Taiwanese nationalism

This article is about the nationalist movement which asserts that the Taiwanese people are a nation distinct from the Chinese people. For Chinese nationalism in Taiwan, seeChinese nationalism § In Taiwan.

Flagof theTaiwan independence movement

Taiwanese nationalism(Chinese:Đài Loan chủ nghĩa dân tộc or Đài Loan chủ nghĩa dân tộc;pinyin:Táiwān mínzú zhǔyì;Pe̍h-ōe-jī:Tâi-oân Bîn-cho̍k Chú-gī) is anationalistmovement which asserts that theTaiwanese peopleare a distinctnation.Due to the complexpolitical status of Taiwan,it is strongly linked to theTaiwan independence movementin seeking an identity separate fromChina.This involves the education of history, geography, andculturefrom a Taiwan-centric perspective, promoting native languages of Taiwan such asTaiwanese Hokkien,Hakka,andindigenous languages,as well as reforms in other aspects. Taiwanese nationalism was described as 'anti-imperialist' in that it opposedJapanese imperialism(orJapanese nationalism) before1945,opposedChinese imperialism(orChinese nationalism) in modern times, and supported its own Taiwanese identity, which was distinct from China.

History and development

Tangwaipoliticians in Taipei in 1951.

No one can confirm when the concept of localism has started. Some say when the first large wave of Han people emigrated from mainland China to Taiwan in the mid-16th century, they must have wanted to maintain some independence from the control of the ruling class in their original hometown. Others say that only when theKingdom of Tungning,with its capital at Tainan, was built by the Zheng family in 1662, did this concept appear.

Most Chinese contemporary scholars of mainland China believe the roots of the localist movement began during theJapanese rule(1895 to 1945), when groups organized to lobby theImperial Japanesegovernment for greater Taiwanese autonomy and home rule. After theKuomintang(KMT) took over Taiwan, the Taiwan home-rule groups were decimated in the wake of theFebruary 28 Incidentof 1947. The KMT viewed Taiwan primarily as a base to retake mainland China and quickly tried to subdue potential political opposition on the island. The KMT did little to promote a unique Taiwanese identity; often newly immigrated Chinese or "mainlanders"as they were called, working in administrative positions, lived in neighborhoods where they were segregated from the Taiwanese. Others, especially poorer refugees, were shunned by theHoklo Taiwaneseand lived among aborigines instead. The mainlanders often learnedHokkien.However, since Mandarin was enforced as the official language of the Republic of China and Taiwanese was not allowed to be spoken in schools, the mainlanders who learned Taiwanese found their new language skills to diminish. As Taiwanese, or any language other than Mandarin, was forbidden in the military posts, many mainlanders whose family lived inmartial villagesonly spoke Mandarin and perhaps their home language (e.g.Cantonese,Shanghainese,etc.). The promotion ofChinese nationalismwithin Taiwan and the fact that the ruling group on Taiwan were considered outsiders by some were the reasons cited for both theTaiwan independencemovement and localism.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the KMT began a period of education reform, including a lift on Hokkien restrictions in schools and the restoration of previously suppressed private schooling. However, these private schools were staffed by regime loyalists and reliant upon government funding for support, meaning that they often provided the same program of political and cultural indoctrination as public schools. Furthermore, while speaking Hokkien in schools or military bases was no longer illegal, few opportunities were available for its use, as Mandarin continued to be the state-approvedlingua franca.

In the 1970s and 1980s there was a shift in power away from the KMT to people native to Taiwan. This, combined with cultural liberalization and the increasing remoteness of the possibility of retaking mainland China, led to a cultural and political movement which emphasized a Taiwan-centered view of history and culture rather than one which was China-centered or even, as before 1946, Japan-centered. Localism was strongly supported by PresidentLee Teng-hui.

TheBentuhuamovement was sparked in the mid-1970s with the growing expression of ethnic discontent due to unequal distribution of political and cultural power between mainlanders and Taiwanese people. Beginning in the 1960s, Taiwan was enveloped by the problems of rapid industrial development, rural abandonment, labor disputes and the uneven distribution of access to wealth and social power. These changes, combined with the loss of several key allies, forced the KMT regime to institute limited reforms. The reforms permitted under Chiang Ching-kuo allowed indigenization to increase as leading dissidents generated a response to the government's failures. Rubenstein (2007) credits Chiang for beginning Taiwanization as Premier. The dissident groups, united under theTangwai,or “outside the party” banner, called for the government to accept the reality that it was only the government of Taiwan and not China. The key demands of the Tangwai involved instituting democracy and seeking international recognition as a sovereign state. Taiwanese demanded full civil rights as guaranteed under the ROC constitution and equal political rights as those experienced by the Mainlander elite.

The Taiwanese cultural elite fully promoted the development ofXiang tuliterature and cultural activities, including rediscovering Taiwanese nativist literature written under Japanese colonial rule. Thetangwai movementrevived symbols of Taiwanese resistance to Japanese rule in the effort to mobilize ethnic Taiwanese. The opposition to the KMT's China-centered cultural policies resulted in dissidents crafting new national-historical narratives that placed the island of Taiwan itself at the center of the island's history. The Taiwanese emerged as a frequently colonized and often oppressed people. The concept ofbentuhuawas finally expressed in the cultural domain in the premise of Taiwan as a place with a unique society, culture and history. This principle has been largely adopted for understanding Taiwan's cultural representation and expressed in a variety of cultural activities, includingmusic, film and the literary and performing arts.

The pressures of indigenization and the growing acceptance of a unique Taiwanese cultural identity have met opposition from more conservative elements of Taiwan society. Critics argue that the new perspective creates a “false” identity rooted in ethnic nationalism as opposed to an “authentic” Chinese identity, which is primordial and inherent. Many mainlanders living on Taiwan complain that their own culture is marginalized bybentuhua,and initially expressed fear of facing growing alienation. In the past decade these complaints have subsided somewhat as Taiwan increasingly views itself as a pluralistic society that embraces many cultures and recognizes the rights of all citizens.

In the mid-to-late 1990s, gestures toward localism were increasingly adopted by pan-blue figures who, while supporting the Chinese nationalism ofChiang Kai-shek,saw it as appropriate, or at least advisable, to display more appreciation for cultures of Taiwan. Pan-blue politicians such asJames Soong,the former head of the Government Information Office who once oversaw the limitation of Taiwanese dialects, began speaking in Hoklo on semi-formal occasions.

Taiwanization

Efforts have been made by theRepublic of China(Taiwan) government beginning in 2000 to distance itself fromChinaand rollback earlier sinicisation efforts by taking actions such as removing Chinese influence from items within Taiwan control. While the nationalists may view such efforts as emphasising the importance of Taiwan's culture, this section addresses the perspective of those who likely support theChinese unificationof all ofGreater Chinaunder a single political entity.

Origin

Wild Lily Movementin Taipei.

At the end ofWorld War II,ChineseKuomintangforcestook overTaiwan and soon began an effort tosinicisethe population. Taiwanese urban elites were wiped out in theFebruary 28 Incident.Mandarin Chinesebecame the only language allowed in media and school to the exclusion of otherlanguages of Taiwan,as well as Japanese. Public institutions and corporations were given names that included the words "China" or "Chinese". School history and geography lessons focused on China with little attention paid to Taiwan. Street names in Taipei were changed from their original names to Chinese names that reflected the geography of China and Kuomintang ideals.

With the end of martial law in 1987 and the introduction of democracy in the 1990s after theWild Lily student movement,an effort began to re-assert Taiwanese identity and culture while trying to get rid of many Chinese influences imposed by theKuomintang.

Education and language campaign

In 2000, then-ROC presidentLee Teng-huibegan making statements such as "Taiwan culture is not a branch of Chinese culture" and "Taiwan's Minnan dialect is not a branch ofFu gian'sMin-nan,dialect but rather a 'Taiwan dialect'Taiwan radio and TV increased theirTaiwanese Hokkienprogramming.These efforts were perceived in China as initial efforts towards breaking the ties between Taiwan culture and Chinese culture by downplaying the long-term Chinese cultural and historic identification in that region.

In April 2003, theNational Languages Committee,which was part of Taiwan'sMinistry of Education,released a legislation proposal entitled "Language Equality Law."The proposed legislation sought to designate fourteen languages as the national languages of Taiwan.In mainland China, this was seen as an effort to diminish the use ofstandard Mandarinand its cultural influences in favor of revising the cultural and psychological foundations on the island of Taiwan by using other languages.The draft was not adopted.

The textbook issue was raised in November 2004, when a group of lawmakers, legislative candidates and supporters of the pro-independenceTaiwan Solidarity Union(TSU) urged the Ministry of Education to publish Taiwan-centric history and geography textbooks for school children as part of the localist campaign.Although the resulting draft outline of history course for regular senior middle schools was criticized by a variety of groups,PresidentChen Shui-bianresponded that "to seek the truth of Taiwan's history" is not equal todesinicizationnor an act of independence and indicated that he would not interfere with the history editing and compilation efforts.

The proposals to revise Taiwan's history textbooks were condemned in February 2007 by thePeople's Republic of China'sTaiwan Affairs Office of the State Councilas being part of the desinicization campaign.In July 2007, the Taiwan Ministry of Education released a study that found 5,000 textbook terms, some relating to Chinese culture, as being "unsuitable".TheKuomintangsaw this as part of a textbook censorship desinicization campaign.The proposals have not been adopted.

Name change campaign

Republic of China (Taiwan) passport.

Taiwan Post Co.post office inTaichung.

Between 2002 and 2007, the ROC government under Chen Shui-bian took steps to revise the terms "China", "Republic of China", "Taipei", and others that impart an association with the Chinese culture.

In 2002, the "Name Rectification Campaign" made significant advances in replacing the terms "China", "Republic of China", or "Taipei" with the term "Taiwan" on official documents, in the names of Taiwan-registered organizations, companies, and public enterprises on the island, and in the names of businesses stationed abroad.In 2003, the ROC Foreign Ministry issued a newpassportwith the word "Taiwan" printed in English on its cover.Moreover, in January 2005, Taiwan adopted a Westernized writing format for government documents, denied that it was an attempt at desinicization, and promoted the actions as "a concerted effort at globalizing Taiwan's ossified bureaucracies and upgrading the nation's competitive edge."

Campaigning in this area continued in March 2006, where theDemocratic Progressive Partysought to change the Republic of China year designation used in Taiwan to theGregorian calendar.Instead of the year 2006 being referred to as the "95th year of the ROC" —with the 1912 founding of the Republic of China being referred to as "the first year of the ROC" —the year 2006 would be identified as 2006 in official usage such as on banknotes, IDs, national health insurance cards, driver's licenses, diplomas and wedding certificates.This was viewed as the government trying another angle for desinicization by removing any trace of China from Taiwan.

In February 2007, the term "China" was replaced by the term "Taiwan" on Taiwan postage stamps to coincide with the 60th anniversary of theFebruary 28 Incidentthat began on 28 February 1947 that was violently suppressed by the Kuomintang (KMT).In that same month, the name of the officialpostal serviceof Taiwan was changed from theChunghwa Post Co.to The Taiwan Post Co.The company's name was changed back on 1 August 2008, and the names on the postal stamps were reversed in late 2008, soon after theKuomintang(KMT) candidateMa Ying-Jeouwon back presidency and ended 8 years of theDemocratic Progressive Party(DPP) rule.

In March 2007, the name plate of theROC Embassy in Panamawas revised both to include the word "Taiwan" in parentheses between the words "the Republic of China" and "Embassy" in both of its Chinese and Spanish titles, and to omit the ROC national emblem.

Supportersof the name-change movement argue that the Republic of China no longer exists, as it did not include Taiwan when it was founded in 1912 and mainland China is now controlled by the Chinese Communist Party as the People's Republic of China. Furthermore, the ambiguity surrounding thelegal status of Taiwanas a result of theTreaty of Peace with JapanandTreaty of San Franciscoafter World War II, means that the Republic of China was merely a military occupier of Taiwan. As Japan relinquished its sovereignty over Taiwan without passing it to a specific country, it is argued that Taiwan ought to be deemed a land belonging to no country, whose international status has yet to be defined.

Constitutional and political campaign

From the perspective of theROC constitution,which the mainstream political parties such as theKMTandDPPcurrently respect and recognize, changing the ROC's governing status or completely clarifying Taiwan's political status would at best require amending the ROC constitution. Passing an amendment requires approval from three-quarters of a quorum of members of the Legislative Yuan. This quorum requires at least three-quarters of all members of the Legislature. After passing the legislature, the amendments need ratification from at least fifty percent of all eligible voters of the ROC, irrespective of voter turnout.

In October 2003, PresidentChen Shui-bianannounced that Taiwan would seek a new constitution suitable for the Taiwan people that would turn Taiwan into a "normal country."In explaining what a normal country was in the context of desinicization and the 1992One-China policy,Chen Shui-bian stated,

Taiwan is an independent sovereign country, but a lot of people do not think of Taiwan as a country and do not dare to call Taiwan an independent sovereign nation, which is quite abnormal.... Taiwan must not fall into the trap of being regarded as part of China, or become a special region of China like Hong Kong.

In response, thePan-Blue Coalitionwithin Taiwan sought to portray President Chen Shui-bian and hisDemocratic Progressive Partyas radicals intent on implementing revolutionary desinicization that would disenfranchise various ethnic groups within Taiwan who have an affinity for China and the Chinese culture.

In February 2007, theDemocratic Progressive Party(DPP) adopted a resolution to identify those responsible for the 1947February 28 Incidentmassacre of Taiwanese people in order to charge them withwar crimesandcrimes against humanity.The effort also sought to remove the "remnants of dictatorship" traced to that sixty-year-old incident.This was seen in mainland China as being in line with a series of desinicization actions by both the Taiwan government and the DPP to rid both Chiang and China from the Taiwan public scene.Some applauded this as a courageous act of seeking justice. Others criticized the request, seeing it as "rubbing salt into wounds" by playing up the historical issues for political gain.

Other campaign

In March 2007, it was noted that the destruction of theWestern Linerailway base found below the floor of theTaipei Main Stationand built in 1893 byQing Empire-appointed Governor ofTaiwan ProvinceLiu Mingchuanwas part of the government's call for desinicization through removal of the Chinese site.

In July 2007, President Chen Shui-bian announced that he would allow mainland Chinese diplomas or students into Taiwan during the rest of his presidential term.This, however, was not achieved.

Impact

Further information:Opinion polling on Taiwanese identity

One phenomenon that has resulted from the localist movement is the advent ofTaikesubculture, in which young people consciously adopt the wardrobe, language and cuisine to emphasize the uniqueness of popular, grassroots Taiwanese culture, which in previous times had often been seen as provincial and backwards by the mainstream.

In April 2002, theChinese Communist Party(CCP) noted both active efforts on the part of Taiwan to push ahead its localist policy and intensify United States-Taiwan military cooperation. In response, the CCP publicly reminded its military to be prepared to achieve its goal of "Chinese reunification" (intended to mean making Taiwan a part of the People's Republic of China) through military means. In addition, the CCP sought assistance from the United States to address the matter with Taiwan. As part of making the upcoming U.S. visit by then vice-presidentHu Jintaogo smoothly, the United States cautioned theChen Shui-bianadministration not to "go too far" incross-Strait relations.

In April 2005, theCCP general secretaryHu Jintao and the former ROC Vice President and then chairman of the Kuomintang party (KMT)Lien Chanshook hands. Billed as a historic moment, this was the first handshake by the top leaders of the KMT and the CCP in 60 years.In remarking on the handshake, chairman Lien noted that it was a turning point where the KMT and the CCP would work together to bring about peacefulcross-strait relationsand specifically distanced the KMT from Taiwan independence and desinicization efforts.

Support and opposition

KMT Chairman Lien ChanvisitedMainland China in 2005 to oppose theTaiwan independencemovement.

Significant outcries surfaced both within Taiwan and abroad opposing the concept of Taiwan localization in the early years after PresidentChiang Ching-kuo's death, denouncing it as the "independent Taiwan movement" (Chinese:Đài độc vận động). Vocal opponents are primarily the 1949-generation Mainlanders, or older generations of Mainlanders living in Taiwan that had spent their formative years and adulthood on the pre-1949 mainland Republic of China, and native Taiwanese who identify with a pan-Han Chinese cultural identity. They included people ranging from academics likeChien Mu,reputed to be the last prominent Chinese intellectual opposing theconventional wisdomtake on theMay Fourth Movement,politicians likeLien Chan,from a family with a long history of active pan-Chinese patriotism despite being native Taiwanese, to gang mobsters likeChang An-lo,a leader of the notoriousUnited Bamboo Gang.

The opposing voices were subsequently confined to the fringe in the mid-2000s Taiwan itself. Issues persist, particularly supporters of thePan-Blue coalition,which advocates retaining a strong link to mainland China, dispute over such issues as what histories to teach. Nonetheless, both of the two major political forces in Taiwan reached a consensus, and the movement has overwhelming support among the population. This is in part due to the 1949-generation Mainlanders have gradually passed on from the scene, and politicians supporting and opposing the Taiwanese independence movement both realize a majority of Taiwan's current residents, either because they are born in Taiwan to Mainlander parents with no collective memories of their ancestral homes, or they are native Taiwanese, thus feeling no historical connotations with the entire pre-1949 Republic of China on mainland China, support the movement as such.

In mainland China, thePRCgovernment has on the surface adopted a neutral policy on localism and its highest-level leaders publicly proclaim it does not consider the localist movement to be either a violation of itsOne China Policyor equivalent to the independence movement. Nonetheless, the state-owned media and academics employed by organizations such as universities' Institutes of Taiwan Studies or theChinese Academy of Social Sciences(CASS) periodically release study results, academic journal articles, or editorials strongly criticizing the movement as "the cultural arm of Taiwanese independence movement" (Chinese:Văn hóa đài độc) with the government's tacit approval, showing the PRC government's opposition towards localism.

Nowadays, another source of significant opposition to the localist movement remains in theoverseas Chinesecommunities in Southeast Asia and the Western world, who identify more with the historic pre-1949 mainland Republic of China or pre-localist movement ROC on Taiwan that oriented itself as the rump legitimate government of China. A great many are themselves refugees and dissidents who fled mainland China, either directly or through Hong Kong or Taiwan, during the founding of the People's Republic of China and the subsequent periods of destructive policies (such as theLand Reform,theAnti-Rightist Movement,Great Leap Forward,or theCultural Revolution),Hong Konganti-Communist immigrants who fled Hong Kong in light of the Handover to the PRC in 1997, or Mainlanders living in Taiwan who moved to the West in response to the localist movement. Conversely, the current population of Taiwan regard these overseas Chinese as foreigners akin toSingaporeanChinese, as opposed to the pre-localist era when they were labeled as fellow Chinese compatriots. The PRC has capitalized on this window of opportunity in making overtures to the traditionally anti-Communist overseas Chinese communities, including gestures in supporting traditional Chinese culture and dropping explicitly Communist tones in overseas communications. This results in a decline of active political opposition to the PRC from overseas Chinese when compared with the times before the localist movement in Taiwan.

In Hong Kong, Taiwanese localist movements have pushed localization or pro-Chinese Communist tilts among the traditionally pro-Republic of China individuals and organizations. A prominent example is Chu Hai College, whose academic degree programs were recognized officially by the Hong Kong SAR government in May 2004, and registered as an "Approved Post-secondary College" with the Hong Kong SAR government since July of the same year. It has since been renamed the Chu Hai College of Higher Education ( châu hải học viện ) and no longer registered with the Republic of China's Ministry of Education. New students from 2004 have been awarded degrees in the right of Hong Kong rather than Taiwan.

Role in domestic politics

Main article:Tangwai movement

Even though it is a broad consensus currently regarding the overall ideology of localism, there are still deep disputes over practical policies between the three main political groups ofTaiwan independence,Chinese unification, and supporters ofChinese culture.Pro-independence supporters argue that Taiwan is and should be enhancing an identity which is separate from the Chinese one, and in more extreme cases advocates the removal of Chinese "imprints". Meanwhile, some would argue that Taiwan should create a distinctive identity that either includes certain Chinese aspect or exists within a broader Chinese one. Those who support Chinese unification call for a policy of enhancing the Chinese identity. Groups that support Chinese unification andChinese nationalismhave emphasized the distinction between localism and what some perceive asdesinicizationand argued that they do not oppose the promotion of a Taiwanese identity, but rather oppose the use of that identity to separate itself from a broader Chinese one. On the other hand, a few apolitical groups have claimed that most of the political factions merely use these points to win support for elections.

See also

• Similar cases such as
  • Austrian nationalism
  • Belarusian nationalism
  • Hong Kong nationalism
  • Macedonian nationalism
  • Montenegrin nationalism
  • Ukrainian nationalism
• Taiwanese people
• History of Taiwan
  • February 28 incident
  • Qiandao Lake incident
  • Third Taiwan Strait Crisis
• Huadu (Taiwan)
• Liberal ethnic nationalism
• Pan-Green Coalition
  • Tangwai movement
  • Formosa Alliance
• Taiwan independence movement
• Taiwanese literature movement
• Sinocentrism
  • Sinicization
  • De-Sinicization
• Warriors of the Rainbow: Seediq Bale

References

2. Tzeng, Shih-jung, 2009. From Honto Jin to Bensheng Ren- the Origin and Development of the Taiwanese National Consciousness, University Press of America.ISBN0-7618-4471-6

External links

• Lam quân đề trình bày và phân tích tam trục cái thảo luận sửa đảng danh,Liberty Times