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United States invasion of Panama

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United States invasion of Panama
Part of theWar on DrugsandCold War

Clockwise from top:
DateDecember 20, 1989(1989-12-20)– January 31, 1990[1]
(1 month, 1 week and 4 days)
Location
Panama
Result American victory[2]
Belligerents
Panama United States
Panamanian opposition
Commanders and leaders
PanamaManuel Noriega(POW)
PanamaMarcos Justine(POW)
PanamaFrancisco A. Rodríguez
United StatesGeorge H. W. Bush
United StatesDick Cheney
United StatesMaxwell R. Thurman
United StatesNorman Schwarzkopf Jr.
United StatesJack B. Farris
PanamaGuillermo Endara
Strength
16,000 27,000
Casualties and losses
314 killed[3]
1,908 captured
23 killed[4]
325 wounded

Panamanian civilians killed according to:[3]
U.S. military: 202
Americas Watch: 300
United Nations: 500
Central American Human Rights Commission: 2,000–3,000[5][6]

1 Spanish journalist killed[7][8]

TheUnited StatesinvadedPanamain mid-December 1989 during the presidency ofGeorge H. W. Bush.The primary purpose of the invasion was to depose thede factoruler of Panama, GeneralManuel Noriega,who was wanted by U.S. authorities forracketeeringanddrug trafficking.The operation, codenamedOperation Just Cause,concluded in late January 1990 with the surrender of Noriega.[9]ThePanama Defense Forces(PDF) were dissolved, and President-electGuillermo Endarawas sworn into office.

Noriega, who had longstanding ties to United States intelligence agencies, consolidated power to become Panama'sde factodictator in the early 1980s. In the mid-1980s, relations between Noriega and the U.S. began to deteriorate due to fallout of the murder ofHugo Spadaforaand the removal from office of PresidentNicolas Ardito Barletta.His criminal activities and association with other spy agencies came to light, and in 1988 he was indicted by federalgrand jurieson several drug-related charges. Negotiations seeking his resignation, which began under the presidency ofRonald Reagan,were ultimately unsuccessful. In 1989, Noriega annulled the results of thePanamanian general elections,which appeared to have been won by opposition candidate Guillermo Endara; President Bush responded by reinforcing the U.S. garrison in theCanal Zone.After a U.S. Marine officer was shot dead at a PDF roadblock, Bush authorized the execution of the Panama invasion plan.

On December 20, the U.S. invasion of Panama began. Panamanian forces were rapidly overwhelmed, although operations continued for several weeks. Endara was sworn in as president shortly after the start of the invasion. Noriega eluded capture for several days before seeking refuge in theHoly Seediplomatic mission in Panama City. He surrendered on January 3, 1990, and was then flown to the U.S., where he was tried, convicted and sentenced to 40 years in prison.

The Pentagon estimated that 516 Panamanians were killed during the invasion, including 314 soldiers and 202 civilians. A total of 23 U.S. soldiers and 3 U.S. civilians were killed. TheUnited Nations General Assemblyand theOrganization of American Statesboth condemned the invasion as a violation of international law.

The United States invasion of Panama can be seen as a rare example ofdemocratizationbyforeign-imposed regime changethat was effective long-term.[10]

Background

[edit]

In the late 20th century, the United States had maintained numerous military bases and a substantial garrison throughout theCanal Zoneto protect and maintain American control of the strategically importantPanama Canal.On September 7, 1977,U.S. PresidentJimmy Carterand thede factoleader of Panama, GeneralOmar Torrijos,signed the Torrijos–Carter Treaties, which set in motion the process of handing over the canal to Panamanian control by 2000. Although the canal was destined for Panamanian administration, the military bases remained, and one condition of the transfer was that the canal would remain open to American shipping. The U.S. had long-standing relations with Torrijos' successor, GeneralManuel Noriega,who served as a U.S. intelligence asset and paid informant of theCentral Intelligence Agency(CIA) from 1967, including the period whenGeorge H. W. Bushwasdirectorof the agency (1976–77).[11]

Noriega had sided with the U.S. rather than theSoviet UnioninCentral America,notably in sabotaging the forces of theSandinistagovernment in Nicaragua, and the revolutionaries of theFarabundo Martí National Liberation Front(FMLN) in El Salvador. Noriega received upward of $100,000 per year from the 1960s until the 1980s, when his salary was increased to $200,000 per year.[12]Although he worked with theDrug Enforcement Administration(DEA) to restrictillegal drug shipments,Noriega was known to simultaneously accept significant financial support from drug dealers and facilitate thelaunderingof drug money.[11]These drug dealers received protection from DEA investigations due to Noriega's special relationship with the CIA.[13]

In the mid-1980s, relations between Noriega and the U.S. began to deteriorate. In 1986, U.S. PresidentRonald Reaganopened negotiations with Noriega, requesting that the Panamanian leader step down after his criminal activities were publicly exposed inThe New York TimesbySeymour Hersh.[14]Reagan pressured Noriega with several drug-relatedindictmentsin U.S. courts; however, sinceextraditionlaws between Panama and the U.S. were weak, Noriega deemed this threat not credible and did not submit to Reagan's demands.[15]In 1988,Elliot Abramsand others in thePentagonbegan pushing for a U.S. invasion. Reagan refused due to Bush's ties to Noriega through his previous positions in the CIA and their potentially negative impact on Bush'spresidential campaign.[16]Later negotiations involved dropping the drug-related indictments.

In March 1988, Noriega's forces resisted an attemptedcoup d'etatagainst his regime. As relations continued to deteriorate, Noriega appeared to shift his Cold War allegiance toward the Soviet bloc, soliciting and receiving military aid fromCuba,Nicaragua, andLibya.[17]U.S. military planners began preparing contingency plans to invade Panama.

In September 1988, Panamanian authorities reported that they had arrested 16 people on suspicion of plotting another coup d'etat. Twelve of the conspirators were alleged to be part of the "National Patriotic Committee", a U.S.-supported guerrilla group that sought to oust Noriega. Panamanian newspaperCriticaclaimed that the plot had been financed by the United States.[18]

In May 1989, during thePanamanian national elections,an alliance of parties opposed to the Noriega regime counted results from the country's election precincts, before they were sent to the district centers. Their tally showed their candidate,Guillermo Endara,defeatingCarlos Duque,candidate of a pro-Noriega coalition, by nearly 3–1. Endara was physically assaulted by Noriega supporters the next day in his motorcade.[11]Noriega declared the election null andmaintained power by force,making him unpopular among Panamanians. Noriega's regime insisted that it had won the presidential election and that irregularities had been on the part of U.S.-backed candidates from opposition parties.[19]President Bush called on Noriega to honor the will of the Panamanian people while the U.S. reinforced its Canal Zone garrison, and increased the tempo of training and other activities intended to put pressure on Noriega.[11][20]

In October 1989, Noriega foiledanother coup attemptby members of thePanama Defense Forces(PDF), led by MajorMoisés Giroldi.[21]Bush, under mounting pressure, declared that the U.S. would not negotiate with a drug trafficker and denied knowledge of Noriega's involvement with the drug trade prior to his February 1988 indictment, although he had met with Noriega as CIA director and had been chair of the Task Force on Drugs whileVice President.[22]On December 15, the Panamanian general assembly passed a resolution declaring that a state of war existed between Panama and the United States.[23][24][25]

1st Lt Robert Paz, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines

On the night following the war declaration, at approximately around 9:00 p.m., four U.S. military personnel were stopped at a roadblock outside PDF headquarters in theEl Chorrilloneighborhood ofPanama City.MarineCaptain Richard E. Hadded,NavyLieutenant Michael J. Wilson,ArmyCaptain Barry L. Rainwater and Marine First Lieutenant Robert Paz had left the U.S. base atFort Claytonand were on their way to have dinner at the Marriott Caesar Park Hotel in downtown Panama City. The Pentagon reported that the servicemen had been unarmed, were in a private vehicle and attempted to flee only after their vehicle was surrounded by an angry crowd of civilians and PDF troops. The PDF asserted later that the Americans were armed and on areconnaissancemission. The PDF opened fire and Paz was fatally wounded by a round that entered the rear of the vehicle and struck him in the back. Hadded, the driver of the vehicle, was also wounded in the foot. Paz was rushed toGorgas Army Hospitalbut died of his wounds; he received thePurple Heartposthumously.[26]

According to U.S. military sources, a U.S. Naval officer,SEALLieutenant Adam Curtis, and his wife, Bonnie, witnessed the incident and were detained by PDF troops.[27]While in police custody, Curtis was beaten, and his wife threatened withsexual assault.Curtis spent two weeks in the hospital recovering from the beating.[23]On December 16 Bush ordered the execution of the Panama invasion plan; the military setH-Houras 0100 on December 20.[28]

International mediation

[edit]

Several neighboring governments secretly tried to negotiate a peaceful outcome and Noriega's willing resignation. PresidentsOscar AriasandDaniel Oduberof Costa Rica,Carlos Andrés Pérezof Venezuela,Alfonso López Michelsenof Colombia and Spanish Prime MinisterFelipe Gonzálezall on different occasions met Noriega in secret attempting to convince him to give up power and self-exile himself in Spain, to no avail.[29][30]

U.S. rationale

[edit]

The official U.S. rationale for the invasion was articulated by President Bush on the morning of December 20, 1989, a few hours after the start of the operation. Bush cited Panama's declaration of a state of war with the United States and attacks on U.S. troops asjustification for the invasion.[31]

Bush further identified four objectives of the invasion:

  • Safeguarding the lives of U.S. citizens in Panama. In his statement, Bush stated that Noriega had declared that a state of war existed between the U.S. and Panama and had threatened the lives of the approximately 35,000 U.S. citizens living there. There had been numerous clashes between U.S. and Panamanian forces; one U.S. Marine had been killed a few days earlier.
  • Defending democracy and human rights in Panama.
  • Combating drug trafficking. Panama had become a center for drug money laundering and a transit point for drug trafficking to the U.S. and Europe.
  • Protecting the integrity of the Torrijos–Carter Treaties. Members ofCongressand others in the U.S. political establishment claimed that Noriega threatened the neutrality of the Panama Canal, and that the U.S. had the right under the treaties to intervene militarily to protect the canal.[32]

U.S. forces were instructed to begin maneuvers and activities within the restrictions of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties, such as ignoring PDF roadblocks and conducting short-notice "Category Three"military exerciseson security-sensitive targets, with the express goal of provoking PDF soldiers. U.S.SOUTHCOMkept a list of abuses against U.S. servicemen and civilians by the PDF while the orders to incite PDF soldiers were in place.[16]

As for the Panamanian legislature's war declaration, Noriega insisted in his memoirs[33]that this declaration referred to a state of war directed by the U.S. against Panama, in the form of what he claimed were harsheconomic sanctionsand provocative military maneuvers (Operations Purple Stormand Sand Flea)[citation needed]that were prohibited by the Torrijos-Carter Treaties.

Bush's four reasons for the invasion provided sufficient justification to establish bipartisan Congressional approval and support. However, the secrecy before the invasion's initiation, the speed and success of the invasion itself, and U.S. public support for it (80% public approval)[34]did not allowDemocraticlawmakers to object to Bush's decision to use military force.[34]One contemporary study suggests that Bush decided to invade for domestic political reasons, citing scarce strategic reasoning for the U.S. to invade and immediately withdraw without establishing the structure to enforce the interests that Bush used to justify the invasion.[34]

Operation Just Cause

[edit]
Tactical map of Operation Just Cause showing major points of attack
Elements of 1st Bn, 508th Infantry parachuting into a drop zone, during training, outside of Panama City.

The U.S. Army, Navy, Marines,Air ForceandCoast Guardparticipated in Operation Just Cause.[35]Ground forces consisted of:

Air logistic support was provided by the22nd Air Forcewith air assets from the 60th, 62nd, and 63rd military airlift wings.

The U.S. invasion of Panama began on December 20, 1989, at 12:46 a.m. local time. The operation involved 27,684 U.S. troops and over 300 aircraft, includingC-130 Herculestactical transports flown by the317th Tactical Airlift Wing(which was equipped with the Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System or AWADS) and314th Tactical Airlift Wing,AC-130 Spectregunships,OA-37B Dragonflyobservation and attack aircraft,C-141 StarlifterandC-5 Galaxystrategic transports,F-117A Nighthawkstealth ground-attack aircraft flown by the37th Tactical Fighter Wing,andAH-64 Apacheattack helicopters. The invasion was the first combat deployment for the AH-64, theHMMWV,and the F-117A. Panamanian radar units were jammed by twoEF-111Aselectronic warfare aircraft of the 390th ECS, 366th TFW.[38]These aircraft were deployed against the 16,000 members of the PDF.[39]

The operation began with an assault of strategic installations, such as the civilianPunta Paitilla Airportin Panama City and a PDFgarrisonand airfield atRio Hato,where Noriega also maintained a residence.Navy SEALsdestroyed Noriega's private jet and sunk a Panamaniangunboat.A Panamanian ambush killed four SEALs and wounded nine. Other military command centers throughout the country were also attacked. C Company 1st Battalion (Airborne) 508th PIR was assigned the task of securingLa Comandancia,the central headquarters of the PDF. This attack touched off several fires, one of which destroyed most of the adjoining and heavily populated El Chorrillo neighborhood inPanama City.During the firefight atLa Comandancia,the PDF downed two special operations helicopters and forced oneMH-6 Little Birdhelicopter to crash-land in the Panama Canal.[40]The opening round of attacks in Panama City also included a special operations raid on the Carcel Modelo prison (known asOperation Acid Gambit) to free Kurt Muse, a U.S. citizen convicted of espionage by Noriega.

A U.S. ArmyM113

Fort Amadorwas secured by elements of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 5th Infantry Division [Scouts] and 59th Engineer Company (sappers) in a nighttime air assault which secured the fort in the early hours of December 20. Fort Amador was a key position because of its relationship to the large oil farms adjacent to the canal, theBridge of the Americasover the canal, and the Pacific entrance to the canal. Keycommand and controlelements of the PDF were stationed there. Furthermore, Fort Amador had a large U.S. housing district that needed to be secured to prevent the PDF from taking U.S. citizens as hostages. This position also protected the left flank of the attack onLa Comandanciaand the securing of the El Chorrillos neighborhood, guarded by Noriega'sDignity Battalions.Military police units fromFort Bragg,North Carolina,deployed via strategic airlift intoHoward Air Force Basethe next morning and secured key government buildings in Panama City. MPs seized PDF weapons, vehicles and supplies during house-to-house searches in the following days and conductedurban combatoperations againstsnipersand Dignity Battalion holdouts for the following week.[citation needed]

A few hours after the invasion began, Guillermo Endara, who had been the "presumed winner" of the scheduled presidential election earlier in 1989, was sworn in at Fort Clayton.[41][42]

A platoon from the1138th Military Police Company,Missouri Army National Guard,which was on a routine two-week rotation to Panama, was called upon to set up a detainee camp on Empire Range to handle the mass of civilian and military detainees. This was the first National Guard unit called into active service since theVietnam War.[43]

Capture of Noriega

[edit]
American soldiers preparing to takeLa Comandanciain theEl Chorrilloneighborhood of Panama City, December 1989

Operation Nifty Packagewas an operation launched by Navy SEALs to prevent Noriega's escape. They sank his boat and destroyed his jet, at a cost of four killed and nine wounded. Military operations continued for several weeks, mainly against PDF units. Noriega remained at large for several days, but realizing he had few options in the face of a massive manhunt and a $1 million reward for his capture, he obtained refuge in theApostolic Nunciatureof the diplomatic mission of theHoly Seein Panama City. However, the U.S. military's psychological warfare pressure on Noriega was relentless, reportedly with the playing of loud rock-and-roll music day and night in the densely populated area surrounding the Holy See mission.[44]A report of the Office of the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staffclaimed that the music was used principally to preventparabolic microphonesfrom being used to eavesdrop on negotiations and not as apsychological weaponbased around Noriega's supposed loathing of rock music.[40]Noriega finally surrendered to U.S. forces on January 3, 1990. He was immediately put on anMC-130E Combat Talon Iaircraft and flown to the United States.

Casualties

[edit]
A U.S. ArmySikorsky UH-60 Black Hawkpicks up a Marine casualty

According to official Pentagon figures, 516 Panamanians were killed during the invasion, including 314 soldiers and 202 civilians;[3]however, an internal U.S. Army memo estimated the number at 1,000.[45]TheUnited Nationsestimated 500 civilian deaths,[citation needed]whereasAmericas Watchestimated 300 civilian deaths. President Guillermo Endara said that "less than 600 Panamanians" died during the entire invasion. FormerU.S. Attorney GeneralRamsey Clarkestimated 3,000 civilian deaths. TheRoman Catholic Churchestimated that 673 Panamanians were killed in total.Physicians for Human Rightssaid it had received "reliable reports of more than 100 civilian deaths" that were not included in the U.S. military estimate but also that there was no evidence of several thousand civilian deaths. According toThe New York Times,figures estimating thousands of civilian casualties were widely rejected in Panama.[3]

Human Rights Watch's 1991 report stated that even with these uncertainties, the figures on civilian casualties are "still troublesome" because:

With respect to the United States forces, our report concluded that the tactics and weapons utilized resulted in an inordinate number of civilian victims, in violation of specific obligations under the Geneva Conventions. [...][Panama's civilian deaths] reveal that the "surgical operation"by American forces inflicted a toll in civilian lives that was at least four-and-a-half times higher than military casualties in the enemy, and twelve or thirteen times higher than the casualties suffered by U.S. troops. By themselves, these ratios suggest that therule of proportionalityand the duty to minimize harm to civilians, where doing so would not compromise a legitimate military objective, were not faithfully observed by the invading U.S. forces. For us, the controversy over the number of civilian casualties should not obscure the important debate on the manner in which those people died.[46]

U.S. military casualties in the invasion were 23 killed[47]and 325 wounded. In June 1990, the U.S. military announced that of its casualties, 2 dead and 19 wounded were victims offriendly fire.[48]The number of Panamanian military dead was estimated at 314 by SOUTHCOM.[3]

Civilian fatalities included Kandi Helin and Ray Dragseth, two American schoolteachers working in Panama for the Department of Defense Schools. The adult son of another teacher, Rick Paul, was also killed by friendly fire as he ran towards an American roadblock. Juan Antonio Rodriguez Moreno, a Spanish freelance press photographer on assignment forEl Pais,was killed outside of the Marriott Caesar Park Hotel in Panama City early on December 21. In June 1990, his family filed a claim forwrongful deathagainst the U.S. government.[7]When the claim was rejected by the U.S. government in 1992, the Spanish government sent aNote Verbaleextendingdiplomatic protectionto Rodriguez and demanding compensation on behalf of his family.[49][50]The U.S. government again rejected the claim, disputing both its liability for warzone deaths in general and whether Rodriguez had been killed by U.S. rather than Panamanian gunfire.[49]

Women's roles

[edit]

Operation Just Cause involved the unprecedented use of U.S. military women during an invasion. Approximately 600 of the 26,000 members of the U.S. forces involved in the invasion were women. Women did not serve in direct combat roles or combat arms units, but did serve as military police, truck drivers, helicopter pilots, and in other logistical roles.[51]CaptainLinda L. Bray,commander of the 988th Military Police Company ofFort Benning,Georgia,led her troops in a three-hour firefight against PDF troops who refused to surrender a dog kennel which (it was later discovered) they were using to store weapons. Bray was said to be the first woman to lead U.S. troops in battle, and her role in the firefight led to controversy in the media and in Congress over women's roles in the U.S. military. Bray requested and received a discharge in 1991.[52]

First Lieutenant Lisa Kutschera and Warrant Officer Debra Mann pilotedUH-60"Blackhawk" helicopters ferrying infantry troops. Their helicopters came under fire during the invasion, and like their male counterparts, both women were awardedAir Medalsfor their roles during the invasion.[53]

The traditional role of women in wars has also seen a transformation during the invasion. Besides being combat medics and logisticians, many women took on support roles and provided crucial support that facilitated the operational objectives. This included roles in transportation, supply chain management, and intelligence. Outside of the battlefield, female journalists and reporters expansively covered the invasion, providing critical information to the public and bringing international attention to the events unfolding in Panama. These perspectives and the subsequent public discussion eventually led to the shaping of the public perception of the U.S. military action. After the invasion was concluded, women in both Panama and the U.S. participated in the reconstruction of communities and advocacy for human rights.

Origin of the name "Operation Just Cause"

[edit]

Operation plans directed against Panama had evolved from plans designed to defend the Panama Canal. They became more aggressive as the situation between the two nations deteriorated. ThePrayer Bookseries of plans included rehearsals for a possible clash (Operation Purple Storm) and missions to secure U.S. sites (Operation Bushmaster). The original operation, in which U.S. troops were deployed to Panama in early 1989, was called Operation Nimrod Dancer.[citation needed]

Eventually these plans became Operation Blue Spoon, renamed Operation Just Cause by the Pentagon to sustain the perceived legitimacy of the invasion.[54]GeneralColin Powellsaid that he liked the name because "even our severest critics would have to utter 'Just Cause' while denouncing us."[55]Critics, however, renamed it Operation "Just 'Cuz", arguing that it had been undertaken "just [be]cause Bush felt like it."[56][57]

The post-invasion civil-military operation designed to stabilize the situation, support the U.S.-installed government, and restore basic services was originally planned as Operation Blind Logic, but was renamed "Operation Promote Liberty" by the Pentagon on the eve of the invasion.[58]

Legality

[edit]

The U.S. government invokedself-defenseas a legal justification for the invasion.[31]Several scholars and observers have opined that the invasion was illegal under international law, arguing that the government's justifications were, according to these sources, factually groundless, and moreover, even if they had been true they would have provided inadequate support for the invasion under international law.[59]Article 2 of theUnited Nations Charter,a cornerstone of international law, prohibits the use of force by member states to settle disputes except in self-defense or when authorized by theUnited Nations Security Council.Articles 18 and 20 of theCharter of the Organization of American States,written in part in reaction to thehistory of U.S. military interventions in Central America,also explicitly prohibit the use of force by member states: "[n]o state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal affairs of any other state". The OAS charter further states that "the territory of a states is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another state, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever."[60]Other international law experts who have examined the legal justification of the invasion have concluded that it was a "gross violation" of international law.[61]

TheUnited Nations General Assemblypassed a resolution which determined that the U.S. invasion was a "flagrant violation of international law."[62]A similar resolution proposed by the United Nations Security Council was supported by the majority of its member nations but vetoed by the U.S., the United Kingdom and France.[63]

Independent experts and observers have also concluded that the invasion also exceeded the authority of the president under theUnited States Constitution.Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution grants the power to declare war solely to the Congress, not to the president.[64][65]The Bush administration argued that the military intervention was constitutional because the Panamanian national assembly had declared a state of war with the United States. This argument is supported by the Federal Convention, where James Madison moved to insert "declare" instead of "make" in "make war", leaving to the executive the power to repel sudden attacks. According to observers, the invasion also violated theWar Powers Resolution[66]– a federal law designed to limit presidential action without Congressional authorization – because the president failed to consult with Congress regarding the invasion prior to its execution.[67][63][68]

Local and international reactions

[edit]

The invasion provoked international outrage. Some countries charged that the U.S. had committed an act of aggression by invading Panama and was trying to conceal a new manifestation of its interventionist policy of force in Central America. On December 29, the United Nations General Assembly voted 75–20, with 40 abstentions, to condemn the invasion as a flagrant violation of international law.[69]

On December 22, theOrganization of American States(OAS) passed a resolution denouncing the invasion and calling for withdrawal of U.S. troops, as well as a resolution condemning the violation of the diplomatic status of the Nicaraguan embassy in Panama byU.S. Special Forceswho had entered the building.[70]At the United Nations Security Council, seven nations initiated a draft resolution demanding the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from Panama.[71]It wasvetoedon December 23 by the U.S., the United Kingdom and France,[72]which cited its right of self-defense of 35,000 Americans present on the Panama Canal.[73]

Peru recalledits ambassador from the U.S.in protest of the invasion.

InRomania,PresidentNicolae Ceaușescu,who was being overthrown in aviolent revolution,criticized the invasion as "brutal aggression".[74][75]

Some say that the Panamanian people overwhelmingly supported the invasion.[76]According to aCBS Newspoll, 92% of Panamanian adults supported the invasion, and 76% wished that U.S. forces had invaded in October during the second attempted coup.[76]The poll was conducted in 158 randomly selected areas of the country covering about 75 percent of Panama's adult population. CBS News said the margin of sampling error was plus or minus four percentage points.[77]Human Rights Watch described the reaction of the civilian population to the invasion as "generally sympathetic".[78]According toRobert Pastor,a former U.S. national security advisor, 74% of Americans polled approved of the action.[76]

Eighteen years after the invasion, Panama'sNational Assemblyunanimously declared December 20, 2007, to be a day of national mourning. The resolution was vetoed by PresidentMartin Torrijos.[79][80]On December 19, 2019, the Panamanian government declared December 20 to be a National Day of Mourning (Dia de duelo nacional), to be marked by lowering the national flag to half-staff.[81]

The Washington Postdisclosed several rulings of theOffice of Legal Counsel,issued shortly before the invasion, regarding the U.S. forces being charged with making an arrest abroad. One ruling interpretedan executive orderwhich prohibits the assassination of foreign leaders as suggesting that accidental killings would be acceptable foreign policy. Another ruling concluded that thePosse Comitatus Actof 1878, which prohibits the armed forces from making arrests without Congressional authorization, is effective only within the boundaries of the U.S., such that the military could be used as a police force abroad—for example, in Panama, to enforce a federal court warrant against Noriega.[82]

Aftermath

[edit]
El Chorrillowas badly damaged by fighting. More than 20,000 Panamanians were displaced during the invasion, and disorder continued for nearly two weeks.

Guillermo Endara, in hiding, was sworn in as president by a judge on the night preceding the invasion. In later years, he staged ahunger strike,calling attention to the poverty and homelessness left in the wake of both the Noriega years and the destruction caused by the U.S. invasion.

On July 19, 1990, a group of sixty companies with operations in Panama filed a lawsuit against the U.S. government inFederal District Court in New York City,alleging that the invasion was "done in a tortuous, careless and negligent manner with disregard for the property of innocent Panamanian residents". Most of the businesses had insurance, but the insurers either wentbankruptor refused to pay, claiming that acts of war were not covered.[83]

About 20,000 people lost their homes and becamerefugeesas a result ofurban warfare.About 2,700 families displaced by the El Chorrillo fire were given $6,500 each by the U.S. to build a new house or apartment in selected areas in or near Panama City. However, numerous problems were reported with the new constructions just two years after the invasion.[84]

Endara's government designated the first anniversary of the invasion a "national day of reflection". Hundreds of Panamanians marked the day with a "black march" through the streets of Panama City to denounce the invasion and Endara's economic policies. Protesters echoed claims that 3,000 people were killed as a result of U.S. military action. Since Noriega's ousting, Panama has had four presidential elections, with candidates from opposing parties succeeding each other in thePalacio de las Garzas.Panama's press, however, is still subject to numerous restrictions.[85]On February 10, 1990, the Endara government abolished the PDF and reformed the security apparatus by creating thePanamanian Public Forces(PPF). In 1994, a constitutional amendment permanently abolished the military of Panama. Concurrent with a severerecessionin Central America throughout the 1990s, Panama'sGDPrecovered by 1993, but very high unemployment remained a serious problem.

Noriega was brought to the U.S. to stand trial. He was subsequently convicted on eight counts ofdrug trafficking,racketeering,andmoney launderingand sentenced to 40 years in prison. His sentence was later reduced to 30 years.[86]He died in Panama City on May 29, 2017, at the age of 83.

On December 20, 2015, Vice PresidentIsabel De Saint Malo de Alvaradoannounced Panama's intention to form a special independent commission that would publish a report to mark the 26th anniversary of the invasion. The commission's goal would be to identify victims so thatreparationscould be paid to their families, as well as to establish public monuments and school curriculums to honor history and reclaim Panama's collective memory. Victims' families have claimed that past investigations into the invasion had been funded by U.S. authorities and therefore were biased.[citation needed]

Timeline

[edit]

Information in this section[citation needed]

1987

[edit]

September 1987

November 1987

  • U.S. Senate resolution cuts military and economic aid to Panama. Panamanians adopt resolution restricting U.S. military presence.

1988

[edit]

February 1988

  • Noriega indicted on drug-related charges. U.S. forces begin planning contingency operations in Panama (OPLAN Blue Spoon).

March 1988

  • March 15: First of four deployments of U.S. forces begins providing additional security to U.S. installations.
  • March 16: PDF officers attempt a coup against Noriega.

April 1988

  • April 5: Additional U.S. forces deployed to provide security.
  • April 9: Joint Task Force Panama activated.

1989

[edit]

May 1989

  • May 7:General electionare held in Panama; opposition alliance tally shows their candidate,Guillermo Endara,beating Noriega's candidate,Carlos Duque,by a 3 to 1 margin. The election is declared invalid two days later by Noriega.
  • May 11: President Bush orders 1,900 additional combat troops to Panama (Operation Nimrod Dancer).[87]
  • May 22: Convoys conducted to assert U.S. freedom of movement. Additional transport units travel from bases in the territorial U.S. to bases in Panama, and back, for this express purpose.

June–September 1989 (Operation Nimrod Dancer)

  • U.S. begins conducting joint training and freedom of movement exercises (Operation Sand Flea[citation needed]and Operation Purple Storm[citation needed]). Additional transport units continue repeatedly traveling from bases in the territorial U.S. to bases in Panama, and back, for this express purpose.

October 1989 (Operation Nimrod Dancer)

  • October 3: PDF, loyal to Noriega, defeat second coup attempt.

December 1989

  • December 15: Noriega refers to himself as leader of Panama and declares that the U.S. is in astate of warwith Panama.
  • December 16: U.S. Marine lieutenant shot and killed by PDF. Navy lieutenant and wife detained and assaulted by PDF.
  • December 17: NCA directs execution of Operation Just Cause.
  • December 18: Army lieutenant shoots PDF sergeant. Joint Task Force South (JTFSO) advance party deploys. JCS designates D-Day/H-Hour as 20 December/1:00 a.m.
  • December 19: U.S. forces alerted, marshalled, and launched.

D-Day, December 20, 1989

  • U.S. invasion of Panama begins. The operation was conducted as a campaign with limited military objectives. JTFSO objectives in PLAN 90-2 were to: protect U.S. lives and key sites and facilities, capture and deliver Noriega to competent authority, neutralize PDF forces, neutralize PDF command and control, support establishment of a U.S.-recognized government in Panama, and restructure the PDF. Major operations detailed elsewhere continued through December 24.

1990

[edit]
  • JCS directs execution of Operation Promote Liberty.

January 3, 1990 (D-Day + 14)

  • Noriega surrenders to U.S. forces in Panama City

January 31, 1990 (D-Day + 42)

  • Operation Just Cause ends.
  • Operation Promote Liberty begins.

1994

[edit]

September 1994 (D-Day + approximately 4.5 years)

  • Operation Promote Liberty ends.[58]

Major operations and involved U.S. units

[edit]

Operations

[edit]

All 27 objectives related to the Panamanian Defense Force were completed on D-Day, December 20, 1989. As initial forces moved to new objectives, follow-on forces from the 7th Infantry Division (L) moved into the western areas of Panama and into Panama City.

December 18, 1989 (D-Day – 2)

  • SFODA-795/796 of Company C, 3rd Bn, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), part of Task Force Black, moves to Albrook Air Force Station as a forward element in preparation to secure the Panamanian President-elect Endara and his two vice presidents-elect, by force, if necessary.

December 19, 1989 (D-Day − 1)

  • Company A, 1st Bn, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) – already deployed into Panama, along with 3rd Bn, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) – then permanently headquartered at Fort Davis, Panama, both elements of Task Force Black, moved to predetermined positions.
  • Task Force Black receives Presidential cross-border authority message from President Bush.
  • Company C, 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) is stood down from its mission to rescue of the duly elected Panamanian Presidency and awaits a new mission.
  • 3d Bde, 7th Infantry Division (L) (4/17th Inf), already deployed as part of peacekeeping forces in the region, was deployed to predetermined positions.
  • 2nd Bde, 7th Inf Div (L), was alerted for deployment. DRF 1 (5/21st Inf) and DRF 2 (2/27th INF) were deployed.
  • Tow Platoon, HHC, 5/87th Inf (L), conducts pre-invasion recon of all objectives for Task Force Wildcat.

December 20, 1989 (D-Day)

  • 3d Bde, 7th Infantry Division (L) (4/17th Inf) began operations in Colon City, the Canal Zone, and Panama City.
  • The remainder of the 2d Bde was deployed and closed in Panama.
  • Elements of 1st and 3rd Bn, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) conducted air assault and secured Pacora River Bridge preventing PDF reinforcements from reaching Omar Torrijos Airport and Panama City.
  • The entire 75th Ranger Regiment, split into two elements (Team Black and Team Gold), conducted simultaneous parachute drops at Rio Hato Airfield, along with half the command and control of the HQ 75th RGR, the entire 2nd Battalion 75th RGR, and two companies from 3rd Battalion 75th, to neutralize PDF and Macho de Montes units present, seize the runway, and secure Manuel Noriega's beachside facility.
  • The other half of HQ 75th RGR C&C, along with 1st Battalion 75th RGR and the remaining elements of 3rd Battalion 75th RGR, dropped into Omar Torrijos Airport to seize the runway and tower for follow-on operations by elements of the 82nd Airborne Division, deployed by C141 airdrop/airland elements of the 317th Combat Control Squadron, 507th Tactical Air Control Squadron.
  • 193d Infantry Brigade (Light) assaulted PDF headquarters at La Commandancia, PDF Engineer Battalion, PDF 5th Company at Fort Amador, PDF units at Balboa and Ancon.
  • 45 minutes after the 75th RGR RGT conducted their parachute drop onto Omar Torrijos Airport the 1st BDE 82 ABN DIV begins parachuting onto the airfield, and then assembles for movement to assigned follow on objectives.
  • Company C, 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) conducts a daylight raid on Panama National Radio in downtown Panama City by fast-roping onto the roof of its 20-story building from MH-60 helicopters, destroying its FM broadcast capability. In a short turn around operation with 15 minutes warning and on order from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the unit air assaults the Radio Panama AM radio transmitter site destroying the transmission tower and cutting off Noriega's final link to rally his supporters.

December 21, 1989 (D-Day + 1)

  • JCS directed execution of Operation Promote Liberty (renamed from Plan Blind Logic).
  • The Panama Canal reopened for daylight operations.
  • Refugee situation became critical.
  • C Company, 5th Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment (193d Infantry Brigade) repelled a PDF counterattack at the PDF DNTT headquarters and rescued Panamanian Vice President Ford, whose convoy was also attacked.
  • TF Bayonet began CMO in Panama City.
  • Marriott Caesar Park Hotel was secured and hostages evacuated.

December 22, 1989 (D-Day + 2)

  • FPP established.
  • CMO and stability operations became primary focus.
  • 2d Bde, 7th Inf Div (L), deployed to Rio Hato.
  • 1st Bde (9th Regiment), 7th Inf Div (L), was alerted for deployment.

December 23, 1989 (D-Day + 3)

  • International airport reopened.
  • 2d Bde, 7th Inf Div (L) and SF elements began operations in west.
  • 96th CA Bn assumed responsibility for DC Camp from USARSO.
  • 1st Bde (9th Regiment) 7th Inf Div (L) closed in Panama.

December 24, 1989 (D-Day + 4)

  • Noriega entered Papal Nunciatura.
  • Money for Weapons program initiated.
  • Combined U.S./FPP patrols began.

December 25, 1989 (D-Day + 5)

  • Rangers secured Davíd.
  • Operations in western Panama continued successfully.

January 3, 1990 (D-Day + 14)

  • Noriega surrendered to U.S. forces.
  • Combat and stability ops continue.

January 31, 1990 (D-Day + 42)

  • Operation Just Cause ends.[1]
  • Operation Promote Liberty begins.

September 1994 (D-Day + approximately 4.5 years)

  • Operation Promote Liberty ends.[58]

Above information in this section[citation needed]

[edit]
  • Operation Nifty Package:an operation which the SEALs undertook in order to capture Manuel Noriega or destroy his two escape routes: his private jet, located at Paitilla Airfield, was destroyed in the operation along with his gunboat, which was docked in a canal. Noriega surrendered to U.S. troops on January 3, 1990.
  • Operation Nimrod Dancer: an operation which reinforced the forward-deployed U.S. forces with a brigade headquarters and an infantry battalion task force from the 7th Inf Div (L), a mechanized infantry battalion from the 5th Inf Div (M), and a U.S. Marine Corps Light Armored Infantry (LAI) Company. Augmentation continued with units rotating from both divisions under Operation Nimrod Sustain.[citation needed]
  • Operation Prayer Book
  • Operation Promote Liberty: an operation whose purpose was to rebuild the Panamanian military and Panama's civilian infrastructure.
  • Operation Purple Storm:an operation whose purpose was to assert, display, and exercise U.S. freedom-of-movement rights, with convoys traveling both inside and outside Panama for that express purpose.
  • Operation Sand Flea: an operation whose purpose was to exercise, display, and assert U.S. freedom-of-movement rights, with convoys traveling both inside and outside Panama for that express purpose.
  • Raid at Renacer Prison:a military operation in which the prison was taken over and 64 prisoners were rescued.

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ab"Veterans Preference and" Wartime "Service".archives.gov.August 15, 2016.
  2. ^"Operation Just Cause: The Invasion of Panama, December 1989".United States Army.
  3. ^abcdeRohter, Larry (April 1, 1990)."Panama and U.S. Strive To Settle on Death Toll".The New York Times.RetrievedDecember 24,2017.
  4. ^Archibold, Randal C. (May 30, 2017)."Manuel Noriega, Dictator Ousted by U.S. in Panama, Dies at 83".The New York Times.RetrievedJanuary 22,2018.
  5. ^Chomsky, Noam (1991).Deterring Democracy.Boston, MA: South End Press. p. 164.ISBN9781466801530.
  6. ^Archived atGhostarchiveand theWayback Machine:Trent, Barbara (1992).The Panama Deception.
  7. ^abRiding, Alan (June 24, 1990)."U.S. Sued in Death of a Journalist in Panama".The New York Times.
  8. ^"'It's Been Worth It': Bush—U.S. Troops Take Control of Panama ".Los Angeles Times.December 21, 1989.
  9. ^Donnelly, Thomas; Roth, Margaret; Baker, Caleb (1991).Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama.Le xing ton Books.ISBN0-669-24975-0.
  10. ^Loxton, James (2022)."The Puzzle of Panamanian Exceptionalism".Journal of Democracy.33(1): 85–99.doi:10.1353/jod.2022.0006.
  11. ^abcdJones, Howard (2001).Crucible of Power: A History of US Foreign Relations Since 1897.SR Books. p. 494.ISBN978-0-8420-2918-6.
  12. ^Kempe, Frederick(1990).Divorcing the Dictator.New York: Putnam. pp.26–30, 162.ISBN978-1-85043-259-3.
  13. ^Cockburn, Alexander&St. Clair, Jeffrey(1998).Whiteout: the CIA, Drugs, and the Press.London: Verso.ISBN978-1-85984-139-6.[page needed]
  14. ^The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations.National Security Archive Electronic Briefing,George Washington University.1999. p. 2.
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  17. ^Cole, Ronald H. (1995).Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, February 1988 – January 1990(PDF).Joint History Office, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. p. 6.ISBN978-0-7881-3557-6.
  18. ^"US Plot".The Canberra Times.
  19. ^Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Panama(Report).Organization of American States:Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.November 9, 1989. Archived fromthe originalon October 20, 2020.
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  23. ^abCole, Ronald H. (1995).Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, February 1988 – January 1990.Joint History Office, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. p. 27.
  24. ^"UNITED STATES v. NORIEGA".On December 15, 1989, Noriega publicly declared that a state of war existed between Panama and the United States.
  25. ^Quigley, John."The Legality of the United States Invasion of Panama"(PDF).
  26. ^"Operation Just Cause".870-5a Organizational History Files(Corps Historian's Notes). XVIII Airborne Corps. 1989–1990. Notebook #1. Permanent.Corps Historian's Personal Notes Recorded During the Operation
  27. ^Mann, Don (2019).Navy SEALs: The Combat History of the Deadliest Warriors on the Planet.Skyhorse. p. 108.
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  30. ^Jauregui, Fernando (March 27, 1988)."Óscar Arias arfirmaa que el general Noriega considera la posibilidad de exiliarse en España".El País (Spain).RetrievedDecember 25,2020.
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  32. ^transcript
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  34. ^abcCramer, Jane Kellett (2006). ""Just Cause" or Just Politics?: U.S. Panama Invasion and Standardizing Qualitative Tests for Diversionary War ".Armed Forces & Society.32(2): 178–201.doi:10.1177/0095327x05277899.S2CID145717080.
  35. ^"U.S. Coast Guard Defends Against Terrorism Locally, Globally".archive.defense.gov.Archived fromthe originalon September 30, 2017.RetrievedMarch 22,2018.Coast Guardsmen served in the War of 1812, Mexican-American War, Civil War, Spanish-American War, World Wars I and II, Korean War, Vietnam War, Mayaguez Incident in Cambodia in 1975, Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, Operation Just Cause in Panama,-
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  37. ^"602nd Tactical Air Control Wing"(PDF).RetrievedFebruary 28,2022.
  38. ^"366th Fighter Wing History".United States Air Force. Archived fromthe originalon 15 June 2011.Retrieved9 April2010.
  39. ^Pizzurno, Patricia & Andrés Araúz, Celestino."Estados Unidos invade Panamá Crónica de una invasión anunciada"(in Spanish). Archived fromthe originalon 21 April 2006.[full citation needed]According to this piece, the PDF had 16,000 troops, but only 3,000 of them were trained for combat: "Para entonces las Fuerzas de Defensa poseían 16.000 efectivos, de los cuales apenas 3.000 estaban entrenados para el combate."
  40. ^abCole, Ronald H."Operation Just Cause: Panama"(PDF).Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Archived fromthe original(PDF)on 17 December 2008.Retrieved12 November2008.
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  43. ^"Guard News – the National Guard".
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  50. ^"España ha asumido ante el Departamento de Estado de EE UU la defensa de Juantxu".El Pais.March 27, 1992.RetrievedMay 29,2015.
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  66. ^50 U.S.C. (1541–1548)
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  75. ^"Bucharest and Beijing Condemn the Invasion".International Herald Tribune.International Herald Tribune. Associated Press. December 22, 1989. p. 4.Romania condemned on Thursday the U.S. invasion of Panama as "brutal aggression" as its own security forces reportedly fired on civilians protesting the hard-line Communist government.
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  84. ^Scott, David Clark (December 20, 1991). "El Chorrillo Two Years after the U.S. Invaded Panama, Those Displaced by the War Have New Homes".Christian Science Monitor.
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  87. ^Combined Arms in Battle Since 1939.U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press. 1992. p. 209.

Bibliography

[edit]
  • Eisenmann, Roberto (December 21, 1989). "For a Panamanian, Hope and Tragedy".The New York Times.

Further reading

[edit]
[edit]