixed 21-inch (533 mm)torpedo tubes,three on eachbroadside.Two of these were submerged forward of 'A' turret'smagazineand the other four were above water,abaftthe rear funnel.About 28 torpedoes were carried.

Fire control

The ship's main battery was controlled by twofire-control directors.One was mounted above theconning tower,protected by an armoured hood, and was fitted with a 30-foot (9.1 m)rangefinder.The other was fitted in thespotting topabove the tripodforemastand equipped with a 15-foot (4.6 m) rangefinder. Each turret was also fitted with a 30-foot (9.1 m) rangefinder. The secondary armament was primarily controlled by directors mounted on each side of thebridge.They were supplemented by two additional control positions in the fore-top, which were provided with 9-foot (2.7 m) rangefinders, fitted in 1924–1925.The antiaircraft guns were controlled by a simple high-angle 2-metre (6 ft 7 in) rangefinder mounted on the aft control position,fitted in 1926–1927. Three torpedo-control towers were fitted, each with a 15-foot (4.6 m) rangefinder. One was on each side of the amidships control tower and the third was on thecentrelineabaft the aft control position.

An aerial view ofHoodin 1924: The two forward gun turrets are visible with their prominent rangefinders projecting from the rear of the turret. Behind the turret is the conning tower surmounted by the main fire-control director with its own rangefinder. The secondary director is mounted on the roof of the spotting top on the tripod foremast.

During the 1929–1931 refit, ahigh-angle control system(HACS) Mark I director was added on the rear searchlight platform and two positions for 2-pounder "pom-pom" antiaircraft directors were added at the rear of the spotting top, although only one director was initially fitted.The 5.5-inch control positions and their rangefinders on the spotting top were removed during the 1932 refit. In 1934, the "pom-pom" directors were moved to the former locations of the 5.5-inch control positions on the spotting top and the 9-foot (2.7 m) rangefinders for the 5.5-inch control positions were reinstalled on the signal platform. Two years later, the "pom-pom" directors were moved to the rear corners of the bridge to get them out of the funnel gases. Another "pom-pom" director was added on the rear superstructure, abaft the HACS director in 1938. Two HACS Mark III directors were added to the aft end of the signal platform the following year, and the Mark I director aft was replaced by a Mark III.

DuringHood's last refit in 1941, aType 279early-warning radarfor aircraft and surface vessels and aType 284gunnery radar were installed,although the Type 279 radar lacked its receiving aerial and was inoperable according to Roberts.An Admiralty document indicates however that, following the 1941 refit at Rosyth,Hood's Type 279 radar was indeed functional.The early-warning radar was of a modified type, known as Type 279M, the difference between this and Type 279 being the number of aerials. While Type 279 used two aerials, a transmitter and a receiver, the Type 279M used only a single transceiver aerial.Hoodreported an accuracy of 3 degrees with her 279M set.

Protection

The armour scheme of the Admirals was originally based on that of the battlecruiserTigerwith an 8-inch (203 mm)waterline belt.UnlikeTiger,the armour was angled outwards 12° from the waterline to increase its relative thickness in relation to flat-trajectory shells. This change increased the ship's vulnerability toplunging(high-trajectory) shells, as it exposed more of the vulnerable deck armour. Some 5,000 long tons (5,100 t) of armour were added to the design in late 1916, based on British experiences at theBattle of Jutland,at the cost of deeper draught and slightly decreased speed. To save construction time, this was accomplished by thickening the existing armour, rather than redesigning the entire ship.Hood's protection accounted for 33% of her displacement, a high proportion by British standards, but less than was usual in contemporary German designs (for example, 36% for the battlecruiserSMSHindenburg).

The armoured belt consisted of face-hardenedKrupp cemented armour(KC), arranged in threestrakes.The main waterline belt was 12 inches (305 mm) thick between 'A' and 'Y'barbettesand thinned to 5 to 6 inches (127 to 152 mm) towards the ship's ends, but did not reach either the bow or the stern. The middle armour belt had a maximum thickness of 7 inches over the same length as the thickest part of the waterline armour and thinned to five inches abreast 'A' barbette. The upper belt was 5 inches thick amidships and extended forward to 'A' barbette, with a short 4-inch extension aft.

The gun turrets and barbettes were protected by 11 to 15 inches (279 to 381 mm) of KC armour, except for the turret roofs, which were 5 inches thick. The decks were made ofhigh-tensile steel.Theforecastledeck ranged from 1.75 to 2 inches (44 to 51 millimetres) in thickness, while the upper deck was 2 inches (51 mm) thick over the magazines and 0.75 inches (19 mm) elsewhere. The main deck was 3 inches (76 mm) thick over the magazines and 1 inch (25 mm) elsewhere, except for the 2-inch-thick slope that met the bottom of the main belt. The lower deck was 3 inches thick over the propeller shafts, 2 inches thick over the magazines and 1 inch elsewhere.

Live-firing trials with the new 15-inch APC (armour-piercing, capped) shell against a mock-up ofHoodshowed that this shell could penetrate the ship's vitals via the 7-inch middle belt and the 2-inch slope of the main deck as a result 3-inch plating on the main deck over the slopes was added alongside the magazine spaces at a very late stage of construction and the four aftermost 5.5-inch guns and their ammunition hoists were removed in partial compensation.. A proposal was made to increase the armour over the forward magazines to 5 inches and 6 inches over the rear magazines in July 1919 in response to these trials. To compensate for the additional weight, the 4 midships above water torpedo tubes and the armour for the rear torpedo warheads were removed, and the armour for the aft torpedo-control tower was reduced in thickness from 6 to 1.5 inches (38 mm). However, the additional armour was never fitted pending further trials.As completed,Hoodremained susceptible to plunging shells and bombs.The torpedo-warhead armour was reinstated during the ship's 1929–1931 refit.

For protection against torpedoes, she was given a 7.5-foot (2.3 m)deeptorpedo bulgethat ran the length of the ship between the fore and aft barbettes. It was divided into an empty outer compartment and an inner compartment filled with five rows of water-tight "crushing tubes" intended to absorb and distribute the force of an explosion. The bulge was backed by a 1.5-inch-thicktorpedo bulkhead.

Aircraft

Hoodafter she was fitted with an aircraft catapult; a Fairey III is visible on her stern, 1932

Hoodwas initially fitted withflying-off platformsmounted on top of 'B' and 'X' turrets, from whichFairey Flycatcherscould launch.During her 1929–1931 refit, the platform was removed from 'X' turret and a rotating, foldingcatapultwas installed on her quarterdeck, along with acraneto recover aseaplane.She embarked aFairey IIIF from No. 444 Flight of theRoyal Air Force(RAF). During the 1932West Indiescruise, the catapult proved to be difficult to operate in anything but a calm sea, as it was frequently awash in bad weather. The catapult and crane were removed in 1932, along with the flying-off platform on 'B' turret.

Battlecruiser or fast battleship

Although the Royal Navy always designatedHoodas a battlecruiser, some modern writers such asAntony Prestonhave classified her as afast battleship,sinceHoodappeared to have improvements over the fastQueen Elizabeth-classbattleships. On paper,Hoodretained the same armament and level of protection, while being significantly faster.

Hoodon her speed trials, 1920s

Around 1918, American commanders, including Vice AdmiralWilliam Sims,commander of US naval forces in Europe, and AdmiralHenry T. Mayo,commander of theAtlantic Fleet,became extremely impressed byHood,which they described as a "fast battleship", and they advocated that the US Navy develop a fast battleship of its own.However, the US continued with their established design direction, the slower, but well-protected,South Dakota-classbattleship and the fast and lightly armouredLe xing ton-classbattlecruiser, both of which were later cancelled in accordance with the terms of theWashington Naval Treatyof 1922.

Influences fromHoodshowed on subsequentLe xing tondesigns, with the reduction of the main armour belt, the change tosloped armour,and the addition of four above-water torpedo tubes to the four underwater tubes of the original design.To add to the confusion, Royal Navy documents of the period often describe any battleship with a maximum speed over 24 knots (44 km/h; 28 mph) as a battlecruiser, regardless of the amount of protective armour. For instance, the never-builtG3 battlecruiserwas classified as such, although it would have been more of a fast battleship thanHood.

The scale ofHood's protection, though adequate for the Jutland era, was at best marginal against the new generation of 16-inch (406 mm) gunned capital ships that emerged soon after her completion in 1920, typified by the AmericanColorado-classand the JapaneseNagato-classbattleships. The Royal Navy were fully aware that the ship's protection flaws still remained, even in her revised design, soHoodwas intended for the duties of a battlecruiser, and she served in the battlecruiser squadrons through most of her career. Late in her career,Hoodwas outclassed by the armour and protective arrangement of Second World War-era fast battleships, but few of the RN's available "big gun" vessels could matchBismarck's speed.

Construction

A John Brown & Company advertisement inBrassey's Naval AnnualfeaturingHood,1923

Construction ofHoodbegan at the John Brown shipyard inClydebank,Scotland, asyard number460 on 1 September 1916.Following the loss of three British battlecruisers at the Battle of Jutland, 5,000 tons of extra armour and bracing were added toHood's design.Most seriously, the deck protection was flawed—spread over three decks, it was designed to detonate an incoming shell on impact with the top deck, with much of the energy being absorbed as the exploding shell had to penetrate the armour of the next two decks. The development of effective time-delay shells at the end of theFirst World Warmade this scheme much less effective, as the intact shell would penetrate layers of weak armour and explode deep inside the ship.In addition, she was grossly overweight compared to her original design, making her a wet ship with a highly stressed structure.

She waslaunchedon 22 August 1918 by the widow ofRear-AdmiralSir Horace Hood,a great-great-grandson ofAdmiral Samuel Hood,after whom the ship was named. Sir Horace Hood had been killed while commanding the3rd Battlecruiser Squadronand flying his flag onInvincible—one of the three battlecruisers which blew up at the Battle of Jutland. To make room in the shipyard for merchant construction,Hoodsailed forRosythto complete herfitting-outon 9 January 1920.After her sea trials, she was commissioned on 15 May 1920, underCaptainWilfred Tompkinson. She had cost£6,025,000 to build.

With her conspicuous twin funnels and lean profile,Hoodwas widely regarded as one of the finest-looking warships ever built. She was also the largest warship afloat when she was commissioned, and retained that distinction for the next 20 years.Her size and powerful armament earned her the nickname of "Mighty Hood" and she came to symbolise the might of the British Empire itself.

Interwar service

Hoodin the Panama Canal Zone during her world cruise with the Special Service Squadron, July 1924

Shortly after commissioning on 15 May 1920,Hoodbecame the flagship of theBattlecruiser Squadronof the Atlantic Fleet, under the command of Rear-AdmiralSir Roger Keyes.After a cruise to Scandinavian waters that year, Captain Geoffrey Mackworth assumed command.Hoodvisited theMediterraneanin 1921 and 1922 to show the flag and to train with the Mediterranean fleet, before sailing on a cruise to Brazil and the West Indies in company with the battlecruiser squadron.

CaptainJohn Im Thurnwas in command whenHood,accompanied by the battlecruiserRepulseandDanae-classcruisers of the1st Light Cruiser Squadron,set outon a world cruisefrom west to east via thePanama Canalin November 1923. The objective of the cruise was to remind thedominionsof their dependence on British sea power and encourage them to support it with money, ships, and facilities. They returned home 10 months later in September 1924, having visitedSouth Africa,India,Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and some smaller colonies and dependencies, and the United States.

Hood(foreground) andRepulse(background) at anchor in Southern Australia during their world tour, 1924

While in Australia in April 1924, the squadron escorted the battlecruiserHMASAustraliaout to sea, where she wasscuttledin compliance with the Washington Naval Treaty.The battlecruiser squadron visitedLisbonin January 1925 to participate in theVasco da Gamacelebrations before continuing on to the Mediterranean for exercises.Hoodcontinued this pattern of a winter training visit to the Mediterranean for the rest of the decade. Captain Harold Reinold relieved Captain im Thurn on 30 April 1925 and was relieved in turn by CaptainWilfred Frenchon 21 May 1927.

Hoodwas given a major refit from 1 May 1929 to 10 March 1931, and afterwards resumed her role as flagship of the battlecruiser squadron under the command of CaptainJulian Patterson.Later that year, her crew participated in theInvergordon Mutinyover pay cuts for the sailors. It ended peacefully andHoodreturned to her home port afterwards. The battlecruiser squadron made a Caribbean cruise in early 1932, andHoodwas given another brief refit between 31 March and 10 May atPortsmouth.Captain Thomas Binney assumed command on 15 August 1932 and the ship resumed her previous practice of a winter cruise in the Mediterranean the next year. Captain Thomas Tower replaced Captain Binney on 30 August 1933. Her secondary and antiaircraft fire-control directors were rearranged during another quick refit between 1 August and 5 September 1934.

While en route toGibraltarfor a Mediterranean cruise,Hoodwas rammed in the port side quarterdeck by the battlecruiserRenownon 23 January 1935. The damage toHoodwas limited to her left outer propeller and an 18-inch (460 mm) dent, although some hull plates were knocked loose from the impact. Temporary repairs were made at Gibraltar before the ship sailed to Portsmouth for permanent repairs between February and May 1935. The captains of both ships werecourt-martialled,as was the squadron commander, Rear-Admiral Sidney Bailey. Tower and Bailey were acquitted, butRenown's Captain Sawbridge was relieved of command. The Admiralty dissented from the verdict, reinstated Sawbridge, and criticised Bailey for ambiguous signals during the manoeuvre.

The German "Panzerschiff"(armored ship)Admiral Graf Spee(foreground) with HMSHood(left) and the battleshipHMSResolution(centre) during King George VI's Coronation Fleet Review at Spithead, May 1937

The ship participated inKing George V's Silver JubileeFleet ReviewatSpitheadthe following August. She was attached to the Mediterranean fleet shortly afterwards and stationed at Gibraltar at the outbreak of theSecond Italo-Abyssinian Warin October. CaptainArthur Pridhamassumed command on 1 February 1936 andHoodreturned to Portsmouth for a brief refit between 26 June and 10 October 1936. She formally transferred to the Mediterranean fleet on 20 October, shortly after the beginning of theSpanish Civil War.On 23 April 1937, the ship escorted three British merchantmen intoBilbaoharbour despite the presence of theNationalistcruiserAlmirante Cerverathat attempted to blockade the port.Hoodwas refitted at Malta in November and December 1937, and had her submerged torpedo tubes removed.Captain Pridham was relieved by Captain Harold Walker on 20 May 1938 and he, in turn, was relieved when the ship returned to Portsmouth in January 1939 for an overhaul that lasted until 12 August.

Hoodwas due to be modernised in 1941 to bring her up to a standard similar to that of other modernised First World War-era capital ships. She would have received new, lighter turbines and boilers, a secondary armament of eight twin5.25-inch (133 mm) gun turrets,and six octuple 2-pounder "pom-poms". Her 5-inch upper-armour strake would have been removed and her deck armour reinforced. A catapult would have been fitted across the deck and the remaining torpedo tubes removed. In addition, the conning tower would have been removed and her bridge rebuilt.The ship's near-constant active service, resulting from her status as the Royal Navy's most battle-worthy fast capital ship, meant that her material condition gradually deteriorated, and by the mid-1930s, she was in need of a lengthy overhaul. The outbreak of the Second World War made removing her from service near impossible, and as a consequence, she never received the scheduled modernisation afforded to other capital ships such asRenownand several of theQueen Elizabeth-class battleships.The ship'scondenserswere in such bad condition by this time that much of the output from the fresh-waterevaporatorswas required to replenish theboiler feedwaterand could not be used by the crew to wash and bathe or even to heat the mess decks during cold weather, as the steam pipes were too leaky. These problems also reduced her steam output so that she was unable to attain her designed speed.

Second World War

CaptainIrvine Glennieassumed command in May 1939 andHoodwas assigned to the Home Fleet's Battlecruiser Squadron while still refitting. When war broke out later that year, she was employed principally to patrol in the vicinity ofIcelandand theFaroe Islandsto protect convoys and intercept Germanmerchant raidersandblockade runnersattempting to break out into the Atlantic. On 25 September 1939, the Home Fleet sortied into the centralNorth Seato cover the return of the damaged submarineSpearfish.The fleet was spotted by the Germans and attacked by aircraft from theKG 26andKG 30bomber wings.Hoodwas hit by a 250 kg (550 lb) bomb from aJunkers Ju 88bomberthat damaged her port torpedo bulge and her condensers. By early 1940,Hood's machinery was in dire shape and limited her best speed to 26.5 knots (49.1 km/h; 30.5 mph); she was refitted between 4 April and 12 June.

Operation Catapult

French battleshipBretagneon fire while being shelled byHoodand the battleshipsValiantandResolution,3 July 1940

Hoodand the aircraft carrierArk Royalwere ordered to Gibraltar to joinForce Hon 18 June whereHoodbecame the flagship. Force H took part in thedestruction of the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébirin July 1940. Just eight days after the French surrender, the British Admiralty issued an ultimatum that the French fleet atOranintern its ships in a British or neutral port to ensure they would not fall intoAxishands. The terms were rejected, and the Royal Navy opened fire on the French ships berthed there. The results ofHood's fire are not known exactly, but she damaged theFrench battleshipDunkerque,which was hit by four fifteen-inch shells and was forced to beach herself.Hoodwasstraddledduring the engagement byDunkerque;shell splinters wounded two men.Dunkerque'ssister ship,Strasbourg,managed to escape from the harbour.Hoodand several light cruisers gave chase, but gave up after two hours;Hoodhad dodged a salvo of torpedoes from a Frenchsloopand had damaged a turbine reaching 28 knots (52 km/h; 32 mph).

Return to home waters

Hoodwas relieved as flagship of Force H byRenownon 10 August, after returning to Scapa Flow. On 13 September she was sent to Rosyth along with the battleshipsNelsonandRodneyand other ships, to be in a better position to intercept a German invasion fleet. When the threat of an invasion diminished, the ship resumed her previous roles in convoy escort and patrolling against German commerce raiders.Hood,RenownandRepulsewere deployed to theBay of Biscayon 5 November to prevent the heavy cruiserAdmiral Scheerfrom using French ports after she had attackedConvoy HX 84,but the German ship continued into the South Atlantic.

In January 1941, the ship began a refit that lasted until March; even after the refit she was still in poor condition, but the threat from the German capital ships was such that she could not be taken into dock for a major overhaul until more of theKing George V-classbattleships came into service. CaptainRalph Kerrassumed command during the refit, andHoodwas ordered to sea in an attempt to intercept the German battleshipsGneisenauandScharnhorstupon the refit's completion in mid-March. Unsuccessful, she was ordered to patrol the Bay of Biscay against any breakout attempt by the German ships fromBrest, France.Hoodwas ordered to theNorwegian Seaon 19 April when the Admiralty received a false report that theGerman battleshipBismarckhad sailed from Germany. Afterwards, she patrolled the North Atlantic before putting into Scapa Flow on 6 May.

Battle of the Denmark Strait

Main article:Battle of the Denmark Strait

The last photograph ofHood,seen fromPrince of Wales

WhenBismarcksailed for the Atlantic in May 1941,Hood,flying the flag ofVice-AdmiralLancelot Holland,together with the newly commissioned battleshipPrince of Wales,was sent out in pursuit along with several other groups of British capital ships to intercept the German ships before they could break into the Atlantic and attack Allied convoys. The German ships were spotted by two British heavy cruisers (NorfolkandSuffolk) on 23 May, and Holland's ships interceptedBismarckand her consort, the heavy cruiserPrinz Eugen,in theDenmark StraitbetweenGreenlandand Iceland on 24 May.

The British squadron spotted the Germans at 05:37 (ship's clocks were set four hours ahead of local time—the engagement commenced shortly after dawn),but the Germans were already aware of their presence,Prinz Eugen'shydrophoneshaving previously detected the sounds of high-speed propellers to their southeast. The British opened fire at 05:52 withHoodengagingPrinz Eugen,the lead ship in the German formation, and the Germans returned fire at 05:55, both ships concentrating onHood.Prinz Eugenwas probably the first ship to score when a shell hitHood's boat deck, between her funnels, and started a large fire among the ready-use ammunition for the anti-aircraft guns and rockets of the UP mounts.

Painting by J.C. Schmitz-Westerholt, depictingHoodsinking stern first;Prince of Walesis in the foreground

Just before 06:00, whileHoodwas turning 20° to port to unmask her rear turrets, she was hit again on the boat deck by one or more shells fromBismarck's fifth salvo, fired from a range of approximately 16,650 metres (18,210 yd).A shell from this salvo appears to have hit the spotting top, as the boat deck was showered with body parts and debris.A huge jet of flame burst out ofHoodfrom the vicinity of the mainmast,followed by a devastating magazine explosion that destroyed the aft part of the ship. This explosion broke the back ofHood,and the last sight of the ship, which sank in only three minutes, was her bow, nearly vertical in the water.A note on a survivor's sketch in the possession of the BritishNaval Historical Branchgives63°20′N31°50′Was the position of the sinking.An apparently precise location of the wreck is given in the documentary "How the Bismarck Sank HMS Hood" as63°24.247′N32°03.870′W.Hoodsank stern first with 1,418 men aboard. Only three survived:OrdinarySignalmanTed Briggs(1923–2008),Able SeamanRobert Tilburn (1921–1995), andMidshipmanWilliam John Dundas (1923–1965).The three were rescued about two hours after the sinking by thedestroyerElectra,which spotted substantial debris but no bodies.

Aftermath of the sinking

Hoodduring and after the explosion; black and white copy of a sketch prepared byCaptain JC Leach(commandingPrince of Wales) for the first board of enquiry in 1941, and photo from theBundesarchiv.The column of smoke or flame that erupted from the vicinity of the mainmast (immediately before a huge detonation obliterated the after part of the ship from view) is believed to have been the result of a cordite fire venting through the engine-room ventilators.

Prince of Waleswas forced to disengage by a combination of damage from German hits and mechanical failures in her guns and turrets afterHoodwas sunk. Despite these problems, she had hitBismarckthree times. One of these hits contaminated a good portion of the ship's fuel supply and subsequently caused her to steer for safety inoccupied Francewhere she could be repaired.Bismarckwas temporarily able to evade detection,but was later spotted and sunk on 27 May.

The official Admiraltycommuniquéon the loss, broadcast on the day of the sinking, reported that: "during the... action, HMSHood... received an unlucky hit in amagazineand blew up. "The first formal board of enquiry into the loss, presided over by Vice-AdmiralSir Geoffrey Blake,reported on 2 June, less than a fortnight after the loss. It endorsed this opinion, stating that:

(c) (The) probable cause of the loss of HMSHoodwas direct penetration of the protection by one or more 15-inch shells at a range of 16,500 yards [15,100 m], resulting in the explosion of one or more of the aft magazines.

The Vice Chief of Naval Staff, Acting Vice-AdmiralTom Phillipsand others criticised the conduct of the inquiry, largely because no verbatim record of witnesses' testimony had been kept. Moreover,Sir Stanley V. Goodall,Director of Naval Constructioncame forward with an alternative theory, that theHoodhad been destroyed by the explosion of her own torpedoes. As a result, a second Board was convened under Rear-AdmiralHarold Walkerand reported in September 1941.This investigation was, in the words of one author, "much more thorough than was the first, taking evidence from a total of 176 eyewitnesses to the disaster",and examined both Goodall's theory and others (see below). The Board came to a conclusion almost identical to that of the first board, expressed as follows:

That the sinking ofHoodwas due to a hit fromBismarck's 15-inch shell in or adjacent toHood's 4-inch or 15-inch magazines, causing them all to explode and wreck the after part of the ship. The probability is that the 4-inch magazines exploded first.

Both boards of enquiry exonerated Vice-Admiral Holland from any blame regarding the loss ofHood.

Memorials to those who died are spread widely around the UK, and some of the crew are commemorated in different locations. One casualty, George David Spinner,is remembered on the Portsmouth Naval memorial,theHoodChapel at the Church of St John the Baptist, inBoldre,Hampshire, and also on the gravestone of his brother, who died while serving in the Royal Air Force in 1942, in theHamilton Road Cemetery,Deal, Kent.

Modern theories on the sinking

The exact cause of the loss ofHoodremains a subject of debate. The principal theories include the following causes:

• A direct hit from a shell penetrated to a magazine aft. Such a shell could only have come fromBismarck,sincePrinz Eugenwas no longer firing atHoodat the time of the explosion. As noted above, this version of events was almost taken for granted at the time of the sinking. Doubt first arose as a result of eyewitness testimony that the explosion that destroyedHoodoriginated near the mainmast, well forward of the aft magazines (for example, the sketch shown prepared for the second board of enquiry byCaptain LeachofPrince of Wales).

At the second board, expert witnesses suggested that what was observed was the venting, through the engine-room ventilators, of a violent—but not instantaneous—explosion ordeflagrationin the 4-inch shell magazines. The same deflagration would have collapsed the bulkhead separating the 4-inch and 15-inch magazines, resulting very quickly in a catastrophic explosion similar to those previously witnessed at Jutland. This theory was ultimately adopted by the board.

• A shell, falling short and travelling underwater, struck below the armoured belt and penetrated a magazine. During the same action,Prince of Walesreceived a hit of this type from a 15-inch shell, which travelled underwater for about 80 feet (24 m), struck about 28 feet (8.5 m) below the waterline, penetrated several light bulkheads and fetched up, without exploding, against the torpedo bulkhead. The second board considered this theory improbable, arguing that the fuse, had it worked at all, would have detonated the shell before it reached the ship. According to Jurens's calculations, one ofBismarck's shells that fell approximately 20 feet (6.1 m) short ofHoodcould have penetrated the side of the ship beneath the armour belt and would have detonated in the vicinity of the ship's magazines if the fuse worked.
• The ship was destroyed by the explosion of her own torpedoes. According to Goodall's theory, the ship's torpedoes could have been detonated either by the fire raging on the boat deck or, more probably, by a direct hit fromBismarck.This would have blown out the side of the ship, destroying the girder strength of the hull; the force of water entering the hole, at a speed of nearly 30 knots (56 km/h), would then shear the stern section from the rest of the hull.
• The fire on the boat deck penetrated to a magazine. Evidence given to the second board indicated that the doors for the 4-inch ammunition supply trunks were closed throughout the action. It remains possible that a door or trunk could have been opened up by an enemy shell, admitting flames to the magazine. Alternative routes for admission of flame could have been the ventilation or venting arrangements of the magazines or, as Ted Briggs suggested, through the floor of a 15-inch gunhouse.
• The explosion was initiated by 4-inch ammunition stored outside the magazines. Writing in 1979, the naval historianAntony Prestonclaimed that the aft magazines ofHoodwere "surrounded by additional 4-inch (102 mm) anti-aircraft shells outside the armoured barbettes. Such unprotected stowage could have been detonated either by the boat-deck fire or by a shell fromBismarck."
• The ship was blown up by her own guns. At the second board, eyewitnesses reported unusual types of discharge from the 15-inch guns ofHood,suggesting that a shell could have detonated within the gun, causing an explosion within the gunhouse. It is possible that, under the stress of combat, the safety measures, introduced after the disasters at Jutland to prevent such an explosion reaching the magazines, could have failed.

An extensive review of these theories (excepting that of Preston) is given in Jurens's 1987 article. Its main conclusion is that the loss was almost certainly precipitated by the explosion of a 4-inch magazine, but that there are several ways this could have been initiated, although he rules out the boat deck fire or the detonation of her torpedoes as probable causes. In Jurens's opinion, the popular image of plunging shells penetratingHood's deck armour is inaccurate, as by his estimation the angle of fall ofBismarck's 15-inch shells at the moment of the loss would not have exceeded about 14°, an angle so unfavourable to penetration of horizontal armour that it is actually off the scale of contemporaneous German penetration charts. Moreover, computer-generated profiles ofHoodshow that a shell falling at this angle could not have reached an aft magazine without first passing through some part of the belt armour. On the other hand, the 12-inch belt could have been penetrated ifHoodhad progressed sufficiently far into her final turn.

Inspection of the wreck has confirmed that the aft magazines did indeed explode. The stern of theHoodwas located, with the rudder still in place, and it was found that this was set to port at the time of the explosion. Furthermore, a section of the bow immediately forward of 'A' turret is missing, which has led historian and formerDartmouthlecturerEric J. Groveand expedition leaderDavid Mearnsto believe that "either just before or just after leaving the surface, the bow suffered massive internal damage from an internal explosion",possibly a partial detonation of the forward 15-inch magazines.

It has been suggested that the fatal fire spread from the aft end of the ship through the starboard fuel tanks, since the starboard side ofHood"appears to be missing most, if not all, of its torpedo bulge plating".

The evidence of the wreck refutes Goodall's theory of a torpedo explosion, while the eyewitness evidence of venting from the 4-inch magazine prior to the main explosion conflicts with the theory that theHoodwas blown up by her own guns. The other theories listed above remain valid possibilities.

In their study of the battleshipBismarck's operational history released in 2019, including its engagement withHood,Jurens, William Garzke, and Robert O. Dulin Jr. concluded thatHood's destruction was most likely caused by a 380-mm shell fromBismarckthat penetrated the deck armour and exploded in the aft 4-inch magazine, igniting its cordite propellant, which in turn ignited the cordite in the adjacent aft 15-inch magazine. Rapid expansion of the resulting combustion gases from the conflagration then caused structural failure, passing out through the sides of the ship as well as forward and upwards via the engine room vents, expelling the aft main battery turrets and causing the stern to be detached from the rest of the hull at the aft armoured bulkhead.

Wreck

In 2001, British broadcasterChannel 4commissioned shipwreck hunter David Mearns and his company, Blue Water Recoveries, to locate the wreck ofHood,and if possible, produce underwater footage of both the battlecruiser and her attacker,Bismarck.This was to be used for a major event documentary to be aired on the 60th anniversary of the ships' battle.This was the first time anyone had attempted to locateHood's resting place.Mearns had spent the previous six years privately researching the fate ofHoodwith the goal of finding the battlecruiser, and had acquired the support of the Royal Navy, the HMSHoodAssociation and other veterans groups, and the last living survivor, Ted Briggs.

The search team and equipment had to be organised within four months, to take advantage of a narrow window of calm conditions in the North Atlantic. Organisation of the search was complicated by the presence on board of a documentary team and their film equipment, along with a television journalist who made live news reports via satellite during the search. The search team also planned tostreamvideo from theremotely operated underwater vehicle(ROV) directly to Channel 4's website.

After footage ofBismarckwas collected, Mearns and the search team began scanning a 600-square-nautical-mile (2,100 km²) search box forHood;completely covering the area was estimated to take six days. Areas that Mearns felt were more likely to hold the wreck were prioritised, and theside-scan sonarlocated the battlecruiser in the 39th hour of the search.

Hood's wreck lies on the seabed in pieces among two debris fields at a depth of about 2,800 metres (9,200 feet).The eastern field includes the small piece of the stern that survived the magazine explosion, as well as the surviving section of the bow and some smaller remains, such as the propellers. The 4-inch fire-control director lies in the western debris field. The heavily armoured conning tower is located by itself, a distance from the main wreck. The amidships section, the biggest part of the wreck to survive the explosions, lies inverted south of the eastern debris field in a large impact crater. The starboard side of the amidships section is missing down to the inner wall of the fuel tanks and the plates of the hull are curling outward; this has been interpreted as indicating the path of the explosion through the starboard fuel tanks.

It is further supposed that the small debris fields are the fragments from the aft hull where the magazines and turrets were located, since that section of the hull was totally destroyed in the explosion. The fact that the bow section separated just forward of 'A' turret is suggestive that a secondary explosion might have occurred in this area.Other researchers have claimed that the final salvo fired byHoodwas not a salvo at all, but flame from the forward magazine explosion, which gave the illusion ofHoodfiring for the last time.This damage, ahead of the armoured bulkhead, could have been implosion damage suffered whileHoodsank, as a torpedo room that had been removed during one of her last refits approximates the site of the break.

It was the opinion of Mearns and White who investigated the wreck that this was unlikely as the damage was far too limited in scale, nor could it account for the outwardly splayed plates also observed in that area.Bill Jurens points out that there was no magazine of any kind at the location of the break and that the location of the break just forward of the forward transverse armoured bulkhead suggests that the ship's structure failed there as a result of stresses inflicted when the bow was lifted into the vertical position by the sinking stern section. Furthermore, the current position of the plates at the edge of the break reflects only their last position, not the direction they had first moved.

The forward section lies on its port side, with the amidships section keel up. The stern section rises from the seabed at an angle. This position shows the rudder locked into a 20° port turn, confirming that orders had been given (just prior to the aft magazines detonating) to change the ship's heading and bring the aft turrets 'X' and 'Y' to bear on the German ships.

In 2002, the site was officially designated awar graveby the British government. As such, it remains a protected place under theProtection of Military Remains Actof 1986.

Expeditions to retrieve ship's bell

In 2012, the British government gave permission for Mearns to return to the site ofHood's final resting place to retrieve one of her twoship's bellswhich were lying in a small open debris field some way from the wreck herself. With the backing of the HMSHoodAssociation, Mearns planned to return the bell to Portsmouth where it would form part of the first official and permanent memorial to the sacrifice of her last crew at the newly refittedNational Museum of the Royal Navy.

The expedition also took the opportunity to re-film the wreck and survey her using techniques unavailable in 2001. As before, with the exception of the attempted retrieval of the ship's bell, a strict look-but-do not-touch policy was adhered to. The original attempt, sponsored byPaul Allenand using his yachtOctopus,was abandoned after ten days in September 2012 due to unfavourable weather conditions.In 2015, the same team attempted a second recovery operation andHood's bell was retrieved on 7 August 2015. After conservation work,Princess Anne,thePrincess Royal,unveiled the bell at the museum on 24 May 2016 – the 75th anniversary of the Battle of the Denmark Strait. The bell was rung eight times in a commemorative service at midday attended by descendants of crew members who died in the battle before being placed in the museum's exhibit on the Battle of Jutland.

The recovered bell was originally carried on thepre-dreadnought battleshipHood.Before being installed on the battlecruiser, the bell was inscribed around its base with the words: "This bell was preserved from HMSHoodbattleship 1891–1914 by the late Rear Admiral, The Honourable Sir Horace Hood KCB, DSO, MVO killed at Jutland on 31st May 1916. "There is a second inscription on the side of the bell that reads "In accordance with the wishes of Lady Hood it was presented in memory of her husband to HMSHoodbattle cruiser the ship she launched 22nd August 1918. "In addition to the two inscriptions, the bell still wears vivid royal blue paint work on its crown as well as its interior.

Surviving relics

Some relics from the time ofHood's sinking still exist. A large fragment of the woodentransomfrom one ofHood's boats was washed up in Norway after her loss and is preserved in theNational Maritime Museumin London.A metal container holding administrative papers was discovered washed ashore on the Norwegianisland of Senjain April 1942, almost a year after the Battle of the Denmark Strait. The container and its contents were subsequently lost, but its lid survived and was eventually presented to the Royal Navy shore establishment HMSCenturionin 1981.

Other surviving relics are items that were removed from the ship prior to her sinking:

5.5-inch guns

Two ofHood's 5.5-inch guns were removed during a refit in 1935, and shipped toAscension Island,where they were installed as a shore battery in 1941, sited on a hill above the port and main settlement,Georgetown,where they remain. The guns were restored by the RAF in 1984.

The Ascension Island guns saw action only once, on 9 December 1941, when they fired on theGerman submarineU-124,as it approached Georgetown on the surface to shell the cable station or sink any ships at anchor. No hits were scored, but the submarinecrash-divedand retreated.

Fragments of propeller

Privately owned propeller fragment

As a result of a collision off the coast of Spain on 23 January 1935, one ofHood's propellers struck the bow ofRenown.While dry-docked for repairs,Renownhad fragments of this propeller removed from her bilge section. The pieces of the propeller were kept by dockyard workers:"Hood" v "Renown" Jan. 23rd. 1935was stamped on one surviving example, and"Hood V Renown off Arosa 23–1–35"on another. Of the known surviving pieces, one is privately held and another was given by the Hood family to theHoodAssociation in 2006.A third piece was found in Glasgow, whereHoodwas built. It is held by a private collector and stampedHMS HOOD v HMS RENOWN 23 1 35.

Bibliography

• Brown, David K.(1999).The Grand Fleet: Warship Design and Development 1906–1922.Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.ISBN1-55750-315-X.
• Bastock, John (1975).Australia's Ships of War.Cremorne, NSW: Angus and Robertson.ISBN0-207-12927-4.
• Burt, R. A. (2012).British Battleships, 1919–1939(2nd ed.). Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.ISBN978-1-59114-052-8.
• Campbell, John (1985).Naval Weapons of World War II.Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.ISBN0-87021-459-4.
• Chesneau, Roger (2002).Hood– Life and Death of a Battlecruiser.London: Cassell Publishing.ISBN0-304-35980-7.
• Friedman, Norman(1978).Battleship Design and Development 1905–1945.London: Conway Maritime Press.ISBN0-85177-135-1.
• Garzke, William H.; Dulin, Robert O.; Jurens, William & Cameron, James (2019).BattleshipBismarck:A Design and Operational History.Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.ISBN978-1-59114-569-1.
• Buxton, Ian (2013).The Battleship Builders – Constructing and Arming British Capital Ships.Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.ISBN978-1-59114-027-6.
• Hone, Trent(2011). "High-Speed Thoroughbreds: The US Navy'sLe xing tonClass Battle Cruiser Designs ". In Jordan, John (ed.).Warship 2011.London: Conway.ISBN978-1-84486-133-0.
• Jurens, Bill (1987)."The Loss of HMSHood– A Re-Examination ".Warship International.XXIV(2): 122–180.ISSN0043-0374.Archived fromthe originalon 4 December 2004.
• Jurens, William; Garzke, William H.; Dulin, Robert O. Jr.; Roberts, John & Fiske, Richard (2002)."A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMSHoodand DKMBismarck".The Society of Naval Architects & Marine Engineers.Archived fromthe original(PDF)on 28 July 2011.Retrieved3 July2010.
• Kennedy, Ludovic (1974).Pursuit: The Chase and Sinking of theBismarck.London: Wm Collins & Sons.ISBN0-304-35526-7.
• Mearns, David(2009).The Search for theSydney.Pymble, NSW: HarperCollins Publishers.ISBN978-0-7322-8889-1.OCLC301679923.
• Mearns, David & White, Rob (2001).HoodandBismarck:The Deep Sea Discovery of an Epic Battle.London: Channel 4.ISBN0-7522-2035-7.
• Morison, Samuel Loring;Polmar, Norman(2003).The American Battleship.St. Paul, Minnesota: MBI.ISBN0-7603-0989-2.
• Parkes, Oscar(1990) [1966].British Battleships,Warrior1860 toVanguard1950: A History of Design, Construction, and Armament(New & rev. ed.). Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.ISBN1-55750-075-4.
• Preston, Antony(1979).Sea Power: A Modern Illustrated Military History.London: Phoebus Publishing Company.ISBN0-89673-011-5.
• Preston, Antony (2002).The World's Worst Warships.London: Conway Maritime Press.ISBN0-85177-754-6.
• Raven, Alan & Roberts, John (1976).British Battleships of World War Two: The Development and Technical History of the Royal Navy's Battleship and Battlecruisers from 1911 to 1946.Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.ISBN0-87021-817-4.
• Roberts, John (1997).Battlecruisers.Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.ISBN1-55750-068-1.
• Roberts, John (2001).The BattlecruiserHood.Anatomy of the Ship (Revised ed.). London: Conway.ISBN0-85177-900-X.
• Rohwer, Jürgen(2005).Chronology of the War at Sea 1939–1945: The Naval History of World War Two(Third revised ed.). Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.ISBN1-59114-119-2.
• Stephen, Martin (1988).Sea Battles in Close-Up: World War 2.Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.ISBN0-87021-556-6.
• Taylor, Bruce (2008).The Battlecruiser HMSHood:An Illustrated Biography, 1916–1941.Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.ISBN978-1-86176-216-0.

Further reading

• Bradford, Ernle(1959).The MightyHood:The Life and Death of the Royal Navy's Proudest Ship.London: Hodder & Stoughton.
• Johnston, Ian (2011).Clydebank Battlecruisers: Forgotten Photographs from John Brown's Shipyard(Hardcover). Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.ISBN978-1591141204.
• Jurens, William (1990). "Re: The Loss of H.M.S.Hood– A Re-examination ".Warship International.XXVII(4): 323–324.ISSN0043-0374.
• Jurens, William; Garzke, William H.; Dulin, Robert O.; Roberts, John (2002). "Re: A Marine Forensic Analysis of HMSHoodand DKMBismarck".Warship International.XXXIX(2): 113–115.ISSN0043-0374.
• Taylor, Bruce (2012).The End of Glory: War and Peace in HMSHood,1916–1941.Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing.ISBN978-1-84832-139-7.
• Taylor, Bruce (2018). "The BattlecruiserHood(1918) ". In Taylor, Bruce (ed.).The World of the Battleship: The Lives and Careers of Twenty-One Capital Ships of the World's Navies, 1880–1990.Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing.ISBN978-1-84832-178-6.

External links

• HMSHoodAssociation
  • HMSHoodToday – Wreck OverviewDescription of the wreck state, and many annotated photographs.
  • Books and Magazines
  • Official Records Pertaining to HMSHood
  • Battle of the Denmark Strait Documentation Resource
• Hunt for theHoodIncludes colour photographs and a log of the expedition.
• HMSHood1920Official Royal Navy page.
• Battle of Denmark StraitA song tribute to theHood.
• Obituary of Ted Briggs – last survivor.
• Imperial War Museum Interview with survivor Robert Tilburn