Second Taiwan Strait Crisis

Second Taiwan Strait Crisis
Part of theChinese Civil Warand theCold War
Taiwan Strait
Date 23 August – 2 December 1958 (3 months, 1 week and 2 days) Location Taiwan Strait Result Taiwan victory Status quo ante bellum
Belligerents
Republic of China United States	People's Republic of China
Commanders and leaders
Chiang Kai-shek Chiang Ching-kuo Hu Lien Ji Xingwen† Zhao Jiaxiang† Zhang Jie† Dwight D. Eisenhower Nathan Farragut Twining Wallace M. Beakley Benjamin O. Davis Jr. Roland N. Smoot	Mao Zedong Peng Dehuai Ye Fei Xu Xiangqian
Strength
192,000 Naval and air support	215,000
Casualties and losses
514 ROC troops killed and missing, 2,200 injured (including 440 dead and missing and 1,911 injured for the Army alone) Civilians: 80 killed, 221 injured 1Landing Ship Mediumsunk, 1Landing Ship Tankdamaged in the naval battle ofDongding Island	460 PRC troops killed and wounded Several ships sunk and several more damaged in the naval battle ofDongding Island 31 fighter jets shot down

Second Taiwan Strait Crisis
Traditional Chinese	82 tam pháo chiến
Simplified Chinese	82 tam pháo chiến
Transcriptions Standard Mandarin Hanyu Pinyin bā èr sān pào zhàn Bopomofo ㄅㄚ ㄦˋ ㄙㄢ ㄆㄠˋ ㄓㄢˋ Wade–Giles Pa1-erh4-san1P'ao4-chan4

TheSecond Taiwan Strait Crisis,also called the1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis,was a conflict between thePeople's Republic of China(PRC) and theRepublic of China(ROC). In this conflict, the PRC shelled the islands ofKinmen(Quemoy) and theMatsu Islandsalong the east coast ofmainland China(in theTaiwan Strait) in an attempt to take control of Taiwan from theChinese Nationalist Party,also known as the Kuomintang (KMT), and to probe the extent of theUnited States' defense of Taiwan's territory. A naval battle also took place aroundDongding Islandwhen the ROC Navy repelled an attempted amphibious landing by the PRC Navy.

Then U.S. Secretary of StateChristian Herterreportedly described the conflict as the "first serious nuclear crisis".

Overview

Location of Quemoy County (pink) relative to Taiwan (dark grey) and the PRC (light grey)

The conflict was a continuation of theChinese Civil WarandFirst Taiwan Strait Crisis.TheRepublic of China(ROC) had begun to build military installations on the island ofKinmen(Quemoy) and theMatsu archipelago.TheChinese People's Liberation Army(PLA) began firing artillery at both Kinmen and some of the nearby Matsu islands.

On 24 and 25 August 1958 Chinese Communist and Chinese Nationalist forces clashed in the vicinity ofDongding Island,which the Nationalist troops controlled. The action was seen as an attempt by the communists to land on the island. This was the only naval and amphibious landing action during the crisis. The communist forces were repelled from taking the island.The action has also been seen as an attempt to draw Nationalist forces away from other areas.

{…}on the 24th two night naval engagements took place near Quemoy. The clashes resulted from a Chinese Communist attempt at landing on the small island of Tung-Ting in the Quemoy complex. The first attack involved four Chinese Communist gunboats and six small landing craft while the second involved five Chinese Communist gunboats and thirty motorized junks. According to theGRCMinistry of National Defense,several enemy ships were sunk and the attack was driven off by seven Chinese Nationalist Patrol craft. The GRC lost one LSM (landing craft, mechanized) and had one LST (landing ship, tank) damaged. Prior to September 3, when they were advised of U. S. escort plans, the Nationalists made five attempts to land an LST with troop replacements and several ships. These efforts were turned back by Chinese Communist PT boats and artillery fire.

In the days after shelling began, the AmericanJoint Chiefs of Staffhad determined to defend the islands even if the defense necessitated a nuclear response.Throughout the following weeks as the crisis continued to unfold, contingency plans were developed as it became clear that the critical issue was supplying Kinmen. In a meeting on 2 September, Secretary of StateJohn Foster Dullesmet with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other top officials to formulate an ongoing American strategy. The group determined that the use ofnuclear weaponswould ultimately be necessary for the defense of Kinmen, but that the United States should initially limit itself to usingconventional forces.Throughout the crisis, coordination between American policymakers and military commanders was hampered by communication delays of days at a time,but by September American officials had authorized naval escorts to accompany ROC convoys up to 3 miles off Kinmen and begun to supply the ROC with advanced weapons. The Chinese Communists considered the escorts a violation of the territorial waters of the People's Republic of China. On 19 September, Soviet PremierNikita Khrushchevsent a letter warning that the American actions threatened world war, claiming that the Soviet Union would be forced to honor its commitments to the territorial integrity of Communist China. The letter was rejected by the American government.

TheEisenhower Administrationresponded to the request for aid from the ROC according to its obligations in theROC-United States mutual defense treatythat had been ratified in 1954. PresidentDwight D. Eisenhowerordered the reinforcement of theU.S. NavySeventh Fleetin the area, and he ordered American naval vessels to help the Nationalist Chinese government to protect the supply lines to the islands. In addition, the U.S. Air Force deployedF-100D Super Sabres,F-101C Voodoos,F-104A Starfighters,andB-57B Canberrasto Taiwan to demonstrate support for Taiwan. The F-104s were disassembled and airlifted to Taiwan inC-124 Globemaster IItransport aircraft, marking the first time such a method was used to movefighter aircraftover a long distance.

By 11 September, the artillery crisis was overall stabilized (even though numerous rounds of artillery would still be fired by Communist China almost daily for the next two months or so) because U.S. Navy warships started to escort ROC convoys to Kinmen, breaking the previous artillery blockade due to constant PRC artillery shells that prevented any air or naval relief for Kinmen. The PRC did not want to risk war with the United States so they refrained from firing on any convoys if they observed U.S. Navy ships. The biggest issues in the crisis after September 11 were the air battles and the success or failure of the naval convoys relieving the Kinmen garrison.

Landing units withLVTsfrom theROC Marine Corpsspent the next few months delivering supplies to the Kinmen Islands, starting from 10 September. Despite continued artillery fire from the PRC, the Marines were able to keep the islands supplied. For this action, the ROC Marines were later awarded a presidential banner from Chiang Kai-shek.

The U.S. carrierUSSLe xing ton(top) with a supply ship andUSSMarshall(bottom) off Taiwan during the crisis.

F-104Asof the83rd Fighter Interceptor SquadronatTaoyuan Air Basein September 1958.

TheMIM-14 Nike Herculesof the71st Air Defense Artillery Regiment,U.S ArmyatTamsui,Taipei Countyon 20 October 1958.

Also, under a secret effort called "Operation Black Magic", the U.S. Navy modified some of theF-86 Sabrefighters of theNationalist Chinese Air Forcewith its newly developed earlyAIM-9 Sidewinderair-to-air missiles.These missiles gave the Nationalist Chinese pilots a decisive edge over the Chinese Communists'Soviet-madeMiG-15andMiG-17fighters in the skies over the Matsu Islands and the Taiwan Strait. The Nationalist Chinese pilots used the Sidewinder missiles to score numerous kills onPeople's Liberation Army Air Force(PLAAF) MiG aircraft. The operation sufferedblowbackwhen one missile lodged in a MiG-17 without exploding, to be removed after landing and reverse-engineered into the SovietK-13.

The US Army's contribution reinforced the strategicair defensecapability of the Republic of China. A provisionalNike missilebattalion was organized at Fort Bliss, TX, and sent via USMTSUSSGeneral J. C. Breckinridgeto Nationalist China. The 2nd Missile Battalion was augmented with detachments of signal, ordnance and engineers, totaling some 704 personnel. In addition, American ambassadorEverett Drumwrightadvocated for a preemptive strike against PRC positions.

Twelve long-range 203 mm (8.0 in)M115 howitzerartillery pieces and numerous155 mmhowitzerswere transferred from theU.S. Marine Corpsto theArmy of the Nationalist China.These were sent west to Kinmen Island to gain superiority in the artillery duel back and forth over the straits there.

Soon, the Soviet Union dispatched itsforeign minister,Andrei Gromyko,toBeijingto discuss the actions of the PLA and the PLAAF, with advice of caution to the Communist Chinese.

On 24 September 1958 the Sidewinder missile was used for the first time inair-to-air combatas 32 Republic of China F-86s clashed with 100 PLAAF MiGs in a series of aerial engagements. 25 MiGs were shot down by Sidewinders, the first "kills" to be scored by air-to-air missiles in combat. In October more dogfights between ROC and PRC fighter jets occurred and the total airplane casualties during the crisis was 31 PRC MiGs shot down and 2 ROC F-86s shot down.

Soon, the People's Republic of China was faced with a stalemate, as the PLA's artillerymen had run out of artillery shells. The Communist Chinese government announced a unilateral ceasefire on 6 October 1958. However, on 20 October the PLA resumed artillery fire on Kinmen because a U.S. Navy warship had breached the PRC-declared 3 nautical miles exclusive zone from the coast of China that they claimed was a stipulation for their unilateral ceasefire agreement. Another more likely reason for the resumption of the PRC artillery bombardment was U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had arrived inTaipeito discuss the situation with the ROC government. The overall crisis finished by December 1958 when both the PRC and ROC troops settled into their eccentric alternating odd and even days firing period that lasted until 1979 when the United States and the PRC established diplomatic relations. Because both armies knew exactly what day, what time, and which areas would be attacked by artillery shells (military bases and artillery positions) the PRC and ROC troops were safe from harm due to hiding in bunkers thanks to thisgentleman's agreement.

U.S. Marine Corps Marine Air Group 11 stationed atNAS Atsugi,Japan, was sent to Taiwan in March 1960 and landed at Kaohsiung, Taiwan, and moved via trucks to Pingtung Air Base about 40 kilometres (25 mi) north of Kaohsiung. They remained there, conducting air operations from the WWII Japanese air strip until sometime in late April 1960 when they returned to Atsugi, Japan.They were joined at Pingtung by a reinforced rifle company from the Ninth Marines based onOkinawa.

Aftermath

August 23 Artillery Battle Museumin Kinmen

Intermittently shelling until 1979

"On 25 October [the Chinese Communists]… declared that they would not fire on even-numbered days… if there were no American escort." This allowed Taiwan to resupply their military units on those islands on those days.Afterwards, both sides continued to bombard each other with shells containingpropaganda leafletson alternate days of the week. This strange informal arrangement continued until thenormalization of diplomatic relationsbetween the United States and the CommunistPeople's Republic of Chinain 1979. The timed shelling created little damage and casualties; it was mainly aimed at military compounds and artillery pieces. Sometimes during tense diplomatic moments PRC forces would revert to August/September 1958 levels of bombardment, temporarily breaking the normally scheduled non-lethal propaganda artillery shelling. One of these occasions happened in June 1960, when President Eisenhower visited Taipei. During Eisenhower's visit PRC forces fired over 100,000 artillery rounds onto Kinmen within a few days, killing 7 ROC soldiers and wounding 59, while 6 civilians perished and 15 were injured. ROC soldiers withheld their fire until after Eisenhower left Taipei. After his visit they retaliated by firing thousands of artillery rounds of their own onto mainland China from Kinmen. The PRC bombardment damaged 200 homes, five schools and a hospital on Kinmen, showing that during the 20-year period of mostly propaganda leaflets being fired by both sides it was still a very dangerous combat zone until 1979.

The crisis subsided and returned tostatus quo ante bellumon 2 December when the U.S. Navy secretly and quietly removed their extra warships from the Taiwan Strait and the ROC Navy resumed unilateral combat and escort duties.

On 23 August 2019, the sixty-first anniversary of the beginning of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, PresidentTsai Ing-wenvisited the Taiwushanmartyrs' shrine(Quá võ sơn Trung Liệt Từ) where she placed flowers and offered incense.

During the crisis, American leadership risked the alienation of the American public, relations with key allies such as France and Japan, and even nuclear war. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles argued that while thestatus quoresult was a victory, the American government could not permit such a situation to arise again. Other than theThird Taiwan Strait Crisisfrom 1995 to 1996 there has been no crisis involving the United States since 1958 in the Taiwan Strait.

See also

• First Taiwan Strait Crisis
• Third Taiwan Strait Crisis
• Chinese Civil War
• Republic of China Armed Forces
• Kinmen knife
• Dongding Island

References

Sources

• Chen Jian. (2001).Mao's China and the Cold War – Beijing and the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958.The University of North Carolina Press.
• www.generals.dk/general/Qiu_Qing-quan/_/China.html
• Ministry of National Defense, R.O.C.Archived6 July 2008 at theWayback Machine
• US Naval War College
• web.archive.org/web/20090326011824/http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/bjorge_huai.pdf

Further reading

• Bush, R. & O'Hanlon, M. (2007).A War Like No Other: The Truth About China's Challenge to America.Wiley.ISBN0-471-98677-1
• Bush, R. (2006).Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait.Brookings Institution Press.ISBN0-8157-1290-1
• Carpenter, T. (2006).America's Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan.Palgrave Macmillan.ISBN1-4039-6841-1
• Cole, B. (2006).Taiwan's Security: History and Prospects.Routledge.ISBN0-415-36581-3
• Copper, J. (2006).Playing with Fire: The Looming War with China over Taiwan.Praeger Security International General Interest.ISBN0-275-98888-0
• Federation of American Scientists et al. (2006).Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning
• Gill, B. (2007).Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy.Brookings Institution Press.ISBN0-8157-3146-9
• Shirk, S. (2007).China: Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise.Oxford University Press.ISBN0-19-530609-0
• Tsang, S. (2006).If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics.Routledge.ISBN0-415-40785-0
• Tucker, N.B. (2005).Dangerous Strait: the U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis.Columbia University Press.ISBN0-231-13564-5
• Watry, David M.Diplomacy at the Brink: Eisenhower, Churchill, and Eden in the Cold War.Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2014.

External links

• Mao Zedong's handling of the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958
• Khrushchev's Nuclear Promise to Beijing During the 1958 Crisis
• First and Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, Quemoy and Matsu Islands of Taiwanfrom the Cold War Museum
• The Communist Threat in the Taiwan AreaContemporary US government reaction