Jump to content

Jihadism

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(Redirected fromJihadists)
"Jihadist" redirects here. For the Islamic doctrine, seeJihad.
"Revolutionary Islamism" redirects here. For the 2003 book by Carlos the Jackal, seeRevolutionary Islam.For Islam and socialist revolution, seeIslamic socialism.

Part of a series on
Jihadism
Practices and concepts
Islamic fundamentalism
Notable jihadist organisations
Jihadism in Africa
Jihadism in Asia
Jihadism in the West
Islam portal
Part ofa serieson
Islam
Beliefs
Practices
History
Cultureandsociety
Related topics
Part ofa serieson
Islamism
Fundamentals
Ideologies
Islamic fundamentalism
Concepts
Influences
Movements
Scholastic

Political

Militant

Key texts
Heads of state
Key ideologues
Criticism of Islamism
Related topics

Islam portal

iconPolitics portal
Territorial presence of jihadist groups and overview of the situation in each region

Jihadismis aneologismformilitantIslamic movementsthat seek to base the state on Islamic principles.[1][2]In a narrower sense, it refers to the belief held by some Muslims that armed confrontation with political rivals is an efficient and theologically legitimate method of socio-political change.[3][4]It is a form ofreligious violenceand has been applied to variousinsurgentIslamic extremist,militantIslamist,andterroristindividuals and organizations whose ideologies are based on theIslamicnotion oflesser jihadfrom the classical interpretation of Islam.[9]It has also been applied to variousIslamic empiresin history, such as theRashidunandUmayyadcaliphates of theearly Muslim conquests,and theOttoman Empire.[10][11]There were also theFula jihadsin West Africa in the 18th and 19th centuries.[12][13]

Modern jihadism mostly has its roots in the late 19th- and early 20th-century ideological developments ofIslamic revivalism,which further developed intoQutbismand related Islamist ideologies during the 20th and 21st centuries.[6][14][15]The jihadist ideologues envisionedjihadas a "revolutionary struggle" against thesecularinternational orderto unite theMuslim worldunder the "rule of God".[16]The Islamist volunteer organisations which participated in theSoviet–Afghan Warof 1979 to 1989 reinforced the rise of jihadism, which has been propagated during variousarmed conflictsthroughout the 1990s and 2000s.[17][18]

Jihadist organizations and rebel groups have become more prominent since the 1990s; by one estimate, 5 percent of civil wars involved jihadist groups in 1990 but more than 40 percent in 2014.[19]French political scientistGilles Kepelhas diagnosed a specificSalafist form of jihadismwithin theSalafi movementof the 1990s.[20]Jihadism with an international,pan-Islamistscope is also known asglobal jihadism.[23]Studies show that with the rise of theIslamic State,some Muslim volunteers that came both fromWestern countriesandMuslim-majority countriestraveled to join theglobaljihadin Syria and Iraq.[29]

Terminology

[edit]
Main article:Jihad
Jihadist variationof theBlack Standardas used by variousIslamist organizationssince the late 1990s, which consists of theShahadain white script centered on a black background.

The concept ofjihad( "exerting" / "striving" / "struggling" ) is fundamental to Islam and has multiple uses, withgreater jihad(internal jihad) meaninginternal struggleagainst evil in oneself, andlesser jihad(external jihad), which is further subdivided intojihad of the pen/tongue(debate or persuasion) andjihad of the sword(warfare). The latter form ofjihadhas meant conquest and conversion in the classical Islamic interpretation, usually exceptingfollowers of other monotheistic religions,[30][31][32]whilemodernist Islamic scholarsgenerally equate militaryjihadwith defensive warfare.[33][34]Much of the contemporary Muslim opinion considers internaljihadto have primacy over externaljihadin the Islamic tradition, while many Western writers favor the opposite view.[31]Today, the wordjihadis often used without religious connotations, like the Englishcrusade.

The term "jihadism" has been in use since the 1990s, more widely in the aftermath of the9/11 attacks.[35]It was first used by the Indian and Pakistani mass media, and by French academics who used the more exact term "jihadist-Salafist".[Note 1]Historian David A. Charters defines "jihadism" as "a revolutionary program whose ideology promises radical social change in theMuslim world... [with] a central role tojihadas an armed political struggle to overthrow "apostate"regimes, to expel theirinfidelallies, and thus to restoreMuslim landsto governance by Islamic principles. "[16]

David Romano, researcher of political science at theMcGill UniversityinMontreal, Quebec,has defined his use of the term as referring to "an individual or political movement that primarily focuses its attention, discourse, and activities on the conduct of a violent, uncompromising campaign that they term ajihad".[36]Following Daniel Kimmage, he distinguishes the jihadist discourse of jihad as a global project to remake the world from the resistance discourse of groups likeHezbollah,which is framed as a regional project against a specific enemy.[36]

"Jihadism" has been defined otherwise as aneologismformilitant,predominantlySunnīIslamic movementsthat useideologically motivated violenceto defend theUmmah(the collectiveMuslim world) from foreignNon-Muslimsand those that they perceive asdomestic infidels.[2][37]The term "jihadist globalism" is also often used in relation toIslamic terrorismas aglobalistideology, and more broadly to theWar on Terror.[38]The Austrian-American academicManfred B. Steger,Professor ofSociologyat theUniversity of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa,proposed an extension of the term "jihadist globalism" to apply to all extremely violent strains of religiously influenced ideologies that articulate the global imaginary into concrete political agendas and terrorist strategies; these includeal-Qaeda,Jemaah Islamiyah,Hamas,andHezbollah,which he finds "today's most spectacular manifestation of religious globalism".[39]

According to the Jewish-Americanpolitical scientistBarak Mendelsohn, "the overwhelming majority ofMuslimsreject jihadi views of Islam. Furthermore, as the cases ofSaudiandother Gulf regimesshow, states may gain domestic legitimacy through economic development and social change, rather than based on religion and piety ".[2]Many Muslims do not use the terms "jihadism" or "jihadist", disliking the association of illegitimate violence with a noble religious concept, and instead prefer the use of delegitimising terms like "deviants".[35][Note 2]Maajid Nawaz,founder and chairman of the anti-extremism think tankQuilliam,defines jihadism as a violent subset ofIslamism:"Islamism [is] the desire to impose any version of Islam over any society. Jihadism is the attempt to do so by force."[41]

"Jihad Cool"is a term for the re-branding of militant jihadism as fashionable, or"cool",to younger people throughconsumer culture,social media, magazines,[42]rap videos,[43]toys,propaganda videos,[44]and other means.[45][46]It is asubculturemainly applied to individuals in developed nations who are recruited to travel to conflict zones on jihad. For example, jihadi rap videos make participants look "moreMTVthan Mosque ", according toNPR,which was the first to report on the phenomenon in 2010.[45]To justify their acts ofreligious violence,jihadist individuals and networks resort to the nonbinding genre of Islamic legal literature (fatwa) developed by jihadi-Salafist legal authorities, whose legal writings are shared and spread via the Internet.[47]

According to Reuven Firestone, Jihadism as commonly used in Western sources describes "militant Islamic movements that are perceived as existentially threatening to the West."[48]

History

[edit]
See also:Islamic fundamentalism,Salafi movement,andWahhabism
Further information:International propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism,International propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism by region,andPetro-Islam
Afghan mujahideenpraying in theKunar Province,Afghanistan (1987)

Key influences

[edit]
Main article:Khawarij
Further information:QutbismandTakfirism

The term “jihadism” has been applied to variousIslamic empiresin history, such as theArabUmayyad Caliphateand theOttoman empire,who extensively campaigned against non-Muslim nations in the name of jihad.[10][11]

Islamic extremismdates back to theearly history of Islamwith the emergence of theKharijitesin the 7th century CE.[49]The original schism betweenKharijites,Sunnīs,andShīʿasamong Muslims was disputed over thepolitical and religious successionto the guidance of the Muslim community (Ummah) after the death of theIslamic prophetMuhammad.[49]From their essentially political position, the Kharijites developed extreme doctrines that set them apart from both mainstream Sunnī and Shīʿa Muslims.[49]Shīʿas believeʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālibis the true successor to Muhammad, while Sunnīs considerAbu Bakrto hold that position. The Kharijites broke away from both the Shīʿas and the Sunnīs during theFirst Fitna(the first Islamic Civil War);[49]they were particularly noted for adopting a radical approach totakfīr(excommunication), whereby they declared both Sunnī and Shīʿa Muslims to be eitherinfidels(kuffār) orfalse Muslims(munāfiḳūn), and therefore deemed themworthy of deathfor their perceivedapostasy(ridda).[49][50][51]

Osama bin LadenandAyman al-Zawahiriofal-Qaedapromoted the overthrow of secular governments.[52][53][54]

Sayyid Qutb,an Egyptian Islamist ideologue and a prominent leader of theMuslim Brotherhoodin Egypt, was an influential promoter of thePan-Islamistideologyduring the 1960s.[55]When he was executed by theEgyptian governmentunder theregime of Gamal Abdel Nasser,Ayman al-ZawahiriformedEgyptian Islamic Jihad,an organization which seeks to replace the government with an Islamic state that would reflect Qutb's ideas about theIslamic revivalthat he yearned for.[56]TheQutbist ideologyhas been influential among jihadist movements andIslamic terroristswho seek to overthrow secular governments, most notablyOsama bin Ladenand Ayman al-Zawahiri ofal-Qaeda,[52][53][54]as well as theSalafi-jihaditerrorist groupISIL/ISIS/IS/Daesh.[57]Moreover, Qutb's books have been frequently been cited by Osama bin Laden andAnwar al-Awlaki.[58][59][60][61][62][63]

Sayyid Qutb could be said to have founded the actual movement of radical Islam.[8][54][55]Unlike the other Islamic thinkers who have been mentioned above, Qutb was not anapologist.[8]He was a prominent leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and a highly influential Islamist ideologue,[8][54]and the first to articulate these anathemizing principles in his magnum opusFī ẓilāl al-Qurʾān(In the shade of the Qurʾān) and his 1966 manifestoMaʿālim fīl-ṭarīq(Milestones), which lead to his execution by the Egyptian government.[8][64]Other Salafi movements in theMiddle East and North Africaand Salafi movements across theMuslim worldadopted many of his Islamist principles.[8][54]

According to Qutb, the Muslim community (Ummah) has been extinct for several centuries and it has also reverted tojahiliyah(the pre-Islamic age of ignorance) because those who call themselves Muslims have failed to follow thesharialaw.[8][54]In order to restore Islam, bring back its days of glory, and free the Muslims from the clasps of ignorance, Qutb proposed the shunning of modern society, establishing a vanguard which was modeled after the early Muslims, preaching, and bracing oneself forpovertyor even bracing oneself for death in preparation forjihadagainst what he perceived was ajahiligovernment/society, and the overthrow of them.[8][54]Qutbism,the radical Islamist ideology which is derived from the ideas of Qutb,[54]was denounced by many prominent Muslim scholars as well as by other members of the Muslim Brotherhood, likeYusuf al-Qaradawi.

Islamic revivalism and Salafism (1990s to present)

[edit]
Main articles:Islamic revivalandSalafi jihadism
Ablack flagreportedly used byCaucasian jihadistsin 2002 displays the phraseal-jihadfi sabilillahabove thetakbirand two crossedswords.
Flag ofISIL/ISIS/IS/Daesh

According toRudolph Peters,scholar ofIslamic studiesand thehistory of Islam,contemporary traditionalist Muslims "copy phrases of the classical works onfiqh"in their writings on jihad;Islamic modernists"emphasize the defensive aspect of jihad, regarding it as tantamount tobellum justumin modern international law; and the contemporary fundamentalists (Abul A'la Maududi,Sayyid Qutb,Abdullah Azzam,etc.) view it as a struggle for the expansion of Islam and the realization of Islamic ideals. "[65]

Some of the earlierIslamic scholarsandtheologianswho had profound influence onIslamic fundamentalismand the ideology of contemporary jihadism include the medieval Muslim thinkersIbn Taymiyyah,Ibn Kathir,andMuhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab,alongside the modern Islamist ideologuesMuhammad Rashid Rida,Sayyid Qutb, and Abul A'la Maududi.[7][15][21][66][67]Jihad has been propagated in modern fundamentalism beginning in the late 19th century, an ideology that arose in the context of struggles againstcolonial powersin North Africa at that time, as in theMahdist Warin Sudan, and notably in the mid-20th century byIslamic revivalistauthors such as Sayyid Qutb and Abul Ala Maududi.[68]

The termjihadism(earlierSalafi jihadism) has arisen in the 2000s to refer to the contemporary jihadi movements, the development of which was in retrospect traced to developments ofSalafismpaired with the origins ofal-Qaedain theSoviet–Afghan Warduring the 1990s. Jihadism has been called an "offshoot" of Islamic revivalism of the 1960s and 1970s. The writings of Sayyid Qutb andMohammed Abdul-Salam Faragprovide inspiration. The Soviet–Afghan War (1979–1989) is said to have "amplified the jihadist tendency from a fringe phenomenon to a major force in theMuslim world."[69]It served to produce foot soldiers, leadership and organization.Abdullah Yusuf Azzamprovided propaganda for the Afghan cause. After the war, veteran jihadists returned to their home countries, and from there would disperse to other sites of conflict involving Muslim populations, such as Algeria,Bosnia,andChechnya,creating a "transnational jihadist stream."[70]

An explanation for jihadist willingness to kill civilians and self-professed Muslims on the grounds that they were actuallyapostates(takfīr) is the vastly reduced influence of the traditional diverse class ofulama,often highly educated Islamic jurists. In "the vast majority" of Muslim countries during the post-colonial world of the 1950s and 1960s, the private religious endowments (awqāf) that had supported the independence of Islamic scholars and jurists for centuries were taken over by the state. The jurists were made salaried employees and the nationalist rulers naturally encouraged their employees (and their employees' interpretations of Islam) to serve the rulers' interests. Inevitably, the jurists came to be seen by the Muslim public as doing this.[71]

Into this vacuum of religious authority cameaggressive proselytizing,funded by tens of billions of dollars ofpetroleum-export moneyfromSaudi Arabia.[72]The version of Islam being propagated (Saudi doctrine ofWahhabism) billed itself as a return to pristine, simple, straightforward Islam,[73]not oneschoolamong many, and not interpretingIslamic lawhistorically or contextually, but as the one, orthodox "straight path" of Islam.[73]Unlike the traditional teachings of the jurists, who tolerated and even celebrated divergent opinions and schools of thought and kept extremism marginalized, Wahhabism had "extreme hostility" to "any sectarian divisions within Islam".[73]

In Iraq, resentment amongst Sunnis over their marginalization after thefall of Ba'athist regimeled to the rise of jihadist networks in the region, which resulted in theal-Qaeda led insurgency in Iraq.[74]De-Ba'athificationpolicy initiated by thenew governmentled to rise in support of jihadists and remnants ofIraqi Ba'athistsstarted allying with al-Qaeda in their common fight against the United States.[75]Iraq War journalistGeorge Packerwrites inThe Assassins' Gate:

"The Iraq War proved some of theBush administration's assertions false, and it made others self-fulfilling. One of these was the insistence on an operational link between Iraq and al-Qaeda... after the fall of the regime, the most potent ideological force behind the insurgency was Islam and its hostility to non-Islamic intruders. Some former Baathist officials even stopped drinking and took to prayer. The insurgency was calledmukawama,or resistance, with overtones of religious legitimacy; its fighters becamemujahideen,holy warriors; they proclaimed their mission to bejihad."[76][77]

Originating in theJaish al-Ta'ifa al-Mansurahfounded byAbu Omar al-Baghdadiin 2004, the organization (primarily under theIslamic State of Iraqname) affiliated itself withal-Qaeda in Iraqand fought alongside them during the2003–2006 phase of the Iraqi insurgency.The group later changed their name to Islamic State of Iraq and Levant for about a year,[78][79]before declaring itself to be a worldwidecaliphate,[80][81]called simply theIslamic State.[82]They are a transnationalSalafi jihadistgroup and anunrecognisedquasi-state.IS gained global prominence in 2014, when their militants conquered large territories in northwestern Iraq and eastern Syria, taking advantage of the ongoingcivil war in Syriaand the disintegrating local military forces of Iraq. By the end of 2015, their self-declaredcaliphateruled an area with a population of about 12 million,[83][84]where they enforced their extremist interpretation ofIslamic law,managed an annual budget exceedingUS$1billion, and commanded more than 30,000 fighters.[85]After a grinding conflict with American, Iraqi, and Kurdish forces, IS lost control of all their Middle Eastern territories by 2019, subsequently reverting to insurgency from remote hideouts while continuing theirpropaganda efforts.These efforts have garnered a significant following in northern andSahelianAfrica,[86][87]where IS still controls a significant territory, and thewar against the Islamic Statecontinues.[88][89]

Shia jihad

[edit]

The termjihadistis almost exclusively used to describeSunniextremists.[90]One example is Syria, where there have been thousands of foreign Muslim fighters engaged in thecivil war,for example, non-SyrianShiaare often referred to as "militia", and Sunni foreigners as "jihadists" (or "would-be jihadists" ).[Note 3][Note 4]One who does use the term "Shia jihad" is Danny Postel, who complains that "this Shia jihad is largely left out of the dominant narrative."[93][94]Other authors see the ideology of "resistance" (Arabic:muqawama) as more dominant, even among extremist Shia groups. For clarity, they suggest use of the term "muqawamist "instead.[95]Yemen's Houthi rebels have often called for "jihad" to resistSaudi Arabia's intervention,even though theHouthi movementfrom theZaidism,is closer to Sunni in theology than other Shi'a sect.[96][97]

Beliefs

[edit]

According to Shadi Hamid and Rashid Dar, jihadism is driven by the idea that jihad is an "individual obligation" (fard‘ayn) incumbent upon allMuslims.This is in contrast with the belief of Muslims up until now (and by contemporary non-jihadists) that jihad is a "collective obligation" (fard al-kifaya) carried out according to orders of legitimate representatives of the Muslim community. Jihadist insist all Muslims should participate because (they believe) today's Muslim leaders are illegitimate and do not command the authority to ordain justified violence.[98]

Evolution of jihad

[edit]
TheHouthiflag, with the top saying "God is the greatest",the next line saying"Death to America",followed by"Death to Israel",followed by"A curse upon the Jews",and the bottom saying"Victory to Islam".

Some observers[6][99][100]have noted the evolution in the rules of jihad—from the original "classical" doctrine to that of 21st-centurySalafi jihadism.[101]According to thelegal historianSadarat Kadri,[99]during the last couple of centuries, incremental changes in Islamic legal doctrine (developed by Islamists who otherwise condemn anybid‘ah(innovation) in religion), have "normalized" what was once "unthinkable".[99]"The very idea that Muslims might blow themselves up for God was unheard of before 1983, and it was not until the early 1990s that anyone anywhere had tried to justify killing innocent Muslims who were not on a battlefield."[99]

The first or the "classical" doctrine of jihad which was developed towards the end of the 8th century, emphasized the "jihad of the sword" (jihad bil-saif) rather than the "jihad of the heart",[102]but it contained many legal restrictions which were developed from interpretations of both theQuranand theHadith,such as detailed rules involving "the initiation, the conduct, the termination" of jihad, the treatment of prisoners, the distribution of booty, etc. Unless there was a sudden attack on the Muslim community, jihad was not a "personal obligation" (fard ‘ayn); instead it was a "collective one" (fard al-kifaya),[103]which had to be discharged "in the way of God" (fi sabil Allah),[104]and it could only be directed by thecaliph,"whose discretion over its conduct was all but absolute."[104](This was designed in part to avoid incidents like theKharijia's jihad against and killing ofCaliph Ali,since they deemed that he was no longer a Muslim).[6]Martyrdomresulting from an attack on the enemy with no concern for your own safety was praiseworthy, but dying by your own hand (as opposed to the enemy's) merited a special place inHell.[105]The category of jihad which is considered to be a collective obligation is sometimes simplified as "offensive jihad" in Western texts.[106]

Scholars likeAbul Ala Maududi,Abdullah Azzam,Ruhollah Khomeini,leaders of al-Qaeda and others, believe that defensive global jihad is a personal obligation, which means that no caliph or Muslim head of state needs to declare it. Killing yourself in the process of killing the enemy is an act ofShuhada(martyrdom) and it brings you a special place inHeaven,not a special place inHell;and the killing of Muslim bystanders (nevermindNon-Muslims), should not impede acts of jihad. Military and intelligent analystSebastian Gorkadescribed the new interpretation of jihad as the "willful targeting of civilians by a non-state actor through unconventional means."[107][100]Al-Qaeda's splinter groups and competitors,Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihadand theIslamic State of Iraq and Syria,are thought to have been heavily influenced[101][108][109][110][111]by a 2004 work on jihad entitledManagement of Savagery(Idarat at-Tawahhush),[101]written by Abu Bakr Naji[101]and intended to provide a strategy to create a new Islamiccaliphateby first destroying "vital economic and strategic targets" and terrifying the enemy with cruelty to break its will.[112]

Islamic theologian Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir has been identified as one of the key theorists andideologuesbehind modern jihadist violence.[101][113][114][115]His theological and legal justifications influencedAbu Musab al-Zarqawi,al-Qaeda member and former leader ofal-Qaeda in Iraq,as well as several other jihadi terrorist groups, includingISILandBoko Haram.[101][113][114][115]Zarqawi used a 579-page manuscript of al-Muhajir's ideas at AQI training camps that were later deployed by ISIL, known in Arabic asFiqh al-Dimaand referred to in English asThe Jurisprudence of JihadorThe Jurisprudence of Blood.[101][113][114][115][116]The book has been described by counter-terrorism scholar Orwa Ajjoub as rationalizing and justifying "suicide operations, the mutilation of corpses, beheading, and the killing of children and non-combatants".[101]The Guardian's journalist Mark Towsend, citing Salah al-Ansari ofQuilliam,notes: "There is a startling lack of study and concern regarding this abhorrent and dangerous text [The Jurisprudence of Blood] in almost all Western and Arab scholarship ".[115]Charlie Winter ofThe Atlanticdescribes it as a "theological playbook used to justify the group's abhorrent acts".[114]He states:

Ranging from ruminations on the merits of beheading, torturing, or burning prisoners to thoughts on assassination, siege warfare, and the use of biological weapons, Muhajir's intellectual legacy is a crucial component of theliterary corpus of ISIS—and, indeed, whatever comes after it—a way to render practically anything permissible, provided, that is, it can be spun as beneficial to the jihad. [...] According to Muhajir,committing suicide to kill peopleis not only a theologically sound act, but a commendable one, too, something to be cherished and celebrated regardless of its outcome. [...] neither Zarqawi nor his inheritors have looked back, liberally using Muhajir's work to normalize the use of suicide tactics in the time since, such that they have become the single most important military and terrorist method—defensive or offensive—used by ISIS today. The way that Muhajir theorized it was simple—he offered up a theological fix that allows any who desire it to sidestep the Koranic injunctions against suicide.[114]

Clinical psychologistChris E. Stoutalso discusses the al Muhajir-inspired text in his essay,Terrorism, Political Violence, and Extremism(2017). He assesses that jihadists regard their actions as being "for the greater good"; that they are in a "weakened in the earth" situation that rendersIslamic terrorisma valid means of solution.[116]

List of conflicts

[edit]
Conflict Dates Groups involved Country/ies Sources
Soviet–Afghan War 1979-1989 Afghan mujahideen Afghanistan
Afghan Civil War (1989–1992) 1989-1992 Afghan mujahideenandAl Qaeda Afghanistan
Kashmir conflict 1990-present Lashkar-e-Taiba Pakistan
Somali Civil War 1991-present Al Shabaab Somalia
Algerian Civil War 1991-2002 Armed Islamic Group Algeria
Bosnian war 1992-1995 Bosnian mujahideen Bosnia and Herzegovina
Afghan Civil War (1992–1996) 1992-1996 TalibanandAl-Qaeda Afghanistan
First Chechen War 1994-2017 Mujahideen in Chechnya Russia
Afghan Civil War (1996–2001) 1996-2001 TalibanandAl-Qaeda Afghanistan
Al-Qaeda insurgency in Yemen 1998-present Al Qaeda Yemen
War in Afghanistan (2001–2021) 2001-2021 Taliban,Al-Qaeda,andIslamic State – Khorasan Province Afghanistan
Insurgency in the Maghreb 2002-present Al QaedaandIslamic State Algeria,Mali,Niger,Mauritania,Tunisia,Morocco,andLibya
Iraqi insurgency 2003-present Al QaedaandIslamic State Iraq
Insurgency in the North Caucasus 2009-2017 Caucasus EmirateandIslamic State Russia
Boko Haram insurgency 2009-present Boko Haram Nigeria,Cameroon,Niger,andChad
Islamist insurgency in the Sahel 2011-present Al QaedaandIslamic State – Sahel Province Mali,Burkina Faso,Niger,Nigeria,Cameroon,Chad,Benin,Togo,Ghana,andIvory Coast
Syrian Civil War 2011-present Al QaedaandIslamic State Syria
War against the Islamic State 2014-present Islamic State
Islamic State–Taliban conflict 2015-present TalibanandIslamic State Afghanistan

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]
  1. ^Gilles Kepel used the variantsjihadist-salafist(p. 220),jihadism-salafism(p. 276),salafist-jihadism(p. 403) in his bookJihad: The Trail of Political Islam(Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2002)
  2. ^Use of "jihadism" has been criticized by at least one academic (Brachman): "'Jihadism' is a clumsy and controversial term. It refers to the peripheral current of extremist Islamic thought whose adherents demand the use of violence in order to oust non-Islamic influence from traditionally Muslim lands en route to establishing true Islamic governance in accordance with Sharia, or God's law. The expression's most significant limitation is that it contains the word Jihad, which is an important religious concept in Islam. For much of the Islamic world, Jihad simply refers to the internal spiritual campaign that one wages with oneself."[40]
  3. ^For example: "The battle has drawn Shiite militias from Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan on the side of Assad, even as Sunni would-be jihadists from around the world have filled the ranks of the many Islamist groups fighting his rule, including the Islamic State extremist group."[91]
  4. ^The Iranian government has drawn from Afghan refugees living in Iran and the number of Afghans fighting in Syria on behalf of the Assad regime has been estimated at "between 10,000 and 12,000".[92]

References

[edit]
  1. ^Ahmad, Aisha (2024),"Jihadist Governance in Civil Wars",Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies,doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.763,ISBN978-0-19-084662-6
  2. ^abcMendelsohn, Barak (21 March 2024). Cruickshank, Paul; Hummel, Kristina; Morgan, Caroline (eds.)."On the Horizon: The Future of the Jihadi Movement"(PDF).CTC Sentinel.17(3).West Point, New York:Combating Terrorism Center:1–10.Archived(PDF)from the original on 25 March 2024.Retrieved3 April2024.
  3. ^Sedgwick, Mark (2015)."Jihadism, Narrow and Wide: The Dangers of Loose Use of an Important Term".Perspectives on Terrorism.9(2): 34–41.ISSN2334-3745.JSTOR26297358.
  4. ^Ashour, Omar (July 2011)."Post-Jihadism: Libya and the Global Transformations of Armed Islamist Movements".Terrorism and Political Violence.23(3): 377–397.doi:10.1080/09546553.2011.560218.ISSN0954-6553.
  5. ^abcAtiyas-Lvovsky, Lorena; Azani, Eitan; Barak, Michael; Moghadam, Assaf (20 September 2023). Cruickshank, Paul; Hummel, Kristina; Morgan, Caroline (eds.)."CTC-ICT Focus on Israel: In Word and Deed? Global Jihad and the Threat to Israel and the Jewish Community"(PDF).CTC Sentinel.16(9).West Point, New York:Combating Terrorism Center:1–12.Archived(PDF)from the original on 20 September 2023.Retrieved1 October2023.
  6. ^abcdPoljarevic, Emin (2021). "Theology of Violence-oriented Takfirism as a Political Theory: The Case of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)". InCusack, Carole M.;Upal, M. Afzal(eds.).Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements.Brill Handbooks on Contemporary Religion. Vol. 21.LeidenandBoston:Brill Publishers.pp. 485–512.doi:10.1163/9789004435544_026.ISBN978-90-04-43554-4.ISSN1874-6691.
  7. ^abBadara, Mohamed; Nagata, Masaki (November 2017)."Modern Extremist Groups and the Division of the World: A Critique from an Islamic Perspective".Arab Law Quarterly.31(4).Leiden:Brill Publishers:305–335.doi:10.1163/15730255-12314024.ISSN1573-0255.
  8. ^abcdefghCook, David(2015) [2005]."Radical Islam and Contemporary Jihad Theory".Understanding Jihad(2nd ed.).Berkeley:University of California Press.pp. 93–127.ISBN9780520287327.JSTOR10.1525/j.ctv1xxt55.10.LCCN2015010201.
  9. ^[5][6][7][8]
  10. ^abThe End of the Jihad State.
  11. ^abMohanty, Nirode (15 September 2018).Jihadism: Past and Present - Nirode Mohanty - Google Books.Rowman & Littlefield.ISBN9781498575973.Retrieved1 October2022.
  12. ^Batran, Aziz (1989). "The nineteenth-century Islamic revolutions in West Africa".General History of Africa: Volume 6.UNESCO Publishing.
  13. ^Ibrahim, Ibrahim Yahaya (28 July 2017).The Wave of Jihadist Insurgency in West Africa: Global Ideology, Local Context, Individual Motivations(Report). Paris: OECD.
  14. ^abAydınlı, Ersel (2018) [2016]."The Jihadists after 9/11".Violent Non-State Actors: From Anarchists to Jihadists.Routledge Studies on Challenges, Crises, and Dissent in World Politics (1st ed.).LondonandNew York:Routledge.pp. 110–149.ISBN978-1-315-56139-4.LCCN2015050373.
  15. ^abJalal, Ayesha(2009). "Islam Subverted? Jihad as Terrorism".Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia.Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press.pp. 239–301.doi:10.4159/9780674039070-007.ISBN9780674039070.S2CID152941120.
  16. ^abA. Charters, David (6 February 2007)."Something Old, Something New…? Al Qaeda, Jihadism, and Fascism".Terrorism and Political Violence.19.Routledge: 65–93.doi:10.1080/09546550601054832.ISSN0954-6553.S2CID144155484– via tandfonline.
  17. ^Hekmatpour, Peyman (1 January 2018)."What do we know about the Islamic Radicalism: A meta-analysis of academic publications".resistance of Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviet invasion..{{cite journal}}:Cite journal requires|journal=(help)
  18. ^Hekmatpour, Peyman; Burns, Thomas (14 August 2018)."Radicalism and Enantiodromia: A Trialectic of Modernity, Post-modernity, and Anti-modernity in the Islamic World".{{cite journal}}:Cite journal requires|journal=(help)
  19. ^Fearon, James D. (2017)."Civil War & the Current International System".Daedalus.146(4).MIT Pressfor theAmerican Academy of Arts and Sciences:20–22.doi:10.1162/DAED_a_00456.ISSN0011-5266.
  20. ^Kepel, Gilles(2021) [2000].Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam.Bloomsbury Revelations (5th ed.). London:Bloomsbury Academic.pp. 219–222.ISBN9781350148598.OCLC1179546717.
  21. ^abMeleagrou-Hitchens, Alexander; Hughes, Seamus; Clifford, Bennett (2021)."The Ideologues".Homegrown: ISIS in America(1st ed.).LondonandNew York:I.B. Tauris.pp. 111–148.ISBN978-1-7883-1485-5.
  22. ^Clarke, Colin (8 September 2021). Cruickshank, Paul; Hummel, Kristina (eds.)."Twenty Years After 9/11: What Is the Future of the Global Jihadi Movement?"(PDF).CTC Sentinel.14(7).West Point, New York:Combating Terrorism Center:91–105.Archived(PDF)from the original on 8 September 2021.Retrieved10 November2021.
  23. ^[5][14][21][22]
  24. ^Milton, Daniel; Perlinger, Arie (11 November 2016). Cruickshank, Paul; Hummel, Kristina (eds.)."From Cradle to Grave: The Lifecycle of Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria"(PDF).CTC Sentinel.West Point, New York:Combating Terrorism Center:15–33.Archived(PDF)from the original on 18 June 2020.Retrieved20 December2021.
  25. ^Schmid, Alex P.; Tinnes, Judith (December 2015)."Foreign (Terrorist) Fighters with IS: A European Perspective"(PDF).ICCT Research Paper.6(8).The Hague:International Centre for Counter-Terrorism.doi:10.19165/2015.1.08.ISSN2468-0656.JSTORresrep29430.S2CID168669583.Archived(PDF)from the original on 25 November 2020.Retrieved12 June2021.
  26. ^Picker, Les (June 2016)."Where Are ISIS's Foreign Fighters Coming From?".The Digest.Vol. 6.Cambridge, Massachusetts:National Bureau of Economic Research.Archivedfrom the original on 23 October 2020.Retrieved12 June2021.
  27. ^Hekmatpour, Peyman; Burns, Thomas J. (2019). "Perception of Western governments' hostility to Islam among European Muslims before and after ISIS: the important roles of residential segregation and education".The British Journal of Sociology.70(5).Wiley-Blackwellfor theLondon School of Economics:2133–2165.doi:10.1111/1468-4446.12673.eISSN1468-4446.ISSN0007-1315.PMID31004347.S2CID125038730.
  28. ^Pokalova, Elena (2020). "Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: Aberration from History or History Repeated?".Returning Islamist Foreign Fighters: Threats and Challenges to the West.Basingstoke:Palgrave Macmillan.pp. 11–58.doi:10.1007/978-3-030-31478-1.ISBN978-3-030-31477-4.S2CID241995467.
  29. ^[5][24][25][26][27][28]
  30. ^DeLong-Bas, Natana J.(22 February 2018) [10 May 2017]."Jihad".Oxford Bibliographies – Islamic Studies.Oxford:Oxford University Press.doi:10.1093/obo/9780195390155-0045.Archivedfrom the original on 29 June 2016.Retrieved25 October2021.
  31. ^abBonner 2006,p. 13.
  32. ^Peters, Rudolph (2005). "Jihad". InEliade, Mircea;Jones, Lindsay;Adams, Charles J.(eds.).Encyclopedia of Religion.Vol. 7 (2nd ed.).Macmillan Reference USA.p. 4917.ISBN9780028657394.
  33. ^Peters, Rudolph (2015) [1980]. "The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern Islam".Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History.Religion and Society. Vol. 20.BerlinandBoston:De Gruyter.pp. 105–124.doi:10.1515/9783110824858.105.ISBN9783110824858.ISSN1437-5370.
  34. ^Wael B. Hallaq (2009).Sharī'a: Theory, Practice, Transformations.Cambridge University Press(Kindle edition). pp. 334–338.
  35. ^ab"What is jihadism?".BBC News.11 December 2014.Archivedfrom the original on 3 December 2016.Retrieved13 October2016.
  36. ^abDavid Romano (2013)."Jihadists in Iraq".In John L. Esposito; Emad El-Din Shahin (eds.).The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics.Oxford: Oxford University Press.doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195395891.013.003.ISBN978-0-19-539589-1.Archivedfrom the original on 15 February 2017.Retrieved15 February2017.
  37. ^Crenshaw, Martha (2017)."Transnational Jihadism & Civil Wars".Daedalus.146(4).MIT Pressfor theAmerican Academy of Arts and Sciences:59–70.doi:10.1162/DAED_a_00459.ISSN0011-5266.
  38. ^Steger, Manfred B.(2011). "Jihadist Globalism versus Imperial Globalism: The Great Ideological Struggle of the Twenty-First Century?".The Rise of the Global Imaginary: Political Ideologies from the French Revolution to the Global War on Terror.OxfordandNew York:Oxford University Press.pp. 213–248.doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199286942.003.0007.ISBN9780191700408.
  39. ^Steger, Manfred B.Globalization: A Short Introduction.2009.Oxford University Press,p. 127.
  40. ^Brachman 2008,p. 4.
  41. ^Maajid Nawaz (14 June 2016)."Admit It: These Terrorists Are Muslims".The Daily Beast.Archivedfrom the original on 25 June 2017.Retrieved25 June2017.
  42. ^Steve Emerson (15 April 2013)."Jihad is Cool: Jihadist Magazines Recruit Young Terrorists".Family Security Matters.Archived fromthe originalon 11 March 2015.Retrieved22 August2014.
  43. ^J. Dana Stuster (29 April 2013)."9 Disturbingly Good Jihadi Raps".Foreign Policy.Archivedfrom the original on 23 August 2014.Retrieved22 August2014.
  44. ^Jytte Klausen (2012)."The YouTube Jihadists: A Social Network Analysis of Al-Muhajiroun's Propaganda Campaign".Perspectives on Terrorism.6(1).Archivedfrom the original on 26 August 2014.Retrieved22 August2014.
  45. ^abDina Temple-Raston (6 March 2010)."Jihadi Cool: Terrorist Recruiters' Latest Weapon".National Public Radio.Archivedfrom the original on 6 October 2014.Retrieved22 August2014.
  46. ^Cheryl K. Chumley (27 June 2014)."Terrorists go 'Jihad Cool,' use rap to entice young Americans".Washington Times.Archivedfrom the original on 3 September 2014.Retrieved22 August2014.
  47. ^French, Nathan S. (2020)."A Jihadi-Salafi Legal Tradition? Debating Authority and Martyrdom".And God Knows the Martyrs: Martyrdom and Violence in Jihadi-Salafism.Oxfordand New York City:Oxford University Press.pp. 36–69.doi:10.1093/oso/9780190092153.003.0002.ISBN9780190092153.LCCN2019042378.
  48. ^Compare:Firestone, Reuven(2012).""Jihadism" as a new religious movement ".InHammer, Olav;Rothstein, Mikael(eds.).The Cambridge Companion to New Religious Movements.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.pp. 263–285.doi:10.1017/CCOL9780521196505.018.ISBN978-0-521-19650-5.LCCN2012015440.S2CID156374198.'Jihadism' is a term that has been applied in Western languages to describemilitantIslamic movementsthat are perceived as existentially threatening tothe West.Western media have tended to refer to Jihadism as a military movement which is rooted inpolitical Islam.[...] 'Jihadism,' like the wordjihadfrom which it is constructed, is a difficult term to precisely define. The meaning of Jihadism is a virtual moving target because it remains a recentneologismand no single, generally accepted meaning has been developed for it.
  49. ^abcdeIzutsu, Toshihiko(2006) [1965]."The Infidel (Kāfir): The Khārijites and the origin of the problem ".The Concept of Belief in Islamic Theology: A Semantic Analysis of Imān and Islām.Tokyo:Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies atKeio University.pp. 1–20.ISBN983-9154-70-2.
  50. ^Khan, Sheema (12 May 2018)."Another battle with Islam's 'true believers'".The Globe and Mail.The Globe and Mail Opinion.Retrieved19 April2020.
  51. ^Hasan, Usama (2012)."The Balance of Islam in Challenging Extremism"(PDF).Quiliam Foundation.Archived fromthe original(PDF)on 2 August 2014.Retrieved17 November2015.
  52. ^abGallagher, Eugene V.;Willsky-Ciollo, Lydia, eds. (2021)."Al-Qaeda".New Religions: Emerging Faiths and Religious Cultures in the Modern World.Vol. 1.Santa Barbara, California:ABC-CLIO.pp. 13–15.ISBN978-1-4408-6235-9.
  53. ^abAydınlı, Ersel (2018) [2016]."The Jihadists pre-9/11".Violent Non-State Actors: From Anarchists to Jihadists.Routledge Studies on Challenges, Crises, and Dissent in World Politics (1st ed.).LondonandNew York:Routledge.pp. 65–109.ISBN978-1-315-56139-4.LCCN2015050373.
  54. ^abcdefghMoussalli, Ahmad S. (2012)."Sayyid Qutb: Founder of Radical Islamic Political Ideology".In Akbarzadeh, Shahram (ed.).Routledge Handbook of Political Islam(1st ed.).LondonandNew York:Routledge.pp. 9–26.ISBN9781138577824.LCCN2011025970.
  55. ^abPolk, William R.(2018)."The Philosopher of the Muslim Revolt, Sayyid Qutb".Crusade and Jihad: The Thousand-Year War Between the Muslim World and the Global North.The Henry L. Stimson Lectures Series.New HavenandLondon:Yale University Press.pp. 370–380.doi:10.2307/j.ctv1bvnfdq.40.ISBN978-0-300-22290-6.JSTORj.ctv1bvnfdq.40.LCCN2017942543.
  56. ^Lawrence Wright(2006). "2".The Looming Tower.Knopf.ISBN0-375-41486-X.
  57. ^Baele, Stephane J. (October 2019). Giles, Howard (ed.)."Conspiratorial Narratives in Violent Political Actors' Language"(PDF).Journal of Language and Social Psychology.38(5–6).SAGE Publications:706–734.doi:10.1177/0261927X19868494.hdl:10871/37355.ISSN1552-6526.S2CID195448888.Retrieved3 January2022.
  58. ^Scott Shane; Souad Mekhennet & Robert F. Worth (8 May 2010)."Imam's Path From Condemning Terror to Preaching Jihad".The New York Times.Retrieved13 May2010.
  59. ^Robert Irwin, "Is this the man who inspired Bin Laden?"The Guardian(1 November 2001).
  60. ^Paul Berman, "The Philosopher of Islamic Terror",New York Times Magazine(23 March 2003).
  61. ^"Out of the Shadows: Getting ahead of prisoner radicalization"(PDF).PBS.
  62. ^Trevor Stanley."The Evolution of Al-Qaeda: Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi".Retrieved26 February2015.
  63. ^Qutbism: An Ideology of Islamic-FascismArchived2007-06-09 at theWayback Machineby Dale C. Eikmeier. FromParameters,Spring 2007, pp. 85–98.
  64. ^Gibril Haddad, “Quietism and End-Time Reclusion in the Qurʾān and Hadith: Al-Nābulusī and His Book Takmīl Al-Nuʿūt within the ʿuzla Genre,”Islamic Sciences15, no. 2 (2017): pp. 108-109)
  65. ^Peters, Rudolph (1996).Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader.Princeton: Marcus Wiener. p. 150.ISBN9004048545.Archivedfrom the original on 18 October 2015.Retrieved12 August2015.
  66. ^R. Habeck, Mary (2006).Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror.London: Yale University Press. pp. 17–18.ISBN0-300-11306-4.
  67. ^Haniff Hassan, Muhammad (2014).The Father of Jihad.57 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 9HE: Imperial College Press. p. 77.ISBN978-1-78326-287-8.{{cite book}}:CS1 maint: location (link)
  68. ^Rudolph Peters,Jihad in Modern Terms: A Reader2005, p. 107 and note p. 197. John Ralph Willis, "Jihad Fi Sabil Allah", in:In the Path of Allah: The Passion of al-Hajj ʻUmar: an essay into the nature of charisma in Islam,Routledge, 1989,ISBN978-0-7146-3252-0,29–57. "Gibb [Mohammedanism,2nd ed. 1953] rightly could conclude that one effect of the renewed emphasis in the nineteenth century on the Qur'an andSunnahin Muslim fundamentalism was to restore tojihad fi sabilillahmuch of the prominence it held in the early days of Islam. Yet Gibb, for all his perception, did not consider jihad within the context of its alliance to ascetic and revivalist sentiments, nor from the perspectives which left it open to diverse interpretations. "(p. 31)
  69. ^Commins, David (2009).The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia.I.B.Tauris. p. 174.
  70. ^Commins, David (2009).The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia.I.B.Tauris. pp. 156, 7.
  71. ^Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2002).The Place of Tolerance in Islam by Khaled Abou El Fadl The Place of Tolerance in Islam.Beacon Press. p.6.ISBN9780807002292.Retrieved21 December2015.The guardians of the Islamic tradition were the jurists.
  72. ^Kepel, Gilles (2006).Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam.I.B. Tauris. p. 51.ISBN9781845112578.Archivedfrom the original on 14 May 2016.Retrieved23 March2016.Well before the full emergence of Islamism in the 1970s, a growing constituency nicknamed 'petro-Islam' included Wahhabi ulemas and Islamist intellectuals and promoted strict implementation of the sharia in the political, moral and cultural spheres; this proto-movement had few social concerns and even fewer revolutionary ones.
  73. ^abcAbou El Fadl, Khaled (2002).The Place of Tolerance in Islam by Khaled Abou El Fadl The Place of Tolerance in Islam.Beacon Press. pp.8–9.ISBN9780807002292.Retrieved21 December2015.The guardians of the Islamic tradition were the jurists.
  74. ^Glynn Williams, Brian (2017).Counter Jihad: America's Military Experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-4112, USA: University of Pennsylvania Press. pp. 45–46, 179, 185–195.ISBN978-0-8122-4867-8.{{cite book}}:CS1 maint: location (link)
  75. ^Glynn Williams, Brian (2017). "4: The Invasion and Occupation of Iraq".Counter Jihad: America's Military Experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-4112, USA: University of Pennsylvania Press. pp. 188–192.ISBN978-0-8122-4867-8.{{cite book}}:CS1 maint: location (link)
  76. ^Packer, George (2006).The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq.18 West 18th Street, New York 10011, USA:Farrar, Straus and Giroux.p. 309.ISBN978-0-374-53055-6.{{cite book}}:CS1 maint: location (link)
  77. ^Glynn Williams, Brian (2017). "4: The Invasion and Occupation of Iraq".Counter Jihad: America's Military Experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-4112, USA: University of Pennsylvania Press. p. 191.ISBN978-0-8122-4867-8.{{cite book}}:CS1 maint: location (link)
  78. ^"Al-Qaeda in Iraq confirms Syria's Nusra Front is part of its network".Al Arabiya.9 April 2013. Archived fromthe originalon 5 October 2022.
  79. ^Abouzeid, Rania (23 June 2014)."The Jihad Next Door: The Syrian roots of Iraq's newest civil war".Politico.Archived fromthe originalon 19 January 2023.
  80. ^Roggio, Bill(29 June 2014)."ISIS announces formation of Caliphate, rebrands as 'Islamic State'".Long War Journal.
  81. ^Withnall, Adam (29 June 2014)."Iraq crisis: Isis changes name and declares its territories a new Islamic state with 'restoration of caliphate' in Middle East".The Independent.London.
  82. ^"What is Islamic State?".BBC News. 26 September 2014.
  83. ^Shinkman, Paul D. (27 December 2017)."ISIS By the Numbers in 2017".U.S. News & World Report.
  84. ^Birke, Sarah (5 February 2017)."How ISIS Rules".The New York Review of Books.
  85. ^Gerges, Fawaz A. (2016).ISIS: A History.Princeton University Press. pp. 21–22.ISBN978-0-691-17000-8.
  86. ^"ISIS far from defeated in Syria: 2019 outlook (maps)".Al-Masdar News.1 January 2019. Archived fromthe originalon 7 April 2020.Retrieved7 April2019.
  87. ^"US-Led Allies Finishing Off 'Caliphate'".VOA News.1 March 2019.Retrieved7 April2019.
  88. ^Brian Carter; Kathryn Tyson; Liam Karr; Peter Mills (17 May 2023)."Salafi Jihadi Movement Weekly Update, May 17, 2023".ISW, Critical Threats.Retrieved4 January2024.
  89. ^Crisis Group 2024,pp. 2, 6.
  90. ^"The war against jihadists. Unsavoury allies".The Economist.6 September 2014.Archivedfrom the original on 26 August 2016.Retrieved11 October2016.
  91. ^Bulos, Nabih (17 August 2016)."Soldiers on both sides see the fight for Aleppo as a battle between jihadists".Los Angeles Times.Archivedfrom the original on 11 October 2016.Retrieved11 October2016.
  92. ^Heistein, Ari; West, James (20 November 2015)."Syria's Other Foreign Fighters: Iran's Afghan and Pakistani Mercenaries".National Interest.Archivedfrom the original on 11 October 2016.Retrieved11 October2016.
  93. ^Danny Postel;Laura Secor(Fall 2016)."Theaters of Coercion: Review of 'Children of Paradise: The Struggle for the Soul of Iran'".Democracy Journal.No. 42.Archivedfrom the original on 14 October 2016.Retrieved11 October2016.
  94. ^see also:Smyth, Phillip (2 October 2013)."Foreign Shia jihadists in Syria".abc.net.au.Archivedfrom the original on 28 August 2016.Retrieved11 October2016.
  95. ^"Are Shia Militias Jihadist?".magazine.zenith.me.20 December 2017.Archivedfrom the original on 19 September 2018.Retrieved4 October2019.
  96. ^Understanding the Houthi Ideology and its Consequences on YemenEmbassy of Yemen in Washington, DC. Salem Bahfi. September 2020
  97. ^"Inside War-Torn Yemen as Civilians Fight for Survival".TIME.Retrieved16 May2023.
  98. ^Hamid, Shadi; Dar, Rashid (15 July 2016)."Islamism, Salafism, and jihadism: A primer".Brookings Institution.Archivedfrom the original on 12 October 2016.Retrieved13 October2016.
  99. ^abcdKadri, Sadakat (2012).Heaven on Earth: A Journey Through Shari'a Law from the Deserts of Ancient Arabia.London:Macmillan Publishers.pp. 172–175.ISBN978-0099523277.
  100. ^abGorka, Sebastian (3 October 2009)."Understanding History's Seven Stages of Jihad".Combating Terrorism Center.Archived fromthe originalon 4 March 2016.Retrieved1 November2015.
  101. ^abcdefghAjjoub, Orwa (2021).The Development of the Theological and Political Aspects of Jihadi-Salafism(PDF).Lund:Swedish South Asian Studies Network (SASNET) at theCenter for Middle Eastern Studies at Lund University.pp. 1–28.ISBN978-91-7895-772-9.Archived(PDF)from the original on 10 February 2021.Retrieved6 July2021.
  102. ^Lewis, Bernard(1988).The Political Language of Islam.Chicago:University of Chicago Press.p.72.ISBN0-226-47693-6– viaInternet Archive.
  103. ^Khadduri, Majid(1955)."5. Doctrine of Jihad"(PDF).War and Peace in the Law of Islam.Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press.p. 60. Archived fromthe original(PDF)on 28 November 2015.Retrieved26 October2015.[Unlike the five pillars of Islam, jihad was to be enforced by the state.]... 'unless the Muslim community is subjected to a sudden attack and therefore all believers, including women and children are under the obligation to fight—[jihad of the sword] is regarded by all jurists, with almost no exception, as a collective obligation of the whole Muslim community,' meaning that 'if the duty is fulfilled by a part of the community it ceases to be obligatory on others'.
  104. ^abKadri, Sadakat (2012).Heaven on Earth: A Journey Through Shari'a Law from the Deserts of Ancient Arabia.London:Macmillan Publishers.pp. 150–151.ISBN978-0099523277.
  105. ^Lewis, Bernard (2003) [1967].The Assassins, a radical sect in Islam.Basic Books. p. xi–xii.ISBN978-0786724550.Retrieved13 October2015.
  106. ^Edwards, Richard; Zuhur, Sherifa (12 May 2008).The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Political, Social, and.ABC-CLIO. p. 553.ISBN978-1851098422.
  107. ^R. Habeck, Mary (2006).Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror.London: Yale University Press. p. 42.ISBN0-300-11306-4.
  108. ^McCoy, Terrence (12 August 2014)."The calculated madness of the Islamic State's horrifying brutality".Washington Post.Retrieved2 December2015.
  109. ^Crooke, Alastair (30 August 2014)."The ISIS' 'Management of Savagery' in Iraq".The World Post.Retrieved2 December2015.
  110. ^Hassan, Hassan (8 February 2015)."Isis has reached new depths of depravity. But there is a brutal logic behind it".The Guardian.Retrieved10 February2015.
  111. ^McCoy, Terrence (12 August 2014)."The calculated madness of the Islamic State's horrifying brutality".The Washington Post.Retrieved1 September2014.
    •Crooke, Alastair (30 June 2014)."The ISIS' 'Management of Savagery' in Iraq".HuffPost.
    •Hassan, Hassan (8 February 2015)."Isis has reached new depths of depravity. But there is a brutal logic behind it".The Guardian.
  112. ^Wright, Lawrence (16 June 2014)."ISIS's Savage Strategy in Iraq".The New Yorker.Retrieved1 September2014.
  113. ^abcBunzel, Cole (18 February 2016)."The Kingdom and the Caliphate: Duel of the Islamic States"(PDF).Carnegie Papers.265.Washington, D.C.:Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:1–43.Archived(PDF)from the original on 28 March 2016.Retrieved5 July2021.
  114. ^abcdeal-Saud, Abdullah K.; Winter, Charlie (4 December 2016)."Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir: The Obscure Theologian Who Shaped ISIS".The Atlantic.Washington, D.C.Archivedfrom the original on 12 June 2018.Retrieved28 September2020.
  115. ^abcdTownsend, Mark (13 May 2018)."The core Isis manual that twisted Islam to legitimise barbarity".The Guardian.London.Archivedfrom the original on 9 June 2018.Retrieved5 July2021.
  116. ^abStout, Chris E.(2018) [2017]."The Psychology of Terrorism".Terrorism, Political Violence, and Extremism: New Psychology to Understand, Face, and Defuse the Threat.Santa Barbara, California:Greenwood Publishing Group.pp. 5–6.ISBN978-1440851926.OCLC994829038.
  117. ^Darion Rhodes,Salafist-Takfiri Jihadism: the Ideology of the Caucasus EmirateArchived3 September 2014 at theWayback Machine,International Institute for Counter-Terrorism,March 2014

Literature

[edit]
  • Abbas, Tahir (2007).Islamic Political Radicalism: A European Perspective.Edinburgh University Press.ISBN978-0-7486-2528-4.
  • Akbarzadeh, Shahram (2010).Islam and Political Violence: Muslim Diaspora and Radicalism in the West.I B Tauris & Co Ltd.ISBN978-1-84511-473-2.
  • Al-Rasheed, Madawi (2009).Dying for Faith: Religiously Motivated Violence in the Contemporary World.I B Tauris & Co Ltd.ISBN978-1-84511-687-3.
  • Coolsaet, Rik (2008).Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge in Europe.Ashgate.ISBN978-0-7546-7217-3.
  • Hegghammer, Thomas (2010).Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979.Cambridge University Press.ISBN978-0-521-51858-1.
  • Lahoud, Nelly (2010).The Jihadis' Path to Self-destruction.C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd.ISBN978-1-84904-062-4.
  • Lohlker, Rüdiger, ed. (2013).Jihadism: Online Discourses and Representations.Vienna University Press.ISBN978-3-8471-0068-3.
  • Lohlker, Rüdiger, ed. (2012).New Approaches to the Analysis of Jihadism.Vienna University Press.ISBN978-3-89971-900-0.
  • Pargeter, Alison (2008).The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe.I B Tauris & Co Ltd.ISBN978-1-84511-391-9.
  • Sageman, Marc (2008).Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-first Century.University of Pennsylvania Press.ISBN978-0-8122-4065-8.
  • Sanchez, James (2007).Who's Who in Al-Qaeda & Jihadi Movements in South and Southeast Asia 19,906 Key Individuals, Organizations, Incidents, and Linkages.Lulu.ISBN978-1-4303-1473-8.
  • Vertigans, Stephen (2007).Militant Islam: A Sociology of Characteristics, Causes and Consequences.Routledge.ISBN978-0-415-41246-9.
[edit]
Wikimedia Commons has media related toJihad.
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Jihadism&oldid=1252334639"