MI5

For other uses, seeMI-5 (disambiguation).

Not to be confused withMI6.

Security Service (MI5)

Thames House,London
Agency overview
Formed	7 October 1909(1909-10-07) (as theSecret Service Bureau)
Jurisdiction	His Majesty's Government
Headquarters	Thames House,London,United Kingdom 51°29′38″N0°07′32″W
Motto	Regnum Defende (Defend the Realm)
Employees	5,259
Annual budget	Single Intelligence Account£3.711 billion (2021–22)
Minister responsible	James Cleverly,Home Secretary
Agency executive	Ken McCallum,Director General
Website	www.mi5.gov.uk

TheSecurity Service,also known asMI5(Military Intelligence, Section 5),is the United Kingdom's domesticcounter-intelligenceandsecurity agencyand is part of its intelligence machinery alongside theSecret Intelligence Service(MI6),Government Communications Headquarters(GCHQ), andDefence Intelligence(DI). MI5 is directed by theJoint Intelligence Committee(JIC), and the service is bound by theSecurity Service Act 1989.The service is directed to protect British parliamentary democracy and economic interests and to counterterrorismandespionagewithin theUnited Kingdom(UK).

Within the civil service community, the service is colloquially known asBox,orBox 500,after its official wartime address of PO Box 500; its current address is PO Box 3255,LondonSW1P 1AE.

Organisation

Structure

The Security Service comes under the authority of theHome Secretarywithin theCabinet.The service is headed by a Director General (DG) at the grade of aPermanent Secretaryof theCivil Service,who is directly supported by an internal security organisation, secretariat, legal advisory branch, and information services branch. The Deputy Director General is responsible for the operational activity of the service, being responsible for four branches; international counter-terrorism, National Security Advice Centre (counter proliferation and counter espionage), Irish and domestic counter-terrorism, and technical and surveillance operations.

The service is directed by the Joint Intelligence Committeefor intelligence operational priorities. It liaises with SIS, GCHQ,DI,and a number of other bodies within the British government, and industrial base. It is overseen by the Intelligence and Security Committee of Members of Parliament, who are directly appointed by thePrime Minister,and by theInvestigatory Powers Commissioner.Judicial oversight of the service's conduct is exercised by theInvestigatory Powers Tribunal.

Legislation

Operations of the service are required to be proportionate, and compliant with British legislation, including theRegulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000,theInvestigatory Powers Act 2016,theData Protection Act 2018,and various other items of legislation. Information held by the service is exempt from disclosure under section 23 of theFreedom of Information Act 2000.

Also, the Security Service Act of 1989 establishes several legal key mechanisms aimed at ensuring the accountability and control of the Service.Certain provisions from this act were later integrated into the Intelligence Services Act of 1994 with European Commission on Human Rights later having endorsed these mechanisms in multiple applications under the European Convention on Human Rights.Additionally, the Service is subject to oversight and accountability through various other means. These oversight mechanisms have evolved over time to meet changing governmental requirements, with the Service now being held accountable through a variety of oversight arrangements.

Oversight

All employees of the service are bound by theOfficial Secrets Act.In certain circumstances, officers handling agents or informers may authorise them to carry out activity which would otherwise be criminal within the United Kingdom.The Security Service "is authorised to investigate any person or movement that might threaten the...security" of the United Kingdom.

The current Director General isKen McCallum,who succeededAndrew Parkerin April 2020.

Centenary and awards

The service marked its centenary in 2009 by publishing an official history titledThe Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5,written byChristopher Andrew,Professor of Modern and Contemporary History atCambridge University.

Members of the Security Service are recognised annually byKing Charles IIIat thePrince of Wales's Intelligence Community AwardsatSt James's PalaceorClarence Housealongside members of theSecret Intelligence Service(MI6), andGCHQ.Awards and citations are given to teams within the agencies as well as individuals.

History

Early years

The Security Service is derived from theSecret Service Bureau,founded in 1909, and concentrating originally on the activities of theImperial Germangovernment, as a joint initiative of theAdmiraltyand theWar Office.The Bureau was initially split into naval and army sections which, over time, specialised respectively in foreign targetespionageand internalcounter-espionageactivities. The former specialisation was a result of a growing interest at the Admiralty, at the time, in intelligence regarding the fleet of theImperial German Navy.This division was formalised, as separate home and foreign sections, prior to the beginning of theFirst World War.Following a number of administrative changes, the home section became known asDirectorate of Military Intelligence,Section 5 and the abbreviation MI5: the name by which it is still known in popular culture.(The foreign/naval section of the Secret Service Bureau was to become the basis of the later Secret Intelligence Service, orMI6.)

The founding head of the Army section wasVernon Kellof theSouth Staffordshire Regiment,who remained in that role until the early part of theSecond World War.Its role was originally quite restricted, as the section existed solely to ensure national security through counter-espionage. With a small staff, and working in conjunction with theSpecial Branchof theMetropolitan Police,the service was responsible for overall direction and the identification of foreign agents, while Special Branch provided the manpower for the investigation of their affairs, arrest and interrogation.

On the day after the declaration of the First World War, the Home Secretary,Reginald McKenna,announced that "within the last twenty-four hours no fewer than twenty-one spies, or suspected spies, have been arrested in various places all over the country, chiefly in important military or naval centres, some of them long known to the authorities to be spies".

These arrests have provoked recent historical controversy. According to the official history of MI5, the actual number of agents identified was 22, and Kell had started sending out letters to local police forces on 29 July, giving them advance warning of arrests to be made as soon as war was declared.Portsmouth Constabularyjumped the gun and arrested one on 3 August, and not all of the 22 were in custody by the time that McKenna made his speech, but the official history regards the incident as a devastating blow toImperial Germany,which deprived them of their entire spy ring, and specifically upset the Kaiser.

In 2006, his article 'Entering the Lists' was published in the journalIntelligence and National Security,outlining the products of his research into recently opened files.Hiley was sent an advance copy of the official history, and objected to the retelling of the story. He later wrote another article, 'Re-entering the Lists', which asserted that the list of those arrested published in the official historywas concocted from later case histories.

Inter-war period

MI5 proved consistently successful throughout the rest of the 1910s and 1920s in its core counter-espionage role. Throughout the First World War, Germany continually attempted to infiltrate Britain, but MI5 was able to identify most, if not all, of the agents dispatched. MI5 used a method that depended on strict control of entry and exit to the country and, crucially, large-scale inspection of mail. In post-war years, attention turned to attempts by theSoviet Unionand theCominternto surreptitiously support revolutionary activities within Britain. MI5's expertise, combined with the early incompetence of the Soviets, meant the bureau was successful in correctly identifying and closely monitoring these activities.

In the meantime, MI5's role had grown substantially. Due to the spy hysteria, MI5 had formed with far more resources than it actually needed to track down German spies. As is common within governmental bureaucracies, this caused the service to expand its role to use its spare resources. MI5 acquired many additional responsibilities during the war. Most significantly, its strict counter-espionage role blurred considerably. It acquired a much more political role, involving the surveillance not merely of foreign agents, but also ofpacifistand anti-conscriptionorganisations, and oforganised labour.This was justified by citing the common belief that foreign influence was at the root of these organisations. Thus, by the end of the First World War, MI5 was a fully-fledged investigating force (although it never had powers of arrest), in addition to being a counter-espionage agency. The expansion of this role continued after a brief post-war power struggle with the head of theSpecial Branch,SirBasil Thomson.

After the First World War, budget-conscious politicians regarded Kell's department as unnecessary. In 1919, MI5's budget was slashed from £100,000 to just £35,000, and its establishment from over 800 officers to a mere 12. At the same time, SirBasil Thomsonof Special Branch was appointed Director of Home Intelligence, in supreme command of all domestic counter-insurgency and counter-intelligence investigations. Consequently, as official MI5 historianChristopher Andrewhas noted in his official historyDefence of the Realm(2010), MI5 had no clearly defined role in theAnglo-Irish Warof 1919–1921. To further worsen the situation, several of Kell's officers defected to Thomson's new agency, the Home Intelligence Directorate. MI5 therefore undertook no tangible intelligence operations of consequence during theIrish War of Independence.MI5 did undertake the training ofBritish Armycase-officers from the Department of Military Intelligence (DMI), for the Army's so-called "Silent Section", otherwise known as M04(x). Quickly trained by MI5 veterans atHounslow Barracks,outside London, these freshly-minted M04(x) Army case-officers were deployed toDublinbeginning in the spring of 1919. Over time, 175 officers were trained and dispatched to Ireland. In Ireland, they came under the command of GeneralCecil Romerand his Deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Searle Hill-Dillon.

In April 1919, Colonel Walter Wilson of the Department of Military Intelligence arrived in Dublin to take over the day-to-day management of these 175 Army intelligence-officers, and the unit was designated as the "Dublin District Special Branch" (DMI/MO4(x)/DDSB), because it operated exclusively within the confines of the Army's Dublin Military District. Royal Marine ColonelHugh Montgomeryof the Department of Naval Intelligence, was also seconded to Romer's intelligence staff at this time.

British Army after-action reports and contemporary accounts indicate that M04(x)/DDSB was considered by some a highly amateurish outfit. Serious cover constraints, coupled with alcohol abuse and social fraternisation with local prostitutes would prove the downfall of several of these amateur sleuths.

Despite these failings, it was not MI5, but one of Basil Thomson's agents, John Charles Byrnes, adouble agentwithin the IRA, who identifiedMichael Collins,and came close to arranging his capture. The IRA identified Byrnes as a British spy and murdered him in March 1920.

The intelligence staff of Michael CollinsIrish Republican Armypenetrated the unit.Using DMP detectivesNed BroyandDavid Nelligan,Michael Collins was able to learn the names and lodgings of the M04(x) agents, referred to by IRA operatives as 'The Cairo Gang'. OnBloody Sundayin 1920, Collins ordered his counter-intelligence unit,The Squad,to assassinate 25 M04(x) agents, several British courts-martial officers, at least one agent reporting to Basil Thomson, and several intelligence officers attached to theRoyal Irish Constabulary Auxiliary Division,at their lodgings throughout Dublin.

Although the shooting of 14 British officers had the desired effect on British morale, in many ways Bloody Sunday was a botched job. Three of Collins's men were apprehended after engaging in a shoot-out on the street, and at least two of the wounded British officers had no connection whatsoever to British intelligence. Moreover, with MO4(x) having fielded a total of 175 agents of the DDSB, Collins's operation only temporarily slowed British momentum. Within days, the remaining 160-odd M04(x) agents were re-established in secure quarters inside solidly loyalist hotels in Dublin, from where they continued to pursue Collins and the IRA relentlessly right up until the truce of July 1921.

In December 1920, the entire DDSB was transferred fromBritish Armycommand to civil command under Deputy Police Commissioner General Ormonde Winter, and thereafter was known as "D Branch" within Dublin Castle. By January 1921, the highly experiencedMI6operative David Boyle arrived at Dublin Castle to take over the day-to-day management of D Branch. The unit's former commander, Colonel Wilson, resigned in protest against having had his command taken from him. D Branch thrived under Boyle's leadership.

The net impact of Collins's strike of Bloody Sunday, 21 November 1920, was therefore quite negligible, even though the IRA had not gone up against MI5 professionals, but instead only against a quickly trained outfit of amateur army "D-Listers".That afternoon, a mixed force of the British Army, theRoyal Irish Constabulary,and theBlack and Tansretaliated by indiscriminately shooting dead 14 civilians at aGaelic Footballmatch atCroke Park.

In 1921, SirWarren Fisher,the government inspector-general for civil-service affairs, conducted a thorough review of the operations and expenditures of Basil Thomson's Home Intelligence Directorate. He issued a scathing report, accusing Thomson of wasting both money and resources, and conducting redundant as well as ineffectual operations. Shortly thereafter, in a private meeting with Prime MinisterDavid Lloyd George,Sir Basil Thomson was sacked, and the Home Intelligence Directorate was formally abolished. With Thomson out of the way,Special Branchwas returned to the command of the Commissioner of The Criminal Investigation Division atScotland Yard.Only then was Vernon Kell able once again to rebuild MI5 and re-establish it in its former place as Britain's chief domestic spy agency.

MI5 operated inItalyduring inter-war period, and helpedBenito Mussoliniget his start in politics with a £100 weekly wage.

MI5's efficiency in counter-espionage declined from the 1930s. It was, to some extent, a victim of its own success. It was unable to break the ways of thinking it had evolved in the 1910s and 1920s. In particular, it was unable to adjust to the new methods of the Soviet intelligence services: thePeople's Commissariat for Internal Affairs(NKVD) andMain Intelligence Directorate(GRU). It continued to think in terms of agents who would attempt to gather information simply through observation or bribery, or to agitate within labour organisations and the armed services, while posing as ordinary citizens. The NKVD, meanwhile, had evolved more sophisticated methods; it began to recruit agents from within theupper classes(most notably fromCambridge University), whom it regarded as a long-term investment. Such NKVD agents succeeded in gaining positions within the government, and, inKim Philby'scase, within British intelligence itself, from where they were able to provide the NKVD with sensitive information. The most successful of these agents;Harold 'Kim' Philby,Donald Maclean,Guy Burgess,Anthony Blunt,andJohn Cairncross;went undetected until after theSecond World War,and became known as theCambridge Five.

Second World War

One of the earliest actions ofWinston Churchillon coming to power in early 1940 was to sack the agency's long-term head,Vernon Kell.He was replaced initially by the ineffective Brigadier A.W.A. Harker, as Acting Director General. Harker in turn was quickly replaced byDavid Petrie,aSecret Intelligence Service(SIS) man, with Harker remaining as his deputy. With the ending of theBattle of Britain,and the abandonment of invasion plans (correctly reported by both SIS and theBletchley ParkUltraproject), the spy scare eased, and the internment policy was gradually reversed. This eased pressure on MI5, and allowed it to concentrate on its major wartime success, the so-called'double-cross' system.This was a system based on an internal memo drafted by an MI5 officer in 1936, which criticised the long-standing policy of arresting and sending to trial all enemy agents discovered by MI5. Several had offered to defect to Britain when captured; before 1939, such requests were invariably turned down. The memo advocated attempting to 'turn' captured agents wherever possible, and use them to mislead enemy intelligence agencies. This suggestion was turned into a massive and well-tuned system of deception during the Second World War.

Beginning with the capture of an agent namedArthur Owens,codenamed 'Snow', MI5 began to offer enemy agents the chance to avoid prosecution (and thus the possibility of the death penalty) if they would work as Britishdouble-agents.Agents who agreed to this were supervised by MI5 in transmitting bogus 'intelligence' back to the German secret service, theAbwehr.This necessitated a large-scale organisational effort, since the information had to appear valuable but actually be misleading. A high-level committee, the Wireless Board, was formed to provide this information. The day-to-day operation was delegated to a sub-committee, the Twenty Committee (so called because the Roman numerals for twenty, XX, form a double cross).The system was extraordinarily successful. A post-war analysis of German intelligence records found that of the 115 or so agents targeted against Britain during the war, all but one (who committed suicide) had been successfully identified and caught, with several 'turned' to become double agents. The system played a major part in the massive campaign of deception which preceded theD-Daylandings, designed to give the Germans a false impression of the location and timings of the landings (seeOperation Fortitude).

While the double-cross work dealt with enemy agents sent into Britain, a smaller-scale operation run byVictor Rothschildtargeted British citizens who wanted to help Germany. The 'Fifth Column' operation saw an MI5 officer,Eric Roberts,masquerade as theGestapo'sman in London, encouraging Nazi sympathisers to pass him information about people who would be willing to help Germany in the event of invasion. When his recruits began bringing in intelligence, he promised to pass that on to Berlin. The operation was deeply controversial within MI5, with opponents arguing that it amounted to entrapment. By the end of the war, Roberts had identified around 500 people. But MI5 decided not to prosecute, and instead covered the work up, even giving some of Roberts' recruits Nazi medals. They were never told the truth.

All foreigners entering the country were processed at theLondon Reception Centre(LRC) at theRoyal Victoria Patriotic Building,which was operated by MI5 subsection B1D; 30,000 were inspected at LRC. Captured enemy agents were taken toCamp 020,Latchmere House,for interrogation. This was commanded by Colonel Robin Stephens. There was a reserve camp, Camp 020R, atHuntercombe,which was used mainly for long term detention of prisoners.

It is believed that two MI5 officers participated in 'a gentle interrogation' given to the senior NaziHeinrich Himmlerafter his arrest at a military checkpoint in the northern German village of Bremervörde in May 1945. Himmler subsequently killed himself during a medical examination by a British officer by means of a cyanide capsule that he had concealed in his mouth. One of the MI5 officers,Sidney Henry Noakesof theIntelligence Corps,was subsequently given permission to keep Himmler'sbracesand the forged identity document that had led to his arrest.

Post-Second World War

The Prime Minister's personal responsibility for the service was delegated to theHome SecretaryDavid Maxwell-Fyfein 1952, with a directive issued by the Home Secretary setting out the role and objectives of the Director General. The service was subsequently placed on a statutory basis in 1989 with the introduction of the Security Service Act. This was the first government acknowledgement of the existence of the service.

The post-war period was a difficult time for the service, with a significant change in the threat as theCold Warbegan, being challenged by an extremely activeKGB,and increasing incidence of the Northern Ireland conflict, and internationalterrorism.Whilst little has yet been released regarding the successes of the service, there have been a number of intelligence failures which have created embarrassment for both the service and the government. For instance, in 1983, one of its officers,Michael Bettaney,was caught trying to sell information to the KGB. He was subsequently convicted of espionage.

Following theMichael Bettaneycase,Philip Woodfieldwas appointed as a staff counsellor for the security and intelligence services. His role was to be available to be consulted by any member or former member of the security and intelligence services who had "anxieties relating to the work of his or her service"that it had not been possible to allay through the ordinary processes of management-staff relations, including proposals for publications.

The service was instrumental in breaking up a largeSovietspy ring at the start of the 1970s, with 105 Soviet embassy staff known or suspected to be involved in intelligence activities being expelled from the country in 1971.

One episode involving MI5 and theBBCcame to light in the mid-1980s. MI5 officerRonnie Stonhamhad an office in the BBC, and took part in vetting procedures.

Controversy arose when it was alleged that the service was monitoringtrade unionsand left-wing politicians. A file was kept on Labour Prime MinisterHarold Wilsonfrom 1945, when he became aMember of Parliament(MP), although the agency's official historian,Christopher Andrewmaintains that his fears of MI5 conspiracies and bugging were unfounded.As Home Secretary, theLabourMPJack Strawdiscovered the existence of his own file dating from his days as astudent radical.

One of the most significant and far reaching failures was an inability to conclusively detect and apprehend the 'Cambridge Five' spy ring, which had formed in the inter-war years, and achieved great success in penetrating the government, and the intelligence agencies themselves.Related to this failure were suggestions of a high-level penetration within the service,Peter Wright(especially in his controversial bookSpycatcher) and others believing that evidence implicated the former Director General,Roger Hollis,or his deputyGraham Mitchell.TheTrendinquiry of 1974 found the case unproven of that accusation, and that view was later supported by the former KGB officerOleg Gordievsky.Another spy ring, thePortland Spy Ring,exposed after a tip-off by Soviet defectorMichael Goleniewski,led to an extensive MI5 surveillance operation.

In 1991, MI5 revealed its head publicly for the first time and declassified some information, "such as the number of its employees and its organizational structure."

There have been strong accusations levelled against MI5 for having failed in its obligation to provide care for former police agents who had infiltrated theProvisional IRAduringthe Troubles.The two most notable of the agents,Martin McGartlandandRaymond Gilmour,went on to reside in England using false identities, and in 2012, launched test cases against the agency. Both men claimed to journalist Liam Clarke in theBelfast Telegraphthat they were abandoned by MI5 and were "left high and dry despite severe health problems as a result of their work and lavish promises of life-time care from their former Intelligence Boss es". Both men suffer frompost-traumatic stress disorder(PTSD).

Following theUnited States invasion of Afghanistan,on 9 January 2002, the first MI5 staff arrived atBagram.On 12 January 2002, following a report by anMI6officer that a detainee appeared to have been mistreated before, an MI6 officer was sent instructions that were copied to all MI5 and MI6 staff in Afghanistan about how to deal with concerns over mistreatment, referring to signs of abuse: 'Given that they are not within our custody or control, the law does not require you to intervene to protect this'. It went on to say that the Americans had to understand that the UK did not condone such mistreatment, and that a complaint should be made to a senior US official if there was any coercion by the US in conjunction with an MI6 interview.

The Security Service's role in counter-terrorism

Part ofThames House

The end of theCold Warresulted in a change in emphasis for the operations of the service, assuming responsibility for the investigation of allIrish republicanactivity within Britain,and increasing the effort countering other forms of terrorism, particularly in more recent years the more widespread threat ofIslamic extremism.

Whilst the British security forces inNorthern Irelandhave provided support in the countering of bothrepublicanandloyalistparamilitarygroups since the early 1970s, republican sources have often accused these forces ofcollusionwith loyalists. In 2006, an Irish government committee inquiry found that there was widespread collusion between British security forces and loyalist terrorists in the 1970s, which resulted in eighteen deaths.In 2012, a document based review bySir Desmond de SilvaQCinto the 1989 murder of Belfast solicitorPatrick Finucanefound that MI5 had colluded with theUlster Defence Association(UDA).The review disclosed that MI5 assessments of UDA intelligence consistently noted that the majority came from MI5 sources, with an assessment in 1985 finding 85% came from MI5.Prime MinisterDavid Cameronaccepted the findings, and apologised on behalf of the British government, and acknowledged significant levels of collusion with Loyalists in its state agencies.

On 10 October 2007, the lead responsibility for national security intelligence in Northern Ireland returned to the Security Service from thePolice Service of Northern Ireland(PSNI), that had been devolved in 1976 to theRoyal Ulster Constabulary(RUC) duringUlsterisation.During April 2010, theReal IRAdetonated a 120 lbcar bomboutside Palace Barracks inCounty Down,which is the headquarters of MI5 in Northern Ireland and also home to the 2nd BattalionThe Mercian Regiment.

MI5 is understood to have a close working relationship with theRepublic of Ireland'sSpecial Detective Unit(SDU), the counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence section of theGarda Síochána(national police), particularly with regards to threats fromdissident republicanterrorism andIslamic terrorism.

Recognising service at home and abroad protecting the United Kingdom

Executive liaison groups enable MI5 to safely share secret, sensitive, and often raw intelligence with the police, on which decisions can be made about how best to gather evidence and prosecute suspects in the courts. Each organisation works in partnership throughout the investigation, but MI5 retain the lead for collecting, assessing and exploiting intelligence. The police take lead responsibility for gathering evidence, obtaining arrests, and preventing risks to the public.

Serious crime

In 1996, legislation formalised the extension of the Security Service's statutory remit to include supporting the law enforcement agencies in their work against serious crime.Tasking was reactive, acting at the request of law enforcement bodies such as theNational Criminal Intelligence Service(NCIS), for whom MI5 officers performed electronic surveillance and eavesdropping duties duringOperation Trinity.This role has subsequently been passed to theSerious Organised Crime Agency(SOCA) and then theNational Crime Agency(NCA).

Surveillance

In 2001, after the11 September attacksin the U.S., MI5 started collecting bulk telephone communications data under a little understood general power of theTelecommunications Act 1984(instead of theRegulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000which would have brought independent oversight and regulation). This was kept secret until announced by theHome Secretaryin 2015.This power was replaced by theInvestigatory Powers Act 2016which introduced new surveillance powers overseen by the Investigatory Powers Commission (IPC) it introduces.

In July 2006, parliamentarianNorman Bakeraccused the British Government of "hoarding information about people who pose no danger to this country", after it emerged that MI5 holds secret files on 272,000 individuals, equivalent to one in 160 adults. It had previously been revealed that a 'traffic light' system operates:

• Green: active; about 10% of files
• Amber: enquiries prohibited, further information may be added; about 46% of files
• Red: enquiries prohibited, substantial information may not be added; about 44% of files.

Participation of MI5 officers in criminal activity

In March 2018, the government acknowledged that MI5 officers are allowed to authorise agents to commit criminal activity in the UK. Maya Foa, the director ofReprieve,said: "After a seven-month legal battle, the prime minister has finally been forced to publish her secret order, but we are a long way from having transparency. The public and parliament are still being denied the guidance that says when British spies can commit criminal offences, and how far they can go. Authorised criminality is the most intrusive power a state can wield. Theresa May must publish this guidance without delay".

In November 2019, fourhuman rights organisationsclaimed that the UK government has a policy dating from the 1990s to allow MI5 officers to authorise agents or informers to participate in crime, and to immunise them against prosecution for criminal actions. The organisations said the policy allowed MI5 officers to authorise agents and informers to participate in criminal activities that protected national security or the economic well-being of the UK. The organisations took the UK government to theInvestigatory Powers Tribunal,seeking to have it declare the policy illegal, and to issue an injunction against further 'unlawful conduct'.In December 2019, the tribunal dismissed the request of the human rights organisations in a 3-to-2 decision. The potential criminal activities include murder, kidnap, and torture, according to aBloombergreport.

Allegations of collusion in torture

In October 2020,Rangzieb Ahmedbrought a civil claim against MI5, alleging that Pakistan'sInter-Services Intelligenceagency had arrested him in 2006, and that MI5 had colluded in torture by submitting questions which were put to him under torture in Pakistan.This claim was rejected by the High Court on 16 December 2020.

Buildings

MI5 was based at Watergate House in theStrandfrom 1912 until 1916, when it moved to larger facilities at 16Charles Streetfor the remaining years of theFirst World War.After the First World War, it relocated to smaller premises at 73–75Queen's Gatein 1919,and then moved to 35Cromwell Roadin 1929, before transferring to the top floor of the South Block ofThames HouseonMillbankin 1934.The Service spent the first year of theSecond World WaratWormwood Scrubs,before moving toBlenheim Palace,Oxfordshire, in 1940.After the Second World War, MI5 was based atLeconfield House(1945–1976), and140 Gower Street(1976–1994, since demolished),before returning to Thames House in 1994.

The national headquarters at Thames House draws together personnel from a number of locations into a single HQ facility: Thames House also houses theJoint Terrorism Analysis Centre(JTAC), a subordinate organisation to the Security Service; prior to March 2013, Thames House additionally housed theNorthern Ireland Office(NIO). The service has offices across the United Kingdom, including a HQ inNorthern Ireland.

Details of a northern operations centre inGreater Manchesterwere revealed by the firm who built it.

Directors General of the Security Service

Dame Stella Rimington,the first femaleDirector General of MI5

Main article:Director General of MI5

• 1909–1940:Sir Vernon Kell(born 1873 – d. 1942)
• 1940–1941:Oswald Allen Harker(born 1886 – d. 1968)
• 1941–1946:Sir David Petrie(born 1879 – d. 1961)
• 1946–1953:Sir Percy Sillitoe(born 1888 – d. 1962)
• 1953–1956:Dick White(born 1906 – d. 1993)
• 1956–1965:Roger Hollis(born 1905 – d. 1973)
• 1965–1972:Martin Furnival Jones(born 1912 – d. 1997)
• 1972–1979:Michael Hanley(born 1918 – d. 2001)
• 1979–1981:Howard Smith(born 1919 – d. 1996)
• 1981–1985:John Jones(born 1923 – d. 1998)
• 1985–1988:Antony Duff(born 1920 – d. 2000)
• 1988–1992:Patrick Walker(born 1932 - d. 2021)
• 1992–1996:Stella Rimington(born 1935)
• 1996–2002:Stephen Lander(born 1947)
• 2002–2007:Eliza Manningham-Buller(born 1948)
• 2007–2013:Jonathan Evans(born 1958)
• 2013–2020:Andrew Parker(born 1962)
• 2020–present:Ken McCallum

Past names of the Security Service

Although the Service is commonly referred to as 'MI5', this was its official name for only thirteen years (1916–1929). However, it is still used as a sub-title on the various pages of the official Security Service website, as well as in their web address (https:// MI5.gov.uk).

• October 1909: founded as theHome Section of the Secret Service Bureau;
• April 1914: became a sub-section of the War OfficeDirectorate of Military Operations, section 5(MO5) — MO5(g);
• September 1916: becameMilitary Intelligence section 5— MI5;
• 1929: renamed theDefence Security Service;
• 1931: renamed theSecurity Service.

Cover name

MI5 has previously usedGovernment Communications Planning Directorate(GCPD) as a cover name when sponsoring research related to drone usage in charging recording devices.

Crest

Coat of arms of MI5

Notes Adopted 1981 Motto REGNUM DEFENDE

See also

• British intelligence agencies
• Annie Machon– MI5 whistleblower
• David Shayler– MI5 whistleblower
• Club de Berne– a European intelligence sharing forum
• Counter Terrorism Policing
• Counter Terrorism Command– of London's Metropolitan Police Service
• Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre(JTAC)
• National Protective Security Authority– child agency of MI5 which provides security advice
• Pat Finucane– Irish lawyer murdered by Ulster Defence Association members with the collusion of the security service

Further reading

• Aldrich, R. J.; Cormac, R. (2016).The Black Door: Spies, Secret Intelligence and British Prime Ministers.Collins.ISBN978-0-00-755544-4.
• Andrew, Christopher(2009).The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5.Allen Lane.ISBN978-1-84614-284-0.Published asDefend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5.USA: Knopf. November 2009.ISBN978-0-307-26363-6..
• Curry, John (1999).The Security Service, 1908–1945.Public Record Office.ISBN978-1-873162-79-8.
• Hennessey, Thomas; Thomas, Claire (2009).Spooks: The Unofficial History of MI5 from the First Atom Spy to 7/7, 1945–2009.Amberley.ISBN978-1-84868-079-1.
• Hennessey, Thomas; Thomas, Claire (2010).Spooks: The Unofficial History of MI5 from Agent ZIGZAG to the D-Day Deception, 1939–45.Amberley Publishing.ISBN978-1-4456-0184-7.
• Machon, A. (2005).Spies, Lies and Whistleblowers: MI5, MI6 and the Shayler Affair.The Book Guild.ISBN978-1-85776-952-4.
• Milne, Seumas(2014).The Enemy Within: The Secret War Against the Miners.Verso Books.ISBN978-1-78168-342-2.
• Murphy, Christopher J. (2006).Security and Special Operations: SOE and MI5 During the Second World War.New York: Palgrave Macmillan.ISBN978-0-230-00241-8.
• Pincher, Chapman (2011).Treachery Betrayals, Blunders and Cover Ups: Six Decades of Espionage.Mainstream Publishing.ISBN978-1-78057-540-7.
• Quinlan, Kevin (2014).The Secret War Between the Wars: MI5 in the 1920s and the 1930s.Bowyer.ISBN978-1-84383-938-5.
• Rimington, Stella(2001).Open Secret: The Autobiography of the Former Director-General of MI5.Hutchinson.ISBN978-0-09943-672-0.
• Thomas, Martin (2008).Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914.University of California Press.ISBN978-0-52025-117-5.
• Thurlow, R. (1994).The Secret State: British Internal Security in the Twentieth Century.Blackwell.ISBN978-0-631-16066-3.
• West, Nigel(1981).A British Security Service Operations, 1939–1945.Bodley Head.ISBN978-0-370-30324-6.
• West, Nigel (1982).A Matter of Trust: MI5, 1945–72.Weidenfeld & Nicolson.ISBN978-0-340-33781-3.
• West, Nigel (2012).Mask: MI5's Penetration of the Communist Party of Great Britain.Routledge.ISBN978-0-415-35145-4.

External links

• Official website
• Records of the Security Service—fromThe National Archives
• UK Intelligence community online—from theCabinet Office