Holy Shrine Defender

The funeral ofAbolfazl Nikzad,a Holy Shrine Defenders member

Holy Shrine Defenders,known inPersianasModāfe'ān-e-Haram(مدافعان حرم), is a phrase used by theIraniangovernment to refer to their advisers and military personnel, whether Iranians or otherwise, fighting inIraqandSyriain defense and protection ofShiapeoples and holy shrines often targeted bySunnifighters. The most prominent shrine associated with the mission of the "holy shrine defenders," and to which their presence in Syria is ostensibly dedicated, is theSayyidah Zaynab Mosquein Damascus.

Background

The term "holy shrine defender" refers to advisers and military personnel who fight on behalf of Iran to defend and protect Shia sites and peoples in Iraq and Syria from groups such asISIS,and in support of the government ofBashar al-Assadin Syria.The term not only includes Iranians, but also Afghan and Pakistani fighters, such as those who fight withLiwa FatemiyounorLiwa Zainebiyoun.

According to Speaker of theIranian ParliamentAli Larijani,the "holy shrine defenders" guarantee the "security, awareness and dignity of the Iranian people" by fighting againstISIS.The term itself begins to appear throughout Iranian media in 2013 in response to the perceived danger facing theSayyidah Zaynab Mosquefrom Sunni rebels and an actual shelling of the shrine in July of that year.

"Holy shrine defenders" is meant to evoke the memory of theIran-Iraq War,often referred to in Persian as theHoly Defense(دفاع مقدس defā'-e moqaddas), and can further be connected to those fighting on the frontlines againstCovid-19 in Iran,known as "health defenders" (مدافعان سلامتmodāfe'ān-e salāmat).

Involvement in Syria and Sayyidah Zaynab Shrine

The Damascene shrine of Zaynab bint Ali, daughter ofAli ibn Abi Talib,the fourth caliph of Islam and first Imam of Shia Islam, features prominently in Iranian state narratives about the involvement of "holy shrine defenders" in Syria. Protection of the shrine from outside attack, and possible destruction, has been used as a key mobilizing tactic for the Iranian state to attract Shia forces from across the region, especially those in Afghanistan who lived under Taliban rule.Hezbollah has claimed the threats against the shrine are what motivated it to send fighters to Syria and Secretary GeneralHassan Nasrallahhas called protecting the shrine "a duty".

Despite the clear political aim of "holy shrine defenders" and other Iranian proxies to support the Assad government in Syria, the justification to be in Syria in order to protect and defend the shrine is not without merit. In April 2013, reports emerged thatAl-Nusra Front,associated withAl-Qaedain Syria, disinterred the dead body ofHujr ibn 'Adiand threatened to repeat this action atZaynab bint Ali’s shrine.

Protecting the Sayyidah Zaynab Shrine features heavily in the experiences of "holy shrine defenders." Forces entering Syria often stop at Zaynab's shrine after first arriving and stop there before departing. It also serves as a prominent site for "holy shrine defenders" to participate inAshuraandArba‘eincommemorations.

Recognition and promotion in Iran

In Iran, "holy shrine defenders" are recognized by the state asmartyrsfor their role in defending bothShia Islamand theIslamic Republic.They are often given official funeral processions, sometimes coinciding with the death anniversary of aShia Imamor alongsidemartyrsfrom theIran-Iraq War,and buried in the designated martyr's section in cemeteries.

Those "holy shrine defenders" who have been designated as martyrs are often depicted in funerary posters and other visual iconography, perhaps none more so thanMohsen Hojaji.Hojaji's status as an iconic martyr of the "holy shrine defenders" can be seen in the multitude of depictions, such as those appearing on the billboard at Tehran's Vali Asr Square,which seek to relate his image and death on the battlefield to the events occurring at theBattle of Karbala.

Other symbols related to the designated mission of the "holy shrine defenders," namely theSayyidah Zaynab Mosquein Damascus, also feature heavily in iconography sponsored by the Islamic Republic and are used to create connections between current events and Shia history. Relating the experiences of Karbala to contemporary events has been an ongoing feature of state-sponsored narratives of national identity and belonging in the Islamic Republic, especially when faced with crisis.

Subgroups

• Liwa Fatemiyoun
• Hezbollah
• Liwa Zainebiyoun
• Badr Organization
• Kata'ib Hezbollah
• Liwa Abu al-Fadhal al-Abbas
• Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq
• Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba
• Liwa Assad Allah al-Ghalib fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham
• Kata'ib al-Imam Ali
• Liwa al-Baqir
• Quds Force

See also

• Shia Crescent
• Axis of Resistance
• Khan Tuman (operation)