Silent Sejm

Silent Sejm(Polish:Sejm Niemy;Lithuanian:Nebylusis seimas), also known as theMute Sejm,is the name given to the session of theSejm parliamentof thePolish–Lithuanian Commonwealthof 1 February 1717 held inWarsaw.^[1]A civil war in the Commonwealth was used by the RussianTsar Peter the Greatas an opportunity to intervene as a mediator. It marked the end ofAugustus II of Poland's attempts to create anabsolute monarchyin Poland, and the beginning of theRussian Empire's increasing influence and control over the Commonwealth.

Background

Augustus II the Strongof theSaxon House of Wettinwaselected to the throne of Polandin 1697. The Wettins, used toabsolute rule,attempted to govern through intimidation and the use of force, which led to a series of conflicts between Wettin supporters and opponents (including another pretender to the Polish throne, KingStanisław Leszczyński). Those conflicts often took the form ofconfederations– legal rebellions against the king permitted under theGolden Freedoms.^[2]

Augustus II wanted to strengthen royal power in the Commonwealth^[3]and to that end he brought in troops from Saxony (by the summer of 1714 more than 25,000 Saxon troops were inside Commonwealth's borders).^[4]This produced dissent within the Commonwealth.^[5]^[6]Meanwhile, in the aftermath of theGreat Northern War,which marked the rise of theRussian Empire(1721), the growing conflict between Augustus II and the Polish nobility (szlachta) was used by the powerful RussianTsar Peter the Great,victor of the Great Northern War.^[5]^[7]At the time Russia was not yet strong enough to conquer and absorb the Commonwealth outright, nor could it easily and openly assume control of it, despite the Commonwealth's dysfunctional politics; the "Polish anarchy "was not to be easily governed.^[8]Hence Peter's goal was to weaken both sides, and to prevent Augustus from strengthening his position, which he feared would lead to a resurgent Commonwealth that could threaten Russia's recent gains and growing influence.^[6]^[9]He succeeded in forcing through conditions (such as reduction of the Commonwealth army's size) that decreased the Commonwealth's political status relative to Russia.^[2]^[7]Peter used Augustus' recent policies, aiming at the reduction of power of thehetmans(Polish military commanders in chief), as well as the occurrence of a bad harvest and some Polish-French negotiations, to stir opposition to Augustus.^[5]

Tarnogród Confederation

The nobles, spurred by Russian promises of support, formed theTarnogród Confederationon 26 November 1715.^[5]The Confederation's marshal wasStanisław Ledóchowski.^[10]The Tarnogród Confederation was only the last and most notable of several confederations formed against Augustus at that time.^[11]The Confederates were supported by most of the Commonwealth's own army.^[4]

The Russians entered the country, but did not participate in any major engagements. They bided their time, as Peter posed as the mediator between the Commonwealth's king and its szlachta.^[7]^[9]^[12]Crucially, the Russians did not support the Confederates as promised, and instead insisted on bringing both sides to the negotiating table.^[13]The civil war lasted for a year and the outcome hung in the balance. Saxon forces under the command ofJacob Heinrich von Flemmingenjoyed military superiority, advanced south-eastwards and tookZamość(this victory was however accomplished less through military tactics than through diplomacy and a treachery).^[9]^[11]The confederates then pushed back, enteredWielkopolska,and tookPoznań.^[9]They gained some support from a local Wielkopolska confederation and from Lithuania.^[9]Neither side was however posed to achieve victory, and the Russian pressure mounted; eventually the Russians declared that they would consider any side that refused to enter into negotiations an enemy, and open hostilities against them.^[11]^[14]Unable to defeat the Confederates, many of whom still saw Peter as the protector of their rights (and some of whom hoped for Augustus to be deposed), Augustus agreed to open the negotiations with Russians acting as arbitrators.^[9]^[12]The Russians were represented by a delegation headed by princeGrigori Dolgorukov(1657—1723).^[14]A peace treaty between the Confederates and the Augustus was signed on 3^[6]or 4^[9]November 1716, as relations between the Confederates and the Russians deteriorated. The Russians made it increasingly apparent that their goals were not wholly benign to the Commonwealth.^[9]Finally, a Sejm session was called for 1 February 1717.^[9]

Sejm

To prevent the use ofliberum vetofrom disrupting Sejm proceedings, the session was turned into aconfederated sejm.^[2](It was also apacification sejm). Threatened by a strong Russian army, with Russian soldiers "guarding" the proceedings, the Silent Sejm was known as such because only the speaker (marshal of the Sejm)Stanisław Ledóchowski(podkomorzykrzemienicki), and a few selected other deputies were allowed a voice, outlining the terms of the settlement.^[8]^[12]^[15]Other names for the Sejm in theEnglish languageinclude Dumb or Muted.^{^}The terms themselves were significantly designed by Peter the Great. The Sejm lasted for one day only, or more precisely, six hours.^[2]^[16]

This settlement stipulated that:

Tarnogród Confederation (and older,Sandomierz Confederation) were dissolved;^[17]
the right to form confederations in the future was abolished;^[17]^[18]
Golden Freedoms(Cardinal Laws) are reaffirmed (in particular,liberum vetostill held);^[2]^[7]^[18]
the king was not to imprison people based on his whim (reaffirmation of theneminem captivabimus);^[18]
the king had to avoid offensive wars;^[17]
Poles andSaxony(Augustus' homeland) should not intervene into each other's domestic affairs (the king had to avoid negotiations on Polish affairs with foreign (Saxonian) powers);^[17]
hetmansandsejmiks(local parliaments) had lost some of their prerogatives (notably, sejmiks no longer could change local taxation);^[6]^[19]
Saxony troops stationed in Poland were to be significantly limited in size (banished totally, or reduced to 1,200 of royal guard, which no further foreign recruits allowed)^[2]^[6]^[7]^[17]
Saxon officials were to be removed from Poland^[2](or were limited to six)^[17]and the king was to not give any further offices to foreign officials;^[18]
the rights ofProtestantsin Poland were curtailed (some Protestant churches were to be demolished to punish "Swedish partisans" )^[17]^[18]
establishment of an estimate of the state's income and expenditure (in essence, abudget,one of the first in Europe)^[20]
established taxes for Commonwealth army (consuming over 90% of the state's income);^[2]^[20]
the army was to be billeted on thecrown estates;^[19]
reduction of the army to 24,000^[2](or 18,000,^[20]or 16,000^[21]– sources vary) for Poland and 6,000^[2](or 8,000^[21]) for Lithuania. An army of that size was insufficient to protect the Commonwealth;^[2]^[7]^[10]a normal soldier's wages meant that after factoring officer pensions and other military needs, the effective army was perhaps 12,000 strong,^[10]several times weaker than those of its neighbours – at that time the Russian army numbered 300,000;^[22]

Sources vary whether Russia was recognized as the power that would guarantee the settlement; this claim is made byJacek JędruchandNorman Davies,^[2]^[7]but rejected byJacek Staszewski^[23]and explicitly noted as erroneous in the edited work byZbigniew Wójcik.^[24]

Aftermath and significance

The Silent Sejm marked the end of Augustus II's attempts to create an absolute monarchy in Poland; he subsequently focused his efforts on securing the succession ofhis sonto the Polish throne.^[15]

While some beneficial reforms were passed (such as the establishment of standing taxes for the military), the Sejm is regarded negatively by modern historians.^[2]^[20]^[25]The reduction in the size of the army and the establishment of Russia's position as the settlement's proposed (even if rejected) guarantor reinforced Commonwealth military inferiority compared to its neighbors, and unofficially, put it in the position of a Russianprotectorate.^[2]^[7]^[10]The Russian tsar, as the proposed guarantor, now had a convenient excuse to intervene in Polish politics at will.^[7]^[8]With a reduced army, removal of Saxon troops and the right to form confederations, the nobility and the king had less power to fight one another – or, not coincidentally, to resist outside forces.^[8]Russian troops remained in the Commonwealth for two years, supporting opposition to Augustus, and Russia soon reached an agreement with other powers to put an end to further attempts at the reform and strengthening of the Commonwealth.^[26]Thus the Silent Sejm is regarded as one of the first precedents for the Russian Empire dictating Polish internal policy,^[2]and a precursor to thepartitions of Poland,which erased the Commonwealth from world maps by 1795. HistorianNorman Davieswrote that this Sejm "effectively terminated the independence of Poland and Lithuania".^[25]

The system created by the Silent Sejm dominated the Polish political scene until the late 18th century, when a new wave of reforms led to theConstitution of the 3 May,soon followed bypartitions of Polandand loss of Polish sovereignty for 123 years.^[6]^[27]

Notes

a^{^}Through some sources claim that the entire Sejm was silent, or that only Ledóchowski spoke, in fact several people spoke during the Sejm.^[12]^[16]Józef Szujskinotes that the Sejm begun with a long speech by Ledóchowski, that other marshals of provincial confederations were allowed to speak in order to renounce their positions, that thechancellor Jan Sebastian Szembekwas able to reply to them, and that the deputy and commissarMichał Potockiread the constitution and relevant treaties.^[16]At the same time, the sources agree that most of the deputies were prevented from speaking; Szujski notes that hetmanStanisław Mateusz Rzewuskiwas refused the right to speak.^[16]Archbishop of Gnieznoandprimate of Poland,Stanisław Szembek,"stormed out in a fury", complaining about being not allowed to voice his position in the discussion.^[28]

References

^Historical Dictionary of Poland, 966-1945, by Halina Lerski
^^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^h ⁱ ^j ^k ^l ^m ⁿ ^oJacek Jędruch(1998).Constitutions, elections, and legislatures of Poland, 1493–1977: a guide to their history.EJJ Books. pp. 153–154.ISBN 978-0-7818-0637-4.Retrieved13 August2011.
^J. S. Bromley (1957).The New Cambridge modern history.CUP Archive. p. 709.ISBN 978-0-521-07524-4.Retrieved13 August2011.
^^a ^bMaureen Cassidy-Geiger (2007).Fragile diplomacy: Meissen porcelain for European courts ca. 1710-63.Yale University Press. p. 29.ISBN 978-0-300-12681-5.Retrieved13 August2011.
^^a ^b ^c ^dJ. S. Bromley (1957).The New Cambridge modern history.CUP Archive. p. 711.ISBN 978-0-521-07524-4.Retrieved13 August2011.
^^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^fJerzy Jan Lerski (1996).Historical dictionary of Poland, 966-1945.Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 595.ISBN 978-0-313-26007-0.Retrieved13 August2011.
^^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^h ⁱNorman Davies (20 January 1998).Europe: a history.HarperCollins. p.659.ISBN 978-0-06-097468-8.Retrieved13 August2011.
^^a ^b ^c ^dNorman Davies (30 March 2005).God's Playground: The origins to 1795.Columbia University Press. p.377.ISBN 978-0-231-12817-9.Retrieved13 August2011.
^^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^h ⁱJ. S. Bromley (1957).The New Cambridge modern history.CUP Archive. p. 712.ISBN 978-0-521-07524-4.Retrieved13 August2011.
^^a ^b ^c ^dJerzy Lukowski; W. H. Zawadzki (17 July 2006).A concise history of Poland.Cambridge University Press. p. 109.ISBN 978-0-521-61857-1.Retrieved13 August2011.
^^a ^b ^cSamuel Orgelbrand (1884).Encyklopedyja powszechna S. Orgelbranda: nowe stereotypowe odbicie.Nakł., druk i własność S. Orgelbranda Synów. p. 316.Retrieved13 August2011.
^^a ^b ^c ^dJacek Jędruch(1998).Constitutions, elections, and legislatures of Poland, 1493–1977: a guide to their history.EJJ Books. p. 155.ISBN 978-0-7818-0637-4.Retrieved13 August2011.
^David J. Sturdy (2002).Fractured Europe, 1600-1721.Wiley-Blackwell. p. 385.ISBN 978-0-631-20513-5.Retrieved13 August2011.
^^a ^bWładysław Smoleński (1897).Dzieje narodu polskiego.Nakładem Autora. p. 252.Retrieved13 August2011.
^^a ^bPiotr Stefan Wandycz (2001).The price of freedom: a history of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the present.Psychology Press. pp. 103–104.ISBN 978-0-415-25491-5.Retrieved13 August2011.
^^a ^b ^c ^dJózef Szujski (1866).Dzieje Polski podług ostatnich badań: Królowie wolno obrani, cz. 2 r. 1668 do 1795.K. Wild. p. 257.Retrieved13 August2011.
^^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^gSamuel Orgelbrand (1867).Encyklopedyja powszechna.Orgelbrand. p. 978.Retrieved13 August2011.
^^a ^b ^c ^d ^eJózef Bezmaski (1876).Notatki do dziejów i historyja ostatnich 98 lat Rzeczypospolitéj Polskiéj.Nakł. autora. pp.233–234.Retrieved13 August2011.
^^a ^bJerzy Lukowski (3 August 2010).Disorderly Liberty: The Political Culture of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Eighteenth Century.Continuum International Publishing Group. p. 36.ISBN 978-1-4411-4812-4.Retrieved13 August2011.
^^a ^b ^c ^dRichard Bonney (1999).The rise of the fiscal state in Europe, c. 1200-1815.Oxford University Press US. p. 475.ISBN 978-0-19-820402-2.Retrieved13 August2011.
^^a ^bKarin Friedrich (2 November 2006).The Other Prussia: Royal Prussia, Poland and Liberty, 1569-1772.Cambridge University Press. p. 172.ISBN 978-0-521-02775-5.Retrieved13 August2011.
^Gordon McLachlan (22 May 2008).Lithuania: the Bradt travel guide.Bradt Travel Guides. p. 19.ISBN 978-1-84162-228-6.Retrieved13 August2011.
^Jacek Staszewski (1998).August II Mocny.Zakład Narodowy Im. Ossolińskich. p. 199.ISBN 978-83-04-04387-9.Retrieved24 October2012.
^Zbigniew Wójcik, ed. (1982).Historia dyplomacji polskiej, t. II 1572-1795.Warszawa. p. 369.{{cite book}}:CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
^^a ^bNorman Davies (May 2005).God's Playground: 1795 to the present.Columbia University Press. p.460.ISBN 978-0-231-12819-3.Retrieved13 August2011.
^J. S. Bromley (1957).The New Cambridge modern history.CUP Archive. p. 714.ISBN 978-0-521-07524-4.Retrieved13 August2011.
^Jacek Jędruch(1998).Constitutions, elections, and legislatures of Poland, 1493–1977: a guide to their history.EJJ Books. p. 151.ISBN 978-0-7818-0637-4.Retrieved13 August2011.
^Jerzy Lukowski (3 August 2010).Disorderly Liberty: The Political Culture of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Eighteenth Century.Continuum International Publishing Group. p. 25.ISBN 978-1-4411-4812-4.Retrieved13 August2011.